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Abstract 
State Reconstruction in International Law: Conjuring with Political 
Independence 
This is a study about large-scale international involvement in the reconstruction of a 
state without an independently effective domestic government. Specifically how the 
practice in Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Kosoyo, East 
Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq, relates to the right of the target state and its people to 
political independence. The international involvement, particularly its legal 
justification, is analysed from the perspective of the right to political independence 
and the core UN system values of self-determination of peoples and international 
peace. From this analysis, an opinion is formed on what explains intenlational 
acceptance of a practice that struggles to remain consistent with the legal structures 
and political values of the inter-sovereign relations paradigm of the international 
system. This is argued to rest on the pursuit of democratic reconstruction. The 
absence of a legal concept of democracy, in the practice analysed, is the basis for the 
thesis that: when there is not an independently effective domestic government, there is 
a need for greater international legal regulation and accountability of those - both the 
domestic and international actors - that exercise the right to political independence for 
the purpose of state reconstruction. This is to compensate for the lack of assurance 
that the process reflects the wishes of the state and its people, which is a threat to the 
core UN system values of self-determination of peoples and international peace. 
Matthew \Villiam Saul 
School of Law 
Uniyersity of Sheffield 
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Introduction 
The right of a state and its people to political independence - understood as the 
sovereign right of the state to decide on 'the choice of a political, economic, social 
and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy', 1 and the right of the 
people as part of the legal doctrine of self-determination to 'freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development'2 -
is of fundamental importance for international order.3 This study analyses how large-
scale international involvement in the reconstruction of a state, absent an 
independently effective domestic government, relates to the right of the target state 
and its people to political independence. The study draws attention to the 
significance of such practice for the core United Nations (UN) system values of self-
determination of peoples and international peace. It also suggests how consistency 
with these values could be improved by the utilisation of the potential that exists in 
international law for the pursuit of democracy, which links the practice examined, to 
be regulated. This introduction explains the rationale of the study, situates the study 
within the existing literature, identifies the primary research questions, indicates 
debates in international law for which the findings have implications, clarifies key 
concepts, explains the structure and approach of the study, and sets out the main 
thesis of the study. 
In recent times, large-scale international involvement in state reconstruction has 
been a prominent feature of international relations. There are three paradigms 
through which international involvement has been possible - occupation, 
administration, and assistance. Subjects of international law - states and international 
organisations - have been integral to the reconstruction process as belligerent 
occupiers in Iraq; international administrators in Cambodia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor; and as assistants to otherwise ineffective 
governments in Sierra Leone, Haiti, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Iraq. These examples 
represent a range of contexts and approaches. Across these examples there is. 
I GA Res. 2625 (1970) Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States adopted in October 1970 by the UN General Assembly (GA). 
2 Common Article 1 (I), 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (ICESR). 
:9 B. R. Roth. 'The Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty', (2004) 56 Florida Law R~'if!w 1017. 
though, the common theme of significant changes in the state and civil infrastructure~ 
such as the redesign of the economic syste~ made possible by international 
involvement, without anything like an independently effective domestic government 
to make the reconstruction decisions. 
A government's ability to independently exert effective control over its territory. 
with effective control understood as the ability to preserve public order, is the 
traditional basis for identifying the agent that embodies the will of a state and its 
people with respect to their rights and obligations in international law.4 Effective 
control provides an objective basis for international actors to identify the 
government. Moreover, effective control suggests some meaningful attachment to 
the state and its people, and entails the potential for obligations to be fulfilled.5 
Accordingly, when choices about change and development of state and civil 
infrastructure are not made by an independently effective domestic government, and 
are only possible because of international involvement, it is not readily apparent that 
the process is consistent with the right to political independence. Yet, the 
preservation of political independence is the cornerstone of an international legal 
system based on the inter-sovereign relations paradigm. Non-interference in the 
internal affairs of a state is essential in a pluralist international society if the core 
political values of the UN system of self-determination of peoples and international 
peace are to be realised. Does the international acceptance of the practice of state 
reconstruction mean that political independence is no longer of such importance for 
international order? 
The answer to this question appears to be no. Consider, for example, the 
international hesitancy surrounding the delivery of humanitarian aid to the people of 
Burma without the blessing of the Burmese government.6 Instead, the international 
acceptance of practice within these paradigms of state reconstruction suggests that 
somehow those involved have managed to project consistency with the right to 
political independence or at least the attendant values of self-determination and 
international peace. This may have been through new law that regulates involvement 
in the interests of the preservation of political independence. Or the approach to 
.. See B. R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999) 137-42; D. Wippman. 
'Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?', (1995) 62 University of Chicago Law Review 607 at 
612 and references therein at note 26. 
, See Roth, loc. cit .. fil. 4; Wippman, loc. cit .. fn.4. 
6 See, e.g., S. Mydans, 'UN Relief Supplies Arrive in Myanmar', International Herald Tribune. 8 
May 2008 available at <http://www.iht.comJarticlesl2008/05/08/asial09cyclone.2.php>. 
2 
reconstruction may have been understood as accommodating the values at stake by 
other means, perhaps supplementation of existing law with policy aims that suit 
these values. In this respect, it needs to be stressed that the risk to international peace 
is a consequence of risk to self-determination. Thereby addressing self -detennination 
also remedies the concern for international peace caused by neglect of political 
independence, but the same is not true the other way round. 
That the practice has not generally been perceived as a cause for concern in 
relation to the right to political independence is evidenced by the focus of the 
literature addressing state reconstruction. The majority of the literature on state 
reconstruction is about policy and focused on best practice recommendations in the 
interests of improving the success rates of particular aspects of international 
engagement. 7 Policy critiques, which seek to explain why a general approach has 
been adopted by reference to a normative framework, are less prominent. 8 
Legal literature in relation to state reconstruction is massively diverse but tends to 
focus on specific aspects of a particular paradigm. There is a flourishing literature on 
the legal issues that arise in relation to international territorial administration (ITA). 
Particular themes include the legal status of the territory,9 accountability of the 
international actors - by way of applicability of international human rights and 
humanitarian law to the relevant international organisations,1O jurisdiction of the 
domestic COurtS,11 the utility of ombudsperson institutions12 - powers of the Security 
Council (SC),13 models for the reconstruction of the legal system,14 post-conflict 
7 See, e.g., S. Chesterman, You the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and 
State-Building (2004); R. Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories - Rule and 
Reconstruction (2005). 
8 See, e.g., R. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (2004) D. Chandler, Empire in 
Denial: The Politics of State-building (2006); D. Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and 
Politics of International Statebuilding (2007). 
9 See, e.g., B. Knoll, 'UN Imperium: Horizontal and Vertical Transfer of Effective Control and the 
Concept of Residual Sovereignty in "Internationalised" Territories', (2002) 7 Austrian Review of 
International and European Law 3; C. Stahn and A. Zimmermann, 'Yugoslav Territory, United 
Nations Trusteeship or Sovereign State ? - Reflections on the current and future legal status of 
Kosovo', (2001) 4 Nordic Journal of International Law 423. 
10 See, e.g., T. H. Irmscher, 'The Legal Framework for the Activities of the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo: The Charter, Human Rights, and the Law of Occupation', (200 1 ) 
44 GYIL 353 at 377 - 387; J. Cerone, 'Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-
Conflict Kosovo' (2001) 12 EJIL 469. 
11 See, e.g., R. Wilde, 'International Territorial Administration and Human Rights'. in N. D. White 
and D. Klassen (eds.), The UN, Human Rights and Post Conflict Situations (2005) 149; O. Korhonen. 
'International Governance in Post-Conflict Situations'. (2001) 14 UIL 495. 
12 See, e.g., C. P. M. Waters, 'Nationalising Kosovo's Ombudsperson', (2007) 12 JCSL 139. 
13 See, e.g., M. Matheson, 'United Nations Governance of po~tconflict Societies', .95 AJIL (2001 ~ 7~ 
at 85; M. Ruffert. 'The Administration of Kosovo and East TlDlor by the International Communaty , 
3 
justice,15 and property disputes. 16 The coalition forces' occupation of Iraq has led to 
a resurgence in the literature on belligerent occupation. This literature has queried 
the compatibility of the practice with the law of occupation,17 pondered the powers 
of the SC and the extent to which it modified the law of occupation, and considered 
the relevance of the law of occupation as a framework for transfonnative 
reconstruction. I8 In relation to the assistance model, one can find analysis of issues 
surrounding the deployment and mandate of the international military presences, 19 
consideration of the regulatory framework for private military companies,20 
suggestions as to the priority that should be given to criminal codes in legal 
reconstruction,21 or treatments of the approach taken to post-conflict justice.22 The 
implicit message from the body of literature is that a valid legal justification for the 
international involvement, in the fonn of state consent and a SC chapter VII 
resolution, separately or combined, is sufficient to remove concern about the right to 
political independence?3 However, given that traditional international legal doctrine 
requires an independently effective domestic government for embodiment of the 
rights and obligations of the state and its people in international law, there is good 
reason to be cautious about accepting these legal justifications as the end of the 
matter with regards the right to political independence. 
In the light of the significance of the preservation of the right to political 
independence for the UN system, and that traditional international legal doctrine 
(2001) 50 ICLQ 555; A. Orakhelashvili, 'The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and 
Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions', (2005) 16 EJIL 59. 
14 See, e.g., H. Stromeyer, 'Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations 
Missions in Kosovo and in East Timor', (2001) 95 AJIL 46. 
IS See, e.g., C. Stahn, 'Justice under Transitional Administration: Contours and Critique of a 
Paradigm', in H. Fischer and N. Quenivet (eds.), Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Nation- and/or State-
Building (2005) 149. 
16 See, e.g., L. Von Carlowitz, 'Settling Property Issues in Complex Peace Operations: The CRPC in 
Bosnia and the HPD/CC in Kosovo', (2004) 17 LJIL 599. 
17 See, e.g., K. Kaikobad, 'Problems of Belligerent Occupation: The Scope of Powers ~xercised b~ 
the Coalition Provisional Authority', (2005) 54 ICLQ 253; G. H. Fox, 'The OccupatIon of Iraq 
(2005) 36 Georgetown Journal of International Law 195. 
18 See, e.g., A. Roberts, 'Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and 
Human Rights' (2006) 100 AJIL 580; D. Scheffer, 'Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict: Beyond 
Occupation Law' (2003) 97 AJIL 842;. " 
19 See, e,g., A. Adebajo and D. Keen, 'Sierra Leone' m M. Berdal and S. Economldes (eds.), Umted 
Nations Interventionism 1991 - 2004 (2007) 246. 
20 See, e.g., S. Chesterman and C. Lehnardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and 
Regulation of Private Military Companies (2007). . ' .. 
21 See, e.g., R. Sannerholm, 'Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms m Post-Conflict SOCieties: 
Beyond the Rule of Law Template', (2007) 12 JCSL 65. .,. . 
22 See e.g., R. Cryer, Post-Conflict Accountability: a matter of Judgeme~t, ,:"ctl~e or PrinCiple? m N. 
D. White and D. Klassen (eds.), The UN. Human Rights and Post Conflict SituatIOns (2005) 267. 
23 See, though, G. H. Fox, Humanitarian Occupation (2008) 177-217. 
4 
requires an independent effective domestic government for embodiment of the rights 
and obligations of the state and its people, the primary research questions of this 
study can be listed. How does the practice in each of the three paradigms noted relate 
to the right to political independence of the target state and its people? To the extent 
that the legal justifications do not sufficiently address the right to political 
independence, what explains international acceptance of the approach? And, does 
this involve international legal development? 
By answering these questions, the study not only has relevance for international 
order and the target states and peoples, but also contributes to a number of strands of 
debate in international law. In particular, the role of international law in the 
reconstruction of states, the continued relevance of state sovereignty in international 
law, and the position of democracy in international law. For the purpose of 
positioning this study in the literature, it is useful to be explicit about how the study 
relates to these debates. 
International law develops in an ad hoc manner pursuant to the needs and desires 
of its subjects. The existing body of international law has been driven, in general 
tenns, by the pursuit of co-existence, co-operation, and, some now argue, 
integration.24 In the interests of justice, certain international lawyers have started to 
call for the development of a jus post bellum to regulate, in particular, the 
reconstruction of a state after conflict. 25 These calls and associated ideas are 
tentative, but assume that international law can and should be relevant for the 
reconstruction process. This study is relevant for the jus post bellum project as it 
identifies the extent to which new law is 'needed' to ensure the core UN system 
values of self-determination of peoples and international peace. Moreover. if both, or 
either, state consent and a chapter VII resolution are found to be sufficient in relation 
to reconciling the process with the right to political independence, this would 
significantly counsel against international actors 'needing' to create any new law. 
This is because if consistent with the right to political independence, the implication 
is that there is not a cause for international concern. or, more specifically, it is an 
24 See Z. Capaldo, 'ANew Dimension of International Law: The Global Law', (2005) 5 The Global 
Community Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence xxiii. . . . 
1.5 See, e.g., C. Stahn, 'Jus ad bellum', Jus in bello' ... Jus post bellum'? -RethmklOg the Con.ceptlon 
of the Law of Anned Force', (2006) 17 EJIL 943; B. Orend, 'Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective ofa 
Just-War Theorist', (2007) 20 LlIL 571; K. Boon, 'Legislative Refonn in Post-conflict Zones: Jus 
Post Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant's Law-Making Powers', (2005) 50 McGill LJ 285. 
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internal matter shielded from outside interference in the interest of the preservation 
of political independence. 
The right to political independence is one of the core attributes of a sovereign state 
in international legal doctrine. A common sign that is pointed to by commentators in 
relation to the demise of the sovereign state is the ascendancy of international 
involvement in the reconstruction of states.26 Others point to the practice of state 
reconstruction as evidence that a liberal international community is evolving. which 
does not consider itself bound by established international law when it conflicts with 
the particular values of that community.27 However, those international actors 
involved in state reconstruction where there is no independently effective domestic 
government, persist in emphasising that the practice is consistent with the sovereign 
rights of the target state?8 Accordingly, an investigation into how the right to 
political independence has in fact been treated in the reconstruction process can help 
to clarify the extent to which state reconstruction is a challenge to the orthodox view 
of sovereignty that prioritises the right to political independence. 
Since the early 1990s, there has been much debate about the position of 
democracy in international law. Some, like Wheatley, have concentrated on the 
emerging consensus on democracy as human right, focusing in particular on the 
meaning of Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).29 Others, like Franck and Fox, by linking the idea of democracy as a 
human right to the legal doctrine of self-determination and the associated idea of 
popular sovereignty, have identified implications in the emerging consensus on 
democracy as a human right for matters of general international law, most 
noticeably, governmental status.30 In contrast, Marks sees the value of democracy for 
international law, but is sceptical about whether it is wise to try and enshrine what 
remains a loose political concept in the form of legal rules. Instead, Marks proposes 
26 See, e.g., S. Tierney, 'The Nonnative Challenge in Forging an Intemati~nal Community:. in C. 
Warbrick and S. Tierney (eds.), Towards an International Legal Commumty? The Sovereignty of 
States and the Sovereignty of International Law (2006) I at 4. 
27 See R. Buchan 'International Community and the Occupation of Iraq'. (2007) 12 JCSL 37: N. 
Tsagourias, 'Inte~ational Community, Recognition of States. ~d Political Clo~ing·. in C. Warbrick 
and S. Tierney (eds.), Towards an International Legal Commumty? The Sovereignty of States and the 
Sovereignty of International Law (2006) 211.. . . 
28 See, e.g., SC Res. 1436 (2002) on international mvolvement m Sierra Leone. 
29 S. Wheatley, Democracy. Minorities and International Law (2005) 135-150. 
30 See, e.g .• T. Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance' (1992) 86 AJIL 46; G. H. 
Fox. 'The Right to Political Participation in International Law' (1992) 17 Yale Journal of 
International Law 539. 
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the development of a principle of 'democratic inclusion', which indicates 'that all 
should have the right to a say in decision-making which affects them, and that 
systematic barriers to the exercise of that right should be acknowledged and 
removed' .31 In the normal run of things, the need for governments to be effective in 
the interests of the efficacy of international law is just one factor that counsels 
against any development which conditions governmental status on criteria other than 
effectiveness. In light of this, state reconstruction where there is no effective 
domestic government is a context in which one might reasonably expect the 
emerging consensus on democracy as a human right to be utilised. Indeed. one might 
expect it to be treated as relevant beyond human rights law, perhaps as a set of legal 
limits and obligations on the competence of a government that is not an independent 
effective domestic government. The long-standing connection of democracy with the 
idea of self-determination, particularly prominent in the doctrine of former US 
President Wilson,32 is further reason to expect the emerging legal concept of 
democracy to be adopted. This is on the basis that should it appear that political 
independence has been neglected, a legal approach could help better accommodate 
the value of self-determination and encourage international acceptance of the wider 
process of state reconstruction, than if democracy were treated only as a loose 
political concept. Due to this reasoning, and because the prominent examples of state 
reconstruction span some twenty years, if a legal concept of democracy has not been 
utilised, this can be seen as telling in relation to the chances of democracy actually 
crystallising as an international legal concept. 
Before addressing the structure that this study takes to answer the questions set. it 
is useful to clarify some of the key concepts in the study and provide some comment 
on the method adopted. 
Terms such as capacity building, state building, nation building, peace building. 
peace implementation, and state reconstruction indicate concepts without a fixed 
meaning. Moreover, there is the potential for almost complete overlap in respect of 
the intended meaning. As it is a key theme that runs throughout this study it is 
particularly important to clarify from the outset the intended meaning of state 
reconstruction and its relationship with the other related terms. 
31 S. Marks, The Riddle 0/ all Constitutions (2002) 119. . . . 
32 M. Pomerance 'The United States and Self-Detennination: Perspectives on the Wllsoman 
Conception', (1976) 70 AJIL 1 at 20; cf. R. A. Miller. 'Self-Detennination in International Law and 
the Demise of Democracy', 41 Columbia Journal o/Transnational Law (2003) 601. 
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Peace building is a term used to indicate a broad range of activity in relation to the 
process of transfonning conflict into peace. This can include change and 
development of state and civil infrastructure.33 But can also be used to indicate many 
.. 
other forms of international assistance both leading up to and in sustaining peace. for 
example, humanitarian assistance.34 Peace implementation has a similar embrace to 
peace building except that it focuses attention more on activity subsequent to a 
tentative condition of peace.35 Neither of the terms sufficiently focuses attention on 
what this study is most interested in. 
Capacity building is essentially about enhancing the capacity of institutions within 
a state to function effectively. Accordingly, it encompasses a broad spectrum of 
international involvement. At one end of the spectrum it can indicate financial aid to 
a poor but largely effective state, at the other end it can refer to the restructuring of 
the military in a state without an effective government. As it can accommodate an 
array of activities, it is a popular term in policy or strategy documents that want to 
encourage greater international support for weak states as a general matter. 36 
Because it indicates the activity that makes change and development of state and 
civil infrastructure possible, explains why it is not the term adopted by this study. 
State building indicates sustained efforts at capacity building accompanied by 
significant change and development of state and civil infrastructure. It is the term 
adopted by those seeking to convey that it is the international involvement as a 
continuum that is of interest, not just the fact that there are changes to the state and 
civil infrastructure.37 Nation building is at times used in place of state building, but 
33 See, e.g., B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
Keeping, UN Doc. Al47/277 (1992), p.32, para. 55; B. Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for 
Peace, UN Doc. Al50/60 (1995), para. 49. 
34 See, e.g., Management Development and Governance Division o~the UND~. Governance. in. Post· 
Conflict Countries, (January 2000) p.13; M. W. Doyle, N. Sambams, In.ter?a!,onal Peacebulldmg: A 
Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis (2002); E. M. Cousens, 'Introductton , m E. M. Cousens and C. 
Kumar (eds.), Peacebuilding as Politics (2001). . '
35 See, e.g., S. L. Woodward, Economic Pri~rities for l!eace. ImplementatIOn (2002.); one ml&!'t also 
limit peace building to activity once a tentative peace IS achieved, see. e.g .. R. Pans. At War sEnd 
Building Peace after Civil Conflict (2004) 38. 
36 See, e.g., UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
Shared Responsibility, UN Doc. Al59/565 (2004) p. 25: 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN. Doc. 
Al60IL.l (2005). 
37 See, e.g., Chesterman, op. cit., fn. 7; Chandler, op. cit., fn. 8; laum. op. cit .. fn. 8. 
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it is better used in reference to the societal aim of fostering a common national 
identity. 38 
State reconstruction is the tenn preferred by this study because it focuses attention 
on the actual act of change and development of state and civil infrastructure. This is 
important because it is this aspect of international involvement that most strikingly 
affects the right to political independence, on the basis that it involves the actual 
exercise of the competencies reserved for an independently effective domestic 
government. It is not possible to provide an exact answer to the minimum level of 
change and development that would touch upon the right of political independence. 
Rather, this study takes the approach that significant alteration in relation to the 
reserved areas, noted above, would have an impact and so is worthy of interest. 
Examples would be the restructuring of the economic system, devolution of 
governmental power, a change in the state religion, or a change of constitution.39 
Moreover, rather than suggesting that the international actors are faced with a blank 
canvas, the tenn state reconstruction acknowledges that there is some state and civil 
infrastructure already in existence. It will, though, become apparent that international 
efforts at capacity building are an essential accompaniment to state reconstruction. 
Indeed, this is to the extent that in some instances, particularly in relation to the 
assistance model of state reconstruction, it is hard to distinguish between the impact 
that capacity building has on political independence and the actual change and 
development of state and civil infrastructure which it facilitates. 
Tenns such as failed or collapsed state are useful hortatory devices, and 
consequently have been used frequently in recent times to indicate those states that 
are completely lacking effective governance.40 A number of reasons explain why. 
despite the situations dealt with here potentially falling within the ambit of the failed 
or collapsed state classification, this study does not adopt the terminology. 
The terms indicate political concepts for which there is no fixed meaning.41 In the 
literature one can identify a spectrum from, at one end, absolutely no residue of 
38 See N. Quenivet, 'Lessons Learned and Applied? Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Nation- or State-
Building in Iraq', in H. Fischer and N. Quenivet (eds.), Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Nation-and'or 
State-Building (2005) 9. .. . 
39 See, for a general overview of institutional reconstruction, the contnbutlons by J .. Chopra, M. 
Ottaway, and M. Duffield in the special issue on State Failure. Collapse, and Reconstruction of (2002) 
33 Development and Change. 
40 See. e.g., the 2002 US National Security Strategy. Section I. 
41 In relation to this point see B. Dunlap, 'State Failure and the Use of Force In The Age of Global 
Terror', (2004) 27 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 453 at 458; T. D. 
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government, as was classically the case with Somali~ to a state that is plagued by 
weak institutions but retains control of at least the vast majority of its territory. a 
category which a large number of states could come under:$2 Use of the tenns 
therefore invites confusion as to the subject matter, which even a concise definition 
for the purposes of a particular study might not be able to guard against, especially as 
even a concise defmition still needs to be applied. Such concern is obviously more 
pertinent for lawyers, interested in identifying legal consequences from a particular 
factual situation, than political scientists, interested in explanation of the occurrence 
of the factual situation.43 Thus the use of the tenns is most prominently found in 
political literature. 44 
Another reason for lawyers to avoid the terminology is that the prefix of failed or 
collapsed can readily be taken to imply that the state is not just empirically distinct 
from other states, through the lack of an effective government, but also legally 
distinct.45 The major point, in this respect, is the risk of encouragement of a belief 
that such states do not benefit from the prohibition on intervention in the internal 
affairs of the state,46 which is far from the case. Furthennore, a decision to adopt the 
terms is not to be taken without good reason because of the potential for reading its 
use as attributing blame to the state in question and its people.47 The main reason 
Grant, 'Partition of Failed States: Impediments and Impulses' (2004) 11 Indiana Journal 0/ Global 
Studies 51 at 51. 
42 Some works address the whole spectrum, see, e.g., S. Chesterman, M. Ignatieff, and R. Thakur 
(eds.), Making States Work - State Failure and the Crisis o/Governance (2005) 16. 
43 Lawyers using similar definitions to one another, but applying them with varying levels of 
stringency leading some to have longer lists than others of examples of failed or collapsed states, 
include: R. Koskenmaeki, 'Legal Implications Resulting from State Failure in Light of the Case of 
Somali', (2004) 73 Nordic Journal 0/ International Law 1; D. Thuer, 'The Failed State and 
International Law', (1999) 836 International Review o/the Red Cross 731; G. Kreijen, State Failure. 
Sovereignty and Effectiveness (2004) 96; R. Geiss, 'Failed States - Legal Aspects and Security 
Implications', (2005) 47 GYIL 457; N. L. Wallace-Bruce, 'Of Collapsed, Dysfunctional and 
Disoriented States: Challenges to International Law', (2000) 47 Netherlands International Law 
Review 57. 
44 See, e.g., J. G. Gros, 'Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying 
Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti' (1996) 17 Third World Quarterly 455; G. B. Helman and S. R. 
Ratner, 'Saving Failed States', (1992-93) Foreign Policy 3; I. W. Zartman (ed.), Collapsed States: 
The Disintegration and Restoration 0/ Legitimate Authority (1995); A. Yannis, . State Collapse and its 
Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction' (2002) 33 Development and ~hange 817. 
45 See, e.g., J. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General. US Department of JUStlC~, Office ~f Legal 
Counsel, Memorandum re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Tahban Detamees (9 
January 2002) 2, reprinted in K. J. Greenberg and J. L. Oratel (eds.), Torture Papers: The Road to 
Abu Gharib (2005) 38. 
46 See D. D. Caron, 'If Afghanistan has Failed then Afghanistan is Dead: 'Failed States' and the 
Inappropriate Substitution of Legal Conclusion for Political Description', in K. J. Greenberg (cd.), 
The Torture Debate in America (2005) 214. 
47 R. Wilde, 'Representing International Territorial Administratio~: A Criti~~e ?f Some ~pproachcs: 
(2004) IS EJIL 71; R. Wilde, 'The Skewed Responsibility Narrative of the Faded States Concep~ 
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why this study does not adopt the terminology is that it conveys a complete lack of 
effectiveness in the territory. While this may have been the case at some point in 
some of the examples addressed, this study is interested in the process of 
reconstruction, which in order to have any real impact requires that there must be at 
least a degree of control of the territory. To reiterate, the important point about the 
examples addressed by this study is that rather than there not being any effectiveness 
at all, which failed or collapsed state would suggest, is that the process of 
reconstruction is not administered by an independently effective domestic 
government. 
How to encapsulate the present condition of international affairs is another point 
that requires clarification. An extensive body of political and, increasingly, legal 
literature has concerned itself with how to describe the relationships between 
states.48 It seems a number of scholars use international society and international 
community interchangeably as a reference to the international political space.49 The 
extensive study of these concepts by scholars means that they carry distinct 
implications. International society identifies states as possessed of a smattering of 
shared values but values that are neutral in terms of internal constitution.so 
International community indicates a much greater unity of values likely to rest upon 
a shared ideology for internal constitution. 51 On these readings of the concepts, to 
suggest that the international political space is a universal international community 
would not be accurate, there is, though, clearly greater unity amongst certain 
groupings of states, such as those in Europe that have formed the European Union. 
States in Europe have thus been able to create their own extensive European legal 
regime. EU states, and the EU itself with separate international legal personality. 52 
are still, however, part of international society and must abide by the international 
law that has been created by international society in pursuit of its shared values. 53 
(2003 9ILSA JICL 425; see also B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social 
Movements and Third World Resistance (2003) 142. 
48 See, for 'an overview, B. Simma and A. L. Paulus, 'The 'International Community': Facing the 
Challenge of Globalization', (1998) 9 E./IL 266. . . 
49 N. Tsagowias, 'The Will of the International Community as a Normative Source of International 
Law', in I. Dekker and W. Werner (eds.), Governance and International Legal Theory (2004) 97 at 
101 
so Tsagourias, op. cit., fh. 49, pp. 101-102 
SI Tsagowias, op. cit., fh. 49, pp. 102-103. .... . 
S2 See J. Klabbers, 'Presumptive Personality: The European Umon m InternatIonal Law . an M. 
Koskenniemi, (ed.), International Legal Aspects of the EU(1998) 243. , 
~J See N. D. White, 'The Ties that Bind: the EU, the UN and International Law', (2006) 37 NUL 57. 
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The practice of state reconstruction has not been restricted to one particular region 
where one might be more inclined to identify the relationship between states as an 
international community. Rather, it has involved states from all parts of the globe. 
with a host of different world views, at least acquiescing to a practice that does not 
appear to sit well with the right to political independence. Accordingly. while this 
study refers to international society, it is well aware that international institutions and 
international actors often use the term international community as a call to arms for 
members of international society;54 and that international society has more common 
problems than ever before which require a common response, meaning such calls to 
arms are increasingly prominent. What, though, are the values of international 
society and how does this relate to law? 
I have already stressed how new law might have been developed to address the 
values of self-determination of peoples and international peace put at risk by a 
potential neglect of political independence in the practice of state reconstruction. 
These I identified as core values of the UN system.55 The UN system, a political 
system with a legal order,56 is a creation of international society intended to address 
common problems. The values enshrined in its constitutive document, the UN 
Charter, can be seen as the impetus for the law which provides the structural 
backbone of the inter-sovereign relations paradigm of the international system. This 
is in the form of those fundamental principles of international law set out in the 
Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970.57 I use the UN system, more specifically the 
54 See, e.g., 'Secretary General Examines 'Meaning of International Community", Address to 
DPIINGO Conference, Press Release SG/SMl7133, PIll 176, 15 Sept. 1999; United States Diplomatic 
and Consular Staff in Tehran, ICJ Reports 1980, p. 3, at p. 43. 
55 See UN Charter, Article 1(2); N. D. White, The United Nations System: Toward International 
Justice (2002) 47-72. 
56 A political system has been identified as existing 'wherever and whenever a group of actors are 
caught up in nexus of relationships, both conflictual and co-operative, generated by common 
problems and need to deal with them', R. W. Gregg and M. Barkun (eds), The United Nations System 
and its Functions (1968) at 5-6; that it has a legal order is confinned by the presence of 'structures 
and processes for creating and applying law by and within the United Nations system of 
organisations.' O. Schachter, 'United Nations Legal Order: An Overview', in O. Schachter and C. C. 
Joyner (eds.), United Nations Legal Order (1996) at 1. 
57 A number of commentators refer to fundamental principles of international law, or similar concepts, 
often with nuances in the understanding of the concept, see, e.g., A. Cassese, International Law 
(2005) 46; K. Zemanek, 'Basic Principles of UN Charter Law', in R. J. ~acdonald and ~. M. 
Johnston (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism (2005) 402; R. A. Kolodkm, 'Fragmentation of 
International Law? A View from Russia', in R. J. Macdonald and D. M. Johnston (eds.), Towards 
World Constitutionalism (2005) 223: B. Fassbender, 'The Meaning of International Constitutional 
Law', in R. J. Macdonald and D. M. Johnston (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism (2005) 837 at 
843; R. Mullerson, Ordering Anarchy: International Law in Inte~national Society (2000) I 55-164; ~. 
Tomuschat, "International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankmd on the Eve of a New Century , 
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UN Charter, as my reference for the values that have bound the international society 
of states together in recent times. I operate on the premise that the values of self-
determination and international peace still apply. And that therefore international 
acceptance of the examples of state reconstruction addressed hinges on satisfaction 
of these values. Of course, should there be international acceptance despite a failure 
to address these values, this would suggest that these values are no longer of such 
importance to international society. But, on the other hand, if they remain important~ 
this might, if existing law is inadequate to address the values, have been the impetus 
for the creation of new law more appropriate for the circumstances of state 
reconstruction. 
Moreover, while I am interested in the political values that underpin the 
development of law, this does not mean I subscribe to the policy-orientated approach 
to international law, which councils that 'trends of past [judicial] decisions are to be 
interpreted with policy objectives in mind. ,58 Rather. I see the political values that 
underpin the existence of the law as a basis for evaluating the present legal position 
in relation to a given practice, and thinking about how the law might be developed in 
line with the established sources of international law to better address these values. 59 
My approach to the creation of international law can be described as modem 
positivism.6o 
Modem positivism understands the law as a set of principles and rules that 
emanate from a set of accepted sources, distinct from politics or morality.61 For 
international law it is those sources listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).62 Positivists identify law by its prescriptive 
Receuil des Cours (1999) 23 at 28; G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law (1976) 33-
36; I use the concept of fundamental principle to indicate the systemic significance of a legal 
principle. I see a legal principle as consisting of obli~at~ons, albeit in more abstract ter:ms than a legal 
rule and also consisting of a basic or general pnnclple, the meta-legal value which reflects the 
ess;nce of the legal principle and which serves as a directive for construing, applying, and developing 
new law, and in this sense providing a degree of cohesion in international law. 
58 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and !f?W We ~s~ It (~994) 6; cf. J. G. 
Merrills, 'Images and Models in the World Court: The IndiVidual Opmlons m the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases', (1978) 41 Modern Law Review 638. 
59 For a similar approach, see White, op. cit., fn. 55, p. 47. .. 
60 B. Sirnma and A. Paulus, 'The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses m Internal 
Conflicts: a Positivist View', (1999) 93 AJIL 302 at 303 and 306-307. 
61 C. Warbrick, 'English International Legal Theory', in C.Warbrick, and T.Carty (eds.), Theory and 
International Law: An Introduction ( 1991) 49 at 61. 
61 ICJ Statute, Article 38 (I) lists: a. international conventions, whether general or particular. 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. intemat~onal cus~o~, as evi~ence 
of a general practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by clvlhzed nations; 
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This, for modern positivism at lea54 does not necessarily mean that there 
wi 
will be only one correct answer to a legal problem. Rather, modem positivism 
accepts that there is a need for identificatio~ interpretation, and application of the 
law and thus there can be different answers in different contexts.64 This flexibility 
enables the law to keep pace with developments in society,6s such as the trend for 
international involvement in the reconstruction of states without independently 
effective domestic governments. This is because rules, which might at first instance 
appear in complete opposition to a particular practice, can overtime become 
modified by, for example, interpretation. 
To answer the primary research questions noted above, the study is structured into 
three parts. Part 1 (Chapters 1 - 3) identifies the nature and significance of the 
problem that the practice of state reconstruction represents from an international 
legal perspective and develops a conceptual framework for analysis of practice in 
subsequent parts. Part 2 (Chapters 4 - 5) addresses state reconstruction by foreign 
governance. Part 3 (Chapters 6 - 7) focuses on what this study conceptualises as the 
assistance model of state reconstruction. The study is completed with some pages of 
conclusions. 
To illustrate the importance of states having a government with effective control 
of the territory, and the significance of the right to political independence for the UN 
system, Chapter 1 addresses why it is that sovereign states continue to exist without 
anything like an effective government for a prolonged period of time. This identifies 
the paradox of state reconstruction in international law: international law requires 
effective governments for its efficacy but in order for international actors to restore 
effectiveness requires neglect of the right to political independence. Paradoxically. 
the importance of the preservation of the right to political independence for the UN 
system explains why an ineffective state remains a sovereign state protected by the 
principle of non-intervention. 
Chapter 2 deals with the relevance of established international law as a means of 
reconciling international involvement in state reconstruction without an 
independently effective domestic government with the right to political 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teach.ing~ of the most highly 
~ualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determmatlOn of rules of law. 
Simma and Paulus, op. cit., fn. 60, p. 307. 
M See Warbrick,/oc. cit .. fn. 61. 
6' See Simma and Paulus, op. cit .. fn. 60, p. 3 I 6. 
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independence. Both a chapter VII resolution and state consent are potential sources 
of legality for the international involvement. However, neither appears capable of 
reconciling such involvement with the right to political independence. The 
applicability of international human rights law offers some reassurance that 
minimum standards of human welfare will be realised, but this does not address the 
neglect of political independence that even international involvement based on the 
consent of an ineffective government and a chapter VII resolution would represent. 
Due to the obvious occurrence of state reconstruction without an independently 
effective domestic government and the international acceptance of such practice. 
Chapter 3 turns to how the existing international legal justifications might have been 
built upon to project accommodation of the values of self-determination and 
international peace which are put at stake by a neglect of political independence. The 
chapter shows how the pursuit of democracy as a central aim of reconstruction 
would serve to accommodate both values at stake, and thus would be expected to be 
an essential part of the explanation for international acceptance of the practice of 
state reconstruction without an independently effective domestic government. It also 
sketches out how there is conceptual potential in international law for a legal concept 
of democracy as a human right linked to the right to self-determination to provide the 
basis for regulation and accountability of those that arrive in power by democratic 
means. This would provide better assurances in relation to the value of self-
determination, than the promise of the pursuit of democracy as a loose political 
concept that could easily be set aside. Subsequent parts of the study analyse the 
practice of reconstruction without an independently effective domestic government 
in light of the concepts and theories that Part 1 deals with. 
Chapter 4 analyses the law of occupation as a framework for state reconstruction 
by foreign governance in relation to the right to political independence of the target 
state and its people. While the principle of conservation of the law of occupation 
reduces the impact on the right to political independence, its application in the other 
paradigms for state reconstruction would be at the expense of the level of 
reconstruction that has been commonplace. This is borne out by an examination of 
practice of reconstruction under the law of occupation that has been in breach of its 
provisions. A number of factors, including the pursuit of democratic reconstruction. 
help explain international acceptance of practice of reconstruction in breach of the 
law of occupation. 
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Chapter 5 deals with the phenomenon of reconstruction by ITA. in which 
governance is conducted directly by international actors whose position is legally 
justified on state consent alone or additionally a chapter VII resolution. Analysis 
focuses on how the different examples relate to the right to political independence. 
Although the consensual aspects and domestic involvement in the governance 
structures project consistency with the right to political independence, these are not 
sufficient to reconcile the activity with the right to political independence. Again. a 
number of factors, including the pursuit of democratic reconstruction, help explain 
the international acceptance of a practice which does not sit well with the right to 
political independence. 
The first chapter of Part 3, Chapter 6, is interested in how the assistance model 
relates to the right to political independence. With reconstruction administered by a 
domestic government this model ostensibly appears unremarkable in respect of the 
right to political independence. When one considers that the government is only in a 
position to administer the process through the long-term involvement and support of 
international actors, it becomes clear that this practice also sits uneasily with the 
right to political independence. As in the other paradigms, democracy again appears 
as a key factor in the international acceptance of the process. 
In light of time and space, Chapter 7 chooses to focus attention on the role of 
democracy in the reconstruction of Sierra Leone as an indicator of democracy's 
likely role in the other examples of the assistance model as well as in future efforts; 
at the time of writing, there are signs that the assistance model will be pursued in 
Somalia. Both the government of Sierra Leone and the international actors are seen 
to acknowledge how important democracy is for international acceptance of the 
process. Still, there is no evidence to suggest that democracy is treated as a legal 
concept, and certainly not one linked to the right to self-determination that could 
provide a basis for meaningful regulation and accountability of the democratic 
excuse in the interests of the value of self-determination. 
The 'democratic excuse' is a key finding of the study. It is a reference to 
democracy as essential for securing international acceptance of a practice that is 
inconsistent with the right to political independence. Essentially. this is because it 
promises genuine rule by the people and thereby portrays accommodation of the 
values of self-detennination and international peace that the neglect of political 
independence puts at risk. The failure to adopt a legal concept of democracy. that 
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could serve as a basis for regulation and accountability and thereby offer some 
guarantee in relation to the promise of genuine rule by the people. is argued to 
undermine the extent to which these values are in fact accommodated. This. 
consequently, brings into question how sustainable the present approach to state 
reconstruction is in relation to international order. 
The thesis pursued, in broad tenns, is that, when there is not an independently 
effective domestic government, there is a need for greater international legal 
regulation and accountability of those - both the domestic and international actors -
that exercise the right to political independence for the purpose of state 
reconstruction. This is to compensate for the lack of assurance that the process 
reflects the wishes of the state and its people, an aspect that threatens the core UN 
system values of self-detennination and international peace. 
By indicating the failings of the current approach in relation to the right to 
political independence and how it could be improved in relation to the attendant 
values of self-detennination and international peace, this study should make 
international actors realise there is a 'need' for new law to ensure that the practice of 
state reconstruction remains consistent with the legal structures and political values 
which underpin the inter-sovereign relations paradigm of the international system. 
17 
Part One 
CO~CEPTS A:\D THEORIES OF STATE R£CO~STRCCTIO~ I~ 
INTER:\'ATIO:\'AL LA \V 
I X 
Chapter 1 
The Paradox of State Reconstruction 
1. Introduction 
Traditional international legal doctrine makes the creation of a state in international 
law dependent on the existence of an effective and independent domestic 
government. 1 Yet a number of the examples focused on in this study represent 
sovereign states without such a government. The legal framework which permits 
such an occurrence is intrinsic to the significant dilemma faced by international 
actors interested in becoming involved in the reconstruction of an ineffective state. 
To reveal the nature and source of this dilemma, this chapter asks, why is effective 
control the central criterion for statehood in international law? And, what is 
international law's role in the existence of sovereign states without anything like 
effective government? These questions are answered through a survey of the 
historical evolution of the state and its associated rights and duties in international 
law. 
It is argued that effective governments are essential in a decentralised legal system 
if the regime for law enforcement, state responsibility, is to have any meaning. 
Without an effective government, calls for compliance with the law, or sanctions to 
coerce compliance, because there is no government with the means to respond, 
cannot even hope to result in fulfilment of legal obligations. This is argued to explain 
why international actors are interested in the restoration of effectiveness in 
ineffective states through reconstruction. On the other hand, though, it is argued that 
the right to political independence is of crucial importance for the core UN system 
values of self-determination of people and international peace, because respect for it 
ensures that ideologically diverse political communities have their own territorial 
space in which they are free to self-govern. Indeed, the importance of the right to 
political independence for the international society of states is contended to be at the 
core of the explanation for the phenomenon of ineffective states. It is therefore 
argued that large-scale international involvement to reconstruct the state would 
I See. e.g .• D. J. Hanis. Cases and Material on International Law (2004) 100-101. 
19 
contradict the reason why the state remains a state, as well as the core UN system 
values which underpin its continued existence: the paradox of state reconstruction. 
This paradoxical situation is contended to have arisen because international law 
develops on an ad hoc 'needs' basis rather than in line with some predefined blue 
print for international order. And how it has been addressed in contemporary 
examples of state reconstruction without an independently effective domestic 
government is contended to be of importance in achieving international order. 
The chapter begins by charting how effective control of territory came to be the 
core criterion for statehood in international law. This historical backdrop helps to 
explain why effective control is so significant for the efficacy of international law. 
The doctrine of statehood in international law is then addressed to indicate the legal 
mechanisms that make it possible for ineffective states to continue as states despite 
lacking the core criterion for the creation of a state. Moving on, attention is turned to 
the rights and duties that are attached to statehood in international law by way of 
state sovereignty. How these rights and duties have developed over time, in line with 
the changing priorities of international society, is crucial for explaining how 
international law has encouraged the existence of ineffective states. The next section 
addresses the evolution and current standing of the right of all peoples to self-
determination in international legal doctrine. This helps to explain the role of self-
determination in relation to ineffective states, particularly why such states continue 
to exist for a prolonged period of time as sovereign states. Subsequent sections set 
out the paradox that these developments have created for international actors 
interested in state reconstruction, and assess the adequacy of scholarly theories of 
state reconstruction in terms of resolving the paradox of state reconstruction. A final 
section draws together the key points from the chapter and indicates their 
significance in relation to the study as a whole. 
2. The History of Effective Control in International Law 
An appreciation of why it so essential for international law that its basic units. states. 
have effective control of their territory and population is readily gleaned from 
considering the historical roots of the modem state based international system. 
Evidence of international law - in the sense of a consistency in the pattern of 
relations and rudimentary regulation between independent political communities -
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has been identified in three particular periods of antiquity. in the fonn of 
standardised practice in the areas of diplomatic relations, treaty making. and the 
conduct of war? The first period from around 1450 B.C to 1250 B.C between the 
Empires, spanned large territorial areas of Egypt, Babylonia and the Hinie Empire.-' 
The second from around 600 B.C when the Greek City states developed law for the 
regulation of relations between themselves and the outside world, in particular the 
Persian and Carthaginian Empires.4 The third is from around the fourth century B.C. 
between the Roman, Carthaginian, Macedonian Empires and the Kingdoms of the 
Seleucids and Ptolemics. 5 These periods each lasted for around two hundred and 
fifty years.6 Commonly those that entered into agreement were those with control of 
territory, which indicated an ability to fulfil obligations and made it worthwhile for 
the other party to enter into agreement. 
The battle of Pydna and the breakup of Macedonia, around 168 B.C, marked the 
beginning of the rise of the all powerful Roman Empire.7 Once the Roman Empire 
began to grow in strength, there was far less need for it to accept reciprocal 
obligations. Instead, because its strength and sophistication meant that territory could 
readily be brought under its control, it was able to impose law without the need to 
seek agreement. 8 This demonstrates the need for a perceived mutual interest if a law-
making agreement is to be concluded, and that the likelihood of such a perception is 
severely diminished when there is great disparity in the strength of potential parties 
to an agreement. 
The Roman Empire, at its height, exerted control over West and Eastern Europe 
and Northern Africa, with military strength an essential component for securing 
obedience to Roman Law. The Empire collapsed in the west around 476 A.D; 9 
debate about the reason for its collapse still persists. It seems that a series of factors 
related to over-stretching of resources, in order to try and maintain the condition of 
2 S. Neff, 'A Short History of International Law', M. D. Evans (ed.), International Law (2006) 29 at 
31. 
3 See W. G. Grewe (translated by M. Byers), The Epochs o/International Law (2000) 10; A. 
Nussbaum, A Concise History a/the Law a/Nations (1954, revised edition) 1-2. 
4 Grewe, op. cit., til. 3, p. 10. . 
'Grewe, op. cit., til. 3, p. 10 citing Preiser, Macht und Norm in der Volke"echtsgesch,chte (1978) 34 
and 73. 
6 See Grewe, lac. cit., til. 3. 
7 Grewe, op. cit .• til. 3, p. 10. . . 
8 Nussbaum. op. cit .. til. 3, p. II: the Republic of Rome preceded the Roman Empare. the Republac 
was subsequent to the Monarchy. 
9 See A. Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army (2003) 
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perpetual conflict, led to the decline and eventual fall of the Empire. 10 With the end 
of military strength, there was no question of a continued adherence to Roman law. 
The lack of control and consequent inability to enforce the law signalled the end of 
the validity of the Roman legal order for the people in the various political 
communities subjugated to Roman Empire. This indicates how effective control of 
territory has a Janus face quality in relation to legal authority. It provides both the 
basis for law to be made between like political communities and for the validity of 
law promulgated within a political community. 
Whereas the Roman Empire relied on military strength to maintain effective 
control of the territory, it was religion that would eventually fill the authority 
vacuum left by its collapse. The obedience which religion engendered. as the 
significance of the Church evolved, led the way out of the dark ages. 11 The Church 
promulgated a comprehensive supranational law known as canon law. 12 Canon law 
was first concerned with matters spiritual, moral and ecclesiastical, but it went far 
beyond this in its regulation of the life of individuals and political communities. 13 In 
800 A.D, Pope Leo III restored the Roman Empire in the West. Endorsed with the 
Christian spirit, the Empire came to be known as the Holy Roman Empire, which 
encompassed most of Central Europe. 14 It did not include England, France, Castile, 
Aragon, Portugal, Sweden and Venice. 15 The Pope and the Emperor are said to have 
'represented supreme and ultimate authority in the western world' .16 And an aspect 
of this authority was that the Emperor, and at times the Pope, accorded the status of 
king upon other rulers even outside the empire; outsiders who were also subject to 
the paramount papal authority and with it canon law:7 In of these developments, it 
might be thought that legal authority has been detached from effective control of 
territory; that legal authority comes from a source greater than man. But it is also 
possible to see religion as a means of galvanising obedience and, from this, effective 
control of territory; and from this control, legal authority. This latter view is 
10 See B. Ward-Perkins, The Fall 0/ Rome and the End o/Civilization (2005) 
11 Nussbaum, op. cit., fn. 3, p.17. 
12 This was eventually codified in the late middle ages, Nussabaum. op. cit .. fn. 3, p. 17 
13 Nussabaum, op. cit., fn. 3, p. 17 
14 Nussbaum, op. cit., fn. 3, p. 21 notes that this included Burgundy. the Netherlands, northe~ Italy. 
and at times Denmark, Hungary and Poland, citing Bryce. The Ho(v Roman Empire (1923. 4 edn.) 
182. l' Nussbaum, op. cit., fn. 3, p. 23. 
16 Nussbaum. op. cit., fn. 3, p. 21. 
17 Nussbaum. op. cit .• fn. 3, p. 19. 
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supported by subsequent developments m relation to the demise of the legal 
authority of the Church. 
Although the reach of the Emperor and the Popes was great, most particularly \\ith 
regards those entities within the Empire, at no point did the . Emperor and Pope 
exercise a power which extinguished the political autonomy and independence of a 
particular power.' 18 Thus particularly those entities outside of the Empire were free 
to enter into agreements with one another. Truces, peace treaties, and alliances were 
the typical reasons for agreements. 19 This reality of territorial based power. even if 
not formally the omnipotent controller of a territory and also limited by the 
prominence of feudalism,20 allowed for a degree of international relations and, with 
this, law: the foundations of the modem state system.21 
The history of the modem state system is not susceptible to a precise start date. It 
is a reference to the emergence of powerful territorial, national or imperial. states, 
with mature internal structures, much more clearly distinguished from one another 
than had been the case; a move away from the feudal system, which so hindered 
exercise of authority over an extended area ofterritory.22 
Of crucial importance in the lead to the modem state system was the change in 
thought from uncritical religious obedience, to the development in humanistic. 
individual, and scientific thought characterised by the Renaissance period of the 
1400s.23 Amidst such conditions, the supremacy of the city-states of Italy withered 
and the papacy became a secular power,24 no longer the ultimate definer of society's 
values and standards. The reformation and the religious wars of Europe, which 
encapsulated the period following the Renaissance, paved the way for the 
domination of the nation state; the direct rule of those who controlled a state, rather 
18 Grewe, op. cit., fn. 3, p. 12. 
19 Nussbaum, op. cit., fn. 3, p. 23 . ' 
20 Feudalism refers to a situation in which the mightier, landowners, entered mto contracts With ~e 
weaker, the worker, whereby the weaker worked obediently to the mightier in return for p~t~tlOn. 
Hence Lords who ruled over land entered directly into agreements with the Church often ml~smg out 
any government that might also claim authority over the territory, see L. Wildhaber. 'Soverelgnty and 
International Law'. in R. J. Macdonald and D. M. Johnston (eds.), The Structure and Process of 
International Law (1983) 453. 
11 Grewe, op. cit .. fn. 3. p. 10. 
12 See Grewe. op. cit .• fn. 3. p. 13; Wildhaber. loc. cit .. fn. 20. 
23 See W. Friedmann. The Changing Structure of International Law ( 1964) I 14-16. 
2" M. Shaw. International Law (~OO3) 20. 
, .. 
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than the rule of religion. 'The pursuit of political power and supremacy became 
overt.,2S 
Practical reasons for the move towards the territorial state model stem from its 
focus on a centralised authority to speak for the peoples of a territory. and include 
escape from the dictates of the Holy Roman Empire;26 the advantages in terms of 
social, economic, and military efficiency; 27 and the greater assurance that 
undertakings would be complied with. And while this move can be seen as 
encompassing a realisation that effective control of territory entailed legal authority 
within that territory, it would, in fact, take sometime for the explicit link between 
legal authority and effective control to be made.28 
The historical centrality of effective control of territory for both domestic and 
international legal authority supports the idea that law follows power.29 Kelsen dealt 
with this idea, more in the interests of the importance of law rather than as a check 
on power, by identifying effective control of territory as a domestic legal order's 
grundnorm, which explains why a domestic legal order is valid. The domestic 
grundnorm is itself a part of internationallaw,3o which rests on another grundorm-
something like 'the states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved. ,31 But 
if one thinks about how states are able to behave at the international level, because 
they have effective control of the their territory, one sees that effective control of 
territory is just as important for the efficacy of international law as for domestic law. 
In terms of enforcing the law in a centralised legal system, such as domestic legal 
orders, the direct control of the territory permits the executive to function as a check 
on the use of power by those within its political community. In a decentralised legal 
system, such as the international legal system, a lack of adherence to the law is 
approached through the regime of state responsibility, which ultimately seeks to 
restore the status quo through coercion.32 The fact of effective control over their 
territory means that there is an entity to be coerced to take action, for example, to 
police borders in order to stop a flow of migrants into another state. Similarly, it is 
25 Shaw, op. cit., th. 24, p. 20 
26 C. Warbrick, 'States and Recognition', in M. Evans (ed.), International Law (2006) 221. 
27 H. Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change (1994) 178. 
28 This point is returned to in the section on state sovereignty below. 
29 See G. Kreijen, State Failure. Sovereignty and Effectiveness (2004) 42-52. 
30 H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law (1967, 2M ed.) 562-563: see also H. Kelsen. General 
Theory of Law and State ( 1961) 115-122. 
31 Kelsen. (1967. 2M ed). op. cit .. th. 30. p. 564. 
32 See. e.g., I. Brownlie, State Responsibility (1983). 
through a government with effective control of territory that states, as abstract legal 
institutions, are able to act and thereby create internationallaw.33 
Huber was particularly aware that it is logical for a decentralised international 
legal system to stay close to factual reality. His approach to international law, 
developed from studying the history of why states treated international law as 
binding, was based on the sociological foundations of the law, found in the power of 
states and the pursuit of co-existence by states. It was most famously expressed in 
his judgement in the Island of Palmas case.34 As arbitrator in the dispute between the 
US and the Netherlands, Huber reasoned that the effective occupation of the island 
by the Netherlands created a superior claim to the title than any the US might have 
had. This was on the basis that in a decentralised legal system territorial sovereignty 
could not be reduced to an abstract right, there needed to be concrete manifestations 
if the law was to retain relevance. 35 If the US had been granted title, without 
effective control of the territory, it would not have been able to fulfil the obligations 
that come with the title. Seen in this light, the further international law moves from 
factual reality the less efficacious it will become. Likewise, a decrease in the 
effective control of states will affect the efficacy of international law, as it will 
reduce states' ability to fulfil obligations and be coerced where they do not. 
Consequently, considerations of effectiveness have at significant role in the doctrine 
of international law and, as is now turned to, it makes sense for effective control of 
territory to be the core criterion for statehood in internationallaw.36 
3. Statehood in International Law and the Possibility of Ineffective States 
Around the sixteenth century, as noted above, a variety of factors led to the territorial 
state becoming the dominant form of political organisation. In particular, states 
preferred to deal with others whose material existence reflected their own, because it 
brought stronger guarantees that undertakings would be fulfilled. Accordingly. states 
only acknowledged like entities as states with which they would deal with on the 
33 See, on the international law-making process, I. Brownlie. Principles of Public International Law 
(2003) 3-29. ..' . 
34 On Huber's approach to international law see 'Symposium: The European TradItion m International 
Law - Max Huber', (2007) 18 EJIL 69-199. 
35 Island Palmas case (Netherlands v. US) (1928) 2 RIAA 829. reprinted in (1928) 22 AJIL 867. 
36 On the prominence of the principle of effectiveness in international law. see E. Milano. Unlawful 
Territorial SilUatioru in International Law (2006) 22-23. 
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same tenns as one another.37 States developed rules (international law) to regulate 
their relationships,38 including rules on what made an entity a state as a matter of 
law.39 
As Crawford has indicated ' [ a] state is not a fact in the sense that a chair is a fact; 
it is a fact in the sense in which it may be said a treaty is fact: that is, a legal status 
attaching to a certain state of affairs by virtue of certain rules'. 40 It is important to 
address the legal mechanisms that surround the creation and extinction of states in 
international law, as they are the source of some contention and how one understands 
these issues ultimately impacts on how one views the nature and significance of the 
paradox of state reconstruction. 
A. The Criteria for Statehood in International Law 
The 1933 Montevideo Convention provides the classic citation on the criteria for 
statehood.41 This posits four attributes that an entity must posses to become a state: 
(a) a pennanent population; (b) a defmed territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity 
to enter into relations with other States.42 
The first two are regarded as self-evident; in combination, Brownlie suggests they 
are intended to connote a stable community. 43 There is no minimum in respect of 
population or territory size.44 Nor is there a need for fixed boundaries.4s 
The requirement of government is commonly treated as meaning effective 
government by commentators and states alike. 46 Effective control is about the 
preservation of public order amongst the population on the territory.47 How this 
came to be the lynchpin of statehood and with it international law has been set out 
above. 48 As Warbrick notes, 'it is a relative concept, 'effective enough', not an 
37 Warbrick, op. cit., fn. 26, p. 222. 
38 On the reason for such rules, see J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (1962) 56. 
39 Warbrick, op. cit., fn. 26, p. 222. 
40 1. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2006) 5. 
4! See T. D. Grant, 'Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and Its Discontents', (1999) 37 
Colum. J. Transnat'l L 403. 
42 1933 Montivideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Article I. 
43 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (1998) 71. 
44 Crawford, op. cit., fn. 40, p. 52 and p. 46. 
4~ Brownlie, op. cit., fn. 43, p. 71. 
46 See, e.g., Crawford op. cit .. fn. 40, pp. 55-61. 
47 Warbrick. op. cit .. fn. 26, p. 233; Crawford. op. cit .. fn. 40. p. 59 
41 See also Grant, op. cit .. fn. 41. p. 418. 
absolute one' ,49 a more stringent interpretation thus produces an international society 
that consists of basic units which have the potential to fulfil obligations to each 
other. This logic also helps to explain why the established rule on identification of 
the agent of the state is based on deference to the government with effective 
control. 50 
In relation to the other criterion, as Crawford notes, '[ c ]apacity to enter into 
relations with states at the international level is no longer, if it ever was, an exclusive 
state prerogative'. 51 Moreover, the legal capacity to enter into relations is a 
consequence of statehood, not a criterion. 52 It is better, then, to see this criterion as a 
conflation of the requirement of government - states as abstract legal institutions 
need an agent to enter into relations - and, what Crawford posits as a fifth 
requirement, independence - not being subject to the authority of another state that 
could stop it entering into relations. 53 Independence is about being able to actually 
maintain a separate existence through an effective government while, at the same 
time, not being formally subject to the authority of another state. 54 This latter aspect 
was indicated by the Commission of Jurists in the context of the Aaland Islands' 
claim to statehood. The Jurists stressed that Finland did not become a state 'until a 
stable political organisation had been created, and until the public authorities had 
become strong enough to assert themselves throughout the territory of the State 
·th th· f&.· ,55 WI out e asslstance 0 lorelgn troops. 
The criteria of statehood, as set out, are essentially a reflection of the process that 
was described above with the emergence of the nation state: with effective control of 
the territory the fledgling states could maintain a separate existence and breakaway 
from the authority of the Holy Roman Empire. The criteria denote factual or 
descriptive sovereignty. 56 Adherence to these criteria, by prioritising effective 
control of territory, supports an efficacious international legal system in which states 
49 Warbrick, op. cit., tho 26, p. 233. 
'0 See K. Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law (1968) 59; B. R. Roth, 
Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999) 137-42. 
'1 Crawford, op. cit., tho 40, p. 61. 
'2 Crawford, op. cit., tho 40, p. 61. 
'3 Crawford, op. cit., fn. 40, p. 62. 
,.. See Austro-German Customs Union Case, Advisory Opinion. PCIJ Series. ArB No.4 I, 1931. p. 37 
at pp. 57-58. .. . 
H The Report of the International Committee of JW1Sts, (1920) LNOJSpeclal Supp. No.3. p.3. 
~b See S. I. Benn, 'The Uses of Sovereignty', (1995) 3 Political Studies 122. 
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have the potential to fulfil legal obligations. 57 The complicated relationship between 
the criteria for statehood and international recognition now turned to, is one reason 
why reality does not match this ideal. 
B. The Role of International Recognition in the Creation of States 
There has been much debate about the role of recognition by third states in the 
creation of states. 58 The declaratory theory posits statehood as result of the 
achievement of the material attributes listed above. 59 The constitutive theory 
suggests that statehood is only attained through recognition.60 Over time, practice 
has changed. 61 
Today, it is increasingly common for the role of recognition in statehood to be 
presented as a composite of declaration and constitution.62 This view arises because 
the material attributes are a matter of evaluation. Thus when clearly achieved 
recognition appears more declaratory of status, and when less obviously achieved 
recognition appears to serve more of a constitutive role. An example of the latter was 
the impact of international recognition policy in relation to the break-up of the FRY 
in the early 1990s, where the governments of the newly recognised states struggled 
to exert effective control over their territory. 63 However, while international 
recognition can clearly be crucial to the process of state creation in circumstances 
where material attributes are in doubt, it is as evidence of status rather than the 
source.
64 For example, in relation to the new states emerging from the break-up of 
the FRY, pretence of adherence to the criteria of effectiveness was retained. 65 
57 See G. Sorensen, 'An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for Conflict and 
Cooperation', (1997) 23 Review 0/ International Studies 253 at 258. 
58 See I. Brownlie, 'Recognition in Theory and Practice' (1982) 53 BrIL 197. 
59 See, e.g., Brierly, op. cit., fn. 38 p. 139. 
60 See, e.g., H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947) 38-66. 
61 Warbrick, op. cit., fn. 26, p. 224. 
62 See, e.g., N. Tsagourias, 'International Community, States and Political Cloning', in C. Warbrick 
and S. Tierney, Towards an International Legal Community: The Sovereignty o/States and the 
Sovereignty o/International Law (2006) 211 at 222-225; Kreijen, op. cit., fn, 29, p. 17. 
63 See R. Caplan, Europe and the Recognition 0/ New States in Yugoslavia (2005). 
64 Crawford, op. cit., fn. 40, p. 27; cf. B. R. Roth, 'The Entity That Dare Not Speak Its Name: 
Unrecognized Taiwan as a Right-Bearer in the International Legal Order', Wayne State University 
Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 07-27 (2007) available at <SSRN: 
http://ssm.comlabstract= 1 0 15120>. 
6~ See, e.g., C. Warbrick, 'Recognition of States: Recent European Practice' in M. Evans (ed.). 
Aspects o/Statehood and Institutionalism in Contemporary Europe (1997) 9 at 22. note 58: see also 
C. Warbrick, 'Recognition of States', 41 ICLQ (1992) 473 at 476. 
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Moreover, the Badinter Commission, set up to advise the European Peace 
Conference, stressed, on a number of occasions, that recognition was purely 
declaratory of status.66 Furthennore, in relation to decolonisation, where new states 
were created without what might be regarded as a sufficient degree of effective 
governance, commentators ponder whether the identification of the colonised people 
as a self-detennination unit lowered the degree of effectiveness required, rather than 
accord an explicitly constitutive role to recognition. 67 
Undoubtedly, the degree of international recognition, of an entity claiming 
statehood, affects the likelihood of a judicial institution agreeing with the claim. 
However, such recognition remains evidence of status, and this point is important in 
relation to the debate on extinction of ineffective states, turned to below. If it were 
otherwise, the implication would be that denial of recognition allowed a non-
recognising state to act as if the non-recognised state were not a state, with obvious 
implications for the stability of international relations.68 
In respect of overwhelming support for the status of an entity as a state, there has 
been debate about the role that membership of the UN can play. Dugard has argued, 
in light of the criteria for membership,69 that membership of the UN is an act of 
collective recognition, which means that there is no longer the prospect of a state for 
some and not for others.70 There are problems with this view. Warbrick notes how 
'the vote for a member on an application (for or against and subject to any 
explanation given by the voting state) is evidence of the voting state's position vis-a-
vis the applicant's status but it is not, unless the voting state says so, an act of 
recognition.,71 Moreover, as Shaw notes, '[p]ractice shows that many of the member 
states or their governments are not recognised by other member states.' 72 
Membership of the UN, in light of the requirement of Article 4 UN Charter, which 
66 See, e.g., Opinion 1, Badinter Commission, 29 November 1991, (1993) 92 ILR 165. 
67 Crawford, Ope cit., fn, 40, p. 59 and p. 128; see also D. Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-
Determination (2002) 364 and 408. 
68 Crawford, Ope cit., fn. 40, pp. 27-28. . 
69 Article 4, UN Charter: '1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-lovmg states 
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the 
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. 2. The admission of any such state to 
membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the 
recommendation of the Security Council.' 
70 J. Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (1987) 78-80; see also C. Hilligruber. 'The 
Admission of New States to the International Community'. (1998) 9 EJIL 491. 
71 Warbrick. Ope cit., fn. 26, p. 261. 
72 Shaw, Ope cit., fn. 24. p. 386, Shaw cites the Arab non-recognition of the Israeli state; see also Q. 
Wright, 'Some Thoughts about Recognition', (1950) 40 AllL 548. 
indicates that membership is open to 'all other peace-loving states~, is clearly. 
though, 'powerful evidence of statehood' .73 And certainly its importance as evidence 
of statehood helps explain why fledgling states instantly look for membership of the 
UN. 
F or present purposes, the important point is that international recognition, and 
membership of certain international organisations, can provide very strong, indeed. 
overwhelmingly evidence in favour of an entity's status as a state. This point is 
sustained even in the face of a clear lack of anything like a government with 
effective control of the territory. Indeed, international opinion can also operate in the 
other direction, helping to preclude the creation of a state where an entity appears to 
satisfy the criteria, the plight of Somaliland is a classic example.74 In the context of 
decolonisation, the right of self-determination might explain a significant lessening 
in the level of effectiveness required for statehood.75 In general, however, the power 
of international recognition as evidence of status makes it difficult to see the creation 
of states with little in the way of effective government, outside of the decolonisation 
setting, as stemming, ultimately, from anything other than the subjective opinion of 
international actors. Undoubtedly, then, existing states have a significant 
responsibility for the efficacy of the international legal system in relation to the 
creation of new states. How does this relate to the continued existence of states 
lacking a government with effective control of territory? 
c. The Extinction of Ineffective States? 
The prolonged existence of states without an effective domestic government is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. A temporary loss of effectiveness as a result of civil 
war is, though, hardly new. It is sufficient to note, at this stage. that a key 
development in international law that has encouraged the fact of ineffective states is 
that previously, if a state was without an effective government for a prolonged 
period, it was likely that the territory would be annexed by another state that was 
able to govern it effectively.76 Since 1945. however, the territory of an ineffective 
73 Shaw, op. cit .• til. 24, p. 387; see also Admission of a State 10 the United Sations (CharIer Art. 4). 
Advisory Opinion, IeJ Reports 1948. p. 57. 7. See Crawford, op. cit., til. 40, pp. 412 - 415; D. J. Harris. op. cit.. fn. I. p. ISS. 
75 A point returned to below. 
76 See Lauterpacht. op. cit., til. 60, p. 35 I. 
state is no longer up for grabs through conquest and annexation. The next two 
sections outline the developments in the legal doctrines of state sovereignty and self-
determination that are central to the fact of ineffective states and their prolonged 
continuation as legal institutions. First, it is necessary to deal with how the 
phenomenon of the continuation of ineffective states is possible when a core 
criterion of statehood is missing. Essentially, this requires a view to be formed on 
whether it is simply international recognition that sustains a state ~ s status. If it were, 
then an obvious response to ineffective states, that are problematic for international 
society, would be to remove recognition of statehood. 
In light of the earlier lack of the prolonged existence of states without effective 
governments, it is common for those who have dealt with the issue of extinction of 
ineffective states, to be thinking about the absence of such a government for only a 
temporary period, and, from this focus, to identify a presumption of continuity for 
statehood. Marek explains this presumption as driven by the practical concern for 
international stability through the maintenance of international rights and obligations 
of the state. 77 Such writers have, however, tended to foresee that more than a 
temporary period of anarchy would lead to the extinction of the state.78 In contrast, 
Crawford, very recently, but still citing Marek, posits that 'extinction is not effected 
by more-or-Iess prolonged anarchy within the state' and cites the lack of doubt that 
has been 'expressed as to the continuity of states such as Somalia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Solomon Islands, notwithstanding total or nearly total 
collapse of internal public order.' 79 Crawford does not address the justification for 
the presumption of continuity. And Raic' s suggestion that the 'presumption is based 
on the assumption of a lack of finality of the situation' ,80 does not seem an adequate 
explanation in light of cases such as Somalia, where the situation persisted for years. 
A notable exception to the lack of sustained legal enquiry into why states such as 
Somalia persisted as states is the effort of Kreijen. It is necessary to deal in some 
detail with Kreijen' s approach because how this study differs is fundamental to the 
nature of the paradox of state reconstruction and, consequently. its significance for 
the UN system. 
77 Marek, op. cit., tn. 50, p. 24 and p. 548. 
78 See, e.g., J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (1955) 137: Marek. op. cit .. fn. 50. p. 188. 
79 Crawford. op. cit., tn. 40, p. 70 I, also notes 2 and 3. 
80 Raic, op. cit., tn. 67, p. 71. 
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Kreijen's thesis is that the occurrence of state failure in sub-Saharian Africa - 'a 
lack of capacity pure and simple', 'inability per se to uphold a minimum level of 
nonnative institutional order that statehood requires', • overall situation of disorder 
and anarchy that characterizes state failure,8l - is a consequence of the shift from 
statehood based on effective control of territory to statehood based on the legal right 
of all peoples to self-determination. This study accepts this argument but disagrees 
with some of Kreijen's reasoning about how it is that statehood continues. 
Kreijen accepts that Marek's rationale for the presumption of continuity makes 
sense in relation to a situation where an ineffective government remains in existence, 
as then there remains a party to be held responsible for the obligations in 
international law. When a government is completely absent, so that is there is no 
residue of a government left, Kreijen does not accept Marek's logic behind the 
presumption, because then there is no government to interact with and be held 
responsible. 82 Kreijen later qualifies his distinction by indicating that there is no 
distinction between a total lack of government and a prolonged situation of nominal 
government as in recent past of 'Sierra Leone, Liberia, [and] the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo' , in terms of having a government to be held responsible.83 
Kreijen does not address that, even where all effectiveness is absent, eventually 
there should be an effective government, which could be held responsible; meaning 
the presumption of continuity would still help with the security of international 
obligations. This would, of course, become less reasonable the longer the situation of 
ineffectiveness continued. Instead, Kreijen turns away from the presumption of 
continuity, to the theoretical debate on the withdrawal of recognition from existing 
states which, as with the creation of states, is about the declaratory and constitutive 
approaches. Lauterpacht, following a constitutive line of reasoning, argued that: 
A state may lose its independence or the necessary degree of cohesion as an organised 
community; a government may cease to wield effective autho~~; a ~cognised bellige~nt 
may be utterly defeated. In all these cases the basis of recogmtion disappears and outside 
states are entitled and bound to take cognisance of that fact.
84 
Chen, following a declaratory line of reasoning, argued that: 
81 Kreijen, Ope cil., fn. 29. p. 96. 
82 Kreijen, Ope cil., m. 29. pp. 335 - 337. 
83 Kreijen, Ope cil., fn. 29. 361 - 362. 
14 Lauterpacht. Ope cil .• m. 60. pp. 349 - 50. 
A state [ ... ] in possession of the essential requirements of statehood [ ... ] exists and contin ues 
to exist, independently of recognition or the 'withdrawal' of recognition. The disappearance 
of any of all of these requirements terminates the existence of the state. 85 
The fact that a state does not become extinct when it is ineffective for a prolonged 
period of time, casts doubt upon Chen's approach and leads Kreijen to accept a 
constitutive role for recognition, albeit recognition that has not been withdrawn. 86 
Kreijen's next effort is to fmd the reason why recognition has not been withdrawn. 
It is important to stress, however, that there is no reason why continued status would 
have to be constituted by recognition; there could just be an extension of the 
presumption of continuity, perhaps on a different basis than that proposed by Marek. 
In which case, as with the creation of states noted above, international recognition 
would serve as evidence of the status, but not the source of the status. The way 
Kreijen constructs his argument suggests that, when criteria for statehood are 
lacking, other states could withdraw recognition and with it statehood.87 However, if 
status were dependent on recognition, the route would be there for a state to escape 
its obligations to the target state through simply removing its recognition. As was 
noted above in relation to the creation of states, this would result in considerable 
legal uncertainty. 
The reason why recognition is not withdrawn in such circumstances is argued by 
Kreijen to rest on the emergence of 'the right to self-determination, and the 
entitlement to independence that rests on it'. 88 More specifically, states continue to 
recognise the ineffective state in order to preserve the right to self-determination. 
Kreijen makes tentative indications that the right to self-determination might prohibit 
the withdrawal of recognition if it is seen as a substitute for empirical deficiencies -
as was suggested above in relation to the creation of states in the context of 
decolonisation. In this way, it would be a more appropriate basis for the presumption 
of continuity; arguments based on international stability suffer when one considers 
the difficulties that ineffective states pose in this respect. But Kreijen is not 
convinced that the right to self-determination should be a legal basis for insisting that 
states continue to recognise the ineffective state: 
85 Ti-Chiang Chen, The Inlernalional Law of Recognilion (1951) 259. 
86 Kreijen, op. cil., tn. 29, p. 355. 
87 ., . '" ")9 355 Kreljen, op. "'I., 111. - ,p. . 
88 Kreijen, Opt cil., fn. 29, p. 355. 
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It would be a vicious absurdity, however, to insist that an entity that in reality constitutes a 
bellum omnia contra omnes should continue to be recognised as a state for the sake of its 
population enjoying its freedom external interference or for reasons of satisf) ing the 
fundamental right of self-determination in internationallaw.89 
Kreijen appears to lose sight of the fact that there would be no requirement that 
states continue with recognition, the right of self-determination as a legal basis for 
the presumption of continuity would be the source of the status as a state, and 
recognition would be evidence of this status. 
In sum, the efficacy of international law is dependent on states having effective 
governments. The basic criteria for the creation of states thus prioritise an effective 
government. However, sufficient international recognition, as evidence of statehood, 
can facilitate the creation of states that are lacking in effective control. When all 
effective control is lacking a presumption of continuity operates to preserve 
statehood. The more of such states there are, the more the efficacy of international 
law will be affected. Why, then, have the strong not simply conquered the weak? As 
one might expect to be the case in light of the comments above on how the Roman 
Empire treated those with less power than themselves. 
In reference to states that are lacking in effective control, the extreme end being 
those completely without an effective domestic government, Jackson, a political 
scientist, uses the term quasi-state.9o This helps to indicate the lack of effectiveness 
on the territory, but risks implications that such states do not have the same 
sovereign rights and duties as other states.91 A similar problem is encountered with 
terms such as failed state, which represent the extreme end of the quasi-state 
spectrum.92 A warning not to be misled by such terms is important because, as is 
now turned to, the increased occurrence of the fact of ineffective states can be 
explained through an exploration of the rights and duties of the state and its people 
found in the doctrine of state sovereignty and the right of a people to self-
89 Kreijen, op. cit., fn. 29, p. 365. 
90 R. H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty. International Relations and the Third World (1990) 17. 
91 See W. G. Werner and J. H. De. Wilde, 'The Endurance of Sovereignty' ,(2001) 7 EUI'opean 
Journal of International Relations 283 at 300. 
92 See D. D. Caron, 'If Afghanistan has Failed then Afghanistan is Dead: 'Failed States' and the 
Inappropriate Substitution of Legal Conclusion for Political Description', in K. J. Greenberg (ed.) The 
Torture Debate in America (2005) 214. 
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determinatio~ and the developments therein that encapsulate the tum away from 
power towards ethics in international legal doctrine.93 
4. State Sovereignty and the Encouragement of the Fact of Ineffective States 
The term sovereignty has a number of different meanings. 94 Its position 10 
international law, as well as political science, is a subject of some contestation.9S As 
a general matter, for international lawyers, there are essentially two approaches to 
sovereignty.96 Sovereignty in a descriptive or empirical sense refers to the factual 
condition of independent effective control over a territory, and posits sovereignty as 
pre-Iaw.97 The other approach is sovereignty in a legal sense. Here, sovereignty is 
constituted by international law, which defines the rights, duties and competences 
attributable to states under internationallaw.98 With the latter approach, some would 
have it that sovereignty has no meaning independent of the specific rules and 
principles from which it is abstracted.99 This, though, ignores the importance of the 
general ideas of freedom to act, freedom from the acts of others, and legal equality 
that state sovereignty as a general principle stands for in relation to international law , 
and from which the specific rules and principles continue to be derived; 100 ideas 
which have their roots in sovereignty in an empirical sense. IOI Through charting the 
development of state sovereignty in relation to international law, it can be seen how 
a changing appreciation of the balance in importance, between the ideas state 
sovereignty stands for, has been central to the development of a legal framework 
93 In recent times, international law has turned ever more to ethical considerations over factual 
realities, positing anterior criterion that facts must comply with to be invested with legal meaning, see 
M. Koskenniemi, 'The Wonderful Artificiality of States', 1994 ASIL Proceedings 22 at 23-24. 
94 See Benn, loco cit., fn. 56. 
95 See, e.g., L. Henkin, 'International Law: Politics, Values and Functions - General Course on 
Public International Law' (1989) 216 Recueil des Cours 9 at 24-5. 
96 Legal argument operates along a spectrum in relation to these approaches, M. Koskenniemi, From 
Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (2006) 301. 
97 See W. G. Werner, 'Self-Determination and Civil War', (2001) 6 JCSL 171 at 180. 
98 See, e.g., H. Kelsen, 'Sovereignty and International Law', (1960) 48 Georgetown Law Journal 
627. 
99 See, e.g., G. Schwarzenberger, E. Brown, Manual of International Law (1976) 52. 
100 See W. G. Werner, 'State Sovereignty and International Legal Discourse', in I. Dekker and W. G. 
Werner (eds.), Governance and International Legal Theory (2004)125 at 1~7-151: W. G. Werner and 
1. H. de Wilde, Ope cit., fn. 91. p. 297. 
101 See B. Fassbender, 'Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law' in N.Walker, (ed.), 
Sm'ereignty in Transition (2003) 115 at 116-120. 
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which encourages the fact of ineffective states, but does not provide a convincing 
explanation for the presumption of continuity. 
A. The Origins of State Sovereignty 
An inquiry into the historical origins of the empirical understanding of sovereignty is 
an essential pre-requisite for understanding the present place of sovereignty m 
international law. This is because, while, amidst the raft of developments m 
international law and persistent transfer of authority to the international level, the 
original formulation of empirical state sovereignty may no longer be sustainable, 
ideas derived from it still hold sway in international legal doctrine, and contestation 
between legal and empirical understandings of sovereignty continues to define legal 
argument. 102 
Sovereignty was first systematically analysed by the political theorist Bodin in the 
sixteenth century.l03 Particularly motivated by the struggle for authority during the 
civil war in France, Bodin introduced a new way of thinking about the nature of 
states. Influenced by changes in other states, Bodin believed that strengthening the 
French monarchy would be the best way to reduce the tensions between rival 
authorities within France. 104 Bodin defined a state as 'a multitude of families and the 
possessions that they have in common ruled by a supreme power and by reason.' lOS 
Bodin's conception was based on the observation of political facts, specifically 
strong personal monarchy, superior to all rivals, unifying once loosely connected 
states. In this conception, there must be one supreme power - a sovereign - in a 
state. Bodin did not see the sovereign, although not bound by his own laws, as above 
the law. Rather, in the natural law tradition, Bodin derived the legal authority of the 
sovereign from higher law of God and nature, as well as the leges imperi, the 
fundamental laws of the state - the constitution - that the sovereign does not make, 
which determine in whom the sovereign power is vested and the limits of its 
. 106 
exerCIse. 
102 See Koskenniemi, loc. cit., fn. 96. 
103 J. Bodin, Les Six Livres de La Repub/ique (Paris, 1576); see also T.Meron, 'The Authority to Make 
Treaties in the Late Middle Ages', (1995) 89 AJIL 1 at 1. 
104 See Brierly, op. cit., fn. 38, p. 8 
10~ Brierly, op. cit., fn. 38, p. 8. 
106 Brierly, op. cit., fn. 38. p. 9 
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As Brierly notes, this idea of legal limits on the supreme power was problematic 
as there was no authentic text of the fundamental laws of the state so no way of 
determining whether rules had been transgressed. t07 As governments strengthened 
people became accustomed to thinking of the sovereign not as the strongest ruler by 
law but as the strongest power in the state, regardless of how the power that had been 
acquired. It was Hobbes who identified that sovereignty had become an absolute 
concept based on might rather than any ethical connection with God or nature. 108 
Thus from being able to operate over a particular territory and the subjects within its 
boundaries, a sovereign is cast as the ultimate source of law within the legal order of 
a state. t09 
The peace treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which established the end of the thirty 
years war, is the focal date which marked the confirmation of the change to the 
modem understanding of the state and the international system, and the domination 
of the positivist approach in international law. 110 The treaty expressly placed 
religious matters in the realm of domestic matters. This demonstrated the separation 
of the domestic and international, III and the dominance of factual power over man's 
own reason. As the main sources of legal authority, • [a ]greements and customs 
emanating from the states were the essence of the law of nations. ' 112 
Thus sovereignty, in its original empirical form, signified independent effective 
government from which legal authority flowed. It is from this and the subsequent 
practice of sovereign states that the fundamental ideas about state sovereignty in 
international law came to be understood. I 13 
B. Sovereignty in International Law 
In the Lotus case, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that: 
107 Brierly, op. cit., fn. 38, p. 11 and p. 12 .. 
108 T. Hobbes, Levithan, R. Tuck (ed.), (1991) ch. Xvii, 121-9; see also N. K. Tsagoumas, 
Jurisprudence of International ~aw (2000) 26... . . , . 
109 See S. Tierney, 'The Nonnative Challenge m Forgmg an International Community, 10 C. 
Warbrick and S. Tierney (eds.), Towards an International Legal Community? The Sovereignty of 
States and the Sovereignty of International Law (2006) I at 1. 
110 See L.Gross, 'The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948' (1948) 42 AJIL 20; S.Beaulac. 'The 
Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy - Myth or Reality?'. (2000) 2 Journal of the History of Intern aliona I 
Law 148. 
III Neff, op. cit., fn. 2, p. 35. 
II:! Shaw. op. cit., fn. 24 . p. 25. 
II) See Fassbender, op. cit., fn. 101, pp. 116-120. 
37 
International law governs relations between independent states. The rules of law binding 
upon states therefore emanate from there own free will as expressed in conventions or by 
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of international law and established in 
order to regulate the relations between those coexisting independent communities or with a 
view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of stales 
cannot therefore be presumed. 1 14 
This stresses the freedom to act that sovereignty entails. Moreover, it reflects the 
idea of legal equality being a consequence of sovereignty and the inherent indication 
of a refusal to acknowledge a superior legal order. I IS The importance of this later 
point for international law was reflected in the reference to the principle of 
'sovereign equality of states' in the UN Charter rather than just the sovereignty of 
states. 
Huber, in the Island of Palmas case, noted that '[ s ]overeignty in the relations 
between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the 
globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other states, the 
functions of a state.' 116 This reflects the idea that sovereignty entails freedom from 
the action of others. 
These ideas - freedom to act, freedom from the acts of others, legal equality -
have been given concrete legal meaning in the form of specific legal rules and 
principles of international law, such as those related to sovereign immunity. I 17 Due 
to the obvious tension between the ideas of freedom to act and freedom from action 
of another state, it is possible for both parties to international disputes to base 
competing arguments on sovereignty. It is the specific rules and principles which are 
used to resolve the matter. I 18 As will be returned to, the balance of the general ideas 
in the specific rules and principles has changed over time. Up until the outlawing of 
the use force, the balance favoured freedom to act, power over law. 
Just as the priority of the general ideas which are traced back to the empirical 
concept of sovereignty are a source of debate in international legal argument, so too 
contention about the position of sovereignty in relation to international law has come 
to provide the potential for international lawyers to mount competing arguments both 
114 Case oftheSS "Lotus", PCIJ Series A. No 10, 1927. at p. 18 (emphasis added). 
115 B. Gilson, The Conceptual System o/Sovereign Equality ( 1986) 59. 
116 The Palmas Island case, op. cit .. fn. 35. p. 838 (p. 875 in AJIL). 
117 See the section on sovereign equality in GA Res. 2625 (1970). Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. 
111 k" . fn 96 "40 "7" See Kos enmeml. op. Cit.. . • pp. - -..-
38 
based on sovereignty; either favouring sovereignty in the empirical sense or in an 
international legal sense. t 19 
In the empirical sense, legal authority, telling us what the law is, follows from the 
political fact of sovereignty. 120 Amidst the proliferation of international law. to 
accommodate the fact that sovereign states are bound by international law, the idea 
of sovereignty as representing absolute authority over a territory must be 
discarded. 121 Instead, it is common for sovereignty to be divided along functional 
lines, this accepts that international law can apply to the territory of a sovereign state. 
but state sovereignty retains meaning only because states are bound by international 
law if they consent and it is states that have the ultimate say on the boundaries of 
legal jurisdictions. 122 
In an international legal (normative) sense, sovereignty is a product of 
international law, which confers the right to make international law. In this sense, 
sovereignty might be seen as nothing more than the rights, duties and competencies 
that international law has come to recognize as residing in a state, with the continued 
use of the term seeming superfluous and confusing. 123 This, though, neglects the 
importance of general ideas, derived originally from observation of empirical 
sovereignty, which sovereignty stands for in relation to international law:24 These 
remain relevant for the interpretation, application and development of the rights of 
duties residing in the state, whether one sees the legal basis for the developments of 
these rights and duties rooted in an empirical understanding of sovereignty or as 
. db' . all 125 constItute y InternatIon aw. 
In the normal run of things, states retain effective governments and so it is 
possible for arguments about sovereignty in an empirical sense to be sustained. 
When there is no effective domestic government the position of empirical 
sovereignty appears unsustainable. 126 In such a context, references to sovereignty, if 
119 Koskenniemi, op. cit .. fn. 96, pp. 224-240. 
120 See loc. cit., fn. 108. 
121 See D. Kennedy, 'International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion', (1996) 65 
Nordic Journal of International Law 385 at 396. 
122 The tendency of states to cede authority to the internationalleveI. along with the increasing reach 
and strength of international law, makes this explanation ever more questionable, see S. Tierney. op. 
cit., fn. 109, pp. 1-2. 
123 See Koskenniemi, op. cit .. fn. 96, p. 231, pp. 246-248. 
124 A point stressed by Werner, op. cit., fn. 100, p. 150 
125 It is common for international lawyers to start from this point without addressing the debate about 
lelal authority. see e.g .• Crawford. op. cit .. fn. 40. p. 32. 
12 See Werner and Wilde. op. cit .. fn. 91. p. 300. 
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it is to have a meaning beyond the specific rights and duties, must indicate claims, 
and acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the claims, to the general ideas that 
sovereignty stands for in international law. 127 To support such claims recourse to the 
idea of popular sovereignty, that sovereignty resides in the people not the state,128 is 
a useful device, as it separates sovereignty from effective control, which, of course, 
when it is absent, is problematic for those claiming sovereignty. What are the 
developments in the specific rights and duties that reside in a sovereign state, which 
help to explain the fact of ineffective but still sovereign states? 
c. Sovereignty and Ineffective States 
There is an inevitable tension and consequent balancing between the ideas of 
freedom to act and freedom from the acts of other. Up until relatively recently, the 
right to go to war was seen as 'the most basic of all the rights of the sovereign state': 
it was believed to be fundamental to a state's sovereignty:29 Thus in respect of the 
use of force, the balance in the law derived from sovereignty favoured the freedom 
to act. A prohibition on intervention co-existed with the right to use force, but its 
legal significance was clearly undermined by the legality of the use of force. 130 In 
this context, should a state show signs of weakness, it was open to be acquired by 
another state through conquest, which provided a valid title to territory. 131 
The destructiveness of wars in the frrst half of the twentieth century encouraged 
moves towards the outlawing of the use of force. Attempts to restrict the use of force 
were made in the covenant of the League of Nations. This was followed by the 
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War in 1928 and in 1945 by the UN Charter 
with its Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force against the territorial sovereignty 
or political independence of a state. 132 With this latter development, the prohibition 
on the use of force, or, rather, the right to be free from such a use of force, was found 
to be an attribute of state sovereignty.133 In relation to the existence of ineffective 
127 See Werner and Wilde, op. cit., fn. 91. p. 302 
128 See, e.g., B. Roth, . Popular Sovereignty: The Elusive Nonn'. (1997) 91 ASIL Proceedings 363. 
129 F. H. Hinsley. Sovereignty (1986) 230. 
IlO See A. Cassese. International Law (2001) 98-99; P. Winfield. "The History oflntervention in 
International Law', (1922 - 1923) 3 BYIL 130. 
III See I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use ofF orce by States (1991) 14-5 I. 
Il2 See Shaw. op. cit., fn. 24, pp. 1016 - 1018; H. McCoubrey and N. D. White. International Law 
and Armed Conflict (1992). 
m See GA Res. 2625 (1970); Werner. op. cit .. fn. 100. p. 155. 
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states, this development represents the growing dominance of the political value of 
peace prompting moves to challenge the supremacy of power over law. One result 
was the illegality of title to territory acquired by force. 134 If a state became weak, it 
could no longer be acquired by another state. Accordingly, this policy option for 
dealing with the threat such states posed for the efficacy of international law was 
removed. 
Another consequence of the prohibition on the use of force was the strengthening 
of the general prohibition on interference, which had obviously suffered while the 
balance of opinion favoured the use of force as an attribute of sovereignty. 135 The 
principle of non-intervention is often presented as a corollary of state sovereignty 
that exists in its own right to protect those matters reserved by sovereignty. 136 As 
Clapham has noted 'the rule that there should be no interference in state sovereignty 
simply begs the question: what are the rights and duties associated with 
sovereignty?' 137 Without doubt, as the International Court of Justice (lCJ) has 
emphasized, '[0 Jne of these [sovereign rights J is the choice of a political, economic, 
social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. 138 In other words, 
the target state's right to political independence. 
Although the scope of the prohibition on intervention is not susceptible to a 
precise standard, 139 and is ever-decreasing, debate tends to be about intervention 
from a distance, such as political influence over an existing regime. 140 In terms of the 
extensive debate about the legality of humanitarian intervention to put an immediate 
stop to immense human suffering, the general verdict is that it remains wrongful,141 
134 See Shaw, op. cit., fn. 24, p. 423; Kreijen, op. cit., fn. 29, p. 339; for a detailed history, S. Konnan, 
The Right o/Conquest: The Acquisition o/Territory by Force in International Law and Practice 
(1996) 135. 
m See Cassese, op. cit., fn. 130, pp. 98-99. 
136 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States). 
Merits, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14 at p. 108, para. 205. 
137 A. Clapham, 'National Action Challenged: Sovereignty, Immunity and Universal Jurisdiction 
before the International Court of Justice', in M. Lattimer and P. Sands (eds.), Justice/or Crimes 
Afainst Humanity (2003) 303 at 313. 
13 Nicaragua case, op. cit., fn. 136, para. 205; see also GA Res. 2625 (1970), in respect of sovereign 
equality, the declaration indicates that '[e]ach state has the right freely to choose and develop its 
political, social, economic and cultural systems'. 
\39 See Shaw, op. cit .• fn. 24, p. 191; G. Abi-Saab, 'Some Thoughts on the Principle of Non-
intervention" in K. Wellens (ed.). International Law: Theory and Practice (1998) 228 at 228 - 231. 
140 See, e.g., L. F. Damrosch, 'Politics Across Borders: Non-intervention and Non-forcible Influence 
over Domestic Affairs'. (1989) 83 AJIL I. 
141 See, e.g .• Simon Chestennan, Just War or Just Peaces: Humanitarian Inter\'en/~on and U 
International Law (200 I) 86; Antonio Cassese, . Ex iniuria ius orilUr: Are We Movmg T oware,c:-~/II~R.(\ SJ.fE"~ u~/y 
I..JSIIA 1'lE"1..D 
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but in extreme circumstances may be excusable. 142 Moreover, it is about putting an 
immediate end to suffering, not restoring effectiveness on the territory. Large-scale 
international involvement, of the type necessary to restore effectiveness - a military 
presence, administration, reconstruction of state and civil infrastructure - is 
prohibited, intervention to restore effective control on the territory has been ruled out 
in the interest of international peace. 143 
With both the annexation of ineffective territory and interference to restore 
effectiveness removed as policy options to respond to the loss of effective control in 
a sovereign state, one can understand why there would be a tendency for the number 
of ineffective states to increase. Whereas historically states that became weak would 
be conquered, international law now addresses such use of power and in so doing 
allows the weak states to possibly progress to ineffective states. Why, though, the 
presumption of continuity of statehood in international law, when long-term 
ineffectiveness of a state has an effect on the efficacy of international law and, 
arguably, threatens international peace? 
Jackson explains the existence of states lacking effectiveness through the concepts 
of negative sovereignty - the freedom from interference - and positive sovereignty -
the ability to act - and related ideas of juridical and empirical statehood. Where 
effectiveness is lacking, statehood is more juridical than empirical, and negative, 
rather than positive, sovereignty explains the existence of the state. 144 One difficulty 
with this means of explanation is that it neglects that states lacking effectiveness are 
still treated as fully sovereign by international society. They do not have an effective 
government, but they still have the freedom to act; 145 finding an agent to exercise the 
freedom to act is another matter and one returned to in Chapter 2. More troublesome 
for present purposes, this approach implies that the presumption of continuity is a 
corollary of state sovereignty. The state's right to political independence, which the 
prohibitions on the use of force, intervention, and annexation are designed to protect 
International Legitimation of Forcibile Humanitarian Countenneasures in the World Community?" 
(1999) 10 EJIL 23 at 25. 
142 See, e.g., Chestennan, op. cit., fn. 141, p. 236; Cassese, op. cit., fn. 141, p. 25; J. Stromseth, D. 
Wippman and R. Brooks, Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military 
Interventions (2006) 39. 
143 Legal justifications that can preclude wrongfulness, such as state consent and a SC chapter VII 
resolution, are addressed in Chapter 2 of this study. 
144 Jackson, op. cit., th. 90, p. 27; see also G. Kreijen, "The Transfonnation of Sovereignty and 
African Independence: No Shortcuts to Statehood', in G. Kreijen (ed.>, Stale!. Sovereignty and 
International Governance, (2002) 45 at 92. 
145 See Werner and Wilde. op. cit .. th. 91. p. 302. 
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(negative sovereignty), is earned through a display of effectiveness and is protected 
in the interests of international peace. Accordingly, the implication, when one uses 
the concept of negative sovereignty to explain the existence of states lacking 
effective control, is that the presumption of continuity is also designed to protect the 
right of the state to political independence in the interest of international peace. 
However, this misses the point that the state's right to political independence, which 
the prohibitions are meant to protect in an effort to deter international conflict, is 
supposed only to exist because of a display of effective control over the territory. 
There is, then, little reason why the state's right to political independence should be 
the basis for the presumption of continuity for states that lack effective control over a 
prolonged period of time. This is supported by the fact that statehood and the 
negative sovereignty, which counsels against international interference to restore 
effectiveness, flow from the presumption of continuity. In such a situation, it would 
make sense for the presumption of continuity to end. The emergence of the legal 
right of self-determination, as will now be detailed, provides a much more 
convincing explanation for the presumption of continuity, and is the final and 
decisive element in sourcing the paradox of state reconstruction. 
5. The Right to Self-Determination as the Explanation for the Continued 
Existence of Ineffective States 
The legal right of all peoples to self-determination is subject to almost as much 
contestation in international law as state sovereignty. 146 It is possible, though, to find 
general agreement on its core features and acknowledgement that, in light of the 
values which underpin it and its history as a political principle, it has the dynamism 
to effect a significant transformation of the status quo in the international system. 
Self-determination was included in the UN Charter as a political postulate 
promoting that all peoples be given the possibility of self-govemment. 147 This is 
what this study refers to as the political value of self-determination. Prior to this, as a 
146 See G. Simpson, 'The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post - Colonial Age', 
(1996) 32 Stan.JIL 255 at 257-58; G. H. Fox, 'Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: a New 
Internal Focus?', (1995) 16 Mich. J. Inl'l L. 733. 
147 UN Charter, Article I (2): '[The purposes of the UN are] To develop friendly relation among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to 
take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.': on the debates leading to its 
inclusion. see A. Cassese. Sd/-Determinalion of Peoples . .4 Legal Reappraisal (1995) 37-43. 
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political principle, it was utilised in a nwnber of different contexts to justify the 
possibility of self-government based, in theory at least, on the freely expressed will 
of the people. 148 These two aspects, the possibility of self-government decided 
through the freely expressed will of the people, can be seen as the ideas that self-
determination as a general principle stands for in international law. 149 Through 
charting the emergence and development of the international legal right of all 
peoples to self-determination, its role in relation ineffective states can be seen. 
A. The Origins of a Right to Self-Determination 
An understanding of the origins of the concept of a right to self-detennination is 
necessary to appreciate how it came to be transfonned into a legal right, and how it 
encourages a reorientation in the focus of international law from effective realities to 
the will of peoples - an impetus for the reorientation of international law from 
deference to power towards ethics. 
Evidence of self-detennination being invoked as a political principle to support 
policy choices can be found around the time of the French Revolution (1789). The 
French invoked it as a means of justifying the annexation of territory on the basis 
that the people wanted it to be annexed, with plebiscites used as evidence when the 
results suited. 150 Subsequently, in the nineteenth century, supporters of the 
unification of Italy adopted the idea of all nations having a choice about their 
status. 151 At the start of the twentieth century self-determination came to the 
forefront of international political debate. Lenin identified the right of a people to 
choose its political status as relevant in support of liberation of colonies and ethnic or 
national groups within sovereign states, and in the aftennath of conflict for the 
allocation of territory. 152 Lenin treated the political principle of self-determination as 
a strategic tool for the socialist cause; an act of self-detennination was to lead to 
federation, and then the integration of nations within socialist structures. 153 For 
Lenin, self-detennination in sovereign states was about secession. US President 
Woodrow Wilson was thinking about self-detennination at the same time as Lenin. 
148 See below. 
149 See below. 
ISO Cassese. Ope cit., th. 147, pp. 11-13. 
UI T. Musgrave. Self-Determination and National Minorities (1997) 7 
U2 See Cassese. op. cit., th. 147. pp. 14-19. 
m See Cassese. op. cit., th. 147. pp. 14-19. 
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Wilson's thinking on self-determination stretched over a number of years and 
encompassed a number of diverse elements. For present purposes it is sufficient to 
quote Pomeranace who identifies in Wilson's conception of self-determination a 
'confusion and fusion of several ideas': 
'freedom from "alien" sovereignty ("external self-detennination"), freedom to select one's 
own form of government ("internal self-determination "), a form of continuing self-
government (democracy), or the principle of one nation-one state' . 154 
The historical range of uses and ideas about self-determination indicate that it is a 
concept of potential relevance for a significant amount of international law. 
Governmental status, title to territory, state boundaries, internal infrastructure of 
states, the prohibition on the use of force, the rules on secession, are just some of the 
aspects of international law that could be affected by the emphasis on what a people 
want over the factual status quo which self-determination encourages. Thus the idea 
of self-determination of peoples holds the potential to radically transform the 
international system. However, the challenge to effective realities that it represents 
could significantly affect the efficacy of international law, and this is just one reason 
for resistance from states to its introduction into international law. Nonetheless, the 
will of a people is a much more ethically sound basis for law than the effectiveness 
of the controlling apparatus of a territory. Hence, with even just a slither of 
international support, the introduction of self-determination into international law 
was always going to be difficult to resist. 
World War II prompted negotiations between China, the USSR, the UK and the 
US on the creation of a world organisation. A draft Charter arising out of talks at 
Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 had no explicit mention of self-determination. At the 
insistence of the USSR, by the time of the 1945 United Nations Conference on 
International Organisation, an amendment that would become part of Article 1 (2) of 
the UN Charter was included: one of the purposes of the United Nations is to 
'develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
154 M. Pomerance. 'The United States and Self-Detennination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian 
Conception'. (1976) 70 AJIL I at 20; see also Musgrave. op. cit .. fn. lSI. pp. 22-24. 
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strengthen universal peace' .155 The terminology is also repeated in Article 55, which 
indicates a number of goals that members pledge, through Article 56, to promote 
with a view 'to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples' . 156 
Some have argued that provisions in Chapters XI and Chapters XIII, on Non-Self-
Governing Territories and Trusteeship (NSGTs), indicate that these 'people' had not 
just a politically endorsed moral entitlement but also a legal right to self-
determination at the time when the UN Charter was drafted. 157 In Chapter XI, Article 
73 provides that member States which administer NSGTs will 'develop self-
government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples'. The term 
'peoples' here is a reference to the inhabitants ofNSGTs. In Chapter XIII, Article 76 
indicates that one objective of the International Trusteeship System is to promote the 
'progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be 
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the 
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned'. The peoples are the inhabitants of 
Trust Territories. One might argue that the political ideal of self-determination of 
Article 1(2) included these territories; 158 the use of the terminology of self-
government associated with the Wilsonian conception of self-determination would 
support this. But there is nothing to suggest that it was a legal right to self-
determination. I 59 
The debate that preceded the inclusion of self-determination in the Charter 
supports that it was a political postulate, a suggestion, rather than a legal 
requirement, that states 'should grant self-government as much as possible to the 
communities over which they exercise jurisdiction.' 160 Nonetheless, the endorsement 
of the importance of the value of self-determination for the UN system, which its 
IS' See I. Brownlie, 'An Essay in the History of the Principle ofSelf-Detennination', in C. H. 
Alexandrowicz (ed.), Groatian Society Papers 1968, Studies in the History of the Law of Nations 
( 1968) 90 at 98. 
1S6 UN Charter, Article 55: 'a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health. 
and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c. universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race. 
sex, language, or religion. ' 
IS? See R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How Jre Use It (1994 112. 
158 See H. Quane, 'The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self -Determination'. (1998) 47 
ICLQ 537 at 545. 
159 See Higgins, op. cit., fn. 157. p. 112. 
160 Cassese, op. cit .. fn. 147. p. 42 and p. 43; see also Higgins. op. cit .. fn. 157. p. 111. 
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inclusion in the Charter represented, laid the foundation for its emergence as a legal 
right. The issue now turned to is how far its conceptual potential to transfonn 
international law has been realised, and what this has meant for states - which still 
remain the basic unit of the international legal system. 
B. The Emergence of a Right to Self-Determination in International Law 
The fact of debate about whether the understanding of Article 1 (2) envisaged 
secession is one reason for desiring greater certainty about what was meant by the 
term 'peoples' .161 Perhaps this influenced Kelsen who equated the tenn . peoples' 
with 'states' on the basis that 'friendly relations among nations' must mean states 
and that peoples do not have rights under international law; hence the clause in 
Article 1 (2) is just another way of referring to sovereign equality. 162 Kelsen was not 
suggesting that it meant peoples organized as states, but actually that peoples meant 
states. As sovereign equality was already a legal concept, Kelsen' s argument 
contradicts the idea of self-determination being a political ambition, but also, by 
suggesting that peoples are not separable from the state even in political tenns, 
sweeps away the rationale for the inclusion of the clause to promote the idea of equal 
rights of peoples. The manner in which the right to self-determination has since 
emerged in international doctrine supports the argument that people were to be 
viewed as separate from the state,163 although there remains no agreement on how far 
the meaning of people can stretch beyond the colonial context. 164 
(i) Self-determination in the colonial context 
A legal form for self-determination was first realised in relation to the termination of 
colonial rule. GA Resolutions 1514 (14 December 1960) and 1541 (15 December 
1960) reflected a consensus amongst states that non-self-governing territories should 
be allowed to freely choose their international status and how to implement the right 
161 See Quane, op. cit .• fn. 147, pp. 544-547. 
162 H. Kelsen, The Law o/the United Nations: A Critical Analysis o/its Fundamental Problems 
(1951) 52-53. 
163 See also Quane. op. cit .. fn. 158. p. 543. 
1M See K. Knop. Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (2002) 18; R. McCorquodale. 
'Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach'. (1994) ICLQ 857; L. Brilmayer. 'Secession and 
Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation '. (1991) 16 Yale Journal of International Law 177; 
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of self-detennination. 165 The emergence of the legal right was confinned and 
summarised in the IC]' s Advisory Opinion on Namibia of 1971. The Opinion 
confmned that, by virtue of the right to self-determination, all non-self governing 
territories, as per paragraph 2 of GA Resolution 1514, have a right to 'freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development'. And that the options for the exercise of this right of self-determination 
are: (i) sovereign independent state, (ii) associate with an independent state, (iii) 
integrate into an independent state. 166 In the Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara of 
1975,167 the Frontier Dispute case of 1986, 168 and East Timor case 1995,169 the 
Court confirmed the legal nature of the right in relation to decolonisation. In the 
latter IC] case, the court noted that it was a right with the character of erga omnes. 
but that this did not override the requirement of consent to jurisdiction. 170 The Court 
did not expand upon the intended meaning of the term erga omnes, which is 
generally taken to indicate a right opposable to all. 171 
The emphasis on decolonisation was based squarely on the external dimension of 
self-determination, escaping from foreign rule, rather than matters of internal 
organisation in the newly created state. 172 Moreover, in the words of GA Resolution 
1514, '[i]nadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness 
should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence' .173 Consequently, a lack 
of independent effective control of the territory should not have an effect on the 
creation of an independent state. This, in the context of decolonisation, appears to 
have reduced the level of effective government required for the creation of a new 
state in international law; leading to an increase in the number of weak states. 
Further, the self-determination reason for granting statehood in the colonial context, 
the importance that all people be given the possibility of self-government, logically 
16S See Cassese, op. cit., th. 147, p. 71. 
166 Legal Consequences/or States o/the Continued Presence o/South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion. ICJ Reports 
1971, p. 16, at pp. 31-32, paras. 52-53 [hereinafter Namibia Opinion]. 
167 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion. ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12. at pp. 31 - 33, paras. 54- 59. 
168 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali). IeJ Reports 1986, p. 554, at p. 566, para. 25. 
169 East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgement, IeJ Reports 1995, p. 90, at p. 103, para. 31. 
170 East Timor case, op. cit., th. 169, para. 29; citing Case o/the Monetary Gold Removedfrom Roml:! 
in J 943 (Preliminary Question). Judgement, IeJ Reports 1954. p. 19. 
171 Barcelona Traction. Light and Power Company. Limited, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 3, at p. 
32; see also J. Klabbers, 'The Scope of International Law: Erga Omnes Obligations and the Tum to 
Morality', in M. Tupamaki (ed.), Liber Amicorum Bengt Broms (1999) 149. 
m Cassese, op. cit., fn. 147, p. 74. 
173 GA Res. 1514 (1960), Article 3. 
counsels against the extinction of statehood even when all effectiveness is 10st.l7.$ 
The development of the right to self-detennination beyond the colonial context has 
enshrined this logic in legal doctrine. 
(ii) A legal right to self-detennination beyond the colonial context 
The opening for ratification of the two UN-sponsored International Covenants on 
Human Rights of 1966 - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
ICCPR; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ICESR-
indicated that there was to be a post-colonial role for the legal right of self-
determination. 175 Common Article 1 of the two covenants provides: 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, 
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case maya people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of 
the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article 1 does not restrict the right to those under colonial or indeed any fonn of 
external rule; consequently, there is debate as to who constitute the peoples. 
Consensus amongst states and commentators, in relation to self-determination 
beyond external rule, extends to the whole population of an existing state. 176 Other 
identifiable groups within a state are treated as exercising their right as part of the 
whole of the population. 177 This understanding of peoples leads self-determination to 
mean something different than in the colonial context. Rather than being about a 
one-off choice of political status of a territory, it is a continuing right related to the 
174 See C. Warbrick, 'States and Recognition in International Law', in M. D. Evans (ed.), 
International Law (2003) 205 at 228. 
175 Both in force 1976. 
176 R. Mullerson.lnternational Law. Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the 
CIS (1994) 90-91: Higgins, op. cit., fn. 157. p. 104. 
In See Opinion 2. Badinter Commission. II January 1992. (1993) 921LR 167: see. though, the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference reo Secession of Quebec. (1998) II DLR. 
(4th) 385 (SCC) para. 138. 
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internal running of the state.178 Article 1 (para. 1) gives the people of the state the 
right to 'freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic. 
social and cultural development'. These elements were framed in an abstract fonn on 
the basis that any attempt to list the aspects covered would be incomplete. 179 In an 
existing state it can be read as the right of a people to freely decide on the change 
and development of state and civil infrastructure, the people's right to political 
independence. This provides obvious support for the prohibition on the interference 
in the internal affairs of the state, which, as noted above, is based on the sovereign 
right to decide. 180 The exclusion of external actors from change and development of 
state and civil infrastructure might be seen as a form of external self-
determination,181 but the rights themselves are about internal self-determination. 
Under the Covenants, by Article 1 (2), governments are required to exploit a 
territory's natural resources so as to benefit the people. This is difficult to assess 
apart from in extreme situations when it is clear that the government is using 
resources to the benefit of a few, or has handed control to another state or 
organisation without guarantees that the people will be the primary beneficiaries. 182 
Article 1(3) can be seen as a duty to grant 'peoples of dependent territories (non-self-
governing and trust territories) the right to freely decide on their territorial status' .183 
Concurrent with the development of self-determination in the Human Rights 
Covenants has been the development of the customary legal principle of self-
determination. The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States (GA Res. 2625) was adopted by 
the GA, on the 25th anniversary of the UN Charter, in 1970. It is an elaboration of 
the rights and duties imposed by the UN Charter. It was adopted without a vote. The 
general view, confirmed by frequent reference to it by the ICI, is that the principles it 
dealt with reflected customary international law. 184 The 'principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples' is treated, in the Declaration, as an element of the 
rights and duties imposed by the Charter - confirming how the political principle in 
178 Cassese, Ope cit., fn. 147, p. 54; see also Knop, Ope cit., fo. 164, p. 19, note 57. 
In See Quane, Ope cit., fo. 158, p. 560 
180 See Cassese, Ope cit., fn. 158, p. 55; B. Conforti, 'The Principle of Non-intervention', in M. 
Bedjaoui (ed.), Internmiona/ Law: A chievements and Prospects ( 1991 ) 467. 
181 See Cassese, Ope cit., fo. 147, p. 55. 
182 Cassese, op. cit .• fn. 147. p. 56. 
183 Cassese, Ope cit .• fn. 147 , p. 57. 
1804 See Quane, op. cit .• fn. 158. p. 563. 
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Article 1 (2) had developed a legal meaning. 185 Moreover, the inclusion of the 
principle in the Declaration reflects that, as well as being a human right, it is also 
considered a fundamental principle of international law with important structural 
significance for the inter-sovereign relations paradigm of the international legal 
system. 186 As a fundamental principle it operates when there is a need for 
interpretation, application, or development of new law in relation to a particular 
practice.187 Cassese reads the general principle of self-determination or, in his terms, 
the 'quintessence of self-determination', as 'the need to pay respect to freely 
expressed will of the people.' 188 In light of its history as a political principle and the 
debate surrounding its inclusion in the UN Charter, it is reasonable to provide a 
clearer definition: where matters related to the possibility of self-government arise. 
there is the need to pay respect to freely expressed will of the people. 
The Declaration (GA Res. 2625) acknowledges in its 15t paragraph on self-
determination that: 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external 
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter. 
This is in line with the formulation found in Article 1 of the Human Rights 
Covenants, and supports that the population of an existing state have a right to self-
determination that prohibits external intervention. 
At this stage, in the interests of clarity, it is useful to address the relevance of the 
doctrine of jus cogens. This instructs that, at least, 'a treaty is void if, at the time of 
its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.' 189 
This is to protect the values and interests that are fundamentally important to all of 
international society, or in the words of the VCLT, 'the international community of 
ISS See J. F. Gareau, 'Shouting at the Wall: Self-Determination and the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory', (2005) 18 UlL 489 at 500. 
186 See R. Mullerson, Ordering Anarchy in International Society (2000) 166; also C. Drew. 'The East 
Timor Story: International Law on Trial', (2001) 12 EJIL 651 at 663. 
187 See R. A. Kolodkin, 'Fragmentation oflntemational Law? A View from Russia', in R. J. 
Macdonald and D. M. Johnston (eds.), Towards World Constitutionalism (2005) 223. 
188 Cassese borrows from the judgement of the Western Sahara case to identify the 'quintessence of 
self-determination', as the 'the need to pay respect to freely expressed will of the people' Cassese. Ope 
cit., fn. 147. p. 128; Western Sahara, Ope cit., fil. 167, p. 32. para. 55; see also J. Crawford, 'Book 
Review: Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisar. (1996) 90 AJIL 331 at 331. 
189 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 53. 
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states as a whole',19O and it does so by preventing a state from entering into a 
contract to achieve what it could not do unilaterally. The role of jus cogens beyond 
the law treaties is a work in progress.191 Which law has the status of jus cogens is 
also a subject of considerable uncertainty.l92 There is no authoritative list. Given the 
implications that attach to identification of a nonn as jus cogens one would expect a 
particularly high standard of state practice and opino juris before a rule was accepted 
as peremptory.193 The legal principle of a right of all peoples to self-detennination 
has been identified by an increasing number of scholars as a nonn of jus cogens. l94 
Once one starts thinking of the right to self-detennination as applicable beyond the 
colonial context, however, such an idea becomes much more unlikely. This is due to 
the potential significance of the status of jus cogens and the uncertainty that 
surrounds the substance of the right of self-determination. Thus this study leaves 
aside consideration of the impact that identifying the right to self-determination as a 
norm of jus cogens status might have. 195 
Similarly, debate about the extent to which the right to self-determination in the 
Covenants is co-extensive with the right in customary international law, or the 
related issue of how far the conceptual potential for the internal right to self-
determination to develop meaning beyond 'keep out', are not present concerns. 196 It 
suffices to note that, in light of the political origins of the concept, there is debate 
about the further legal meaning of a right to self-determination, and that the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) has indicated that, where there is uncertainty about the 
meaning of Article 1, it seeks guidance from the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations. 197 This latter point suggests that at least by 1996, when the Committee 
indicated this in its General Comment on Article 1, there was a strong basis for an 
argument that the customary and covenant law were co-extensive. 
c. Self-Determination and Ineffective States 
190 VCLT, Article 53; see also Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, No. IT-95-1711-TIO, Trial Chamber, 
Judgment, 10 December 1998, paras. 155-157; J. Frowein, 'Jus.Cogens.', (1984) 7 EPIL 329. 
191 For an account of the implications of jus cogens throughout mternattonallaw, see A. 
Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (2006). 
192 See D. Shelton, 'Normative Hierarchy in International Law', (2006) AJIL 291 at 303. 
193 A point emphasized by reference to acceptance by 'the international community of states as a 
whole' in VCL T. Article 53. 
194 See, e.g .. M. Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa (1986) 91; Cassese, op. cit., fn. 147, pp. 171-172. 
195 A point is returned to in the conclusions of this study. 
196 See discussion in Chapter 3. 
197 General Comment 12 (1996), para. 7. 
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As a legal principle beyond the colonial context, as has been set out, much remains 
to be resolved about the right to self-determination. There is, however, a core of 
accepted legal meaning, which grants the population of the state as a whole the right 
to 'freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development'. 198 This overlaps with the sovereign attribute of the 'right to 
freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems,.I99 
Accordingly, the prohibitions on forcible annexation or intervention that protect the 
political independence of a state also protect the right of the state's people to self-
determination. In light of this, in the normal run of things, there is arguably not yet 
much to distinguish the rights of the state from the rights of the people. 
However, unlike the right of the state to political independence, which it acquires 
through a display of effective control of the territory, the right of the people to 
political independence exists because of the fact that they are a people. The 
importance of self-determination as a value in its own right for the UN system has 
been identified by the HRC: 'its realization is an essential condition for the effective 
guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and 
strengthening of those rights'. 200 Seen in this light, self-determination provides an 
ethical justification for statehood and helps legitimise sovereignty.201 Accordingly, 
when effective control of a territory is lost for a prolonged period of time, the right 
of the people to political independence provides the best explanation for the 
presumption of continuity of the ineffective state. To extinguish the state simply 
because of a prolonged lack of effectiveness would, like intervention in the internal 
affairs of the state,202 be to violate the right of the people to self-determination. 
Hence the value of self-determination overlaps with international peace in terms of 
encouragement of the fact of ineffective states. But self-determination is the better 
198 Common Article 1(2) of the Human Rights Covenants. 
199 GA Res. 2625 (1970). 
200 General Comment 12 (1996), para. I. 
201 See M. Koskenniemi, 'National Self-Detennination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and 
Practice, (1994) 43 ICLQ 241 at 245. 
202 A number of commentators have identified how the right of the people to self-detennination is the 
best explanation for the continued deference to state sovereign~ when it co~es to mane~ of 
intervention, see, e.g., C. Tomuschat. 'International Law: Ensunng the Survival of Mankmd on the 
Eve ofa New Century', (1999) 281 Receuil des Cours 9 at 165; Mullerson, op. cit .. fn. 176, pp. 90-
91. 
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explanation for the presumption of continuity. How, then, does one explain the 
relationship between the right of self-determination and state sovereignty? 
The thesis of self-determination as sovereignty in abeyance, as argued by Bennan. 
is that self-determination is a doctrine which operates when, as a consequence of 
exceptional circumstances, state sovereignty is in question. Such circumstances are 
found in the context of the Aland Islands opinion, where Finland in 1917. recently 
liberated from Russia, was not yet considered to be a definitively constituted state, 
and the state of flux meant that a guiding principle other than sovereignty had to be 
looked for to determine whether the Aland Islands as part of Finland were free to 
secede and become part of Sweden. The League of Nations appointed two 
Commissions to investigate different aspects. In one report, the report of the Jurists, 
it was found that that the principle of self-determination may be taken into account 
during a period of transition when an entity is trying to become established as a state; 
meaning that the people of the Islands should have a voice, if a not a right to secede. 
in the search for a compromise solution.203 The other Commission, the Committee of 
Rapporteurs, found Finland to be a continuation of the autonomous State of Finland, 
hence a definitively constituted state for which the question of the Aland Islands was 
a matter of domestic jurisdiction.204 
As Werner has noted, the abeyance thesis also works well in relation to the 
exceptional circumstance of colonial domination. It 'nicely captures the role and 
function of self-determination: the right of self-determination was used to suspend 
the normal functioning of international law in order to create new sovereign states 
for the colonized people. ,20S However, in other exceptional circumstances, such as 
civil war, sovereignty is not lost. Rather state sovereignty and self-determination of 
peoples can be, and have been, called upon interchangeably to explain the 
prohibition on non-intervention?06 If one were to apply the thesis of sovereignty in 
abeyance to situations of a prolonged lack of effectiveness then it would not be an 
issue of sovereignty, only self-determination of people. In practice, however. there is 
no suggestion of ineffective states becoming only self-determination units, they 
remain sovereign states. 
20) Report of the International Committee of Jwists, .op. cit .. fn. 55. pp .. S - 6. ! ") 
204 Report of the Committee of Rapporteurs, 16 Apn1192l: LN Councd Doc. B7/~IJ68106 [VII], 2_-
3. 
20~ Werner. op. cit., fn. 97. p. 190. 
206 Werner. op. cit., fn. 97, p. 190. 
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Another means of indicating the relationship between state sovereignty and self-
determination is through the concept of popular sovereignty. Noted above. this 
identifies sovereignty not with the state but with the people of the state.207 It has long 
been used as a rhetorical device to legitimise governmental authority as something 
granted by the people, rather than obtained through a display or threat of force.208 
Certainly one might feel that it is more accurate for certain forms of government to 
identify themselves as the embodiment of the will of the people than others. 
However, it is just as easy for a military dictatorship as it is for a democracy to 
include reference to the will of the people as the basis for governmental authority in 
the state's constitution.209 The concept is so easily exploited because the means for 
identification of the will of the people remains a contested one in international 
law. 210 This means that potential interventionists might seek to employ it as a 
justification for intervention, identifying the intervention as in the interests of the 
will of the people and thereby not restrained by the principle of non-intervention.21I 
At the same time, incumbent governments might use their purported embodiment of 
the will of the people as a means of galvanising international support to resist an 
unwanted external intervention. 
The emergence of the legal right to self-determination gives the concept of 
popular sovereignty some legal bite. However, as things stand, one can only be 
confident that it stretches so far as to reinforce the right of the political community of 
a state to be free from external interference. This means that invoking popular 
sovereignty as a basis for intervention can be seen as disingenuous, given that as far 
as established international legal doctrine is concerned popular sovereignty signifies 
'keep out'. 
By identifying state sovereignty as the vehicle for the exercise of the right to self-
determination, whether terming it popular sovereignty or not, this legitimises 
sovereignty. 212 It also introduces a framework to transform the nature of the 
international legal doctrine associated with statehood. This is because, if one accepts 
the right to self-determination as the basis of state sovereignty, developments in the 
207 See, e.g .• M. W. Reisman. 'Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law' 
(1990) 84 AJIL 866 at 867. 
208 See Roth, op. cit .• fn. 128. p. 370. 
209 See Roth, op. cit .. fn. SO, p. 38. 
210 Roth. op. cit .• fn. 128. p. 370. 
211 See Reisman.loc. cit., fn.207. 
212 Koskenniemi. op. cit .. fn. 201. p. 245. 
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former do not clash with state sovereignty because they are part of it. Thus it would 
be hard to resist argument that any agreement on further meaning for self-
determination as a legal right would take priority over any pre-existing inconsistent 
law. If, for example, it were agreed that the right to self-determination required a 
government be of a certain form, to enter into agreements with a government without 
credentials based on such a form would be a violation of the right to self-
determination, and would be expected, in light of the significance of the right to self-
determination, to make any inconsistent rules of international law ineffectual. In 
light of such implications, the difficulty in gaining agreement amongst states on the 
meaning of the right to self-determination is understandable. This is further 
aggravated by the fact that states are not always consistent in their application of the 
right to self-determination?13 It is, though, important to keep this understanding of 
the relationship between the right to self-determination and state sovereignty in 
mind, as it is returned to in Chapter 3 as a potential means of responding to the 
paradox of state reconstruction; which it is hoped has become apparent. 
6. The Paradox of State Reconstruction: Nature and Significance 
The paradox of state reconstruction has arisen because of the way that international 
law develops on a 'needs' basis rather than in a holistic manner. Initially, states felt 
that there was a need to provide legal protection for their rights to political 
independence in the interests of international peace. To not prohibit the use of force, 
interference in the internal affairs of a state, and annexation through an illegal use 
force, could have been good in some respects for the efficacy of international law. It 
would have continued with the tradition of law following power and ensured 
effective states. But the legality of the use of force encouraged power to be used in a 
manner that could spark war and lead to immense human suffering. The consequent 
change in the law, however, means that weak states are able to persist and in some 
cases become ineffective with little prospect of being conquered. 
213 See, e.g., the acknowledgement by the UK that: ·self-determination is a concept which can be 
convenient for certain Governments on some occasions and inconvenient when it runs counter to their 
untrammelled exercise of arbitrary power. This is not. however. a reason to set it aside; on the 
contrary. such situations require that the principle be asserted with greater conviction.' Statement by 
UK Permanent Representative to UN (Sir John Thomson) to the Special Committee of24. 2 Sept. 
1983 AJAC.109IPV.1238, UKMIL (1983) 54 BYIL 405. 
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With a growing awareness of the importance of all peoples having the possibility 
of self-government in a world committed to human rights, a need to acknowledge 
and seek to implement the right of all peoples to self-determination arose. The 
implications attached to this concept have made it difficult to reach agreement on its 
legal meaning beyond the colonial context. It is, though, agreed that all peoples~ in 
the sense of a population of a state as whole, possess a right to political 
independence. In the normal run of things, there is little to distinguish this right from 
the state's right to political independence. Thus it serves to cement in international 
legal doctrine the importance for the UN system, amidst an ideologically plural 
international society, that political communities have a territorial space in which they 
are free to self-determine,214 in the sense of a freedom to decide on the change and 
development of state and civil infrastructure without external interference. However. 
unlike the right of the state to political independence, the right of the people has not 
been granted because of a display of effective control. Instead, the right is granted 
because of the existence of the people as a people. So not only does the right to self-
determination interchangeably underpin the legal protection afforded the state' s right 
to political independence, but it also provides a more ethically and logically 
convincing explanation for the prolonged continuation of ineffective states than the 
right of the state alone to political independence. This, though, creates a significant 
paradox. 
The continued existence of states without effective government leads to human 
suffering,21S and has been identified as a source of security threats for international 
society.216 The response of international law to such breaches of international legal 
obligations is the state responsibility regime. This, however, relies on the existence 
of a government that can be coerced into compliance. Accordingly, in the interests of 
human well-being, international security, and the efficacy of international law, other 
states are interested in restoring effectiveness through a military presence and 
reconstruction of the state and civil infrastructure; activity which, leaving any 
potential legal justifications until Chapter 2. contradicts the right to political 
independence of the target state and its people. 
214 See B. R. Roth, 'The Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty', (2004) 56 Florida Law Review 
1017: even Reisman concedes the importance of this point for international order. M. W. Reisman. 
Why Regime Change Is (Almost Always) a Bad Idea. (2004) 98 AJIL 516 at 516-17. 
:115 G. Kreijen. op. cit., fn. 29, p. 87. 
116 UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility. UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004). p. 25. 
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7. Retention of Sovereignty and International State Reconstruction? 
A number of commentators have speculated about how to engage with ineffective 
states to restore effectiveness on the territory in light of the retention of sovereignty 
by these states, which counsels against such activity. By addressing some of these 
ideas it is further seen how the restoration of effectiveness, through large-scale 
international involvement in the reconstruction process, appears irreconcilable with 
the right to political independence of the target state and its people. 
Helman and Ratner were among the frrst to suggest means of addressing a lack of 
effectiveness through international involvement. When the state was weak but not 
absolutely lacking in effectiveness they suggested that the government delegate some 
authority to the UN, which could assist with governance for a period of time. For 
instances of a complete lack of effectiveness Helman and Ratner suggested the 
resurrection of the UN trusteeship system.217 
The Trusteeship System replaced the League of Nations Mandates System, which 
regulated the administration of the colonial possessions of enemy states following 
the end of World War 1.218 The trusteeship system potentially applied to all colonies 
and dependencies but mainly affected the former League Mandates. 219 Under it, 
territories were administered by a foreign power, until such time as they could fulfil 
their destiny, which was independence. 22o A UN Trusteeship Council monitored 
events: '[t]he Councils basic responsibilities were to consider reports from the 
administering power, to accept petitions from inhabitants, and to provide for periodic 
visits.,221 Article 77 UN Charter describes to whom the trusteeship system shall 
apply.222 Article 78 crucially limits its use: '[t]he trusteeship system shall not apply 
217 G. B. Helman and S. R. Ratner, 'Saving Failed States', (1992-3) 89 Foreign Policy 3 at 13. 
218 See S. Chesterman, 'You the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State 
Building' (2004) 38. 
219 Chesterman, op. cit., fit. 218, p. 38. 
220 See, M. J. Matheson, 'United Nations Governance of Post-Conflict Societies', (2001) 95 AJIL 76 
at 76. 
221 Chesterman, op. cit., fit. 218. p. 39. 
222 UN Charter, Article 77: 'I. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following 
categories as may be place there under by means of trusteeship agreements: (a) territories now held 
under mandate; (b) territories which may be detached from enemy States as a result of the Second 
World War; (c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their 
administration. ' 
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to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship 
among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality' . 
Helman and Ratner thus propose amending the Charter so that willing states can 
choose trusteeship as an option. 223 Trusteeship as envisioned under the Charter 
arguably removes so much of the attributes of sovereignty that it could spell 
extinction of statehood.224 Moreover, even if such amendment of the Charter were 
possible, who would agree on behalf of the state and its people to such a radical 
circumvention of the right to decide? Essentially, what this suggestion boils down to 
in relation to the paradox, in light of the magnitude of authority that is transferred to 
the trustee, without a specific time limit or mechanism for it to end, is finding some 
government with the legal capacity to represent the state and its people so that it can 
sign the certificate extinguishing the existence of the ineffective state. 
Kreijen also identifies trusteeship as the best approach for restoring effectiveness 
in states suffering from an absolute lack of it. Rather than search for consent, Kreijen 
reasoned that as it is unreasonable to expect consent to be obtained from a state 
without an effective domestic government, the only way a trusteeship could be 
established would be extinguish statehood and with it 'the sovereign prerogatives 
that imply its consent', or, more specifically, the right to decide.225 For Kreijen this 
would be possible by removing recognition from the ineffective state. As noted 
above, this supposes that recognition is the source of statehood, when in fact it is 
better explained by the right to self-determination which once accepted cannot 
simply be removed at the whim of other states. This point is supported by Gordon 
who, far from advocating trusteeship, writing in response to Helman and Ratner, 
reasons that even if a government could be found and was so inclined to consent to 
trusteeship, the legal principle of self-determination might render it illegal to 
introduce trusteeship unless the choice could be seen as emanating directly from the 
people.226 In contrast to Helman and Ratner, then, Kreijen implicitly suggests getting 
the international actors to impose the extinction of the ineffective state. 
An alternative approach to the extinction of the ineffective state is the 
reinterpretation of its sovereignty. Schermers has suggested that while ineffective 
223 Helman and Ratner, op. cit., fit. 217, p. 6. 
224 See R. Gordon, 'Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship'. (1995) 28 Cornell International Law 
Journal 301 at 345-346; also see discussion in Chapter 2 of this study. 
225 Kreijen. op. cit .. fit. 29. p. 377. 
226 Gordon. op. cit., fit. 224. p. 323~ see also R. Gordon. 'Saving Failed States: Sometimes a 
Neocolonialist Notion'. (1997) 12 American University Journal of International Law and Polil..")· 904. 
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states have no apparent sovereignty, rather than being lost completely, it has been 
passed to the UN (World Community).227 This suggestion seems to transfer the right 
to decide on change and development, when there is a lack of effectiveness, while 
retaining the shell of statehood so the right to decide can be transferred back when 
there is effectiveness. 
A similar consequence appears to stem from the re-characterisation of sovereignty 
as responsibility by the Canadian commissioned International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).228 ICISS argues that sovereignty should 
be re-characterised, with control as the basis of sovereignty replaced by 
responsibility. This was supported by the idea that states are accepted into the UN as 
'responsible members of the community of nations' and the strengthening of human 
rights norms and the concept of human security that make a state responsible to its 
people.229 Such reasoning leads to the responsibility to protect, which is cast as an 
emerging guiding principle, and supports intervention to prevent human catastrophe 
through a duty to react, alongside duties to prevent and rebuild following 
intervention.23o In relation to the proposed duty of international actors to rebuild, 
there is no mention of the rights of the state and the people to decide. Interestingly, 
the Report does refer to the right to self-determination, but briefly, as a basis for a 
refashioning of sovereignty as responsibility - that permits, in certain circumstances, 
international involvement - rather than as limiting the involvement in the interests of 
the people's right to political independence.231 
Krasner is slightly more aware of the right to decide, he proposes: 
shared sovereignty, arrangements under which individuals chosen by international 
organisations, powerful States, or ad hoc entities would share authority with nationals over 
some aspects of domestic sovereignty would be a useful addition to the policy repertoire. 
Ideally, shared sovereiwty would be legitimated by a contract between national authorities 
and an external agent. 2 
227 H. Schenners, 'Different Aspects of Sovereignty' , in G. Kreijen, (ed.), State, Sovereignty and 
International Governance, (2002) 185 at 191. 
228 The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), December 200 I, available at: <http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#sovereignty> . 
229 ICISS, op. cit., fn. 228, p.13. 
230 ICISS, op. cit., fn. 228. p. 17. 
231 Ibid 
232 See, S. D. Krasner, 'Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States'. 
(2004) 29 International Security 85 at 88; see similar suggestions made by R. O. Keohane. 'Political 
Authority after Intervention: Gradiations of Sovereignty' , in J. L. Holzgrefe and R. O. Keohane. 
(eds.). Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical. Legal and Political Dilemmas (2003) 234. 
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Krasnser makes an attempt to accommodate the right to decide: '[b lased on contracts 
they would not involve a direct assault on sovereignty norms'. 233 But in the absence 
of an independent effective government such contracts could hardly be seen as 
giving any meaningful protection to the right to decide, not least because how would 
the local actors dependent on the international actors resist the desires of the latter 
when it came to reconstructionf34 
Ratner, in another work, sees difficulty in deciding which groups to obtain consent 
from, and identifies the intersection with the debate on humanitarian intervention -
intervention without consent, which does not address political independence. 235 
Ratner appreciates that there is a difficultly reconciling this approach with 
understandings of sovereignty that prioritise political independence. In response, 
Ratner suggests the international assumption of control should be seen as a means of 
enhancing sovereignty in the sense of the factual side of sovereignty, and, with 
sovereignty seen as popular sovereignty, as a means of furthering sovereignty in the 
sense of giving the people (eventually) the ability to exercise the continuing right of 
self-determination.236 This is a good example of how the various meanings attributed 
to the concept of sovereignty can be used to deflect attention from the right to 
political independence. The right to political independence as the cornerstone of 
international order is crucially, however, not one that can be easily elided. 
The ideas addressed, all, in one way or another, seek to facilitate international 
involvement through removing the right to decide. Collectively, they miss the point 
that, rather than encouraging its abandonment, the right to self-determination 
reinforces the ethical strength of the state's right to political independence. It is the 
importance of the right to political independence for the UN system and the 
commitment of states to the values that underpin its legal protection, which 
encourage one to believe that such options will not be pursued. 
8. Conclusion 
233 Krasner. op. cit., fn. 232, p. 119. 
234 The idea of consent to international involvement is addressed in Chap~er 2. . ').. 
23' S. R. Ratner, 'The United Nations in Cambodia: A Model fo~ Re,solutlon of Inten:'al Confhc~ .. 10 
L. F. Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervenllon In Internal Con/ltcts (1993) _41 at 
265. 
236 Ratner, op. cit .. fn. 235. p. 267. 
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This chapter has addressed the importance of effective control of territory for 
international law. It has been shown that effective control is essential for efficacy of 
the law. Without a government with effective control, enforcement mechanisms 
found in the doctrine of state responsibility become meaningless. An ineffective 
government, if one exists, is not able to respond to the human suffering and security 
threats found in ineffective states. This explains why international actors would be 
interested in restoring short-term effectiveness, through an international military 
presence, and seeking to encourage long-term effectiveness, through reconstruction 
of the state and civil infrastructure. 
This chapter has also, however, addressed what it is that has encouraged the fact 
of ineffective states and explains the continued existence of such states for a 
prolonged period of time. Both are down to developments in international law which 
prioritise the right of the state and its people to political independence driven by 
concern for core UN system values of self-determination of peoples and international 
peace. The guarantee of a territorial space for the political community in a state to 
self-govern is something that is important in its own right - all peoples should have 
the right to self-determination - as well as essential for international peace in a 
pluralist international society. International involvement in state reconstruction, 
without considering the relevance of state consent (considered in the next chapter), 
impinges upon the right to political independence. The state itself only has the right 
to political independence found in the doctrine of state sovereignty as a result of a 
display of effective control on the territory. Thus if this were the only right to 
political independence at the stake, one might more readily accept that international 
reconstruction should be prioritised over political independence as being better 
overall for international peace. However, the right to self-determination gives 
meaning to the old rhetoric of popular sovereignty and provides a much more 
ethically sound right to political independence. A point reflected in the fact of the 
prolonged continuation of states without effective governments. 
Simply removing or refashioning sovereignty, in contrast to most of the literature 
which has considered this matter, does not, in light of the right to self-determination, 
appear to be an option. Therefore those international actors interested in state 
reconstruction are faced with a troubling paradox: the explanation for the 
continuation of statehood is the same as the explanation for why intervention for the 
purpose of reconstruction is prohibited. How. then, can there be large-scale 
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international involvement in the reconstruction of an ineffective state in a manner 
that is consistent with the right to political independence? The next chapter deals 
with the relevance of established international law as a means of reconciling 
international involvement in state reconstruction without an independently effective 
domestic government with the right to political independence. 
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Chapter 2 
The Legality of State Reconstruction 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 has identified the paradox of state reconstruction. This is a reference to the 
idea that large-scale international involvement to restore effectiveness in an 
ineffective state, through a military presence and facilitation of the reconstruction of 
the state and civil infrastructure, risks contradicting the reason for the continuation of 
the target state as a state: the importance of the right to political independence for the 
core values of the UN system of self-determination of peoples and international 
peace. Consequently, this chapter asks, does established international law provide an 
answer that can reconcile the large-scale international involvement, necessary to 
restore effective control on a long-term basis, with the right of the target state and its 
people to political independence? Further, if not political independence, what about 
the attendant values of self-determination and international peace? The latter 
question is important because if state reconstruction neglected political 
independence, but was still able to accommodate the values of self-determination 
and international peace, which explain the legal protection afforded political 
independence in the normal run of things, this, it is premised, would encourage 
international acceptance of the practice. 
The chapter concentrates on how the most appropriate legal justifications, state 
consent and a SC chapter VII resolution, would position the international 
involvement in relation to the right to political independence of the target state and 
its people and the attendant values, and the extent to which the applicability of 
international human rights law could compensate for any shortcomings. 
The chapter argues that established international law provides the possibility of 
the preclusion of wrongfulness through, separately or combined. state consent and a 
chapter VII resolution. The possibility of state consent, however, relies on the power 
of international recognition, as evidence of the status of a government in an 
international legal sense, to override the requirement of traditional international legal 
doctrine that legal status is dependent on a display of independent effective control. 
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And international recognitio~ because of its subjectivity, is argued to offer no 
guarantees about the attachment of the government to the will of the state or its 
people, thus significantly reducing the extent to which state consent reconciles 
practice with political independence and consequently with the value of self-
detennination. With regards a chapter VII resolutio~ it is argued that this provides 
legality because member states of the UN have waived the right to complain about 
an infringement of the right to political independence under this heading. It is further 
contended that a chapter VII resolution, because it represents the apex of the UN 
collective security system, indicates that the practice is in the interest of international 
peace. Crucially, this is not seen to have any positive bearing for the value of self-
detennination. Accordingly, legality does not entail consistency with the right to 
political independence or the value of self-detennination and, as a consequence. also 
not international peace. 
The applicability of international human rights law is argued to offer some 
reassurance that minimum standards of human welfare will be realised during the 
process, but does not offer reassurance in respect of the values of self-detennination 
or international peace. Central to this latter point is the fact that international human 
rights law has been designed for implementation by a government that is accepted as 
an embodiment of the will of the state and its people. Thus the provisions are 
broadly worded, leaving significant discretion with little scope for meaningful 
accountability. And, most acutely for present purposes, international human rights 
law does not directly address the subject of change and development of state and 
civil infrastructure, a matter where, in the nonnal run of things, governmental 
discretion is prized. 
The chapter begins by addressing how a chapter VII resolution positions 
authorised activity in relation to the right of political independence of a target state. 
It then considers the competence and likelihood of the SC to authorise an 
international military presence and state reconstruction under a chapter VII 
resolution. Next, the chapter addresses how state consent positions activity in 
relation to the right to political independence, and, when there is no independent) y 
effective domestic government. the possibility of a valid source of state consent. 
Subsequent segments consider whether valid state consent would be possible in 
relation to an international military presence and international involvement in the 
reconstruction of the state. The penultimate section, referring to a situation where 
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reconstruction is not administered by an independently effective domestic 
government, considers the regulation and accountability that international human 
rights law would provide. 
2. UN SC Chapter VII Resolution 
The introduction of an international military presence to secure short-term 
effectiveness, and some form of internationally assisted administration of the state to 
allow for reconstruction of the state and civil infrastructure in the interests of long 
term independent effectiveness, would, in its discrete parts and as a whole, violate 
the right to political independence of the target state and its people. 1 A range of legal 
justifications can preclude wrongfulness in internationallaw.2 The International Law 
Commission's (lLC) Articles on State Responsibility include six such justifications: 
consent, self-defence, countermeasures, force majeure, distress, and necessity.3 
Whether they eliminate wrongfulness or act as an excuse for wrongfulness varies in 
relation to the justification at stake,4 and is a point to be borne in mind when 
considering the relationship with the right to political independence. The list does 
not include a chapter VII resolution of the UN SC, the focus of the Commission on 
state responsibility to the exclusion of issues related to international organisations is 
one explanation for this. Article 59 of the ILC's Articles does, though, indicate that 
the articles are without prejudice to the Charter of the United Nations, the law of the 
UN Charter is thus to be seen as a lex specialis in relation to the general law 
contained in the Articles. 5 
The central questions of this section and the next section, which deals with state 
consent, are: is it possible to preclude the wrongfulness of the international 
involvement for state reconstruction? Would this reconcile the practice with the right 
of political independence? And, to what extent does it accommodate the values of 
I See the relevant discussion in Chapter 1. 
2 See A. Abass, 'Consent Precluding State Responsibility: A Critical Analysis'. 53 ICLQ (2004) 211 
at 211. 
3 In the order listed. these are found in Articles 20. 21, 22. 23. 24, and 25. of the 200 I ILC's Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
4 See R. Rosenstock. 'The ILC and State Responsibility'. (2002) 96 AJIL 792 at 794; cf. V. Lowe. 
'Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A Plea for Excuses', (1999) 10 EJIL 405. 
'H. Duffy. The War on Terror and the Framework o/Inlernalional La,,' (2005) 60. note 72, 
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international peace and self-determination that would be put at stake with a neglect 
of political independence? 
A chapter VII resolution justification for international involvement in state 
reconstruction is addressed fIrst because, as it can originate separately from any 
contemporary input from the target state, one would expect it to be less consistent 
with the right to political independence than state consent. 
A. Chapter VII Resolutions and Political Independence 
A corollary of the sovereignty and equality of states is that international legal 
obligations (customary law and treaties) are dependent 'on the consent of the 
obligor,.6 Member States, in an exercise of their sovereignty in 1945, through a 
multilateral treaty, created and endowed the United Nations with separate 
international legal personality.' For the most part, the interaction of the United 
Nations with Member States is dependent on contemporaneous consent. This is 
made clear by Article 2(7) of the Charter which provides that: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll. 
The last clause indicates the exception to the rule. Member States, in the aftermath of 
World War II, decided that the UN SC should be given the power, in the pursuit of 
international peace and security, to create superior legal obligations and authorise 
activity that would otherwise, without contemporary consent, be wrongful.8 Thus the 
creation of the United Nations introduced a compulsory element into the otherwise 
voluntary set of relationships between states.9 
6 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn., 2003) 287. 
7 Reparationfor Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
1949, p. 174, at p. 179. 
8 The obligations created for states by chapter VII resolutions are, by virtue of Article 103. superior to 
other treaty obligations. there is scope for debate about the relationship with customary international 
law. particularly peremptory norms, see A. Orakhelashvili, . The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the 
Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions', (2005) 16 EJIL 59 at 
67; on the provisions which provide the binding nature of SC chapter VII resolutions, see below. 
9 See on the voluntary nature of international law. Case of the SS 'Wimbledon " pelJ Series A. No. I. 
1923: at 25; and Case of the SS 'Lotus', PCIJ Series A. No. 10. 1927, at p, 18; see also J. G. Merrills. 
Anatomy of International Law (1981) 1-17. 
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Querying how a chapter VII resolution sits in relation to the right of a target state 
and its people to political independence, is not to question whether so\"ereignty 
might prevent certain action being taken under chapter VII; as has been raised by 
defence counsel as a challenge to the legality of the chapter VII created criminal 
tribunals for Rwanda and the fonner Yugoslavia 10 Rather, the focus here is on 
whether the legality that flows from a chapter VII resolution also entails consistency 
with the right of political independence. 
One possible argument is that the original act of consent to the UN Charter. as a 
sovereign act, reconciles the chapter VII activity undertaken with the right to 
political independence of the target state. 11 This begs the question. to what did they 
consent? The substantive limits on the authority of the SC are returned to below. 
More pressingly, for the action of the SC under chapter VII to reconcile the activity 
with the right to political independence, the member states would have had to have 
consented to the SC acting as the agent of their right to political independence. 12 
This is because, if the SC is not seen as the agent, any decisions it makes which 
affect political independence must be seen as an infringement of the right to political 
independence, coming as they do from a foreign entity. After all, the essence of the 
right to political independence is that it is for the state and its people to decide on the 
change and development of state and civil infrastructure. 
It could be argued that the SC, when it acts under chapter VII, was intended to be 
treated as the agent of the target state's right to political independence, with its 
decisions to be understood as an exercise of the right to political independence rather 
than infringement, on the basis that the SC was created by the member states to act 
on behalf of member states. But the relevant clause in Article 24( 1) 13 could also 
merely be an indication that whatever the SC does, it is for the general good, not 
self-serving. Alongside the presumption that international organisations do not 
10 Prosecutor v. Tadic. Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-I-T, T.Ch. II. 
10 August 1995, at para. 2. and paras. 41-44; Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Decision on the Defence 
Motion on Jurisdiction, Case NO.ICTR 96-15-T, T.Ch. 11,18 June 1997. at paras. 13-16. 
11 For discussion of implied consent as a basis for chapter VII resolutions overriding peremptory 
nonns, see G. H. Fox, Humanitarian Occupation (2008) 214 - 216. 
12 On the concept of agency in international law, see A. Sereni, 'Agency in International Law', (1940) 
34 AJIL 638; D. Sarooshi, International Organisations and their Exercise of Sovereign Powers (~OO5) 
33-53. 
13 UN Charter, Article 24 (1): 'In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, 
its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the 
Security Council acts on their behalf.' 
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operate as agents for member states, because, it is strongly presumed. that the 
existence of an international organisation is a result of member states wanting to 
create something completely separate from their own personality, 14 another strong 
reason for not subscribing to the agent approach is found in Article 2(7). 
Article 2(7) stresses that the UN is not, in general, permitted to interfere in the 
internal affairs of a Member State, or in other words, to violate the right to political 
independence. If Member States had intended the SC to be the agent for their rights, 
it would have been logical for this to be included in the subsequent clause that 
explains how chapter VII relates to this rule. But, instead of marking chapter VII as 
consistent with the right to political independence, chapter VII is marked out as 
separate from the domestic jurisdiction principle, 'this principle shall not prejudice 
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII'. This suggests that 
chapter VII is to be seen as an accepted infringement rather than an exercise of 
political independence. IS Thus member states have, in creating the SC with its 
chapter VII mechanism, consented to the possibility of an infringement of the right 
to political independence in the interests of international peace. Or, in other words, 
they have waived the right to remedy for the infringement. Only, though, to the 
extent that the activity can be legally justified under chapter VII, which depends on 
how one understands the powers of the SC. 
The current arrangements in the SC, where only 15 UN Member States sit and get 
a vote and where only 9 concurring votes including the votes of the 5 permanent 
members are required for a decision to be made under chapter VII, give the vast 
majority of states little input in decisions which might affect their political 
independence. 16 Were it to be understood as the agent of the Member State, the SC 
which already starts to appear omnipotent, would be even more so. As its acts would 
have the endorsement of being consistent with political independence, the need for 
sensitivity to the right of the political independence, turned to below. would be 
significantly dampened. Presently, then, no matter how much within the powers of 
the SC under chapter VII a particular activity is felt to be, the resolution, on its own. 
will not improve the relationship of the authorised involvement with the right to 
political independence. It is to the issue of whether international involvement 
14 See Sarooshi. op. cit., tn. 12, p. 43. 
15 cr. M. Matheson. 'United Nations Governance of Post-Conflict Societies'. 95 AJIL (200 1) 76 at 8~. 
16 See UN Charter, Chapter V. 
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necessary to make the state effective would be in the powers of the SC that attention 
is now turned. 
B. Military Intervention under Chapter VII 
Logic dictates that the fIrst element of an international response to an ineffective 
state is the restoration of short-term effectiveness through an international military 
presence. The nature of the international military presence depends on the 
circumstances that explain the lack of effectiveness, in the sense of a lack of public 
order. It may be that civil conflict is raging in the state and the international military 
presence is needed to enforce peace through engaging in the war. Alternatively, it 
may be that hostilities have ended, perhaps through international enforcement. but an 
international military presence remains vital for keeping the peace in a volatile 
situation - providing order in a state with no functioning security infrastructure of its 
own. In UN terminology, the fIrst would be peace enforcement and the second 
peacekeeping; the line between the two can at times be blurred. 17 Would it be within 
the power of the UN SC to authorise such activity under chapter VII? 
Article 24( 1) of the UN Charter confers primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security upon the SC. The powers of the SC 
are found in chapters VI and VII, as well as chapter XII,18 of the Charter. Chapter VI 
is about the pacifIc settlement of disputes by non-binding recommendatory 
measures. Chapter VII introduces the binding enforcement element. It is for the SC 
by virtue of Article 39 to: 
detennine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression 
and [the sel shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Article 41 provides for non-forcible measures to be taken in order to give effect to 
the decisions of the SC in relation to circumstances identified in Article 39, which in 
accordance with Article 25 and 48( 1) are understood to be binding on all Member 
17 See H. McCoubrey and N. D. White. Blue Helmers: Legal Regularion o/United 'varions .\{i/itary 
Operarions (1996) II. . . 
18 Chapter XII is about the role of the SC an the trusteeship system. 
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StateS. 19 If Article 41 action proves, or is deemed, inadequate~ forcible action may be 
authorised in accordance with Article 42 to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. Article 42 provides: 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces 
of Members of the United Nations. 
Hence military enforcement action to address a threat to peace IS explicitly 
envisaged. 
Indeed, in the original collective security scheme, by virtue of Article 43, the SC 
was to have armed forces made available to it through special agreements made by 
Member States.20 Such agreements, however, 'were not arrived at because the unity 
of the wartime Allies [that permitted the creation of the UN] soon collapsed into 
bitter ideological struggle between East and West. ,21 Despite the lack of such 
standby forces, the SC has still, on numerous occasions, decided on the use of 
military measures under Articles 39 and 42. In the absence of an inextricable link 
between Articles 42 and 43, as McCoubrey and White note, 'it would appear 
acceptable for the SC to use the power granted to it in Article 42 without the 
mechanisms that were designed to make the imposition of military coercion a 
practical option. ,22 Thus, when making use of its Article 42 power, the SC has 
authorised ad hoc 'coalitions of the willing' to commence military enforcement 
operations in pursuit of objectives laid down by the SC. This approach raises a 
number of legal, military, and political issues, such as the degree to which the SC 
must retain control over the forces. 23 The important point, for present purposes, is 
that a military enforcement response is within the powers of the SC, albeit dependent 
on finding that there has been a threat to peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression, and sufficient agreement amongst the SC. 
19 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Afr.ica in N~"'.ibia (South Wt!st 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), AdVISOry Opmlon, ICJ Reports 
1971, p. 16, at para. 116 [hereinafter Namibia case]. 
20 UN Charter, Article 43. 
21 McCoubrey and White, op. cit., fn. 17, p. 12. 
22 McCoubrey and White, op. cit., fn. 17, p. 13. 
23 See G. Wilson, 'The Legal, Military and Political Consequences of the 'Coalition of the Willing' 
Approach to UN Military Enforcement Action', (2007) 12 JCSL 295. 
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Military enforcement achieves its objectives by force of anns against the will of 
those that it seeks to coerce.24 In contrast, peacekeeping has been defined as: 
an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, undertaken by 
the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of 
conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and co-operation.15 
UN peacekeeping refers to an ad hoc multinational force under UN command.16 
There is no express provision in the UN Charter providing a basis for UN 
peacekeeping. A resolution of, most commonly, the SC, but also the GA, can 
establish peacekeeping operations.27 Debate persists about which articles may serve 
as the basis for peacekeeping.28 In relation to the SC, depending on the nature of the 
role accorded the peacekeeping forces, the basis might be more properly seen as a 
power derived from chapter VI, Article 36(1) linked to pacific settlement, or chapter 
VII, Article 40 linked to overseeing provisional measures.29 In either case, even 
when the provisional measures are mandatory under chapter VII, the actual legal 
basis for the presence of the peacekeeping mission in the host state remains 
consensual. 30 Could the presence of a peacekeeping mission be authorised under 
chapter VII without consent? 
In the Certain Expenses case, an advisory opinion requested by the GA on the 
issue of financing GA established peacekeeping, the ICJ emphasised that 
peacekeeping operations are not enforcement actions.31 Some have thus argued that 
Articles 41 and 42 could not be the basis for the establishment of peacekeeping 
operations, on the basis that these articles deal with enforcement actions.32 However, 
there is wide discretion under Articles 41 and 42 for the SC to choose the appropriate 
24 See McCoubrey and White, op. cit., fn. 17, p. 18. 
2S The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (1990, 2nd edn.,) (UN Publication) 4. 
26 See McCoubrey and White, op, cit., fn. 17, Chapter 7 (Command Structures and Responsibilities). 
27 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 151, for the ICJ,.the theory ~fimplied ~wers, linked to a revie~ of the 
aims, purposes and powers of each organ, prOVides the basiS upon which UN organs can estabhsh 
peacekeeping operations, pp. 163-168; on the theory of implied powers, see N. D. White, The Law of 
International Organisations (2005) 111-133. 
28 See A. Orakhelashvili, 'The Legal Basis of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', (2003) 
23 Virginia Journal of International Law 485. 
29 See McCoubrey and White, op. cit., fn. 17, pp. 50-51. 
30 McCoubrey and White, op. cit., fn. 17, p. 51. 
31 Certain Expenses, op. cit., fn. 27, p. 166 and p. 171. 
32 See, e.g., D. Ciobanu, 'The Power of the Security Council to Organise Peace-Keeping Operations', 
in A. Cassese (ed.), United Nations Peacf!lceeping: Legal Essays (1978) 15 at 18. 
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measures. 33 Accordingly, there is no reason why something that at least looked liked 
peacekeeping could not be established. If there were also consent from the target 
state, there appears no reason why these articles could not serve as the basis for the 
establishment of an actual peacekeeping mission. Under Article 41 the use of force is 
excluded as an enforcement option, and thereby there would be a need for state 
consent to remove the force aspect and bring the action within this Article. If there 
were not state consent, particularly given the centrality of consent to the common 
definition of peacekeeping, the action would be better seen as enforcement action 
under Article 42. This is so, even if the conflict had ended and the military operation 
was merely maintaining the peace that it had achieved through force, because it 
would still be seen as forceful enforcement. Thus, while something like the 
peacekeeping function could come under chapter VII, without consent, it would not 
be peacekeeping in the normal sense. 
It is, then, possible for both roles that can be performed by the international 
military presence, enforcing order and keeping order, to be legally justified under a 
chapter VII resolution, without the need for any contemporary consent of the target 
state. In enforcing the peace, however, the UN will likely have to take sides,34 and 
even just the fact of an international military presence keeping order would affect 
how the future of the political community of the target state proceeds, thus there is a 
clear infringement of the right to political independence. That such an infringement 
would occur was foreseen by those signing the UN Charter, and the provision for 
such military deployment in the Charter represents a view that, in certain 
circumstances, an infringement of the right to political independence is justified in 
response to a threat to international peace. Still, the fact of chapter VII does nothing 
to address the value of self-determination. Moreover, the more the action taken under 
chapter VII becomes removed from what could reasonably be envisaged as within 
the powers of the SC, the more any infringement of political independence itself 
starts to become a threat to international peace. And, of course, the same military 
action taken outside of the chapter VII framework would be more troublesome for 
the value of international peace because it would be much more likely to be 
perceived as self-interested, rather than in the interests of international peace. The 
H See Orakhelashvili, op. cit .• fn. ~8. pp. 492-495. 
)~ See McCoubrey and White. op. cit., fn. 17. p. 19. 
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extent to which a consensual basis would address such concern is addressed below in 
Section 3. 
C. State Reconstruction under Chapter VII 
Once there is a degree of effectiveness in the target state, albeit short-term from an 
international military presence, the next step, in the pursuit of long term independent 
effectiveness, is state reconstruction: change and development of state and civil 
infrastructure to encourage the normal functioning of the state. While only possible 
following military intervention, the reconstruction aspect represents a more direct 
contravention of the right to political independence than military intervention. This is 
because it permanently affects the right to decide, whereas the military intervention 
has an effect on the exercise of the right to political independence but does not itself 
involve the actual exercise of the right. Moreover, reconstruction rests on a more 
distant link to international peace and security than the actual restoration of order in 
a state through a military presence. Thus there is reason to think that state 
reconstruction would not have been included in the powers of the SC by the Member 
States that signed the UN Charter. 
In fact, neither Article 41 nor 42 provide an exhaustive list of action that is 
permissible under chapter VII.35 And what 'may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security', a general limit that Article 42 places on the type of 
action, is hardly susceptible to definition. Accordingly, the vagueness of key articles 
and the significance of the powers granted have provoked considerable debate about 
the limits of the powers of the SC under chapter VII. The debate encompasses what 
constitutes a threat to international peace, and whether the SC faces substantive legal 
limits as to what it can authorise and therefore make binding on states. 36 How does 
state reconstruction figure in such debate? 
Chapter VII action is dependent on a determination of 'the existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression' by the SC. As Shaw notes, 
'[t]hreat to the peace is the broadest category provided for in Article 39 and the one 
3~ Prosecutor \'. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, No.lT-94-AR72, paras. 32-38.2 October 1995. 
reprinted in (1996) 35 ILM 32. 
36 See D. Akande. 'Are there Limits to the Power of the Security Council?'. (2007) 5 Journal of 
International Law and Policy 2-11. 
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least susceptible to precise definition. ,37 Accordingly, it is this category that is used 
to reconcile a chapter VII response to an internal matter, such as civil conflict. with 
the idea that the UN is about international peace and security. 38 In the search for 
limits to the concept, an obvious potential source is international law. Matheson is at 
one end of the spectrum of the debate, and seems to be of the view that, in the pursuit 
of what is necessary for the restoration and maintenance of international peace and 
security, the SC is essentially unbound by international law. Thus 'pennanent change 
in some aspect of the status, boundaries, political structure, or legal system of a 
territory within a state' would be within its power.39 Others, such as Akande, believe 
that there are discernible legal limits to be found in the purposes and principles of the 
UN, which the SC is obliged to act in accordance with under Article 24( 1) of the 
Charter, as well as from general international law, international human rights law. 
and peremptory nonns.40 
While the debate on whether there are legal limits to the powers of the SC remains 
inconclusive, political considerations dominate what little mention of international 
law occurs in the debates at the SC prior to the adoption of chapter VII resolutions.41 
In light of this, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that how far the category of a threat 
to the peace can be stretched is dependent on how far is politically acceptable 
amongst the membership, rather than there being a substantive limit that remains to 
be reached.42 This view supports the idea that there is a possibility that the SC might 
seek to pursue the reconstruction of state and civil infrastructure of a target state that 
has suffered from ineffectiveness for a prolonged period of time as a necessary 
response to a threat to international peace. 
However, the preservation of the right to political independence is a core feature 
of the UN system, which one would not expect to be easily disregarded even by the 
SC. This is reflected in the trend amongst scholars, those who have address the issue 
of legal limits, to mark out the limit as at least the exercise of the right to decide. 
37 M. Shaw, International Law (2003) 1120. 
38 See, e.g., SC. Res. 794 (1992) 'the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the [internal] conflict 
in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian 
assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security'. 
39 Matheson. op. cit., fn. 15, p. 85. 
40 D. Akande, 'The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is there Room for Judicial 
Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations'?', (1997) 461CLQ 309 at 317-325. 
41 See Fox, op. cit., fn. II, p. 204. 
42 See, e.g., International Commission on Intervention and State Sove~eign~)',. The Responsibi.lity ~o 
Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (200 I) 159: 'no theoretical limIts to the ever-wldenmg 
interpretation of international peace and security. ' 
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Alvarez is of the view that 'the Council must respect some essential core of 
sovereignty so that targeted states are not deprived of their right to statehood, 
including the right to self-preservation and to manage and govern their territory'. 43 
Similarly, Gill fmds, '[t]he UN - including the Security Council- cannot by means 
of invoking the enforcement provisions of the Charter, impose a particular fonn of 
government upon a majority or significant segment of a population of any state or 
non-self governing territory,.44 Furthermore, Judge Fitzmaurice, in the Namibia case 
at the ICJ, has commented that '[e]ven when acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 
itself, the Security Council has no power to abrogate or alter territorial rights, 
whether of sovereignty or administration' .45 This scholarly trend and the importance 
of the preservation of political independence for the UN system, encourages one to 
query whether the SC would feel it was within its powers to authorise state 
reconstruction; an activity which requires a greatly stretched reading of the concept 
of a threat to international peace, and which could risk becoming a threat to the 
peace through the degree of its inconsistency with political independence. 
This reading is supported by the argument that for the sake of its own legitimacy, 
even if not legality, there are certain international legal principles of such 
fundamental importance that the SC, even under chapter VII, should adhere to;46 the 
consequence of neglect being an increased risk that the broader membership would 
not implement the decision, thus undermining the authority of the SC.47 There is also 
the need to secure agreement amongst the members of the SC on what is necessary 
and proportionate. Here, the compromises involved are likely to severely limit the 
level of involvement that would be authorised in relation to the reconstruction of a 
state. Further, particularly China has been reluctant to support certain uses of chapter 
VII enforcement powers without contemporaneous consent of the relevant state.48 
It is apparent, then, that a chapter VII resolution could provide a legal justification 
for an international military presence to restore effectiveness short term, and for 
43 J. E. Alvarez, 'Judging the Security Council', (1996) 90 AJIL at 17. 
44 T. D. Gill, 'Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the U.N. Security Council to 
Exercise its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter', (1995) 26 NYIL 33 at 75. 
45 Namibia case, op. cit., fn. 19, p. 294 para. 115. 
46 See N. D. White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council after Iraq', (2004) 17 LlIL 645 at 
672. 
47 White, Ope cit., fo. 46, p.650 and p.655; T. M. Franck. Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions (1995) 26. 
48 See, e.g., D. Kritsiotis, 'Security Council Resolution 1101 (1997) and the Multi-national Protection 
Force of Operation Alba in Albania'. (1999) 12 LlIL 511 at 528-529. 
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efforts at state reconstruction to restore effectiveness long-term. Such a resolution. 
however, would not operate to reconcile the activity with the right to political 
independence. Rather, the legal justification stems from the fact that member states. 
in signing the UN Charter, waive their right, when political independence is 
infringed under chapter VII, to invoke the state responsibility regime; a concession 
driven by the interest all states have in international peace and security. Chapter VII 
activity is thus readily projected as in the interests of international peace, but this has 
no positive bearing for the value of self-determination. The reconstruction aspect, if 
only chapter VII authorised, would be much more dubious as an activity that could 
be said to be necessary to respond to threat to international peace, and could less 
clearly be said to be included in what the member states consented to, in terms of the 
permissible degree of infringement of the right to political independence when they 
signed the UN Charter. One would therefore not expect state reconstruction to be 
authorised, at least not without some other means of seeking to reconcile the activity 
with the right to political independence, such as state consent, considered next. 
3. State Consent 
State consent is the other legal justification that has the potential to preclude the 
wrongfulness of international involvement in state reconstruction. It does not 
necessarily follow, however, that state consent is a legal justification that reconciles 
the practice with the right to political independence. It is therefore important to 
consider how state consent positions the relevant activity in relation to the right to 
political independence of the target state and its people, as well as whether the fact of 
ineffectiveness on behalf of a government affects the validity of consent. 
A. State Consent and Political Independence (when the Government is 
Ineffective) 
It is an established point of international law that state consent can serve as a legal 
justification for otherwise wrongful activity in international law.49 There is. though. 
some uncertainty about how it is that consent to intervention functions to preclude 
492001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility. Article 20; see also J. Crawford. The International Law 
Commission's .~rticles on Stale Responsibility: Introduction. Text and Commentaries (2001) 164. 
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the wrongfulness of an activity that appears to infringe the right to political 
independence. Ago suggested that, in the case of intervention, consent suspends the 
nonnal operation of the rules.50 Alternatively, Wippman suggests that the lack of 
consent is central to the defInition of wrongful intervention. 51 If one starts from the 
basis that inherent in state sovereignty is a freedom to contract away parts of that 
same sovereignty, 52 and the level of contracting out must be within reason if the state 
t t . tat 53 W' , . wan s 0 remam a s e, Ippman s suggestIon appears to better encapsulate how 
state consent relates to the right to political independence. This is because consent is 
the vehicle for contracting out the exercise of sovereign rights, such as those that an 
unlawful intervention affects, and this means that the intervener is to be seen as an 
agent for the exercise of the sovereign right,54 unless otherwise indicated,55 rather 
than an infringement of the exercise of the right. In contrast, Ago's suggestion 
implies that the intervention remains a wrongful one that infringes the right to 
political independence, but one that is excused because the right to complain has 
been waived. 
The choice that depicts the lack of consent as central to the definition of the 
wrongfulness of intervention, is further supported by the fact that if a state consents 
to have another state conduct activity on its territory other states are not permitted to 
interfere with that activity. In this respect, to suggest that state consent just suspends 
the normal operation of the rules on state responsibility while an infringement of 
political independence remains, does not encapsulate how the consent serves to 
transform the activity it into an internal affair of the host state. The ultimate point, in 
relation to intervention, is that valid state consent projects that there is consistency 
with the right to political independence, on the basis that one agent, the governmen~ 
has passed its competence in relation to the right to decide on to another agent, the 
international actor - an actor which must operate within the confines of the consent 
50 R. Ago, Eighth Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. AlCN .4/318 (1979) and Add. 1-4 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1979) 31 - 32. 
51 D. Wippman, 'Military Intervention, Regional Organization, and Host State Consent'. (1996) 7 
Duke J. Compo & Int'l L. 209 at 210; see, making a similar point, A. V. Thomas and A. J. Thomas. 
Non intervention - The Law and its Import in the Americas (1956) at 91. 
52 Wimbledon case, op. cit., fn. 9, p. 25; 
53 B. Roth, 'The Illegality of Pro-Democratic Invasion Pacts', in G. Fox and B. Roth (eds.), 
Democratic Governance in International Law (2000) 328 at 330. 
54 On the concept of agency in international law, see Sarooshi, op. cit .. fn. 12. pp. 33-42. 
55 In the light of this, it is important to remember the argument from abo~e th~t, through si~ing the 
UN Charter, the UN member states waived (contracted away) the sovereign right to complam about a 
violation of the right to political independence in relation to action taken under chapter VII. rather 
than consenting to the SC acting as the agent. 
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given. This, thou~ raises the question of who can serve as the agent of the right of 
the state and its people to political independence so as to provide valid state consent? 
The validity of consent is dependent on the rules in international law for the 
expression of the will of the state. 56 States are abstract legal institutions; an agent is 
needed for the exercise of legal personality. For the most part, international law 
identifies the government as the sole agent of the state. 57 Traditional international 
legal doctrine identifies a government on the basis of effective control of the state. 58 
This provides an objective basis for international actors to identify the government. 
moreover, effective control suggests some meaningful attachment to the state, and it 
entails the potential for obligations to be fulfilled. 59 
'People' is nearly as much as an abstraction as the state.60 In respect of the right of 
the people as the population of the state as a whole to self-determination, effective 
control is also the traditional basis for identification of the agent of the people. This 
is because the ability to exert effective control suggests acquiescence of the people 
and, however unsatisfactory, is as far as consensus has stretched in an ideologically 
pI uralistic international society. 61 
The relative nature of the effective control test, 'effective enough', means that 
provided a government has a modicum of independent effective control of the state, 
it is possible to argue that it retains the credentials to be treated as the agent of the 
state and its people.62 Accordingly, on the basis that there is a lack of an objective 
basis for identification of the agent of the target state and its people, which one might 
logically assume would be necessary if consent was not to be opened up to abuse by 
those interested in involvement, state consent might be expected to be excluded as a 
possible legal justification for international involvement in the reconstruction of a 
state where all semblance of effective control is absent. Do the rules on valid state 
consent address such a situation? 
S6 Crawford, op. cit., fn. 49, p. 164. 
S7 J. Crawford, The Creation o/States in International Law (2006) 33-4. 
sa Tinoco Arbitration (Great Britain and Costa Rica) (1923) 1 RIAA. 375; see also J. Crawford, 
'Democracy in International Law', (2003) 64 BYIL 113 at 119. . 
S9 See B. R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999) 137 - 42; D. WIPPman. 
'Treaty-Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?'. 62 University o/Chicago Law Review (1995) 607 at 
612 and references therein at note 26. 
60 Roth, op. cit .• fn. 59, p. 430. 
61 Roth. op. cit .• fn. 59, p. 419. . .. .. ., 
62 For criticism of effective control test as not free from subjectiVity In Its application. see M. 
Aristodemou. 'Choice and Evasion in Judicial Recognition of Governments: Lessons from Somalia'. 
(1994) 5 £.IlL 532. 
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Different factors that can affect the validity of consent include coercion, either of 
the representatives of the state or the state itself, as well as the competence of those 
purporting to act on behalf of the state.63 The basic rules on competence are found in 
Article 7 of the VCLT. Essentially, Article 7 lists the relevant positions in 
government that are presumptively able to provide consent. 64 There is no suggestion 
of a lack of governmental effectiveness making a difference to the validity of the 
consent, possession of status as the government in the sense of international law 
appears sufficient. 6S 
To possess governmental status in the sense of international law, the general rule 
is that recognition is declaratory, and that status, as was decided in the Tinoco 
Claims Arbitration,66 is based on effective control of the territory.67 However, as 
with statehood, international recognition serves as evidence of status. Importantly, 
those states that no longer adopt the policy of recognising governments do 
occasionally still use it to support the position of favoured governments.68 And, by 
indicating the position of other states in relation to a particular government, the 
occurrence of diplomatic relations serves a similar role to recognition.69 International 
recognition has therefore continued as a means of helping to preserve or establish the 
status of governments struggling for effective control. 70 
International recognition is a matter of discretion for the recogruslng state. 
Consequently, where a government's status in an international legal sense rests 
largely on the fact of international recognition, it is hardly conceptually consistent to 
63 See Abass, op. cit., fn. 2, p. 214. 
64 1969 VCLT, Article 7 (2a) 'Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs'. 
6.5 See Application o/the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o/the Crime o/Genocide. 
Preliminary Objections, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 595, at pp. 621-2; while some commentators 
use 'legitimate government' to indicate a government that meets the criteria for governmental status 
in international law, this is easily confused with the use of the term 'legitimate' to suggest political or 
moral approval. Accordingly, this article avoids the term 'legitimate' in relation to governmental 
status; support for this approach is found in S. Talmon, 'Who is a Legitimate Government in Exile? 
Towards Nonnative Criteria for Governmental Legitimacy in International Law', in G. S. Goodwin-
Gill and S. Talmon (eds.), The Reality o/International Law: Essays in Honour o/Ian Brownlie (1999) 
499 at 537. 
66 Tinoco Arbitration, op. cit .. th. 58. 
67 M. J. Peterson, Recognition o/Governments: Legal Doctrine and Stale Practice. 1815-1995 (1997) 
37 and 49. 
68 See Peterson. op. cit .. fn. 67. p. 182; C. Warbrick, • States and Recognition in International Law'. in 
M. Evans (ed.), International Law (2006) 256. 
69 See Crawford. op. cit., th. 57. p. 152: S. Talmon. Recognition o/Governments in International Law 
(1998) 5-7: in this respect. the UK were keen to present its dealings with the TaJiban. when the laner 
exercised a degree of effective control in Afghanistan. as not inter - governmental. see UKMIL 72 
BrIL (2001) p. 578. 
70 See, e.g., Genocide case. op. cit .. fn. 65. p. 622. 
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view this government as the agent of the rights of the state and its people. One might 
accept that such a government, out of practical necessity, can represent the state and 
its people in relation to matters that do not have a significant effect on the political 
independence of the state and its people; such as the signing of a postal treaty. Yet, 
one should still question whether status that is dependent on international recognition 
should be sufficient for a government to be competent to provide valid consent to a 
process which will have a significant impact on the right to political independence, 
given the significance of this right for the values of self-determination and 
international peace.71 Thus the next two segments address whether an ineffective 
government could provide valid consent to an international military presence and 
international involvement in the state reconstruction process. In the following 
discussion, the voluntary nature of consent is assumed, if coercion was identified this 
would serve to invalidate consent. 72 
B. Consent to Military Intervention (when the Government is Ineffective) 
Is consent from an ineffective government a possible legal justification for an 
international military presence? Further, how does the fact of consent in light of a 
lack of independent effectiveness position the military presence in relation to the 
right to political independence? 
In terms of enforcing order, there has in the past been some debate about whether 
a still internationally recognised but increasingly ineffective government, in the 
context of a civil war, could offer valid consent to international military intervention 
to assist it. 73 This was underpinned by a concern for the protection of the right of the 
state and its people to political independence, the agent of these rights being 
uncertain in a time of civil war when effective control was in doubt. 74 Despite the 
strong conceptual logic of the purported rule, its strength has always suffered. This is 
primarily because of the ease by which those accused of violating it can claim there 
71 This reasoning fmds support in comments from Wippman, op. cit., fn. 59, pp. 666 - 667; see also L. 
Doswald-Beck, 'The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government'. (1985) 
56 BYIL 189 at 200. 
7:! See Article 51 and Article 52 of the 1969 VeL T. 
73 See Doswald-Beck. op. cil., fn. 71; A. Tanc&.. Foreign Armed Inlen'enlion in Internal Con/lier 
(1993); D. Acevedo 'The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of EtTectiveness in Protecting 
Democracy" in L. Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Reslrainl- Collective Inlen'emion in Internal Con/hels 
(1993) 119 at 139. 
14 Doswald-Beck. op. cit .• til. 71. pp. 200-21 I . 
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had already been external assistance for the other side, which can justify further 
involvement on the basis of collective self-defence.75 Today, whether the rule exists 
in relation to civil war,'6 or military assistance to an ineffective government in 
general,77 is highly doubtful. This is particularly so in light of the recent example of 
the international recognition of the formed-in-exile government of Somalia and the 
toleration of Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia at the request of that government. 
against contestants who controlled far more of the population and territory. 78 
It would, then, be possible for an ineffective government to provide valid consent 
to an international military intervention to enforce order in its state. Without 
effective control there would be no objective basis for identification of the 
government as the agent of the rights of the state and its people. The validity of the 
consent and the relationship of consensual activity and political independence would 
signify that the activity was consistent with the right to political independence. 
However, in reality it could be that a government with little support from the people 
is put in control of the state, which would severely affect the process for exercising 
the right to political independence. If this occurred within the framework of a chapter 
VII resolution one might be reassured in terms of the threat to international peace as 
it would reduce the perception of self-interest, but this would not improve matters in 
relation to the value of self-determination. 
Peacekeeping, in line with common definition, only exists where there is 
consent. 79 Military intervention without a consensual basis is thus enforcement 
action. If enforcement occurs without a chapter VII resolution, international 
responsibility is incurred. Along with consent, the other basic principles which 
define peacekeeping and distinguish it from an enforcement action are 
neutrality/impartiality and the use of force in self-defence.8o These principles were 
identified by the UN Secretary, following the first UN Peacekeeping Operation, 
" Wippman, op. cit .• fu. 51, p. 220; see also Tanca, op. cit., fu. 73, p. 92; T. J. Farer, 'A Paradigm of 
Legitimate Intervention', in L. F. Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in 
Internal Conflicts (1993) 316 at 319. 
76 C. J. Le Mon, Vnilaterallntervention by Invitation in Civil Wars: The Effective Control Test 
Tested', (2003) 35 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 741 at 741. . 
77 Institut De Droit International, 10th commission: Present Problems of the Use of Force m 
International Law. D. Sub-group on Intervention by Invitation. Rapporteur G. Hafner (2007) p. 263. 
78 See discussion in Chapter 6. 
79 Certain Expenses case, op. cit., fn. 27. p.165 . ' . 
80 See N. Tsagourias. ·Consent. NeutraJityllmpartiality and the Use of Force m Peacekeepmg: Their 
Constitutional Dimension', (2003) 11 JCSL 465. 
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UNEF,81 in 1958, and are continuously reiterated. Consent means the operation has 
to be wanted by the target state. It provides a legal basis for the presence. but also 
allows the operation to achieve its aims through co-operation rather than 
confrontation.82 Impartiality refers to the actual conduct of the operation, and means 
it must hold no prejudices towards participants in a conflict and should not influence 
the course of events.83 'Neutrality is about the apolitical character of the operation 
that facilitates those involved in the crisis to give their assent, confident that they are 
not compromising their respective positions.,84 Use of force only in self-defence 
indicates that the military presence is about supervision and a visible deterrent rather 
than enforcement action aimed at affecting the distribution of power.85 While these 
principles offer a potential reason, in contrast with peace enforcement, not treating 
peacekeeping as offensive to the target state's sovereignty, or, more specifically. as 
an infringement of the right to political independence.86 Still, the ideals that the 
principles represent are easier to live up to in certain circumstances than others. In 
intra-state conflict, if only the government consents to the peacekeeping military 
presence there is greater likelihood of there having to be enforcement. And even if 
there is additionally the consent of the different factions that have been fighting, 
there is still the issue of whether that consent actually reflects a source of control 
over those that have been fighting. 87 
Regardless of its ideals, however, when consent comes from an ineffective 
government, there are still reasons to be concerned about the relationship of 
peacekeeping with political independence. 
Were the government to retain some degree of effectiveness, one would treat 
consent as making peacekeeping an exercise of the right to political independence. 
However, where the government lacks all independent effectiveness even before the 
deployment of peacekeepers, such as where a government has been put in place 
81 UNEF: Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the 
Force: Report of the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, Thirteenth Session, Annex I, Agenda Item 
65, UN doc. Al3943 (1958), 9. 
82 See Tsagourias, Ope cit., fn. 80, p. 481; consent is also a factor in relation to the composition of the 
peacekeeping force, A. Di Blase, 'The Role of the Host State's Consent with Regards to ~on­
Coercive Actions by the United Nations', in A. Cassese (ed.), United Nations Peacekeepmg: Legal 
Essays (1978) 55 at 58-69. 
83 Tsagourias, op. cit .. fn. 80, p. 478. 
u Tsagourias. op. cit .. fn. 80, p. 478. 
"P. F. Diehl. International Peact!kt!eping (1994) 7. 
86 See. e.g., McCoubrey and White. op. cit .. fn. 17, p. 84; N. D. White. Kt!eping tht! Pt!uct!' (1992) 
204. 
87 McCoubrey and White, op. cit .. fn. 17. p. 85. 
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through peace enforcement, it is hard to accept that the government would be able to 
continue in authority without the peacekeeping force. In such a context. 
peacekeeping pennits a government that could not otherwise exercise the rights to 
decide, to do so. Thus peacekeeping also affects the exercise of the right to political 
independence, albeit more discreetly than peace enforcement. 88 
In terms of ensuring the peace holds, there are clear practical benefits from 
seeking the consent of all the parties to a conflict for deployment of a peacekeeping 
force. 89 Although international legal doctrine does not require it, 90 one might still 
think that this would cure the affect on the right to political independence by 
ensuring that the political community of the state was adequately represented.91 One 
is, certainly, easily convinced that the consent of various groups struggling for 
effective control of a state is more representative than the consent of one group, the 
government. However, it remains the case that there is no consent from a 
government that because of its independent effective control can be accepted as 
embodying the state and its people's right to political independence. Instead, without 
any alternative to the effective control rule, it is a matter of discretion for the 
international actors as to which groups within the state are engaged with; groups that 
even between them might still struggle to exercise effective control of the state 
without an international military presence. Moreover, because international legal 
doctrine only requires the consent of the government, should the consent of one of 
the other groups engaged with be withdrawn, this would not result in wrongfulness, 
despite the further reduction in consistency with the right to political independence 
that this would represent. 
When restoring or keeping order come within a chapter VII resolution, there is a 
reassurance that the interests of international peace are being served, because such 
activity is readily seen as consistent with the collective security system that states 
sign up to with the UN Charter. When occurring outside of chapter VII. only on the 
legal basis of consent, the international military presence to bring order is less 
securely in the interest of international peace. Nonetheless, valid consent is clearly 
88 See further discussion in Chapter 6. 
89 C. Gray, 'Host- State consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia' (1996) 7 Dulce 1. 
Compo & Int'l L. 241 at 245. 
Q() Gray, op. cit., fit. 89, p. 245. .. . 
91 See Wippman. op. cit., fit. 51. pp.224-234; cf. G. Nolte, 'Restonng Peace by Regional Action: 
International Legal Aspects of the Liberian Conflict', (1993) 53 Zeilschrift Fur Auslandisch.:s 
Offentliches Recht und JloIJcJcerrecht603 at 623-625. 
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possible, and, in its favour, it at least projects greater consistency than an 
intervention without any effort to fmd consensual basis. The level of international 
recognition the supported government has received is of obvious importance for the 
validity of consent. Based on the worthiness of a government in the eyes of 
international actors,92 the degree of international recognition does not improve 
matters with the right to political independence, and consequently the value of self-
determination. Greater international recognition does, though, reduce the chances of 
the activity sparking international conflict as result of third states seeking to uphold 
the right to political independence of the target state. 
C. Consent to State Reconstruction (when the Government is Ineffective) 
The international military presence, that provides the short-term effectiveness, will at 
some point have to leave. State reconstruction, understood as change and 
development of the state and civil infrastructure, is seen as a key element in the 
policy approach that is required if long-term effectiveness is to be ensured. It reflects 
the fact that the existing state infrastructure is not seen as adequate to support 
prolonged effectiveness. The short-term effectiveness ensures conditions where 
change can be introduced. All aspects of the state can be included, especially those at 
the heart of the right to political independence, such as the form of government, the 
economy, and security infrastructure. Could an ineffective government consent to an 
international actor administering this reconstruction? 
Whereas there has been debate about the competence of an ineffective government 
to invite military intervention to support it, there has been little attention given to 
whether the same government could consent to an international actor administering 
the reconstruction. An obvious reason is that such a government would not be 
inclined to contract out such authority. It is, though, still important to enquire into 
whether it would be legally valid for it to do so, not only because its occurrence is 
not implausible, but also because if it lacked the competence to contract out. this 
would be an obvious reason to question its own authority to administer 
reconstruction when effectiveness is dependent on an international military presence. 
However, in the latter respect, in the light of the discussion above. it is difficult to 
92 See Tanca. op. cit .. fn. 73. p. 139. 
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imagine that a lack of independent effectiveness would be fatal for the legal validity 
of consent. This is despite the contrast in consistency, with the right to political 
independence, between a government with independent effective control and one 
dependent on an international military presence for effective control. Thus an 
otherwise ineffective government could administer the reconstruction process itself. 
Nonetheless, limits on what can be consented to by way of international involvement 
in the reconstruction process could still exist, not least because issues related to the 
continuation of state are introduced when sovereign rights are contracted out. 
As the government is treated as the embodiment of the right to political 
independence it is possible for it to contract all of the right to decide, all of its 
sovereignty, away.93 However, in so doing, the state would cease to exist as a 
sovereign state, the territory and its political community would become part of 
whatever entity the right to political independence was contracted to. What, then, is 
the extent of what can be consented to while retaining status as a sovereign state? 
International law itself exists because of a willingness of states to use their power 
to limit their power in the interests of co-existence and co-operation.94 The entry into 
a legal obligation is not itself a reduction of sovereignty.95 What matters is the 
substance of the obligation. To date, even the most invasive limitations that states 
have created for themselves, such as those resulting from membership of the 
European Union, do not affect the existence of the state as a state. As Lauterpacht 
has noted, '[ t ]he State remains a sovereign State in international law and continues to 
be able to guide its future destiny within the limits that it has itself accepted. ,96 Thus 
while the discretion of states is bounded by international law there is still a need for 
autonomous decision-making, hence there is still meaning in the right to political 
independence as the right to make those decisions free from interference.97 If a 
state's discretion in its decision making is given away, despite any pretence that 
sovereign statehood is retained, one would struggle to accept that the state continued 
as a sovereign state. Roth gives the example that • a sovereign State cannot exist 
which privileges foreign States to use force within it to impose a will other than that 
9) R. Jennings. 'Sovereignty and International Law' in G. Kreijen (ed.), State. Sovereignty. and 
International Governance (2002) 27 at 36. 
94 See W. Friedmann. The Changing Structure of International Law (1964). 
95 See Wimbledon case, op. cit.. fn. 9. p. 25. 
96 E. Lauterpacht. 'Sovereignty-Myth or Reality'. (1997) 73 International Affairs 137. 
97 See B. R. Roth, 'The Endwing Significance of State Sovereignty', (:!004) 56 Florida Law Rc!\'iew 
IOt7. 
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of the political community as manifest at that time.,98 Accordingly, if a government 
was to consent to have another entity exercise the right to political independence 
completely one would expect that state to cease to exist as such; the irreducible core 
of sovereignty would be 10st.99 How much discretion could be given up before there 
is no core left would be a hard point to judge and one dependent on the 
circumstances; one for which international recognition would serve as evidence. 100 
Indeed, the significance of international recognition as evidence of statehood might, 
of course, help sustain the continuation of statehood even when there is clearly no 
discretion left. 
In the normal run of things, where the consent to an international exercise of right 
to political independence came from an effective government, giving away the right 
to political independence could be reconciled with the right to political 
independence, even though it would spell the end of it. Where the consent was from 
an otherwise ineffective government it would not be consistent with the right to 
political independence, because of the lack of attachment of the government that 
consented with the will of the state and its people. And, were it to occur, the direct 
contravention of the right to political independence would be much more likely to 
instigate international conflict than the consent to an international military presence, 
which, while affecting the exercise of political independence, does not have such a 
direct impact and is more readily justified in the interest of international peace. In 
contrast, the administration of reconstruction by an otherwise ineffective domestic 
government assisted by international involvement will help project the process as 
more consistent with political independence and the attendant values, than external 
administration. This is because an element of local ownership is retained, and this 
will also help avoid suggestions that sovereignty has been lost to the international 
actors. 
In sum, effective control is the established route for identifying the agent of the 
rights of the target state and its people, this serves the interests of the efficacy of 
international law, but also stops abuse and neglect of the rights of the state and its 
people through exploitation of the consent mechanism. Without effective control. 
state consent is possible depending on international recognition. But. because of the 
98 Roth, Ope cit., fn. 53. p. 331. 
99 See Roth. Ope cit., fn. 53. p. 330. 
100 See also Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of United Siaies of America in Morocco. leJ 
Reports 1952. p. 176 at p. 185 and p. 188. 
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inherent subjectivity of international recognition and the complete imbalance in 
bargaining position that it creates between the domestic government and 
international actors, such consent would not reconcile the activity with political 
independence. It would, though, project greater consistency with the right to political 
independence and accordingly the value of self-determination, than non-consensual 
intervention. Thus one would expect it to be utilised where possible. 
In the light of the analysis of these legal justifications, one can predict how the 
process would be likely to proceed to best ensure consistency with political 
independence. A consensual basis for international military and reconstruction 
focused involvement, perhaps complimented by chapter VII to address any doubts 
about the legal validity of the consent, with reconstruction administered by a 
domestic government, has claim to be more consistent than a chapter VII based 
international administration. The concern with even the more consistent approach, 
however, is that it would place in authority a government that still, because of a lack 
of independent effectiveness, falls short in terms of consistency with the right to 
political independence, and so puts at stake the values of self-determination and 
international peace. If, though, there were a basis for international legal regulation 
and accountability of those involved designed to protect the value of self-
determination, and with it international peace, one would be less concerned about the 
exploitation of the under-developed rules on the expression of the will the state and 
the people to preclude wrongfulness of the large scale international involvement in 
state reconstruction. 
4. International Human Rights Law and Political Independence 
However international involvement in the reconstruction process might proceed, be 
it with an ineffective domestic government or international actors administering the 
process, the legal justifications addressed above would not reconcile the activity with 
the right to political independence. This is because a government without 
independent effective domestic control, which provides objective evidence of the 
attachment of the government to the will of the state and its people, would be treated 
as the embodiment of the right to political independence. The concern with this is 
that it put at risks the values of self-determination and international peace. which 
explain the legal protection that political independence is afforded in the normal run 
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of things. Some appropriate means of regulation and accountability of the process 
could serve to reassure that the governance is in the interests of the people, not self-
interest, and thus potentially help address the values of self-determination and 
international peace. In this respect, the fact that '[international] [h]uman rights law is 
revolutionary because it purports to regulate the behaviour of a sovereign within its 
own territory', 101 calls for some consideration of the relevance of this body of law. 
Specifically, the universality of human rights law and its purported aim make it 
necessary to consider the relevance of international human rights law as a framework 
for regulation and accountability of state reconstruction. 
The emergence of international human rights law can be attributed to a collective 
feeling amongst the international society of states that people as individuals, and 
collectively, matter. 102 The frrst significant attempt to lay down the rights that all 
people possess was the GA' s 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR). Certain parts of which, through state practice, reflect customary 
international law and this would 'certainly include the prohibition of torture, 
genocide and slavery and the principle of non-discrimination'. 103 The Declaration 
led, eventually, in 1966, to the creation of the two universal UN sponsored 
international covenants, which split those rights found in the Declaration, refined 
them, and added new ones. Since then, the number of human rights instruments, 
focusing on a particular set of rights or region, has continued to grow. 104 
In broad terms, the law is designed to ensure that minimum standards of human 
welfare are reached, thus it impacts on all aspects of running a state. And it is states, 
or more specifically governments that are charged with ensuring that human rights 
are respected, protected, and fulfilled. 105 In relation to the state reconstruction 
context, then, if all involved adhere to intemationallaw human rights law, this helps 
to ensure that minimum standards of human welfare are maintained. Would, though, 
the law apply? 
101 A. Anghie, Imperialism. Sovereignty and the Maki~g of Intern~tional Law. (~005) 254. 
102 See L. Sohn, 'The New International Law: ProtectIon of the Rights of IndiViduals Rather than 
States', (1982) 32 American University Law Review 1; T. Buergenthal. 'The Nonnative and 
Institutional Evolution of International Human Rights'. (1997) 19 Human RighJs Quarter~r 703. 
103 Shaw. op. cit., fn. 37. p. 257.. . . ... ., 
104 See, e.g .. 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons With Dlsablhtles; 1984 Convention agamst 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
105 M. Nowak. Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime (2003) 49-51. 
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Considerable attention has been given to whether international human rights law 
applies to the extra-territorial activity of a state party. 106 The high-water mark for the 
moment is found in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Bankovic case. 
relating to a complaint about a NATO bombing campaign in Belgrade on 23 April 
1999:°7 Here, the ECtHR dealt with the meaning of 'within its jurisdiction', which 
is the key term for application of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) (Article 1) and also the ICCPR 
('within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction', Article 2(1)). It found that 
effective control of an area outside of its national territory, whether lawful or 
unlawful, was the key point which engaged the obligations of the state party. lOS As a 
consequence, should a third state come into control of a formerly ineffective state, 
one would expect human rights obligations to apply. The extent to which the same is 
true for an international organisation is less clear, in light of human rights law being 
addressed to states not international organisations. lo9 There is also debate about the 
attribution of conduct in UN authorised peace operations, either to troop contributing 
states or the UN, which has decisive implications for applicability and accountability 
of international human rights law. llo The present concern, however, is with 
compensating for neglect of the right to political independence, which the 
international involvement in the reconstruction would represent, by addressing the 
values of self-determination and international peace. How does the nature and 
substance of international human rights law relate to this concern? 
The existence of human rights can be read as a curtailment of the exercise of 
political independence, in the sense of constraint on the pursuit of political ends. 
106 See M. Kamminga and F. Coomans (eds.), The Extra-Territorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties (2004). 
107 Bankovic and Others v Belgium and 16 other NATO States (No. 52207/99), ECtHR 12 December 
2001, (2002) 411LM 517. 
108 Bankovic, Ope cit., tn. 107, paras. 70-71. 
109 See N. D. White, 'The Ties that Bind: the EU, the UN and International Law', in (2006) 37 NYIL 
57 at 79-80; J. Cerone, 'Reasonable Measures in Unreasonable Circumstance: a Legal Responsibility 
Framework for Human Rights Violations in Post-Conflict Territories under UN Administration', in N. 
D. White and D. Klassen, (eds.) The UN, Human Rights and Post-Conflict Situations (2005) 42; G. 
Verdirame, UN Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Post-Conflict Situations', in N. D. 
White and D. Klassen, (eds.) The UN. Human Rights and Post-Conflict Situations (2005) 81; on the 
utility of international human rights law for individuals, see R. Mullerson, 'Human Rights and the 
Individual as Subject of International Law: A Soviet View'. (1990) I UIL 33. 
110 See the recent ECtHR's (in)admissibility decisions in App. No. 71412101 Agim Behrami and Bekir 
Behrami v. France. and App. No. 78166/01 Ru:hdi Saramati \'. Franct'. Germany and Norway, Grand 
Chamber decision of 2 May 2007; cf. K. M. Larsen. • Attribution of Conduct in Peace Operations: The 
'Ultimate Authority and Control' Test', (2008) 19 UIL 509. 
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However, human rights posit ends to be achieved, ends which are often ambiguously 
phrased and, when it comes to implementation, favour state discretion. This weak 
nature stems from disagreements about ideas of international justice amongst 
international society. Such persistent disagreement is why sovereignty, in terms of 
respect for another states political independence, is so important for order in 
international society. Sovereignty provides a space for political communities to 
pursue their own interpretation of human rights free from direct interference, apart 
from in extreme circumstance when the bounds which international law has set, such 
as the prohibition on apartheid, III are over-stepped; bounds which reflect definite 
points of convergence in the disparate set of values that define international society's 
approach to internal constitution. 112 This, then, explains a reluctance of other states 
to question human rights in other states or to protest at some states abysmal records 
of reporting on human rights. l13 Of course, in terms of rationale for international 
involvement in ineffective states, if there is not an effective government, there is not 
even the possibility of cajoling compliance. 
The implementation and exercise of human rights requires an agent that can make 
the political decisions and has the capacity to implement them. The implementation 
of human rights by a foreign entity, in the normal run of things, is thus subject to 
consent. I 14 As implementation reflects an act of self-determination, the agent should 
be considered the embodiment of the right of self-determination. In this respect, 
, [0 Jne could go so far as to say that sovereignty, as the consummation of the self-
determination of peoples, is not only itself a human right, but indeed-in light of 
common Article 1 of the human rights Covenants-the first human right (in the sense 
of providing a foundation for, not morally outweighing, other human rights)' .IIS This 
understanding finds support in the Human Rights Committee's comment on the right 
to self-determination, 'its realization is an essential condition for the effective 
guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and 
strengthening of those rights' .116 The point being that, without self-determination, 
III See 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid; 
1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Racial Discrimination. Art. 3; SC 
Res. 288 (1970). 
112 See Roth, op. cit .. fn. 97, pp. 1049-1050 
113 On reluctance of states to submit reports or criticise other states, see N. D. White, The UN System: 
Towards International Justice (2002) 240. 
114 Roth, op. cit .• fn. 97. p. 1034 
II' Roth, op. cit., fn. 97. p. 1042 
116 GeneraJ Comment 12. para. 1 (1996). this quote is also cited in Chapter 1 of this study. 
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the relative worth of the other rights is reduced, as it is an outsider that tells the 
people how to enjoy them. In the context of state reconstruction without an 
independently effective domestic government, there is no such agent, the people are 
not in a position to exercise self-determination, and so, while hwnan rights 
adherence can reassure about hwnane treatment, this does not cure neglect of 
political independence. For example, by pursuing those human rights that relate to 
political organisation, such as Article 25 ICCPR, in the reconstruction of a state, the 
international actors would be imposing their understanding of the human right on the 
political community. 
Furthermore, human rights do not serve as a limit on reconstruction. Rather they 
are a bare minimum standard. Thus adherence to hwnan rights does not stop 
complete overhaul of the state in contravention of political independence. 
In sum, human rights instrwnents are designed, both in contents and 
implementation, with discretion for governments in mind. This stems from the 
presumption that the government is the embodiment of the will of the state and its 
people. Where the government is not independently effective, this presumption is 
rebutted, but still international human rights law continues to defer to the 
government. One thus struggles to see the applicability of international hwnan rights 
law as compensating for a neglect of political independence. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed how the established legal answers for large-scale 
international involvement in state reconstruction, when there is not an independent 
effective domestic government, relate to political independence and the attendant 
core UN system values of self-determination and international peace. 
A chapter VII resolution has been argued to be a possible legal justification for the 
international military presence and the international involvement with the 
administration of state reconstruction. However, it was argued that a chapter VII 
resolution has its legalising ability because member states waived the right to 
complain about an infringement of the right to political independence. Thus it does 
not reconcile the activity with the right to political independence. For activity clearly 
within the remit of chapter VII. such as the deployment of an international military 
presence, the fact of a resolution is a reassurance in terms of the value of 
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international peace; it says nothing, however, about the value of self-determination. 
State reconstruction is less clearly within the ambit of the powers of the SC under 
chapter VII, this, and the fact of the importance of the right to political independence 
for the UN system, led to the suggestion that such activity would not be authorised 
without the additional legal justification of state consent, which could help project 
consistency with the right to political independence. 
State consent precludes wrongfulness, as the lack of it is central to definition of 
unlawful intervention in international law. Accordingly, state consent, subject to the 
limits of the agreement, is to be seen as making the international actors agents of the 
target state's and it people's right to political independence. This produces 
consistency with the right to political independence and thus the value of self-
determination. However, a source of valid state consent, when there is no 
independently effective domestic government, is only possible through the power of 
international recognition as evidence of governmental status in an international legal 
sense. Despite the subjectivity of international recognition being a compelling reason 
why such a government should not be able to consent to large-scale international 
involvement, it remains a possibility in international legal doctrine. 
There is, then, by chapter VII and state consent, separately or combined, scope for 
the preclusion of wrongfulness of an activity which is far from consistent with the 
right to political independence. 
Given the importance of the right to political independence and the attendant 
values for the UN system, one would not expect these legal justifications alone to be 
sufficient to explain the international acceptance of the practice. One would expect 
further attempts to accommodate the values of self-determination and international 
peace. International human rights law offers regulation and accountability, but it 
does so on the assumption that the government is the embodiment of the will of the 
state and its people. Thus it is overly deferential to governmental discretion, both in 
terms of the level of regulation and the means for accountability, to be of comfort in 
relation to the values of self-determination and international peace. If, however, there 
was an acknowledgement of the failings of a non-independently effective domestic 
government, this might be the impetus for parts of international human rights law to 
be interpreted with greater specificity and with a greater willingness to challenge 
authority that acts with a disregard for them. The conceptual potential for this to 
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occur in a manner that addresses the values of self-detennination and international 
peace, and the likelihood of such an occurrence, is turned to in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The Potential Role of Democracy in State Reconstruction 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 has indicated how large-scale international involvement for the purpose of 
the reconstruction of a state, appears incompatible with the right to political 
independence. The proposed approaches to international involvement in state 
reconstruction, addressed at the end of Chapter 1, all essentially advocated the 
abandonment of the right to political independence, apparently seeing no way for 
such involvement and its retention. This, though, neglects the importance of political 
independence for the UN system, particularly in respect of the values of self-
determination of peoples and international peace. Chapter 2 has pointed out that the 
legal justifications of state consent and a chapter VII resolution, separately or 
combined, could preclude wrongfulness, but, when there is not an independently 
effective domestic government, would not reconcile the activity with the right to 
political independence. And while state consent would project a degree of 
consistency with the right to political independence, and a chapter VII resolution 
would offer some reassurances in respect of international peace. This would still 
seem to fall short of a comprehensive explanation for international acceptance, 
primarily because of a failure to sufficiently address the value of self-determination. 
Thus, given the importance of the values of self-determination and international 
peace for the UN system, one would expect the practice of state reconstruction to 
involve the pursuit of aims that better accommodate these values and, consequently, 
engender international acceptance. 
The pursuit of democracy is a central feature of contemporary efforts at state 
reconstruction. Moreover, democracy is readily associated with the values of self-
determination and international peace. There is, then, a strong likelihood that 
democracy is a vital element for the international acceptance of a practice that is not 
expected to sit well with the right to political independence. Hence this chapter is 
interested in the details surrounding how the pursuit of democracy would 
accommodate the values at stake. Specifically, in light of substantial debate about the 
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position of democracy in international law, the chapter asks, what difference does the 
pursuit of democracy as a political or as a legal concept make in terms of 
accommodation of the values at stake? 
The chapter argues that because democracy suggests genuine rule by the people, 
its pursuit would help project the international involvement as necessary for the 
realisation of self-determination. It is contended that this, in itself, would help 
address the threat to international peace stemming from a neglect of political 
independence, and that accommodation of the value of international peace would 
also be supported by democracy's other apparent, discrete, benefits for international 
peace. In this latter respect, it is argued that the flexibility of democracy as a political 
concept would be useful for potential peacemaking tasks, which might require an 
approach to democracy that struggles to be seen as consistent with a strive for the 
democratic ideal. Crucially, however, if democracy is treated only as a political 
concept, it is reasoned that the lack of scope for regulation and accountability would 
be to the detriment of the value of self-determination. 
There is, though, an emerging consensus on democracy as a legal concept, which 
is more than just the right to take part in elections. It includes both aspects of 
procedure for identification of the government and substantive standards of 
governmental conduct, and this it is argued could provide a basis for regulation of 
governance during the reconstruction process. To make most effective use of this 
emerging consensus on democracy as a legal concept, in the sense of 
accommodating the values of self-determination and international peace, it is argued 
that it should be linked to the legal right to self-determination where there is no 
effective domestic government. This, it is argued, in light of self-determination as 
the basis of sovereignty, with reasonable exceptions in the interest of international 
peace, would provide a basis for meaningful regulation and accountability of the 
pursuit of democracy. It is predicted, however, that if there is a possibility of gaining 
at least the toleration of wider international society without the development of 
regulation and accountability. the 'need' for the development of new law will not 
. 
anse. 
The chapter begins by considering how simply making the pursuit of democracy, 
loosely defined as a political concept, a central aim of the reconstruction process. 
would potentially accommodate the values put at stake by a neglect of political 
independence - self-detennination of peoples and international peace. It then 
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addresses the extent to which it is possible to identify a consensus on the meaning of 
democracy as an international legal concept, and considers what impact this would 
have on the values of self-determination and international peace. A penultimate 
section considers the relationship between democracy and the legal right of all 
peoples to self-detennination. This demonstrates the potential for meaningful 
regulation and accountability of the pursuit of democracy in the interests of self-
detennination and international peace. 
2. Democracy, Self-Determination, and International Peace 
A. Democracy and the Value of Self-Determination 
Both the concepts of democracy and self-detennination of peoples have long 
histories. Democracy derives from the classical Greek fonn of citizen self-
government known as demokratia meaning 'rule by the people' . I It was indicated in 
Chapter 1 how self-detennination as a political value stands for giving all people the 
possibility of self-government, but does this mean democratic government? 
Walt van Praag, so as to forge a strong - 'even inseparable' - link between self-
detennination and democracy, posits that democracy is about the right to choose 
ones leaders so it must also include the right to choose whether those leaders are 
from the same people and territory. This means, for Walt van Praag, that the origins 
of democracy are synonymous with that of self-detennination, and hence the latter 
stretches back to 'the first stirrings of democracy in classical Greece'? However, the 
first stirrings of self-detennination as a political principle are generally traced back 
to around the time of the French Revolution (1789). And it was not until US 
President Wilson took an interest, at the start of the Twentieth Century, that one 
finds democracy clearly merged with a political principle of self-detennination. Prior 
to Wilson's interest, ideas about self-detennination as a political principle tended to 
centre on the right of the people to choose their political status free from external 
interference, with democracy a fonn of government that could be chosen rather than 
I S. Marks and A. Clapham, Inlernational Human RighJs Lexicon (2005) 62. 
2 M. C. van Walt van Praag, 'Self-Detennination in a World of Conflict - a Source oflnstability or 
Instrument of Peace?'. in T. D. Gill and W. P. Heere (eds.). Reflections on Principles and Practice of 
International Law (2000) 265 at 266: see also U. Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law 
(1972) 4-5. 
97 
an essential part of self -detennination. 3 Thus the nature and context of Wilson ~ s 
understanding of self-determination is of particular interest for detennining the 
extent to which the value of self-detennination supposes a democratic form of 
government. 
Wilson's thinking on self-detennination stretched over a number of years and 
encompassed a number of diverse elements. To begin with, Wilson talked only in 
terms of 'self-government', and the cognate 'consent of the governed', rather than 
expressly of self-determination. The meaning of self-government, as Pomerance 
notes, 'had for him an imprecise dual connotation': 
On the one hand, it implied the right of a population to select its own 
form of government, yet, on the other hand, it also strongly suggested that 
self-government must be a continuing process and must therefore be synonymous with the 
democratic form of governance.4 
This reflected a logical advancement of the idea that the authority of a government 
comes from the will of the people - popular sovereignty. In the sense that, if 
authority of a government comes from the will of the people, this should entail that 
the people have a right to choose the form of the government. 5 
Self-determination is said to have entered Wilson's vocabulary on 11 February 
1918.6 Self-determination appears to have been used as something of an umbrella 
term, with Wilson introducing new dimensions when faced with political situations 
that required it. This was mostly in the context of the First World War, with 
arguments of self-determination used to justify a particular position.7 The importance 
of democracy in relation to peace further confmned Wilson's thinking of self-
determination and democracy as fused in the concept of 'self-government'. As such, 
Wilson considered that the German people could not be held responsible, as they 
were not 'self-governed,.8 Moreover, for Wilson, the League of Nations was to be 
composed of 'self-governing nations', identified on the basis of governments 
3 See T. Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities (1997) 2. 
4 M. Pomerance, 'The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian 
Conception', (1976) 70 AJIL I at 17 note 80. 
, See A. Cassese, Self-Determinalion of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal (1995) 19. 
6 Pomerance, op. cit., fn. 4. p. 2. 
7 See Pomerance. op. cit., fn. 4, p. 18. 
• Pomerance. op. cit .• fn. 4. p. 19. 
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'controlled by the will and vote' of their people, as it was such governments that 
could be trusted to preserve peace in the world.9 
Looking over Wilson's pre-war, war, and post-war thoughts on self-detennination. 
Pomerance identifies in Wilson's conception of self-determination a 'confusion and 
fusion of several ideas': 
freedom from "alien" sovereignty ("external self-determination"), freedom to select one's 
own form of government ("internal self-determination"), a form of continuing self-
government (democracy), or the principle of one nation-one state lO 
A constant theme running through these disparate strands of Wilson's conception is 
'belief in the democratic ideal as a desideratum worth attaining for its own sake and 
as a means to achieve the ultimate goal of universal peace. ' II 
Support for the view that self-determination was not at the time understood in 
legal terms but rather as a political postulate, subscribed to when convenient, is seen 
in the lack of insistence from the Allies, in the aftermath of World War I, that new 
states be democratic. 12 Did, though, the inextricable connection between democracy 
and self-determination, found in Wilson's concept, continue with the inclusion of 
self-determination in the UN Charter? 
During World War II, the Allies adopted a number of policy documents, on 
matters related to the end of the conflict, in which external and internal aspects of 
self-determination featured prominently.13 The 1941 Atlantic Charter, between 
President Roosevelt and Churchill, indicated a 'desire to see no territorial changes 
that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned', and 
expressed a willingness to 'respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of 
government under which they live':4 Churchill, however, was keen to stress that it 
was in the context of the end of the war, rather than generally, that this was to be 
relevant. And, while it implies going through a democratic process to find the will of 
9 Pomerance, op. cit .• fn. 4. p. 20. 
10 Pomerance, op. cit .. fn. 4, p. 20. 
II Pomerance. op. cit .• fn. 4. p. 20. 
12 Cassese, op. cit .• fn. 5. p. 26. 
13 See I. Brownlie, • An Essay in the History of the Principle of Self-Detennination', in C. H. 
Alexandrowicz (ed.), Groatian Society Papers /968, Studies in the History of the Law o/Sations 
( 1968) 90 at 96-98. 
14 Reprinted in J. A. S. Grenville. The Major International Treaties: 191-1 - 1973 - A History and 
Guide with Texts (1974) 198. 
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the people, it does not indicate that the form of government chosen must be itself 
democratic. 
World War II, as noted in Chapter 1, prompted negotiations between China. the 
USSR, the UK and the US on the creation of a new world organisation. Article 1 (2) 
of the UN Charter provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to 
'develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace'. As there is no explicit meaning ascribed to self-
determination in the Charter, one must look to the preparatory work for evidence of 
how the political ambition was understood by those agreeing to the Charter. There 
was much debate about the inclusion of Article 1 (2) at San Francisco, with fears that 
it would prompt claims of a right to secession,15 or be manipulated as a basis for 
military interventions prominent concems. 16 Amidst considerable debate it was 
presented, by the Rapporteur, as acceptable on the basis that, amongst other things, it 
conformed to the purposes of the Charter as a right to self-government not 
secession,17 and that 'an essential element of the principle is free and genuine 
expression of the popular will of the people, which avoids cases of the alleged 
expression of the popular will, such as those used for their own ends by Germany 
and Italy in later years' .18 In relation to form of government, Cassese finds that the 
preparatory work confirms that the latter point just referenced 'was only intended to 
stress that where a people is afforded the right to express its views, it must truly be 
free to do so', thus confirming that there was no consensus on a particular form of 
government that was to be required when the term was included in the UN Charter. 19 
Moreover, in relation to the rationale for the inclusion of reference to self-
determination, Cassese concludes from the debates that the understanding of self-
determination included in the Charter was rooted in the idea of equal rights of 
peoples, and as such was considered valuable to the extent that it helped promote 
IS See, e.g., comments from Colombia, First Committee of the First Commission of the San Francisco 
Conference, 14 - 15 May and 1 and 11 June, 1945, Microfilm Minutes, Library of the Palais des 
Nations, Geneva, [hereinafter Debates] at p. 20, 15 May, cited by Cassese, op. cit .. fn. 5, pp. 39-40. 
16 See, e.g .. comments from Egypt, Debates, op. cit., fn. IS, p. 22, 14 May 1945. 
17 See Cassese, op. cit., fn. 5, p. 40; cf. H. Quane, 'The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self 
-Determination', (1998) 47 ICLQ 537 at 547. 
18 UNICO, Vol. VI, (1945) 455. cited by Cassese, op. cit., fn. 5, p. 40. 
19 A. Cassese. Political Self-Determination - Old Concepts and New Developments'. in A. Cassese 
(ed.), UN Law - Fundamental Rights: Two Topics in International Law (1979) 139; see also Cassese. 
op. cit., fn. 5, p. 42. 
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friendly relations among states. It was not considered to have a significance 
independent of the pursuit of peace, and could thus be set aside if conflict 100med.2o 
The emergence of self-determination as a fundamental principle of international law 
indicates a change of consensus on this last point. The way the legal norm has 
developed indicates that the value of self-determination is important for its O\\,TI 
sake.21 It would thus no longer be an internationally acceptable practice for the value 
of self-determination to be simply set aside if conflict loomed. The important point, 
here, is that at the creation of the UN Charter, agreement was reached that self-
determination stood for the importance of self-government not that this required a 
democratic government. 
The Wilsonian understanding did not form the basis for the inclusion of self-
determination in the UN Charter. It does, though, arguably, represent a logical 
extension of giving people the possibility of self-government. If it is to be self-
government, the government must be the one the people want; it must represent the 
will of the people. Democracy, which, by way of its historical origins, promises 
genuine rule by the people, is naturally thought of as a form of government that 
ensures government represents the will of the people.22 As this logic has taken hold, 
most states in the world that base governmental authority on the will of the people, 
popular sovereignty, now have some aspect in the structure of governance that can 
be termed democratic. Moreover, testament to the continuing significance of the 
Wilsonian conception of self-determination is found in the fact that some scholars, 
who strive to encourage an international legal right to democracy, cite the Wilsonian 
conception of self-determination to support this cause?3 
It is, then, apparent that large-scale international involvement in state 
reconstruction that seeks to accommodate the value of self-determination, should 
purse a democratic form of government. In so doing, while not curing the 
infringement of the right to political independence, the involvement can be cast as 
facilitating the realisation of self-determination. This is because, in the absence of an 
independently effective domestic government, the involvement is creating the form 
of government most readily acknowledged as the method for extrapolating the will 
20 Cassese, op. cit., fn. 5. p. 43. 
21 See Chapter I of this study. 
21 Cf. R. A. Miller, 'Self-Detennination in International Law and the Demise of Democracy', (2003) 
41 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2003) 60 1 at 611. 
2J See, e.g .• T. Franck. 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance' (1992) 86 AJ/L 46 at 53; cf. 
Miller. op. cit .• fn. 22, p. 633. 
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of the people for the purpose of the exercise of self-determination. Further, this has 
obvious implications, now turned to, for the threat that the neglect of the right to 
political independence poses for international peace. 
B. Democracy and International Peace 
The association of democratic government with international peace also has a long 
history. The oldest association is found in the idea that democratic states do not wage 
war against one another. Kant famously speculated about how perpetual peace might 
be achieved.24 A key component was that every state should have a 'republican' 
constitution.2s This is commonly understood as indicating democratic government. 26 
The theory was that making government accountable would counteract aggressive 
tendencies of monarchies, because there would be a need for greater concern about 
the welfare of the citizens. Doyle's empirical study of 1983, looking at international 
wars since 1817, provided some confirmation of Kant's idea. Doyle identified that 
democratic states remained at peace with one another, while going to war with non-
democratic states that also fought amongst themselves.27 The reasons for this 
predisposition continue to be a source of debate.28 One might query whether such 
states would remain peaceful amongst themselves were there not non-democratic 
states to go to war with.29 Or one might see that there is something intrinsically 
peaceful about a democratic state, which means, when disputes arise with a like 
state, there is a common trust that the dispute will be settled peacefully.3o 
If adding another member to the 'zone of peace' was the only benefit for 
international peace from the pursuit of democracy in state reconstruction, the 
potential of democracy to make up for the threat to international peace posed by a 
neglect of political independence would hardly be mentionable. It is, after all. 
somewhat contradictory to try and excuse the neglect of political independence 
24 I. Kant, 'Perpetual Peace' (1795). in H. Reiss (ed.), Kant's Political Writings, (1991) (trans. H. 
Nisbet) 93. 
2' Kant, Opt cit., fn. 24, p. 99. 
26 See, e.g., Franck, Opt cit., fn. 23, p. 88. 
27 M. Doyle, 'Kant. Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs'. (1983) 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
205 at 223 and 235; see also A-M. Slaughter, 'International Law in a World of Liberal States' (1995) 
6 ElIL 50. 
28 S. Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions (2002) 37. 
29 M. Koskenniemi, 'Intolerant Democracies: a Reaction', (1996) 37 Han'ard International Law 
Journa/231 at 234. 
30 R. Buchan. 'International Community and the Occupation oflraq·. (2007) 12 JCSL J 7 at 52. 
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which risks sparking international conflict, on the basis of the pursuit of a fonn a 
government that will not go to war. Neither the people of the target state nor 
interested third states would be reassured with an explanation that there is no need to 
be agitated by the imposition of a governmental fonn if this rests only on the fact 
that it is a form that will not go to war with other states that have the same fonn.31 
Another, more pertinent, association of democracy with international peace relates 
to the peacemaking process within the target state. Democracy has a long history 
within the peacemaking process after internal-conflict.32 At a basic level, the holding 
of free and fair elections, along with the possibility of building in power sharing 
arrangements, offers an authoritative means of reconciling the differences between 
warring factions. 33 Further, democratic institutions and processes are seen as a means 
of limiting the risk that conflict will re-erupt, as they channel competing interests 
into discourse and so encourage compromise.34 Democracy thus reduces the threat of 
civil conflict spilling over into neighbouring states, and therefore serves to offset 
concerns about a threat to international peace caused by a neglect of political 
independence in the reconstruction process. This, though, is without consideration of 
how the value of self-determination has been treated. Indeed, it could be that, in the 
short-term, peace might best be served through predefmed governance arrangements 
that struggle to be consistent with what one might consider as necessary for 
consistency with the value of self-determination.35 Long-tenn, however, it is 
premised that a disregard for the value of self-determination would be harmful to 
peace.36 
The third association of democracy with international peace is connected to its 
relevance for the value self-determination, noted above. By the pursuit of 
democracy, while not curing the infringement of the right to decide, the involvement 
is cast as facilitating the realisation of self-determination. It is, in the absence of an 
31 See, making a similar point, B. R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999) 
369. 
32 Franck, op. cit., fn. 23, pp. 80 - 81. 
33 S. Bames, 'The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies' , (200 1) 95 AJIL 
86 at 86; K. Samuels, 'Post-Conflict Peace Building and Constitution Making', (2005-2006) 6 
Chicago Journal 0/ International Law 663 at 665. 
34 Supplement to Reports on Democratization, UN Doc. AJ51 /761. 20 Dec. 1996, para. 17; see also 
ECtHR decision, United Communist Party o/Turkey and others v. Turkey, Reports of Judgements and 
Decisions 1998-1. para. 45. 
35 See D. Wippman. 'Practical and Legal Constraints on Power Sharing', in D. Wippman (ed.), 
International Law and Ethnic Conflict (1998) 211 at 128 and 230. 
36 See Samuels, op. cit., fn. 33, p. 671. 
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independently effective domestic government, creating the fonn of government most 
readily acknowledged as the basis for identifying a government that represents the 
will of the people for the purpose of exercise of self-determination. Accordingly. the 
risk that the neglect of the right to political independence would spark conflict is 
reduced because the underlying values are still addressed, albeit in a different way. 
Thus the pursuit of democracy would have a discrete benefit in tenns of 
international peace, as well as one flowing from accommodating the value of self-
determination. The approach taken to democracy to address the requirements of 
peacemaking process, as noted, might lead to a reduction of the actual 
accommodation of the value of self-determination. There is therefore a need to 
address what would be required, in tenns of the definition of democracy pursued, to 
accommodate the values of self-determination and international peace in relation to 
the process of large-scale international involvement in state reconstruction. 
C. The Political Concept of Democracy 
As Fox and Roth note, 'prior to the events of 1989-91, 'democracy' was a word 
rarely found in the writings of international lawyers. ,37 The extent of development in 
international legal doctrine on democracy subsequent to the end of the cold war is 
returned to below. For most of its history democracy has been treated only as a 
political concept. 
As it is used in a variety of ways, in a variety of disciplines, it is not possible to 
identify a definitive definition of democracy. 38 Beetham, from mapping the different 
usages of the political concept, suggests democracy can be distilled down to two 
principles about the competence of decision-makers in public affairs. These are 
popular control, meaning that the decisions are subject to the control of those 
affected, and political equality, meaning that control is distributed amongst those 
affected on the basis of equality. 39 The identification of these ideals, while a useful 
tool for 'criticizing actuality and orientating change' ,40 does not in itself indicate 
37 G. H. Fox and B. R. Roth, 'Democracy and International Law'. (200 I) 27 Review of International 
Studies 327 at 327. 
38 See, in this respect. the account of political theorist D. Beetharn, Democracy and Human Rights 
(1999) chapter I. 
39 Beetham, op. cit .. fn. 38. pp. 4-5; see also Marks and Clapbam, op. cit., fn. 1, pp. 62-63; J. 
Crawford, Democracy in International Law. (1994) BYIL 113 at 114. 
40 S. Marks, op. cit., fn. 28, p. 150. 
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what would be required of the international actors for there to be at least an element 
of truth in a claim of the pursuit of democracy. Democracy as a loose political 
concept is used to describe a number of different institutions and procedures. 
including 'electoral politics, multipartyism, interest-group politics, majority rule, 
political liberalism, participatory decision-making, and a pluralist social and political 
order' ,41 which encompass both the procedure for the identification of the 
government and the substantive conduct of the government thereafter. Elections, 
though, remain the dominant process associated with democracy, and although this is 
only about procedure for the identification of a government, such a limited approach 
would still have a claim to be 'democracy'. Indeed, in terms of a peacemaking 
process, if the goal is only to gain an agreement of the warring factions on a way 
forward, elections alone might suffice.42 It does not follow, however, that this would 
be sufficient to uphold the value of self-determination. 
Free and fair elections are essential in the process of identification of those that 
will govern on behalf of the people.43 If, however, the pursuit of democracy is to be 
the element that essentially excuses neglect of political independence, there is surely 
a need for more than just a promise and then the conduct of elections.44 There is a 
need for a more comprehensive attempt at realising the genuine rule by the people 
that the term democracy promises, as it is this promise that makes democracy of 
relevance for the value of self-determination. 
While genuine rule by the people is perhaps destined to be just beyond reach in 
even the most developed of democracies, striving to realise the democratic ideal 
must bring a government closer to this elusive goal. Accordingly, there should be an 
understanding of democracy that addresses both aspects of the democratic ideal. 
noted above. This requires a government that is both representative of, and 
accountable to the people of a state. And means a definition of democracy that 
includes particular procedures for the identification of the government beyond 
elections, such as rights to participate, and requires standards of substantive conduct, 
such as in relation to freedom of expression. Such an understanding of democracy 
41 Clapham and Marks, Ope cit .. fIl. 1. p. 62. 
42 See Wippman, Ope cit .• fn. 35, p. 226 . 
43 On the importance of elections in the post conflict situation generally, see G. Fox 'International 
Law and the Entitlement to Democracy after War', (2003) 9 G/obal Governancf? 2179 at 2185 . 
.... See, on the importance of a more expansive understanding for the actual success of intenational . 
efforts to foster a peaceful and effective state. W. Malley. 'Democratic Governance and Post-ConflICt 
Transitions'. (2005-2006) 6 Chicago Journal of International Law 683 at 700. 
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will be referred to by this study as genuine democracy. This reflects the stronger 
claim to produce genuine rule by the people, than an understanding that is satisfied 
with merely a procedure for identification of government. 
Particularly in relation to international involvement in state reconstruction, a key 
reason for stressing the importance of genuine democracy is that, if all the focus of 
democracy is on elections, once a government is elected, in terms of the commitment 
of the international actors to seeing democracy realised, this is more easily the end of 
the matter. It is, however, unlikely that all the people will have voted for the 
government. Thus, while the government remains dependent on international actors 
for its effectiveness, it would seem appropriate for international actors, that excuse 
their involvement on the basis of democracy, to ensure that the elected government 
strives to meet the democratic ideal, which will bring it closer to the will of the 
people; and thereby better reconcile international involvement with the value of self-
determination. Moreover, if it is only about elections, the conduct of the governance 
moving towards the facilitation of elections is taken out of the spotlight. Democracy 
is projected entirely as something that is coming, as irrelevant for the transitional 
period. Yet again, if democracy is to excuse international involvement, in order to 
bring governance as close to the will of the people as possible, it follows that there 
should be an appropriate level of commitment to the democratic ideal in the 
governance before elections. After all, it is through such governance that vital 
decisions about the change and development of the state and civil infrastructure - the 
exercise of the state and the people's right to decide - will be made. 
Whether such a level of commitment to the democratic ideal would be pursued in 
practice is influenced by whether this would be necessary for the pursuit of 
democracy to uphold self-determination. Despite the lack of agreement on a 
definition of democracy as a political concept, the term itself, advising of genuine 
rule by the people, has a palliative effect, offering reassurance in relation to the value 
of self-determination.45 In the normal run of things, once a government has some 
democratic credentials, in the loosest sense, such a government has a significant 
hortatory tool for resisting any challenges to its legitimacy, in the sense of its right to 
rule. The power of the term democracy to convince that genuine rule by the people is 
being realised, helps to disguise the level of actual commitment to the democratic 
4~ See also Miller. op. cit., fn. 22, p. 606. 
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ideal. It is hard to imagine that similar considerations would not apply in the state 
reconstruction context. Hence, the pursuit of democracy could be nothing more than 
a promise to hold elections at some distant point in the future, but the fact of the 
pursuit democracy would remain, and with it the same message of genuine rule by 
the people. The point is that, in terms of how the international involvement is 
portrayed in relation to the value of self-determination, the synonymous nature of the 
term democracy and the idea of genuine rule by the people suggests that it may not 
be necessary for genuine democracy to be posited in order for democracy to serve its 
role as an excuse for the neglect of political independence. 
Clearly, for the reasons noted above, it would in actual fact be troublesome, in 
terms of the value of self-determination, if there were no understanding of 
democracy that stretched beyond elections. Moreover, even if a more acceptable 
level of democracy was pursued - which addressed the procedural and substantive 
aspects of governance - as a political concept there would be no scope for regulation 
or accountability. This latter aspect would seem crucial, in the interests of the value 
of self-determination, because otherwise there is little to guarantee what has been 
promised.46 In contrast, however, the flexibility of democracy as a political concept 
could be of utility for the peacemaking process. 
To help form a view on which, a legal or a political concept, is most likely to have 
been found in practice, it is useful to consider whether it is possible to see democracy 
as an international legal concept, and to address the relevance of this in relation to 
the values of self-determination and international peace. 
3. Democracy in International Law 
Most states now acknowledge the importance democracy. This is seen in the raft of 
declarations emanating from meetings under the auspices of the UN and other 
international meetings of states. The latter include the 1997 Inter-Parliamentary 
Union's Universal Declaration on Democracy,47 the Bucharest Declaration of the 
Third International Conference of the New or Restored Democracies,48 and the 
<46 See. similarly, Samuels, Ope cit .. fn. 33 • p. 680 . 
• 7 Inter-Parliamentary Union's (IPU) Universal Declaration on Democracy, 16 September 1997. 
adopted without a vote . 
.. The Bucharest Declaration of the Third International Conference of the New or Restored 
Democracies. 11 September 1997, UN Doc. AlS2I334. 
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Warsaw Declaration: Towards a Community of Democracies.49 And from the UN, 
such documents as the 1993 Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on Human 
Rights, The GA's Millennium Declaration,5o and The GA~s World Summit 
Outcome.51 Commonly, these declarations call for promotion and assistance with 
the realisation of democratic ambitions of states, but offer very little in the way of 
defmition of democracy. The Vienna Declaration, for example, determines simply 
that, '[ d]emocracy is based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine 
their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation 
in all aspects of their lives'. 52 As such, it is not clear whether these are intended as 
lex lata, lex ferenda, or mere political aspiration. 53 
The members of the European Union are legally committed to have a democratic 
government. Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union states that, '[t]he Union is 
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
Member States.' Article 49 provides that only states adhering to the principles 
contained in Article 6(1) are eligible for membership. New membership of the EU is 
decided in accordance with the 1993 Copenhagen Principles, which stress that, 
amongst other things, 'the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy'. 54 A breach of Article 6 (1) requirements can lead to 
expulsion under Article 7 of the consolidated treaties, but this requires a vote of the 
membership and does not specify any further the meaning of democratic principles. 
Membership of the Organisation of American States is not conditioned on 
democratic government. But by Article 9 of the OAS Charter: 
A Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has been 
overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate in the 
sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the 
Organization and the Specialized Conferences as well as in the commissions, working 
groups and any other bodies established. 55 
49 Warsaw Declaration: Towards a Community of Democracies, (2000) 39 ILM 1306. 
~o GA Res. 55/2 (8 September, 2000) para. 24. 
~I 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN. Doc. Al601L.l, September 2005. para. 135. 
~2 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Program of Action. 
adopted by acclamation on 25 June 1993. (1993) 321LM 1661, at 1666. 
~3 See G. H. Fox, 'Democracy, right to, International Protection'. EPIL (forthcoming 2008) para. 4. 
S4 Conclusions of the Presidency - Copenhagen. June 21-22 1993, section 7(a) (iii). 
S$ As amended by the 1992 Washington Protocol. 
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This is dependent on a decision from the wider membership, with no criteria 
provided for the detennination of democracy.56 The African Union does not 
condition membership on democracy. It does, though, have as an objective of the 
Union, by Article 3(g) of the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union, to 
'promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good 
governance'. And, by Article 30 of the Act, 'governments which shall come to 
power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the 
activities of the Union'. This is noticeably not anti-democratic action, but as Fox 
notes, 'the AU's limited practice in this area suggests that Article 30 was intended to 
target interruptions of democratic governance.' 57 The point, here, is that while 
introducing legal obligations for members of the organisations based on democracy, 
there is a lack of specificity about what democracy means, and it is essentially for the 
membership of these organisations to decide what is meant by democracy in a 
particular circumstance. 58 If this approach to democracy was employed in state 
reconstruction, there would be no guarantee of the level of democracy that would be 
implemented or of objective regulation and accountability. 
It is as part of international human rights law that most evidence on a consensus 
for a legal concept of democracy, which could be of utility in relation to regulation 
and accountability of the pursuit of democracy in state reconstruction, is found. 
A. The Emergence of Democracy as a Human Right? 
The present concern is with the identification of a legal concept of democracy, 
specifically one that seeks to ensure genuine democracy, and that might be employed 
in the state reconstruction context as a basis for regulation and accountability of 
those involved. The interest is in universal international law, rather than regional. 
This is because state reconstruction, in most cases, involves states from a variety of 
. 
regIons. 
There has been considerable debate since the end of the cold war about a right to 
democracy in international law. Such debate has been fuelled by the spread of 
56 See. though. the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter. Article 3; see also T Legler. S Lean and 
D Boniface (eds.). Promoting Democracy in the Americas (2007). 
57 Fox. Ope cit .• file 53. para. 21. 
58 The Commonwealth is similar. see. e.g .• Harare Commonwealth Declaration. Issued by Heads of 
Government in Harare. Zimbabwe on 20 October 1991; see also the 1996 Ushuaia Declaration. of 
MECURSOR. 
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democratic politics around the world at the national level, the trend for international 
monitoring of elections, an acceptance of the importance of democracy for the 
broader protection of human rights, and, indeed, the pursuit of democracy in 
instances of state reconstruction. 59 Debate, of course, does not necessarily lead to 
consensus on a right to democracy. 
The most widely ratified international treaty that supports the idea of democracy 
as a human right is the 1966 ICCPR.6o The Human Rights Committee (HRC), a 
body of experts serving in their individual capacities, through its comments on 
reports from state parties, views on individual complaints, and general comments on 
specific articles, provides the most authoritative, albeit not legally binding, 
interpretations of the Covenants provisions.61 The HRC has emphasised that Article 
25 ICCPR, 'lies at the core of democratic government based on consent of the 
people' .62 Article 25 provides: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions 
mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restriction: 
(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
(b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the 
will of the electors; 
(c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country. 
While 'Article 25 does seem to provide the minimum foundations upon which 
democracy can built' ,63 there is a lack of specificity,64 which means it need not be 
read as requiring genuine democracy, in the sense noted above. In this respect, there 
is no indication of the powers to be accorded the elected institutions or that there 
must be more than one party contesting the elections.65 The resultant indeterminacy 
appears to have been central in gaining the consent of states with ideologically 
opposed views. 66 
The ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) were intended to give immediate legal meaning to the human 
'9 See Fox and Roth, op. cit., fn. 37, pp. 330-335. 
60 In force 1976. 
61 See D. McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1991 ). 
62 General Comment No. 25, 12 July 1996, UN Doc. CCPR/CI21IRev.I/Add.7. para. 1. 
63 N. D. White. The United Nations System: Toward International Justice (2002) 178. 
M Franck, op. cit .. fn. 23. p. 64. 
6' Roth. op. cit., fn. 31. pp. 330-331. 
66 Roth. op. cit., fn. 31. p. 332. 
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rights enumerated in the non-legally binding, more political aspiration, 1948 UDHR. 
The less ideologically neutral tone of the earlier instrument was reflected in the 
reference to 'democratic society' in Article 29 UDHR on permitted limitations to the 
human rights.67 As well as in Article 21 UDHR on political participation. this links 
the provision on elections with governmental authority: 
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives. 
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. 
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent voting procedures. 
As Roth notes, 'although the tone [in the UDHR] was not congenial, the meaning 
was malleable', and this encouraged those states not committed to genuine 
democracy, in the sense of this study, to at least abstain rather than vote against.68 
There were, though, still limits. The USSR was not, for example, willing to tolerate a 
version of Article 21 that required multiple political parties contest the election.69 
Consequently, when it came to agreeing upon the text of the covenants, the legal 
nature of the instrument, and emergence of the Soviet and Non-Aligned Blocs as 
significant powers in international society, meant that, in transforming the provisions 
of the UDHR, terminology which suggested a requirement of genuine democracy 
was never likely to be included. 70 
Thus, by the law on treaty interpretation,71 the intended meaning of Article 25 
ICCPPR is open to a range of conflicting interpretations.72 However, through the 
factors indicated in Article 31 of the VCLT, the meaning of a treaty is open to 
change over time. This means that, 'any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions', 73 and, 
'subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
67 Article 29 UDHR includes '[T]he just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society'. 
68 Roth, op. cit., fn. 3 I, p. 326. 
69 H. J. Steiner, -Political Participation as a Human Right', (1988) 77 Harv.Hum.Rts.Y.B. I at 91. 
70 See Roth, op. cit., fit. 31, pp. 329-332. 
71 See 1969 VCLT. Article 31(1), '[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given the terms of the treaty and in their context an in light of their object and 
purpose'; Article 32 indicates that should there be ambiguity then one may examine 'the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion .. 
72 Roth. op. cit., fn. 31. p. 332. 
73 Article 3 I (3)(a), VeL T. 
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of the parties regarding its interpretation', 74 should be taken into account when 
seeking to identify if a more specific meaning has developed. Finding evidence to 
support a development in relation to a multilateral treaty with some 160 states parties 
is, of course, a difficult task. There is, though, the HRC. 
Debate surrounds the exact status of the HRC, 'quasi judicial' or 'conciliator' are 
oft-heard terms.75 It does not provide binding interpretations. But, as the most 
authoritative body in relation to the ICCPR, its pronouncement on provisions are far 
from bereft of significance, and would be expected to influence the interpretation of 
provisions by states parties. Accordingly, how the Committee reads Article 25 is of 
particular interest for present purposes. 
In the 1990s, the HRC started to fmd its voice in relation to democracy, and 
sought to improve the specificity of Article 25 along genuine democratic lines in its 
General Comment. 76 The Comment takes as its starting point the content of Article 
25, which provides rights for individuals to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
to vote and be elected at genuine periodic elections, and to have access to public 
service. The Comment then sets out what the HRC understands as required to ensure 
fulfilment of these rights. The Comment explains that it is implicit in Article 25 that 
the freely chosen representatives do in fact exercise governmental power and are 
accountable,77 and that citizens can take part in the conduct of public affairs through 
public debate and dialogue with representatives, which is supported by ensuring 
freedom of expression, assembly and association.78 Moreover, the rights of freedom 
of expression, assembly and association are identified as essential conditions for the 
effective exercise of the right to vote, and suggestions are made as to what these 
rights, which are enshrined elsewhere in the ICCPR, require in the context of Article 
25.79 The principle of non-discrimination with regards the citizens right to vote is 
stressed.8o Conditions on eligibility to vote or stand for office on factors such as 
descent or political affiliation are rejected.81 It stresses the importance of voters 
74 Article 31 (3)(b), V CL T. 
7S See McGoldrick, op. cit., fn. 61, p. 54. 
76 For a detailed overview of the jurisprudence of the HRC in respect of Article 25, see A. Conte. S. 
Davidson. and R. Burchill. Defining Civil and Political RighJs (2005) 68-79. 
n General Comment No. 25: The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right 
of Equal Access to Public Service (Art. 25), 12107/96. CCPR/CI21/Rev.l/Add.7, para. 7. 
78 Ibid. para. 8. 
79 Ibid. para. 12. 
80 Ibid. para. 3. 
81 Ibid. para. 15. 
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being free to fonn opinions and oppose the government without undue influence or 
coercion of any kind.82 The issue of multiparty elections is not tackled directly. but 
when one reads that 'elections must be held at intervals . . . which ensure that the 
authority of government continues to be based on the free expression of the will of 
the electors,83 with the statement that 'political parties playa ... significant role in 
the election process', 84 the implication appears one of incompatibility with one party 
states.
85 In accordance with the idea that these are the basic rights that provide the 
foundation for democracy, the Comment does not venture so far as to suggest a type 
of electoral system beyond one person one vote.86 
In sum, the Comment on Article 25 the HRC sets out what one might describe as 
'all the essential conditions attributed to a [genuine] democratic system'. 87 While 
there is an emphasis on the procedure for identification of the government rather 
than conduct, it acknowledges that substantive conduct of governance must be of a 
certain type and standard if the procedure is to be consistent with the ideal of 
democracy. It indicates a set of basic rights that can be thought of as necessary for 
any society to be tenned democratic, rather than a complete blueprint for 
governance.88 This is the sort of legal idea of democracy that might be employed in 
the practice of state reconstruction. To what extent does it have the support of states? 
The reporting system under the ICCPR is an obvious place to look to see if a state 
subscribes to this interpretation of Article 25, and, more generally, treats democracy 
as a legal concept substantiated in the manner indicated by the HRC. In fact, 
however, it is difficult to extract support for a definitive interpretation from these 
reports. Because the reports are cast in tenns of what the state in question does to 
satisfy the provisions, rather than suggesting their approach is the only way of 
82 Ibid, para. 19. 
83 Ibid, para. 9. 
84 Ibid, para. 26. 
8S See White, op. cit., fn. 63, p. 179; cf. R. Rich, 'Bringing Democracy into International Law'. (200 I) 
12 Journal of Democracy 20 at 24; The Human Rights Commission has, though, been c~earer on the 
need for multiparty elections, in operative para. I (d)(ii) of Resolution 2000/47, 'Promotmg.and 
Consolidating Democracy', it refers to the need for the election process to be 'open to multIple 
parties', there were no negative votes but 8 abstentions: Bhu~ China. Cuba, Pakistan, Qatar. Congo 
(Brazzaville), Rwanda, and Sudan, see below. 
86 General Comment 25, op. cit., fn. 77, para. I; options include majority or proportional 
representation systems. see G. Fox. 'The Right to Political Participation in International Law' 2002 
Yale Journal of International Law 539 at 556. 
87 White. op. cit., fn. 63, p.178. 
88 See S. Wheatley. 'Democracy and International Law: a European Perspective'. (2002) 51/CLQ 225 
at 235; White. op. cit .• fit. 63. p. 178. 
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satisfying the provisions,89 the reports leave open that other approaches can be valid. 
Accordingly, in tenns of evidence of a change to a more specific meaning of Article 
25, the relevance of those reports that can be read as following genuine democracy is 
reduced. Moreover, while the tenn democracy is frequently mentioned in state 
reports, one struggles to fmd an example where this is used to indentify a set of core 
rights. Instead, the tenn democracy appears as a nod towards some type of undefined 
ideal governmental fonn.9o There is also, of course, the struggle to actually get states 
to report. Not reporting is the easiest way to avoid setting any precedent in terms of 
interpretation. 
Support for interpretation of Article 25 in line with that of the HRC might further 
be identified through recourse to the regional human rights agreements that states 
have entered into.91 In light of Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT, noted above, the 
wording of parallel provisions in regional instruments is relevant in relation to 
demonstrating the parties understanding of the ICCPR commitment. States, when 
creating regional instruments, have, though, tended simply to echo the broad nature 
of Article 25 ICCPR, and certainly do not seek to offer an explicit definition of 
democracy.92 The earlier 1950 ECHR is particularly weak in this respect, Article 3 of 
Additional Protocol 1 goes only so far as to require that: '[t]he High Contracting 
Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under 
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the 
choice of the legislature.' This reflects a troublesome preference for discretion by 
those states that may be seen as the beacons of democracy for those struggling to 
establish democracy in more perilous conditions. 93 
Judicial bodies attached to these regional instruments certainly acknowledge the 
importance of democracy. The ECtHR, for example, declared in the case of United 
Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey that 'democracy is without doubt a 
89 See, e.g., the Sixth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and No~e~ Ir~land [I 
November 2006] CCPRJC/GBRJ6 at p. 184, detailing how the 2006 UK Electoral AdmmlstratlOn Act 
improves the enjoyment of Article 25 for the people of the UK but with little to suggest that 
alternative approaches would not be consistent with Article 25. 
90 See, e.g., the UK Report, Ibid. 
91 See A. H. Robertson and J. G. Merrills, Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study of 
the International Protection of Human Rights (1996) 330-335. 
92 See, e.g., 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 13; 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights, . Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica', Article 23; 2004 League of Arab 
States. Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 24. 
93 D. J. Harris. M. O'Boyle, and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(1995) 557; Franck, op. cit., fn. 23, p. 90; M. Novak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: A 
Commentary (1993) 437. 
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fundamental feature of the European public order.,94 The Court has identified certain 
rights as essential in democratic society, for example, '[democracy] thrives on 
freedom of expression' ,95 but has fallen short of sketching out democracy as a 
composite of human rights. Indeed, it appears that the HRC has provided the most 
extensive (quasi)judicial legal account of democracy, at the international level, to 
date. 
Strong support for the importance of the human rights identified as the core of 
democracy by the HRC is found in the earlier 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document. 
The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe originated from the 1975 
Helsinki Conference of European Powers (Plus the US and Canada), through the 
Helsinki Final ACt.96 The act was a political document laying down a series of basic 
principles of behaviour in the areas of security in Europe, co-operation in economics, 
science and technology, and co-operation with humanitarian matters.97 Regular 
follow-up meetings review implementation, and produce non-binding instruments 
elaborating on the political commitments made at Helsinki. In respect of the right to 
democracy, Franck describes the Copenhagen Document 'as detailed to an 
unprecedented extent'. 98 Franck suggests that even though it is in a political 
document it is weighted with the terminology of opinio juris.99 Certainly, it does go 
into some considerable detail in relation to procedure for identification of 
governments, as well as what rights such as freedom of expression, association and 
assembly, entail. And, the 'will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through 
periodic and genuine elections,' is declared as 'the basis of the authority and 
legitimacy of all government.' 100 However, at no point is any of this explicitly cast as 
94 United Communist Party of Turkey and others v. Turkey,op. cit., fn. 34, para. 45; on the ECtHR's 
approach to Article 3 of Additional Protocol 1, see also B. Bowring, 'Negating Pluralist Democracy: 
the Str&sbourg Court Forgets the Rights of the Electors', (2007) 11 KHRP Legal Review 67. 
95 United Communist Party of Turkey and others v. Turkey,op. cit., fn. 34, para. 45; see also A. 
Mowbray, 'The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in the Promotion of Democracy', 
(1999) Public Law 703. 
96 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act of Helsinki, 1 August 1975: 
renamed the OSCE in 1995, see D. McGoldrick, 'The Development of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe - From Process to Institution', in B. S. Jackson and D. McGoldrick 
(eds.), Legal Visions of the New Europe (1993) 135; See also M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas 
(eds), The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security (1997). 
97 See, on the political nature of the document, N. D. White and M. Ode 11o, 'The Legal Base for 
Human Rights Field Operations' in M. O'Flaherty (ed.), The Human Rights Field Operation: Law. 
Theory and Practice. (2007) 47 at 51 
98 Franck, op. cit., tn. 23, p. 67. 
99 Franck, op. cit., tn. 23, p. 67; for a more hesitant approach, see S. Chestennan. Just U'ar or Just 
Peace? Humanitarian Intervention (2001) 95 and references cited therein. 
100 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document. Article 6. 
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constituting democracy. Moreover, where democracy is mentioned it is as an abstract 
political ideal: 'welcome the commitment expressed by all participating States to the 
ideals of democracy and political pluralism' .101 Later in 1990, the Paris Charter was 
signed, again not a legally binding treaty, it included a pledge to 'co-operate and 
support each other with the aim of making democratic gains irreversible.' 102 Rather 
than seek to offer a legal defmition of democracy, the main effort, by way of 
democracy, seems to have been the setting up of 'Office for Free Elections at 
Warsaw' (now renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights), 
mandated to 'facilitate contacts and the exchange of information on elections within 
participating States. ' 103 
In terms of the explicit promotion of a legal understanding of democracy, the 
Human Rights Commission was more forthcoming. In its 1999 resolution 
'Promotion of the Right to Democracy', the Commission described the right of 
democratic governance as including the following: 
(a) The rights to freedom of opinion and expression, of thought, conscience and religion, and 
of peaceful association and assembly; 
(b) The right to freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media; 
(c) The rule of law, including legal protection of citizens' rights, interests and personal 
security, and fairness in the administration of justice and independence of the judiciary; 
(d) The right of universal and equal suffrage, as well as free voting procedures and periodic 
and free elections; 
(e) The right of political participation, including equal opportunity for all citizens to become 
candidates; 
(t) Transparent and accountable government institutions; 
(g) The right of citizens to choose their governmental system through constitutional or other 
democratic means; 
(h) The right to equal access to public service in one's own country. 104 
In this concept of democracy, the procedure for the identification of the government 
is situated amongst aspects of substantive conduct. This varies from the approach of 
the HRC, noted above, wherein the procedure is the focus, and aspects of substantive 
101 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document, Preamble. 
102 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe and 
Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter, 21 November 1990, 
Preamble· see also Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Document of the Moscow 
Meeting ~fthe Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 3 October 1991. which is often 
cited on the debate in respect ofpro-democratic intervention. see on this debate Roth. op. cit .• fn. 31. 
~. 343; Chestennan, op. cit., ro. 99, pp. 94-96. 
03 See < http://www.osce.orglodihrl>. 
104 Promotion of the Right to Democrac),. Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/57 (27 
April 
1999). 
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conduct are intended to support it. In voting on the resolution there was no dissent, 
and only two members (China and Cuba) abstained. However, significant concern 
was expressed in relation to these rights being promoted as a right to democracy. 105 
As Fox and Roth note: 
The remarks of several states reflect, on the one han~ an unwillingness to repudiate either 
discrete participatory rights or democracy in the abstract, yet on the other han~ a deep 
concern about the imrolications of characterizing an entire and specific form of government 
as legally mandated.' 06 
Clearly, then, there is not universal consensus on a legal concept of genuine 
democracy in the normal run of things. The important point is that the HRC and the 
Human Rights Commission have indicated that there are a core of human rights 
which can be treated as a legal concept of democracy. And this is based on an 
understanding of democracy that addresses both procedure for identification of 
government and the substantive conduct of government. Accordingly, it could, if 
adopted by states, offer some reassurance that those involved in state reconstruction 
would strive for the democratic ideal, and, in so doing, come closer to genuine rule 
by the people. Consideration of some likely concerns about the development of a 
legal concept of democracy is an opportunity to clarify the need for such a concept. 
B. Why a Legal Concept of Democracy? 
In terms of objections to a legal concept of democracy, one might assert that to insist 
on a particular form of government, is a challenge to the right of self-
determination. 107 This concern helps to explain why the UN Secretary General 
preferred to refer to democratisation, rather than democracy, in his report on 
assistance from the UN system to new or restored democracies: "the UN System ... 
does not endorse or promote any specific form of government. That is why. in the 
t". d .. .108 present report, I do not attempt to define democracy but reler to emocratlsabon. 
10' 25 out of 53 member states on the UN Human Rights Commission dissented or 
abstained on the 'right to democracy' language of Resolution 1999/57. though none dissented and 
only two (China and Cuba) abstained on the resolution as a whole. UN Doc. ElCN.4/1999/SR.57 
(April 27. 1999). 
106 Fox and Roth. op. cit .. th. 37. p. 346; see also Rich, op. cit., fn. 85, pp. 23-24. 
107 See especially the comments ofIndia on Resolution 1999/57. op. Cil., fn. 105. paras. 8-9. 
108 Report by the UN Secretary General, . Support b~ ~e UN system for the efforts of governments to 
promote and consolidate new or restored democracies, 7 August 1995. A/50/332. 
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As Rajagopal responds, '[c]onceived in this way, democratisation becomes 
disaggregated into a series of bureaucratic steps taken by the UN solely in response 
to the wishes of the countries requesting assistance and therefore conformity \\ith 
sovereignty. ,109 Even in the normal run of things, where a government is 
independently in effective control of its territory, this approach struggles to convince 
of its consistency with the right to political independence. This is because the 
promotion of democracy by the UN is far from the neutral and apolitical act that the 
Secretary General and the fact of a consensual basis attempt to portray it as. IIO The 
point, then, is not to try and reconcile a requirement of democracy with the right to 
political independence per se, but rather, when political independence is 
compromised, to see democracy as another means of accommodating the value of 
self-determination. If this is to be the case, there is a need for some explicit legal 
regulation and accountability to ensure that what is advertised - democracy, and with 
it genuine rule by the people - is at least strived towards. 
Further, it might be argued that identifying pre-existing human rights as 
democracy is to add nothing. But this is to miss that there are core rights that are 
clearly more central to the democratic ideal than others, and through identifying 
these, a platform for challenging the misuse of the term of democracy is formed. 
More specifically, thinking back to the discussion on democracy as a political 
concept, it is clear that identifying the basic components of democracy in legal terms 
is a means to challenge the utility of democracy as a malleable concept, able to 
legitimise even governments with little interest in striving for the democratic ideal. 
In the opposite respect, to identify all human rights as forming the legal concept of 
democracy would also be to lose sight of the legal concept of democracy as a basis 
for assessment of the pursuit of genuine rule by the people, not a basis for passing 
judgement on a government's provision for human welfare in general. 
The idea is not, however, to suggest that other human rights, outside of the legal 
concept of democracy, are somehow less important. Rather, by identifying those 
rights that are most central to the democratic ideal, and expecting a government to 
pursue their achievement, the idea is that the nature of the government, striving for 
genuine rule by the people. will incline it to seek to uphold all human rights. Clearly 
109 B. Rajagopal. International Law from Belo'w: Development. Social Movements. and Third World 
Resistance (2003) 142. 
110 RajagopaJ. op. cit., fn. 109, p. 142. 
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this is idealistic, III but certainly in a situation where effective control of the territory 
is dependent on international actors there is reason for greater optimism~ than in 
fledgling democracies without such invasive international involvement. 
Moreover, there is scope for debate about which rights are most central to the 
democratic ideal. The HRC and the Human Rights Commission have. though~ 
indicated that it is possible to single at least some rights out as more central. 
Minority rights are noticeably absent. The implementation of minority rights in 
general is particularly dependent on the circumstances of a given state. 112 But the 
logic of the democratic ideal, that all citizens are equal, means that minorities. 
particularly their cultural distinctiveness, should not be left to the whim of the 
democratically elected majority.l13 Ideally, then, there would be provision in a legal 
concept of democracy to address the importance of minorities being represented in 
government. Agreement on what such a provision would look like, however, remains 
elusive. 114 And thereby is not likely to be specifically addressed in a legal concept of 
democracy, even when limited to the state reconstruction context. 
As the best that can be hoped for, by way of a legal concept of democracy, reflects 
minimum standards rather than an extensive blueprint for democratic sophistication, 
some consideration of the thesis of Marks, the author of a significant critical analysis 
of the concept of democracy in international law, is required. A key conclusion of 
Marks is that the democratic ideal must not be reduced to any particular set of 
institutions and practices. 'Instead, they [the two aspects identified by Beetham, 
noted above] must be permitted to retain their character as tools for criticizing 
actuality and orientating change'. 115 Marks was writing in response to the trend for 
the liberal West to encourage countries of the third world and the European 
transition states to pursue democracy, and, in relation to this, international scholars 
who attempt to identify a legal concept. 116 Mark's criticism stemmed from the 
promotion of a low-intensity democracy, characterised by 'the holding of periodic 
III Wippman, op. cit., tn. 35, p. 241. . 
112 See R. Mullerson, 'Minorities in Eastern Europe and the Fonner USSR Problems. TendenCies and 
Protection' (1993) 56 The Modern Law Review 793 at 804. 
113 Marks and Clapham, op. cit., fn. 1, p. 66; Wippman, op. cit .. tn. 35. p. 230. 
114 See S. Wheatley. Democracy. Minorities and International Law (2005) 195. 
II' Marks. op. cit., th. 28. p. 150. 
116 See also T. Carothers, 'Empirical Perspectives on the Emerging Nonn of Democratic Governance 
in International Law'. (1992) Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 261 at 264; 
M. Koskenniemi. op. cit .. th. 29. p. 234; cf. G. H. Fox, Humanitarian Occupation (2008) 155. 
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mUltiparty elections and the official separation of powers' ,117 with an undemanding 
standard set for 'more far-reaching objectives, such as enhancing respect for human 
rights, social justice, and civilian control of the military'; 118 in sharp contrast to the 
far more demanding standards pursued in 'actually existing democracies ~. The 
concern, for Marks, is that it is not: 
orientated to the reproduction of Western political practices, neither is it designed to 
capitalise on the distinctive democratic possibilities offered by non-Western experiences and 
traditions. Rather, its significance lies in providing some of the institutions and procedures 
associated with modem democracy, while leaving established centres of powers substantially 
intact. 
As Gills et al emphasise 'in a real sense these new democracies have preserved 
ossified political and economic structures from an authoritarian past. Not only have 
they not come close to operating a political structure modelled on actual Western 
liberal democracies, this is not part of a long-term agenda for the future.' 119 Marks 
also reports on how the theorists of low-intensity democracy 'suggest that moves to 
support democratic reconstruction may serve to curb democratic aspirations; that free 
elections may substitute for transformative social and political change. ,120 
In the light of Mark's concern, it is important to stress that identifying the basic 
rights that are required by democracy is not to suggest that their satisfaction entails 
the democratic ideal is achieved. But it does offer a basis for legal opinion to be 
formed on whether there is a commitment to the democratic ideal, which is important 
if the pursuit of democracy is to be the excuse for the neglect of political 
independence in the state reconstruction context. Moreover, in the situations being 
addressed by this study, there are no established centres of power to be 
legitimised. 121 In fact, it is exactly the lack of an independently effective domestic 
government to embody the right of the state and its people to political independence, 
which introduces the need for a legal concept of democracy: to serve as a check on 
international and domestic actors, that might seek to take advantage of the legitimacy 
that the term democracy provides, without a commitment to the genuine rule by the 
117 Marks, op. cit .. fn. 28, p. 53. 
118 Marks, op. cit .. fn. 28. p. 53. 
119 B. Gills, J. Rocamora. and R. Wilson, 'Low Intensity Democracy', in B. Gills. J. Rocamora. and R. 
Wilson (eds.). Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order (1993) 3. 
120 Marks, op. cit .• fn. 28. p. 74. . ., 
121 On the subject of promoting democracy to the major world powers of RUSSia and Chana. see R. . 
Mullerson, 'Promoting Democracy Without Starting a New Cold War', (2008) 7 Chinese Journal oj 
International Law 1. 
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people which the term promises. lbis is not, of course, to suggest the irrelevance of 
efforts to achieve democracy during the reconstruction of ineffective states for the 
debate on whether and how democracy should be promoted around the world. 122 
Such debate is not, though, the focus of this study. 
Grounded in international human rights law, how would this legal concept of 
democracy fare as a basis for regulation and accountability of those involved in state 
reconstruction without an independently effective domestic government? 
c. Regulation and Accountability through Democracy as a Human Right 
The rationale of this enquiry into democracy in international law is that if an 
essential cause of international acceptance of large-scale international involvement 
in the reconstruction of an ineffective state is to be the pursuit of democracy, there is 
a need for assurances that there is a commitment to what the term implies, genuine 
rule by the people. This is important because, if understood only as a political 
concept, democracy could go on to be treated as little more than a platitude, intended 
to conceal a complete absence of concern for the input of the people into 
governance. And if this were to occur, the values of self-determination and 
international peace, the accommodation of which rests on the promise of genuine 
rule by the people, would be affected, with consequent negative implications for the 
people of the state in question and international order. 
Before commenting on the extent that a legal concept of democracy grounded in 
international human rights law would serve to provide meaningful regulation and 
accountability of the process. It is useful to imagine a how model for legal regulation 
and accountability could operate in the context of state reconstruction where there 
was not an independently effective domestic government. 
If governance were from an un-elected domestic government kept in power 
through international military presence, or an international governance structure. the 
idea is that, along with evidence of a genuine commitment to realising the procedural 
aspects, governance would be expected to be in line with the substantive conduct 
aspects of the legal concept of democracy. To accommodate the peacemaking 
situation, there could be reasonable exceptions in the interests of international peace, 
122 See. on the debate surrounding democracy promotion. T. Carothers. 'How Democracies Emerge: 
The "Sequencing" Fallacy" (2007) 18 Journal o/Democracy 12. 
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but evidence of a genuine commitment beyond the exception must be sustained. 
Further, the legal approach to democracy, identified above, is still made up of rather 
abstract tenns that leave discretion on implementation. At the present time, it is 
difficult to imagine agreement on greater specificity, but as it would not be practical 
to micro manage the process of governance, even if there were greater specificity. 
this would not affect the core significance of the legal concept of democracy 
identified above. Crucially, what this legal concept provides is a basis for 
distinguishing a commitment to the democratic ideal from disregard, which is 
missing when democracy is treated as a loose political concept. A standard of 
persistent neglect could be employed to challenge the authority of those that do no 
display commitment, perhaps dependent on a resolution from the GA or the SC. 
With the possibility of a challenge to governmental authority, one would hope that 
those entrusted with governance would be more inclined to ensure at least a strive for 
the realisation of a model of democracy that addresses both the substantive and 
procedural aspects of governance, and thus brings the process of reconstruction 
closer to genuine rule by the people. 
Back to reality, whether it was international actors or an otherwise ineffective 
domestic government administering the move towards democratic self-government, 
international human rights obligations would still, at least arguably, be applicable. 123 
But this returns the present enquiry to the nature of international human rights law, 
as addressed in Chapter 2. International human rights law expects that there is a 
government that embodies the rights of the state and its people to implement it. 
Accordingly, the instruments tend to be set up so that they do not come with a 
meaningful basis for enforcement or, more generally, for challenging the authority of 
the governments entrusted with fulfilment of the rights. Nor is there a culture of third 
states complaining about the human rights situation in a particular state. Thus, as a 
human right, those with authority could easily set aside the legal concept of 
democracy. As with the political concept, democracy might readily amount to a mere 
platitude. However, if the legal concept of democracy were treated as the basis of 
authority, there would be the framework for challenging authority, and, with it. the 
impetus for adherence to democracy. In light of this, and recalling discussion in 
Chapter 1 about the relationship between state sovereignty and the legal right to self-
123 See Chapter 2 of this study. 
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detennination, it is useful to consider the likelihood of the legal right to self-
determination requiring adherence to the legal concept of democracy. 
4. A Legal Concept of Democracy as Part of the Right to Self-Determination? 
Chapter 1 set out how the right to self-determination is the best explanation for state 
sovereignty in contemporary international law. As things stand, it gives legal bite to 
the idea of popular sovereignty - sovereignty belongs to the people - by granting the 
people the same right to political independence as the state. There is, though. as was 
noted in Chapter 1, the conceptual potential for further development. This. if one 
follows the logic of the ideas associated with the legal right - the general principle -
which stresses the importance of the possibility of self-government decided through 
the freely expressed will of the people, could have wide-ranging significance for 
international law. 
It is not unimaginable that the legal concept of democracy, given the historical 
association of democracy with self-determination and identification of the will of the 
people, might come to be seen as a legal requirement for governance to be consistent 
with the right to self-determination.124 If it did, there would be clear implications for 
the rules on the identification of the agent of the state and its people. Presently, 
international legal doctrine, on who can embody the rights of the state and its people, 
is based on the idea that where there is effective control acquiescence of the people 
can at least be assumed. Thus a failure to meet standards of democratic governance 
has no direct impact on governmental status in an international legal sense. This 
helps to sustain the efficacy of international law, which would clearly suffer if 
effective governments could lose their status as a consequence of a failure to commit 
to the democratic ideal. 125 
However, where there is no independently effective domestic government, and 
there is a need for identification of a government to exercise the rights to decide 
found in the overlapping legal doctrine of state sovereignty and self-determination of 
124 See I. F. Dekker, 'Reconsidering the Legal Relevance of Structural Violence', in N. Schrijver, P. 
de Waart, and E. Denters, Reflections on International Law from the Low Countries: in Honour of 
Paul de Waart (1998) 324 at 336. 
12$ Cf. J. d'Aspremon~ 'Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy' 38 ,\TV Journal of 
International Law and Politics (2006) 877: also C. G. Fenwick, 'The Recognition of De Facto 
Governments: is there a Basis for Inter-American Collective Action', (1964) 58 AJIL 109. 
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peoples, it is more reasonable to expect that this link between the emerging legal 
consensus on democracy as a human right and the right to self-determination might 
have been made. This is because it would not so readily threaten the authority of 
effective, but hardly democratic, governments, and would help improve the 
consistency of large-scale international involvement for the purpose of state 
reconstruction with the value of self-determination. It would provide a basis for 
challenging the authority of the government, if it did not adhere to the legal concept 
of democracy, with much more purchase than if democracy were seen only as a 
human right. 126 To gain a better idea of the likelihood of this conceptual potential 
being adopted, it is worth considering how strong the claim, that a legal concept of 
democracy is already part of the right to self-determination, is. 
When the people, for the purpose of the right to self-determination, are understood 
as the population of the state as a whole, states benefit from the ethical justification 
this provides for statehood and the legitimacy it confers on sovereignty. 127 States are, 
however, reluctant to encourage further developments in the legal doctrine of self-
determination. Such reluctance can be explained by fears about the potential 
encouragement of claims to secession from groups within states, or the risk to the 
status of effective governments, if a criteria for governmental form and conduct that 
is consistent with the right of self-determination is introduced. Accordingly, states, 
as well as the HRC, have tended to concentrate on the external aspects of right to 
self-determination.128 And Harris is confident of legal doctrine in relation to the 
colonial context: 'a rule of international law by which the political future of a 
colonial or similar non-independent territory should be determined in accordance 
with the wishes of its inhabitants, within the limits of the principle of uti possidetis '. 
However, within a state, Harris will only venture that the legal principle of a right of 
all peoples to self-determination 'may require governments generally to have a 
democratic base, and that minorities be allowed political autonomy' .129 Two related 
lines of reasoning support the latter, more hopeful, point. 
One line of reasoning is based on the inclusion of the right to self-determination as 
Article 1 in the ICCPR. Cassese argues that 'freely' in Article 1. as well as indicating 
126 On self-detennination as more than just a human right. see C. Drew. 'The East Timor Story: 
International Law on Trial', (200 I) 12 EJ/L 65 I at 663. 
127 See Chapter I of this study. 
128 See Cassese. op. cit., til. 5. p. 62-65. 
129 D. J. Harris. Cases and Materials on International Law (2004) 112. 
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freedom from external influence, also indicates that a people be "free from any 
manipulation or undue influence from the domestic authorities themselves' when 
choosing 'their legislators and political leaders ' . 130 It follows from this, for Cassese. 
that 'internal self-determination is best explained as a manifestation of the totality of 
the rights embodied in the Covenant [ICCPR], with particular reference to: freedom 
of expression (Article 19); the right of peaceful assembly (Article 21); the right to 
freedom of association (Article 22); the right to vote (Article 25b); and more 
generally, the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives (Article 25a).' 131 Cassese concedes, however, that the 
rights cited, particularly Article 25, are framed in such a manner as to make it easy 
for states to contend that they are satisfied. 132 On this reasoning, if one adheres to 
interpretations of Article 25 such as that offered by the HRC in its General Comment 
on Article 25, self-determination would already require genuine democracy. 
The HRC in this Comment indicated a close relationship between Article 1, the 
right to decide, and Article 25, the right to participate, but did not link the two. 133 
Elsewhere, the HRC has, though, noted in the comments on at least one state report 
that a failure to conduct elections represented an infringement of the people's right to 
self-determination,134 suggesting that it favours seeing the two as linked. A number 
of states have also stressed a link between democracy and the right to self-
determination in their reports, but this is democracy as a loose political concept. 135 It 
remains, then, to be confirmed that the right to self-determination in the ICCPR 
requires genuine democracy. 
The other line of reasoning relates to how the right to self-determination was 
formulated in the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations, GA Res. 2625. After noting that: 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-detennination of peoples enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to detennine, without external 
interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural 
130 Cassese, op. cit .. fn. 5, p. 58. 
131 Cassese, op. cit., fn. 5. p. 53. 
132 Cassese, op. cit., fn. 5, p. 53. 
133 General Comment 25, op. cit., fn. 62, para. 2. 13~ Human Rights Committee. Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of the Congo, 
UN Doc. CCPRlC1791 Add. I 18. 27 March 2000. para. 20. 
13.5 See, e.g., India's Third Periodic Report. UN Doc. CCPRlCI76/ Add.6, 17 July 1996. para. 32; cf. 
Wheatley. op. cit., fn. 88. pp. 231-2. 
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development, and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter. 
It is added in the safeguard clause that: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraph shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any 
action w~ich dis~ember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity 
of sovereIgn and mdependent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representinf the whole people belonging to the te"itory without distinction as to 
race, creed or colour. 13 
As a result of the need for compromise to gain agreement on the text of the 
Declaration, there is a large degree of ambiguity in the clause. 137 
The UK and the US, amongst others, were keen to make the link between the right 
to self-determination and the nature of the government through which the people 
would exercise the right. The US draft that was presented to the Special Committee 
on Friendly Relations, read: '[t]he existence of a sovereign and independent state 
possessing a representative government, effectively functioning as such to all distinct 
peoples within its territory, is presumed to satisfy the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination as regards those peoples.' 138 The UK draft echoed thiS. 139 The 
ambiguous term 'representative' was used by the US and the UK, but it seems that 
what these states had in mind was democracy:4o Other states resisted the inclusion 
of the term 'representative government' in the manner desired by the US and UK. 
One reason for resistance was that it implied 'a mild attempt to impose certain of its 
[the sponsor's] own political persuasions on the constitutional law and practice of 
other states' :41 Ultimately, it was included in the more ambiguous manner cited 
above. But Rosenstock still considers that the clause as framed requires a 
government to represent the governed as part of the right of self-determination. I"2 
136 GA Res. 2625, (1970) Emphasis added. 
137 See M. Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice (1982) 37-38. 
138 UN Doc. AlAC.1251L.32, 12 April 1966. 
139 UN Doc. AlAC.1251L.44, 19 July 1967. 
140 See Pomerance, 0p. cit., fn. 137, pp. 38-39. 
141 Burmese representative, 1967 session of the Special Committee on Friendly Relations, UN Doc. 
AlAC.125/SR.68,4 December 1967, p. 9; the UK representative, Mr. Sinclair, denied that 'only one 
system of government properly met the criterion' of being 'representative' UN Doc. 
AlAC.l25/SR.69,4 December 1967, p. 19. 
142 R. Rosenstock, 'The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: 
A Survey', (1971) 65 A1IL 713 at 732. 
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Cassese, in contrast, sees that, as originally framed, it only means that racial and 
religious groups within a state have a right of equal access to government. 143 
Regrettably, the ICJ in the recent Wall Opinion missed an opportunity, in its first 
treatment of the legal right outside the colonial context, to clarify issues surrounding 
the legal doctrine of self-determination. l44 A significant international instrument 
endorsing the right of the whole population of a state to self-determination is the 
Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE, which stresses the importance of the rights to 
decide but offers nothing that could be read as limiting the right to the colonial 
context. 145 Perhaps most significant in respect of the safeguard clause is the 1993 
Vienna Declaration from the UN World Conference on Human Rights. While it 
reaffirmed the safeguard clause, it replaced 'distinction as to race, creed, or colour' 
with 'without distinction of any kind'. As Crawford notes, in reference to the clause 
as expressed in the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Vienna Declaration, the 
people of an existing state 'exercise the right to self-determination through their 
participation in the government of the state on a basis of equality' .146 The Badinter 
Commission on the dissolution of the FRY, and the Canadian Supreme Court in the 
Quebec case, also support the broader views. 147 These instances of support make it 
difficult to argue against the idea that all peoples in a state have the right to decide, 
to be enjoyed through a representative government. 148 The issue that remains, of 
course, is what does 'representative' mean? 
Cassese sees the change from GA Res. 2625 to Vienna, noted above, as an 
implication that self-determination means 'the right freely to determine the 'political 
status' of the country and to have equal access to government without any political, 
social, economic, racial or ethnic discrimination: in short, it means pluralistic 
representative democracy.' 149 On this basis, and on the Helsinki Declaration, and 
143 Cassese, op. cit., th. 5, p. 114 and p. 150. . 
144 Legal Consequences o/the Construction 0/ a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. AdVISOry 
Opinion, ICJ Report 2004, p. 136, see, in particular, the separate opinion of Judge Higgins on the lack 
of more legal analysis in relation to the legal right of self-determination in the Opinion. 
14' Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act of Helsinki, 1 Aug 1975. Article 
VIII. 
146 J. Crawford, The Creation o/States in International Law (2006) 119. 
147 Opinion 2, Badinter Commission, 11 January 1992, (1993) 92 fLR 167; see, though, the reasoning 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Re/erence reo Secession o/Quebec, (1998) 11 DLR. (4th) 385 
(SCC) para. 138. 
1 .. See also Musgrave. op. cit .• fn. 3, p. 96 
149 Cassese, op. cit .. tn. 5. p. 306. 
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statements of some states at the GA,150 Cassese suggests it may warrant contending 
that a customary rule that 'representative' means pluralistic representative 
d . . h f.c.· 151 H . emocracy IS m t e process 0 lormatlon. owever, this as Cassese acknowledges 
is only a contention. A 'representative government' or a 'government representing 
the whole people', if they are different, does not have to entail democracy. The term 
'representative' is an open ended one; it clearly has associations with democracy, but 
does not have to mean democracy. This ambiguous nature helps to explain how it 
was acceptable to the array of states involved in drafting the two declarations 
referred to above. Beyond blatant policies of exclusion from government, such as 
apartheid,152 there is, then, no general agreement on a particular form of government 
that is required to fulfil the representative requirement. 153 Accordingly. if a 
government is in effective control of the territory it is presumed to constitute the 
embodiment of the peoples' right to self-determination. 154 This approach makes 
sense in light of effective control being the criterion for governmental status in 
international law, and the importance of effective governments for the efficacy of 
international law. 
Moreover, keeping the meaning of representative open protects against a 
consequence of a logical reading of the safeguard clause, which suggests a 
government that is not representing the whole people could be at risk of a right to 
secession being afforded the oppressed group. 155 Perhaps the most significant finding 
in this respect has been by the Supreme Court of Canada, which suggested that: 
the international law right to self-determination only generates, at best, a right to external 
self-detennination in situations of former colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for 
example under foreign military occupation; or where a definable group is denied meaningful 
access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development. In 
all three situations, the people in question are entitled to a right to external self-detennination 
because they have been denied the ability to exert internally their right to self-
detennination. ls6 
ISO Cassese, op. cit., fit. 5, p. 305 
lSI Cassese, op. cit., fn. 5, p. 306. 
152 See 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid; 
1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Fonns of Racial Discrimination. Art. 3~ SC 
Res. 288 (1970). 
m See Musgrave. op. cit., th. 3. pp. 100-102. 
I,.. Roth. op. cit .. th. 31, p. 419. . . . . 
15' See C. Tomuschat. Yugoslavia's Damaged Sovereignty over the ProvInce of Kosovo . m G. 
Kreijen (ed.), State. So\'ereignty, and Inlernational Governance.323 at 342. 
1.56 Reference reo Secession of Quebec, loc. cit., fn. 147 (emphasiS added). 
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There is, though, little to support this approach in state practice, with states wary of 
creating a mass of calls for a right to secession. 1 57 
Given that these inchoate developments linking self-determination to democracy 
in legal doctrine binge in some respects on a fear of challenges to the authority of 
effective governments, it would not be unimaginable in relation to large-scale 
international involvement in state reconstruction for a legal concept of democracy to 
be required as part of the right to self-determination. This relates to the fact that, in 
such a situation, there is no independently effective domestic government, and. 
accordingly, as was noted in Chapter 2, established international law on 
governmental status defers in an unsatisfactory manner to international recognition. 
Thus a normal reason for not adopting the conceptual potential is not present, and 
there is a clear need in the interests of the value of self-determination and 
international peace for its adoption. Whether it would be adopted or not is, however, 
far from clear. 
5. Concluding Hypothesis on the Approach to Democracy in the Practice of 
State Reconstruction 
This chapter has addressed the role that democracy could have in inducing toleration 
of the practice of large-scale international involvement in state reconstruction 
without an independently effective domestic government. It has suggested that this 
would be through projection of an accommodation of the values of self-
determination of peoples and international peace - the values that are put at stake by 
a neglect of political independence. It was argued that this could be achieved by the 
pursuit of democracy as a loose political concept, which would provide flexibility 
which could be useful for the peacemaking process. But that in order for there to be 
some truth in democracy's promise genuine rule by the people, there would need to 
be some commitment to minimum standards derived from the democratic ideal 
which cover procedural identification and substantive conduct of government. A 
political concept would not offer the necessary basis for regulation and 
accountability of democracy to ensure this commitment. 
15' See J. Crawford. 'State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession', (1998) 69 BYIL 
85; specifically on the relationship of self-determination with secession. see R. Mullerson . . Or~eri~g 
Anarchy: International Law in International Society. (2000) 283; G. H. Fox. 'Self-Determlnatlon In 
the Post-Cold War Era: a New Internal Focus?" (1995) 16 Alich. J. Int'l L. 733 at 755. 
There are signs of an emerging consensus on democracy as a human right. But as 
a human right, while it would provide a standard for external assessment of the 
process, it would not provide a substantive basis for regulating or holding 
accountable, because of the inherently weak nature of international human rights law 
in this respect. It was consequently argued that the conceptual potential to make the 
legal concept of democracy part of the right to self-determination should be adopted. 
This would acknowledge that democracy was required because of the neglect of the 
rights to decide, and, because of self-determination as the core of sovereignty, it 
would provide a basis for the development of a legal framework in relation to 
limiting changes, imposing obligations, and for monitoring and challenging the 
policy of even an elected government, at least while it remains ineffective without 
international support. Operating on the basis of reasonable exceptions in the interests 
of international peace, this approach would retain flexibility for any peace process. 
But, if there was persistent neglect of the democratic concept, the authority of any 
government that received effectiveness through an international military presence 
could be challenged. Thus as an impetus to strive for the democratic ideal, this 
approach would more securely accommodate the value of self-determination, in the 
sense of giving people the possibility of self-government. 
International law, though, develops on a 'needs' basis. If international actors 
perceive it as in their interests to develop law then they will seek to encourage its 
development. The importance of the right to political independence for the UN 
system is reason to believe that it would be in the interests of international actors to 
develop law to regulate international involvement in the reconstruction of states to 
try and better reconcile such practice with the right to political independence. As 
things stand, however, legal answers, which counsel against the likelihood of such 
law, are available in state consent and a chapter VII resolution. 
Alone, these justifications look inadequate as explanation for international 
acceptance. Still, even though these legal answers do not reconcile the practice with 
the right to political independence, concern about this could be offset by the pursuit 
of democracy, because of its ability to accommodate the values of self-determination 
and international peace. Such an approach would more likely induce international 
acceptance and retain flexibility for all involved. Seen in this light, it is hardly 
obvious that there will be a perceived "need' for development of the law. Whether or 
not there will be signs of new law, in this respect. depends on how strongly the need 
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for real consistency with the value of self-detennination is perceiYed to be relative to 
other factors that might counsel against the development of law. Factors such as the 
need to sustain amicable relations amongst a pluralist international society. and the 
importance of flexibility for international involvement, in tenns of goyernment 
arrangements that can be introduced, both of which could be affected by the potential 
legal development outlined. 
The next two parts of this study turn attention to how the contemporary practice of 
state reconstruction without an independently effective domestic government 
actually relates to the right to political independence. Attention is first given to th~ 
law of occupation. As an established framework for the administration of territory 
without an independently effective domestic government. it is necessary to address 
why this has not been adopted, at least by analogy, in the other paradigms. And to 
analyse contemporary practice of state reconstruction under the law of occupation 
which is relevant for the hypothesis just set out. The other chapter in Part 2 addresses 
the phenomenon of IT A, which represents reconstruction through direct foreign 
governance. While Part 3 is concerned with analysis of what this study 
conceptualises as the assistance model of state reconstruction, the most favoured 
approach for large-scale international involvement in the reconstruction of a 
sovereign state without an independently effective domestic government. 
Part Two 
STATE RECONSTRUCTION BY FOREIG~ GOVER'\A:\CE 
Chapter 4 
State Reconstruction under the Law of Occupation 
1. Introduction 
The law of occupation is an established legal framework for the administration of 
territory without an independently effective domestic government. Accordingly. in a 
study that concerns itself with how the right to political independence is dealt with in 
state reconstruction without an independently effective domestic government, there 
is an obvious need for some consideration of the law of occupation. This chapter is 
interested in how the approach the law of occupation takes to reconstruction relates 
to the right to political independence of the occupied state, and the relevance of this 
approach for the other paradigms of state reconstruction. The chapter asks, when 
does the law apply? What is the approach to state reconstruction? Would it be of 
utility, if adopted by analogy, for the other paradigms of state reconstruction? Are 
there lessons for how to improve the other paradigms in relation to political 
independence? And, does the framework, or practice under it, have any relevance for 
the hypothesis of Chapter 3? 
To re-cap, the hypothesis of Chapter 3 is about how to accommodate the UN 
system values of self-determination and international peace that are put at risk by 
large-scale international involvement in an ineffective state's reconstruction. It is 
contended that the success of such accommodation is likely to be of central 
importance for international acceptance of the practice as a whole. The hypothesis 
rests on the idea that, where there is no independently effective domestic 
government, the pursuit of democracy would be a means of addressing the 
inadequacy of the legal justifications - state consent/chapter VII resolution - in 
relation to accommodation of these UN system values. How well the values are in 
fact accommodated is argued to depend on whether democracy has been pursued as a 
legal or a political concept. In this respect, it is predicted that international actors are 
likely to favour a political concept because this retains discretion for all involved 
while still portraying accommodation of the values of self-detennination and 
international peace. This is despite the better consistency \\ith the value of self-
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detennination that a legal concept of democracy linked to the right of self-
determination is argued to offer. 
This chapter argues that, despite originating before the right to self-determination 
and the prohibition on annexation of territory following a use of force, the law of 
occupation retains relevance for contemporary efforts at state reconstruction because 
it was still intended to preserve sovereign rights of the target state. While the 
presence of, at least one of, state consent and a chapter VII resolution is argued to 
explain why the law of occupation does not apply in the other two paradigms of state 
reconstruction addressed by this study. The approach that the law of occupation 
takes to the surreptitious manufacture of target state consent to end application of the 
law - insistence on an independently effective domestic government before the 
application can end - is argued to support the concern about the lack of an 
independently effective domestic government in the other paradigms. In this respect, 
attention is drawn to the lack of credentials for an otherwise ineffective domestic 
government, or an international administration, to be treated as the embodiment of 
the will of the state and its people, and the lack of scope for domestic resistance to 
the designs of the international actors in terms of how reconstruction proceeds. 
Furthermore, it is contended that the conservationist emphasis of the law of 
occupation, in terms of change and development of state and civil infrastructure, 
would frustrate efforts at contemporary state reconstruction, and this signals little 
prospect of it being adopted by analogy. The law of occupation's approach to 
addressing concern for the right to political independence, limiting discretion of 
those with authority, is, though, contended to be support for the idea that, in the 
interests of the values of self-determination and international peace, there should be 
limits on the discretion of an authority that is not an independently effective 
domestic government. In this respect, recent practice is argued to confirm the 
established law of occupation's unsuitability for wide-scale reconstruction. The basis 
for international acceptance of the practice of reconstruction in breach of the law of 
occupation is argued to rest on the particular circumstances and the pursuit of 
democracy as a core reconstruction aim. The importance of the pursuit of democracy 
for international acceptance is argued to rest on its ability to accommodate the values 
of self-determination and international peace put at risk by the disregard for the law 
of occupation. However. it is also contended that there is little to suggest that the 
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centrality of democracy in contemporary practice has encouraged development of the 
law of occupation, or that in any other sense a legal concept of democracy has been 
adopted. 
The chapter begins with an account of the history and rationale of the law of 
occupation. This is to indicate why, despite existing before the right to self-
determination and the prohibition on annexation of territory following a use of force, 
the law of occupation is expected to have addressed the issue of state reconstruction 
and the right to political independence, in its framework for administration, in a 
manner of relevance for contemporary reconstruction efforts. To indicate how 
occupation relates to the right to political independence, to explain why it does not 
apply in the other paradigms, and to form a view on whether there are similarities 
that could justify its adoption by analogy in the other paradigms, the next section 
addresses the rules on application of the law of occupation. Subsequently, the legal 
framework the law of occupation provides for state reconstruction is addressed, both 
in terms of potential for adoption by analogy and general lessons about the level of 
change and development that should be permissible in state reconstruction without 
an independently effective domestic government. Moving on, attention is turned to 
how the emergence of the legal right of self-determination, as the core of state 
sovereignty, might have encouraged the development of the law of occupation in 
relation to state reconstruction along the lines set out in Chapter 3. In an effort to 
identify evidence of such development, subsequent sections address practice of 
occupation and reconstruction in post World War II Germany, the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, and in Iraq. A fmal section draws together the key themes 
and relates these to the study as a whole. 
2. The History and Rationale of the Law of Occupation 
The starting point in the emergence of a law of occupation is commonly linked to the 
United States Civil War, specifically the 1863 Lieber Code. I In 1874, seventeen 
European States met in Brussels to attempt the production of the first treaty on the 
I See D. A. Graber. The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation 1863-1914 -A Historical 
Survev (1949) 15. 
law of occupation;2 a fmal declaration was drafted but never ratified.3 The text of the 
Brussels Declaration, along with judicial decisions, military manuals and other non-
binding instruments, proved highly significant during discussions on the laws of war 
at The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907.4 The most significant document 
from the Hague Conferences for the law of occupation was the 1907 Fourth Hague 
Convention and annexed Regulations, in particular articles 42-56 of the 
Regulations. 5 The whole of the regulations, as confrrmed by the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, now represent customary internationallaw.6 
The law of occupation emerged at a time when there was not yet any general 
prohibition on the use of force,7 or a legal right of all peoples to self-determination. 8 
Hence title to territory could still be acquired through annexation following the use 
of force. In terms of a need for the law, there was, however, a rule that during 
warfare - if territory of a state came under the authority of an army whose 
government did not have title to the territory - annexation of the territory was not 
permitted until the cessation of hostilities.9 Thus there was still a period of time 
when the territory could not just be taken, and the law emerged to instruct the army 
of the occupier on how to deal with such territory until the war was over. 10 
A significant rationale underlying the Hague law is thought to have been the drive 
to preserve the rights of a sovereign displaced during warfare by another, but not yet 
completely defeated, so as to prevent a further deterioration in the relations between 
2 See C. Greenwood, 'Historical Development and Legal Basis" in D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook 0/ 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (1995)1 at 10; Graber, loc. cit., fn. 1. 
3 N. Jochnick, 'The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War', (1994) 35 
Harvard JIL 49. 
4 See E. Benvenisti, The International Law o/Occupation (1993) Chapter 2. 
, 1907 Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention No.lV Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land [hereinafter the Hague Regulations]. 
6 See 'The Trial of the Major War Criminals', (1947) 41 AJIL 172 at 248-49; see also Legality of the 
Threat or Use o/Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226 at p. 257, para. 79; J-
M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005). 
7 See C. Greenwood, 'The Administration of Occupied Territory in International Law', in E. Playfair 
(ed.), International Law and the Administration o/Occupied Territories (1992) 242 at 245 and note 
16. 
8 See O. Simpson. 'The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post - Colonial Age'. 32 
(1996) Stan.JIL 255. 
9 See G. Schwarzenberger, 'The Law of Belligerent Occupation: Basic Issues', (1960) 30 Nordislr. 
Tidskrift/or International Ret 10 at 12-14; S. Ko~an, The Right o/Conquest: The Acquisition 0/ 
Territory by Force in International Law and Pracllce (1996) 94-131: Greenwood, op. elf., fn. 7, p. 
245. 
10 See Benvenisti, op. cit .. fn. 4, p. 3. 
136 
belligerents and hopefully make a peace treaty more likely.11 The nature of the law 
developed at the Hague Conferences was also guided by an expectation of short 
occupations and a belief that the occupiers would not be particularly interested in 
civilian affairs, or that they would need to be. 12 These factors help to explain why the 
body of law found in the Hague Regulations is focused on issues that would concern 
the displaced government, such as Article 55 which classifies the occupier as only 
the administrator of public properties which must be done according to the rules of 
usufruct (prudent administrator),13 rather than with civilian affairs or rights. 
The concern with the preservation of sovereign rights, one of which is the right to 
political independence, and the potential desire of the occupier to change and 
develop state and civil infrastructure, signals that the issue of reconstruction will 
have been addressed in the law. Protection of the sovereign right to decide also 
serves as protection for the people's right to decide, so, although developed before 
the emergence of the legal right of self-determination, the law of occupation retains 
relevance even when self-determination is seen as the best explanation for the 
protection afforded to state sovereignty by international law. Indeed, given that 
annexation through use of force is no longer an option, the law is arguably more 
relevant today, as the period of occupation might be expected to be longer and the 
occupier has no prospect of eventually becoming the sovereign. 
Developments in the nature of the state and in the conduct of warfare up to and 
during the world wars showed the state-orientated laws of war to be inadequate. 14 
The result was a rethinking of the laws of war at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference in 
Geneva. IS 
The Geneva contribution to the law of occupation is to be found in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention 1949, especially Articles 27-34 and 47_78. 16 The provisions 
II See A. Roberts, 'Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967', 
(1990) 84 AJIL 44 at 46; Graber, op. cit., fn. 1, pp. 37-40. . . 
12 E. Benvenisti, 'The Security Council and the Law on Occupation: Resolunon 1483 on Iraq m 
Historical Perspective', (2003) 1 Israeli Defense Forces Law Review 19 at 20-21. . 
13 On contemporary relevance of 'Usufruct' see R. D. Langenkamp and R. J. Zedahs, '~at Happens 
to the Iraqi Oil?: Thoughts on Some Significant. Unexamined International Legal QuestIOns 
Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields', (2003) 14 EJIL 417. 
14 See Benvenisti, op. cit .. fn. 12, pp. 23-27. 
IS Benvenisti, op. cit .. th. 12, p. 27. 
16 1949 Geneva Convention No. IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
[hereinafter GCIV); see, for an account of these provisions, H. P. Gasser. 'Protection of the Civilian 
Population' in D. Fleck (ed.), 'The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts' (1995) 209 at 
241. 
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supplement rather than replace the Hague Regulations. I7 The humanitarian rationale 
greatly shaped the content of the law. This is focused on the plight of civilians 
during occupation, typified in provisions such as the requirement not to create 
unemployment (Article 52), and provisions regarding labour conditions (Article 51). 
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are now all considered to reflect customary 
international law in their entirety.I8 The Geneva 1977 Additional Protocol 1. in 
respect of the law of occupation, supplements the 1949 instruments in some limited 
ways. It has not, however, been so successful in gaining acceptance and only certain 
of the provisions are considered to be a reflection of customary international law. 19 
The Geneva focus on humanitarian interests is reason to hope that in relation to 
the regulation of reconstruction the interests of preserving political independence for 
international peace will have been balanced against the need to provide a functioning 
a state in humanitarian interests; a balancing which might have resulted in a legal 
framework for reconstruction that could be employed more generally beyond 
situations of occupation for regulation of reconstruction. The most important point to 
be gleaned here is that the law of occupation, even though created before the 
emergence of the legal right to self-determination, was still designed to protect the 
right to political independence. Some consideration of the rules on application can 
help to position situations of occupation in relation to the other two paradigms of 
state reconstruction that are addressed in this study: ITA and the assistance model. 
3. The Rules on Application of the Law of Occupation 
A. The Start of Application 
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations provides a narrow definition of what an 
occupation is for the purpose of the law's application: 
Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the. authority of the h~stile 
anny. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authonty has been estabhshed 
and exercised. 
17 J. Pictet, (ed.). Commentary: The Fourth Geneva Convention (1958) 614. 
18 Greenwood. op. cit., fn. 2. p. 23. . 
19 Greenwood. op. cit., fn. 2, at 23: see also A. Roberts, 'What is Military Occupation' (1985) 55 BHL 
249 at 254. 
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This strictly limits application of the law to a 'hostile army' with authority over a 
territory, and indicates that it is the facts that are important, not an acceptance by the 
parties.2o 
The second paragraph of common Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions sets 
out the applicability of the laws of occupation included therein: 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. 2 1 
This indicates that the application of the law is ensured even without the declaration 
of war and despite a lack of hostilities, such as circumstances of invasion and 
occupation before the outbreak of war where there is no military resistance to the 
invasion.22 It is also apparent that, although occupation is only mentioned in the 
second paragraph, the provisions apply to occupation during hostilities.23 Indeed, 
there remains a need for some connection with armed conflict; it would not therefore 
apply to an invited occupation.24 
The Geneva law, although broader in its scope of application, does not affect the 
application of the Hague Regulations. And, given that both place emphasis on a need 
for uninvited effective control of the territory for application, there should, and has 
in practice been a large degree of coincidence in application.25 
It is clear, then, that the law of occupation applies when the domestic government 
has been displaced and occupiers that take control, because they are foreign, lack an 
attachment to the state and its people. The situation it is designed to regulate, the fact 
20 See Gasser, op. cit., fit. 16, p. 243; Roberts, op. cit., fn. 19, p. 256; u.s. v. List (Hostages case), 
(1949) Vllf Law Reports of Trials of Major War Criminals p. 38 at pp. 55-56; Prosecutor v. Naletilic, 
Judgment of 31 March 2003, ICTY Trial Chamber, para. 217; cf. Case Concerning Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), ICJ Reports 2005, p. 1, at p. 59 paras. 173-177. 
21 Common Article 2 reads in whole: 'In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in 
peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them. 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance. 
Although one of the powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers 
who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shal.l furthermo~ be 
bound by the convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provIsions 
thereof. ' 
21 See Roberts, op. cit., fn. 19, p. 253. 
2J See Pictet, op. cit., fn. 17. p. 21. 
24 See O. Ben-Naftali, A. M. Gross and K. Michaeli, "Illegal Occupation: Framing the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory'. (2005) 22 Berlceley JIL 551 at 565. 
25 Benvenisti, op. cit., th. 4. at 100. 
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of foreign occupation, is in itself an infringement of the right to political 
independence, it stops the people exercising their right to decide. The paradox of 
state reconstruction, as set out in Chapter 1, is encountered here in the sense that 
today the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by the use of force is best 
explained by the preservation of the people's right to self-determination, 
accordingly, to allow unrestrained reconstruction by the occupier - that does not 
have an attachment to the state or its people - would contradict the reason why the 
occupier can no longer acquire title to the territory. Thus, despite that the occupation 
itself is in breach of the right to political independence, the law of occupation could 
still offer a framework for reconstruction of utility for state reconstruction generally, 
in the interests of better reconciling the practice with the right to political 
independence. As in the other two paradigms - ITA and the assistance model - there 
is also, because of a lack of independently effective domestic government, an 
apparent lack of attachment to state and its people on behalf of the government 
charged with administration of the reconstruction process. How the law of 
occupation deals with reconstruction and political independence is turned to below 
with assessment of the substantive law. First, it is necessary to enquire into why the 
law of occupation does not apply in the other paradigms of state reconstruction 
without an independently effective domestic government. 
B. Application in ITA and the Assistance Model 
The assumption of plenary authority of a territory by the UN, as in Kosovo and East 
Timor, can appear to be a case of occupation, and has stimulated comparative 
discussion as a result.26 Should an international organisation find itself belligerently 
occupying a territory, most or all of the customary international law of occupation 
would apply.27 It is, after all, the case that international organisations are bound by 
customary international law.28 The UN has, though, certainly not operated on the 
basis that the law of occupation has been applicable. In support of this approach 
there is a consensual aspect, as well as the chapter VII basis of the authority. 29 Both 
26 See. e.g .• S. R. Ratner. 'Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The 
Challenges of Convergence' (2005) 16 EJIL 695. 
27 Roberts. op. cit .• fn. 19. p. 290. 
28 See, T. M. Franck. Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995) 218 -220. 
29 See Chapter 5 of this study. 
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of which, arguably, serve to remove the necessary connection to armed conflict and, 
with it, the formal applicability of the law.3o In this respect, as noted in Chapter 2. 
the absence of state consent can be seen as central to the definition of unlawful 
intervention.31 And, chapter VII trumps the law of occupation in terms of priority as 
the applicable legal framework.32 Moreover, a chapter vn resolution is not deployed 
for the purpose of warfare, but rather to preserve and ensure peace, the mandated 
forces are therefore not seen as belligerents.33 The SC could, of course, have adopted 
the law of occupation as an applicable framework, likewise the missions themselves, 
but there is no reference to it in either the SC resolutions or the regulations of the 
respective missions.34 
In the assistance model context, as found, for example, in the recent past of Sierra 
Leone, the law of occupation is not applicable because political authority remains 
vested in a domestic government that provides a consensual basis for the 
international involvement. Thus there is not even, formally at least, an invited 
occupation in the assistance model, which is how one might depict the recent 
situations of partial ITA in Bosnia and Cambodia. In these two examples, there have 
been substantial international military presences, but, in distinction to the assistance 
model, political authority has been shared between domestic and international actors. 
This facet makes it more akin to a situation of invited occupation. However, the 
consensual aspect again precludes formal application of the law of occupation. 
The significant international military presences associated with ITA and the 
assistance model can in their own right come to control significant areas of 
territory.3S In respect of UN peacekeeping forces, Kelly has argued that the law of 
30 Cf. J. Cerone, 'Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo', (2001) 
12 EJIL 469; T. H. lnnscher, 'The Legal Framework for the Activities of the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo: The Charter, Human Rights, and the Law of Occupation' , (200 1 ) 
44 GYIL 353 at 377-387. 
31 D. Wippman, 'Military Intervention, Regional Organization, and Host State Consent', (1996) 7 
Duke 1. Compo & Int'l L. 209 at 210; see also A. V. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Non Intervention -
The Law and its Import in the Americas (1956) 91. 
32 See T. Grant, 'Occupation and Refonn', June 2003 ASIL Insight. 
33 R. O. Weiner & F. Ni Aolain, 'Beyond the Laws of War: Peacekeeping in Search of a Legal 
Framework', (1996) 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 293 at 307. 
34 K. Boon, 'Legislative Refonn in Post-conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary 
Occupant's Law-Making Powers', (2005) 50 McGill U 285 at 312. 
35 In Sierra Leone, at its height. the UN peacekeeping force numbered some 17,000. and UNAMSIL 
was described as 'indispensable' for the extension of state administration throughout the country. 
Second Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) on the 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc S/2000/13 (II January 2000), para. 44. 
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occupation should be applicable when these forces come into control of territory.36 
The law would serve as a useful approximation of the rights and responsibilities of 
the UN forces, which can be difficult to discover from broad UN mandates. Kelly 
identifies that this is significant because the mandates may be required to be 
interpreted by different force commanders, as was the case in Somalia during 1992 -
1995, which Kelly takes as his case study.37 Kelly's rationale, that the opportunity 
for differing approaches to engagement with the local population from international 
forces and the vagueness of the mandates in general do not provide for 
accountability, and that adoption of the law of occupation could thereby help 
engender legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, is sound. However, consent, 
albeit something of a fiction, and/or chapter VII, provided the legal basis for the 
three main military operations in Somalia from 1992 - 1995. and thus the law of 
occupation did not formally apply.38 Indeed, where there is also state consent, as in 
the examples addressed by this study, however unattached to the will of the state and 
its people it appears, the likelihood of adoption of a legal framework intended for 
warfare is further reduced. This is because the forces are supposed to be deployed at 
the wishes of the state and its people, and this makes the situation. formally at least, 
even more removed from a situation of belligerency than when the legal basis of 
military intervention is chapter VII alone.39 The UN, in its report on lessons learned 
from conduct in Somalia, did indicate that the Fourth Geneva Convention could offer 
some adequate basis for regulating interaction between peacekeepers and the local 
population, but it does not appear that anything more has come of this tentative 
suggestion.4o 
While one might see the law of occupation as a means of plugging the 
accountability gap left by uncertainty around whether human rights obligations apply 
to the UN missions,41 the military presence is not the administrator of the 
36 M. J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Complex Peace Operations: the Search for a 
Legal Framework (1999) 181. 
37 See Chapter 6 of this study: in contrast to the US and UN, the Australian forces identified the law 
of occupation as applicable, Kelly, Ope cit., fn. 36, p. 33. 
38 See the notes on the legal basis of the international involvement and the strained efforts that were 
f90ne to gain consent for most of the international involvement. Chapter 6 of this study. 
See, generally, Weiner & Ni Aolain. Ope cit., fn. 33. 
40 United Nations, The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM), Apr. I 992-Mar. 1995, para. 57 (1995). 
41 See F. Megret and F. Hoffmann. 'The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the 
United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities', (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarter(r 314 at 
331-333. 
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reconstruction process. Accordingly, discussion of application of the law of 
occupation to the military presence does not address the broader point of whether the 
law of occupation could serve as an analogous legal framework for the 
reconstruction process. This latter issue was somewhat beside the point in the 
Somalia context that Kelly focused on, as the international efforts did not manage to 
secure sufficient control of the territory for an effort at reconstruction of the state and 
civil infrastructure to begin. Indeed, Kelly stressed that it was a short-term interim 
role that was envisaged for the law of occupation with specifically tailored 
frameworks recommended for more long term involvement.42 
That the law of occupation, disregarding the substance for the moment, has the 
potential to be relevant as an analogous framework for regulation of reconstruction 
without an independently effective domestic government in general is seen through 
addressing the rules on the end of application. 
c. The End of Application 
In relation to the end of application, the Hague Conferences occurred around a time 
when it was expected that the peace treaty would resolve the matter, or absolute 
defeat would see the title of the territory pass to the occupier.43 Now with the 
prohibition on the annexation of territory, it should be a matter of waiting until the 
displaced sovereign returns. 
The displaced sovereign, in such a context, is presumed to still represent the state 
and its people on the basis of effective control being lost at the hands of external 
forces, rather than internal factors.44 In the absence of the continued existence in 
exile of a displaced sovereign, one would expect the law to apply until a new 
domestic government emerges to embody the state's sovereignty or, of course, until 
the occupiers leave.4s 
As the issue of a new domestic government emerging to end the law's application 
was not adequately accounted for in the Hague Regulations, it occurred that some 
occupiers around World War II, keen to escape the restraints of the law, would create 
a local government with only the pretence of independence. Such a government 
42 Kelly. Ope cit., fn. 36, p. 181. 
43 See Schwarzenberger, Ope cit .. fn. 9, p. 17 . 
... See 8. R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999) 188. 
4' L. Green. Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (1993) 258. 
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would then provide an invite for the continued occupation and consequently end the 
law's application.46 This obviously undermined the law and its rationale. 
Surreptitious circumvention of the law was addressed, albeit indirectly, in Geneva 
Law through Article 47: 
Inviolability of Rights: Protected persons who are in a occupied territory shall not be 
deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention 
by any change introduced, as a result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or 
government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authoritative 
of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of 
the whole or part of the occupied territory. 
By way of its pursuit of the protection of the rights of individuals, Article 47 is 
thought to address the possible means of avoiding the application of the law of 
occupation, such as the appointment of new governments, creation of new states, or 
changes to the boundaries.47 It is commonly interpreted as an indication that the law 
continues to apply while factually the occupation continues, despite what formalities 
might have been entered into to try and disguise reality.48 Similarly, Article 7 GCIV 
prohibits protected persons from renouncing the rights secured for them in the 
Convention.49 In these articles there is, however, no explicit indication of how a 
competent domestic government is to be distinguished from a government that has 
been created just to escape the restraints of the law. There is, though, some indirect 
indication in other articles of the Geneva Convention. 
Article 6(3) of the Geneva Convention indicates that the law ceases to apply a year 
after the close of military operations, but that the occupying power is still bound by 
many of the most significant provisions, which includes Article 47, for the duration 
of the occupation. Further, Article 3 (b) of the Geneva Additional Protocol I stresses 
that all humanitarian law is to apply until the end of the occupation. 50 As there is no 
suggestion that a particular form of domestic government is to be favoured for 
ending the occupation while the occupying forces remain, it has been argued that the 
situation must simply await the emergence of an effective domestic government. 
46 Benvenisti, op. cit .. tho 4, pp. 63-66. 
47 See, Benvenisti, op. cit., th. 4, p. 99; M. Sassoli, 'Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and 
Civil Life by Occupying Powers' (2005) 16 EJIL 661 at 682. 
48 See, Benvenisti, op. cit .. tho 4, p. 99; Sassoli, op. cit .. tho 47, p. 682. 
49 See G. H. Fox, 'The Occupation of Iraq' (2005) 36 Georgetown Journal of International Law 195 
at 249-250. 
50 See A. Pellet, 'The Destruction of Troy will not Take Place'. in E.Playfair (ed.) International Law 
and the Administration of Occupied Territories (1992) 169 at 193 and note 81. 
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which could be through the return of a displaced sovereign Of, in its absence, the 
emergence of a new one.51 Waiting on an effective government to emerge not only 
means that there is an objective basis for identifying the agent of the state and its 
people, but it is also a government that is able to support itself, so is more likely to 
be able to resist the designs of any remnants of the occupiers, than would be the case 
were it dependent on the former occupiers for effective control. 
In state reconstruction by IT A and the assistance model, there is no independently 
effective domestic government. The administrators of the reconstruction process, 
either internationals or domestic governments, are dependent on international actors 
for authority over the territory. Although far from identical, there are clearly 
similarities between these two paradigms and the attempts at surreptitious 
circumvention of the law of occupation. Thus the two key concerns in relation to the 
right to political independence from attempts at surreptitious circumvention of the 
law of occupation are also pertinent for the other paradigms. Without an 
independently effective domestic government, there is not an objective basis for 
identifying an embodiment of the will of the state and its people. And, when a 
domestic government has been introduced, there is little to support that it can 
realistically resist the designs of the international actors as to how the reconstruction 
proceeds. Such similarity is support for an argument that it is reasonable, in the 
interests of the better preservation of political independence, to seek legal limits and 
obligations on the political discretion of the administrators of state reconstruction. 
Furthermore, the similarities with surreptitious circumvention suggest that it is not 
until a government in a state is independently effective that it would be reasonable 
for assumptions about attachment to the state and its people to resume. 
From what has been identified about the law of occupation in terms of rationale 
and the situations in which it is applicable, there is good reason for exploring further 
the relevance of the substantive provisions of the law of occupation as a potential 
framework for reconstruction outside formal occupation. 
4. The Law of Occupation as a Legal Framework for State Reconstruction 
,. See Sassoli. op. cit .. th. 47. p. 682; E. Milano. Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law 
(2006) 94. 
145 
A. An Analogous Legal Framework for ITA and the Assistance Model of State 
Reconstruction? 
The suitability of the law of occupation as an analogous legal framework for state 
reconstruction is far from assumed, likewise, if deemed suitable, the prospect of it 
actually being adopted. From some consideration of the nature of the law of 
occupation in relation to reconstruction one can readily form an opinion on 
suitability and likelihood of adoption. 
The cornerstone provision of the law of occupation is Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations: 
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, 
the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, 
public order and safe!y [civil life], while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in 
ti . th S2 orce m e country. 
Article 43 indicates, by an emphasis on the de facto nature of authority and respect 
for the laws in force, that the occupant only has a temporary authority and no 
sovereignty over the territory. S3 
The requirement that the occupant 'take all the measures in his power to restore 
and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety [civil life]' is thought to 
impose a duty to provide for the government of the occupied territory. 54 There is no 
blueprint for the form this administration must take. It does not have to use the 
existing institutions, but of course can, and must respect the existing law unless 
absolutely prevented.5s 
The vast majority of provisions impose obligations on the occupiers and give 
rights to the occupied in relation to how the administration is conducted. These are 
extensive and cover a range of areas. For example, Article 50 (GCIV) requires for 
provision of education; Article 55 the supply of foodstuff's and medical supplies to 
the civilian population; Article 48 (Hague Regulations) collection of taxes; and 
Article 52 requisitions. There is a clear emphasis on areas where administration must 
be conducted rather than on change and development. 56 The expectation is that 
.52 Benvenisti, op. cit. fn. 4, p. 7; see also E. H. Schwenk, 'Legislative Power of the Military Occupant 
under Article 43, Hague Regulations', (1945) 54 Yale U 393 at 393 . 
.53 Greenwood, op. cit., fn. 7, p. 244; see also Pictet. op. cit., fn. 17. p. 275. 
~ Greenwood. op. cit., fn. 7, p. 246. 
~~ Greenwood, op. cit., fn. 7, pp. 252-259 . 
.56 Greenwood. op. cit., fn. 7. p. 246. 
146 
change will be deferred until the end of the occupation, 57 when any temporary 
changes made would be open to the possibility of change, or adoption, on return of 
the displaced sovereign. 58 Any attempts to make permanent changes would therefore 
be of doubtful legality. S9 The unsuitability of the law of occupation as a framework 
for change and development is further evidenced through a brief review of some 
practice where reconstruction has been attempted. 
There were two major World War I occupations: the German Occupation of 
Belgium (1914-1918) and the Armistice Occupation of the Rhineland. Belgium was 
still a functioning state when Germany invaded and gained effective control. The law 
of occupation was, formally at least, accepted as applicable.6o In the pursuit of 
political and economic gains/1 the German 'Government Central' made extensive 
changes to the Belgian law in almost all areas.62 There was a significant level of 
reorganisation of the Belgian economy, regulation of industry, eventually major 
changes in the court system, changes to welfare legislation, and attempts to influence 
the balance between the Flemings and Walloons through regulations in favour of the 
Flemish. In the German occupation of Belgium, the law of occupation was accepted 
as applicable then simply flouted for the purpose of reconstruction. In the Rhineland 
occupation, different forces occupied different zones and their individual interests 
informed their policies as occupiers. The occupation came about as a result of 
agreement with the enemy sovereign of that territory pending a peace treaty; this 
supports claims that the law was not formally applicable, as it was based on consent, 
although the law's applicability had been acknowledged.63 The territory as a whole 
appears to have been in a worse condition than Belgium, characterised by poverty, 
unemployment, and social unrest.64 The US and British forces are said to have 
operated within the Hague Regulations, while the French and Belgian forces made 
far reaching changes in the territorial infrastructure in pursuit of political and 
economic gains, reversing the tide on the earlier German approach.65 In the 
" See Fox, op. cit., fn. 49, pp. 234 - 240. 
~8 H. McCoubrey and N. D. White, International Law and Armed Conflict ( 1992) 287. 
~9 Greenwood. op. cit. fn. 7. p. 245; see also Fox. op. cit., fu. 49. p. 237. 
60 Benvenisti, op. cit., fn. 4. p. 34 and in particular references at note 10. 
61 Benvenisti. op. cit., fn. 4. p. 57. 
62 Benvenisti, op. cit .• fn. 4, p. 34. 
6) See Benvenisti, op. cit .. fn. 4. p. 49 and p. 57. 
b4 Benvenisti, op. cil .. fn. 4. p. 50. 
M ., . fn 4 50 Benvemstl, op. CII.. . • p. . 
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Rhineland, the French and Belgian forces tried to cover the appearance of 
unlawfulness by emphasising the consensual nature of the occupation. 66 
In the build up to and during World War II, the axis powers - Gennany, Italy, and 
Japan - and also the communist Soviet Union pursued aggressive invasion policies 
seeking to strengthen their regional and world positions, make economic gains, and 
ensure ideological supremacy through the acquisition of territory. This resulted in the 
law's application, but it was denied through surreptitious means, so they also did not 
govern as if restrained by the law.67 
During World War II there were widespread instances of allied occupation. In 
particular, there was a significant amount of British involvement in the French and 
Italian colonies in Africa.68 In Somalia, the law of occupation was accepted as 
applicable. But the British were faced with a collapsed local administrative system 
and a lack of law and order and, as a result, it is said that the British set up in effect a 
colonial administration, by which new systems of administration had to be created 
from 'first principles'. 69 The implication being that a lack of guidance on 
reconstruction in the law of occupation helped justify the disregard for the law. 
The major joint allied occupations of World War II were in Italy, Japan and 
Gennany. In general, these were marked by a tendency for widespread refonn of the 
civil and state infrastructure, to remove the doctrines that were so prevalent in these 
societies. And, with the exception of some of the involvement in Italy, were not 
accepted as restrained by the law of occupation.7o In Japan the government was still 
in existence and the refonns went through this government as the intennediary on 
the basis of the Instrument of Surrender,71 which arguably removed the restraints of 
the law of occupation. The Gennany example is addressed below. One struggles, 
from this brief overview of practice, to find an example of practice of state 
reconstruction that came within the law of occupation framework. 
As a measure to avoid future ineffectiveness, the preference in contemporary 
practice on state reconstruction tends to be for significant change and development 
66 Benvenisti, Ope cit., fo. 4, p. 57. 
67 Benvenisti, Ope cit., fo. 4, pp. 63-66. 
68 See Benvenisti, Ope cit., fn. 4, p. 76. 
69 F. Rennel, British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa (1948) 45; see also 
War Office, British Military Administration of Occupied Territories in Africa During the Years 1941 
- 43 (Cmd 6589, 1945). 
70 See Benvenisti, Ope cit., fn. 4, p. 89. 
71 Benvenisti, Ope cit .• fn. 4. p. 93. 
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of the state and civil infrastructure. The law of occupation, in contrast, expects 
occupiers to be concerned with the 'pragmatic tasks of administration'.12 
Undoubtedly, adopting the law of occupation for contemporary state reconstruction 
would help protect political independence. Delaying change and development until 
the emergence of an effective domestic government is a sure way of minimising the 
impact on the right to political independence. However, the obvious conflict with the 
transformative ambitions of contemporary state reconstruction, suggests that there is 
little likelihood of the law of occupation actually being adopted as an analogous 
legal framework for state reconstruction. This is not to mention the negative 
connation of colonial domination that the term carries, and which those involved 
would not likely want to be associated. In this respect, how much impact renaming 
it, to something like 'international law regulating civilian-military relations', would 
have, is debatable. 73 
B. The Law of Occupation and the Permissible Level of Change and Development 
by an Otherwise Ineffective Domestic Government 
The law of occupation depicts an administering occupier that is required to respect 
the existing laws, essentially, because they lack an attachment to the state and its 
people.74 There are, however, circumstances in which the law of occupation allows 
for temporary legislative changes to be made. By addressing these, one can glean 
some indication of the level change and development that would, at a minimum, be 
acceptable in the other paradigms, in the sense of the level of deference that should 
be accorded political independence - if it is permissible for a belligerent occupant 
then it should also be the case in the other reconstruction paradigms. 
Article 43, supplemented with Article 64 GCIV, is thought to embody the raison 
d'elre of the law of occupation, what has been referred to as the 'conservationist 
72 Fox. op. cit., tn. 49, p. 45; see also M. S. McDougal and F. P. Feliciano, The International Law of 
War (1961) 768. 
73 Kelly proposes this tenninology as a substitute for the law of occupation in contexts whe~ the UN 
comes into control oftenitory. Kelly. op. cit., tn. 36. p. 179; cf. Megret and Hoffmann. op. CIt., fn. ~ I. 
D.332. -
,. See G. von Glahn. The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice oJ 
Belligerent Occupation (1957) 95. 
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principle' or the 'presumption of continuity' .75 Article 43 requires that the existing 
laws must be respected unless absolutely prevented in pursuit of 'public order and 
safety [civil life]'. Exactly how far this provides scope for some change is the subject 
of debate, as it was at Brussels and during the Hague Conference, where the eventual 
terms adopted reflected a compromise - they are more restrictive than the Brussels 
Declaration's use of 'maintaining' 'unless necessary' .76 However, as Stone notes, 
, [t ]he limits on the legislative and regulatory authority power are as vague as the 
authority is general' .77 
The key term in Article 43 is 'absolutely prevented'. The nature of the term is 
aptly described by Stone, '[i]t has never been taken literally; and unless it is so taken, 
the boundaries of the occupant's legislative powers are still to be drawn. ,78 It has 
been seen as a matter military necessity only.79 But most texts now link it with 
military necessity and necessity for public order and safety/civil life depending on 
language.8o Civil life is broader than safety, and is generally accepted as the correct 
terminology. 81 
Article 43 is closely related to Article 64 GCIV. 82 Article 64 highlights that the 
occupying power is to have 'legislative competence in matters concerned with the 
fulfilment of its obligations under the convention, the maintenance of orderly 
government, and the security of itself, its personnel, equipment and 
establishments. ,83 The inclusion of 'fulfilment of its obligations' suggests a 
potentially broad scope for change in light of the breadth of areas covered in the 
75 The difference between 'conservation' and 'continuity' is one of semantics, on the principle of 
'conservation' see McCoubrey and White, op. cit., fn. 58 p. 286; for use of 'continuity' see Boon, op. 
cit., fn. 34, p. 303, fn. 85. 
76 See Benvenisti, op. cit., fn. 4, pp. 12 -13. 
77 J.Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (1954) 698 
78 Stone, loc . cit., fn. 77. 
79 See Schwenk, op. cit. fn. 52, p. 393 and the many citations therein. 
80 See M. Bothe, 'Occupation, Belligerent', (1996) EPIL 763 at 765; McCoubrey and White (1992), 
oF" cit., fn. 58, p. 284 
8 See Schwenk, loc. cit., fn. 52. 
82 Article 64 GCIV: 'The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception 
that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a 
threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention. Subject to the latter 
consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice. the tribunals of 
the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the said laws. 
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions 
which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present 
Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory. and to ensure the security of the 
Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and 
likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them.' 
83 H. McCoubrey, International HumanilQTian Law: ;\.Iodern Developments in the Limitation of 
War/QTe (1998) 202 
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Fourth Geneva Convention.84 These rights, however, are "generally limited to 
instances of egregious misconduct' such as Article 31' s reference to physical and 
moral coercion, and so would, generally, not require great legislative change to 
'enable' them to be achieved.85 Nonetheless, the wording of Article 64 provides a 
degree of scope to argue for the validity of some temporary change in almost all 
areas covered by the administration, and what is meant by the requirement of 
necessity, which the 'absolutely prevented' clause is thought to represent, is of 
importance for determining the extent of such change. 
Although what is meant by 'necessity' will, like what is covered as an area 
suitable for change, be dependent on the circumstances,86 in the literature an 
emphasis on the importance of a narrow interpretation in line with the principle of 
conservation is dominant. The potential for Article 64 to be seen as introducing a 
more flexible test is dismissed by Pictet, who notes: 'the occupation authorities 
cannot abrogate or suspend penal laws for any other reason -- and not, in particular, 
merely to make it accord with their own legal conceptions.' Pictet further notes: 
The reason for the Diplomatic Conference making express reference only to respect for penal 
law was that it had not been sufficiently observed during past conflicts; there is no reason to 
infer a contrario that the occupation authorities are not also bound to respect the civil law of 
the country, or even its constitution. 87 
Benvenisti has, nevertheless, argued that there is scope, on the basis of the 
preparatory work, for arguing that Article 64 was intended to separate law, other 
than penal, from the principle of conservation, and to be more flexible on the basis of 
the permissive language used.88 However, any lessening of the burden for change 
must be treated with caution because it introduces potential for the rationale of the 
law to be undermined. This is because a wide scope to make changes to the civil and 
state infrastructure runs the risk, even though of a temporary nature, of the occupier 
cementing its position to the detriment of the displaced sovereign.89 The fact that 
84 See Benvenisti, op. cit., tn. 4, p. 101. 
8S Fox, op. cit., tn, 49. pp. 243-244. 
86 See McCoubrey and White. op. cit .• tn. 58. p. 284. 
87 Pictet. op. cit., fn. 17, p. 335. 
88 Benvenisti. op. cit., tn. 4. p. 101. 
" See McCoubrey. op. cit., fn. 83. p. 202, quoting P. Rowe. Defence: The Legallmplicalions (1987) 
184: see also McCoubrey and White. op. cit .. fn. 58. p. 284. 
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national military manuals 'uniformly' reaffirm the principle of conservation is strong 
support for the narrower view.90 
The framework for change in the law of occupation is support for change and 
development in the other paradigms of state reconstruction that is required as a 
matter of military or humanitarian necessity. This would likely cover some efforts in 
the security sector. On the basis that security must be a key aspect in relation to both 
the military and humanitarian needs in a state suffering from a lack of effectiveness. 
In this respect, there would likely need to be plans to remove the international 
military presence from the state or else it would be hard to suggest necessity. 
However, even with such plans, anything beyond training and recruitment of the 
police and military would likely be hard to support in light of the 'conservationist' 
emphasis that attaches to the necessity requirement. And, consequently, it is very 
difficult on the basis of the law of occupation to make a case for change and 
development in other areas of the state and civil infrastructure of the target states. 
The law of occupation's emphasis on conservation reflects that it is designed to 
regulate a relationship based on force rather than law, and is consequently about 
balancing the competing interests of security with protection of humanitarian 
interests; rather than directing benevolent intentions.91 As a consequence, in response 
to the threat posed to self-determination and international peace by a neglect of 
political independence, its advice, until there is an independent and effective 
domestic government, is to change very little. 
The context for state reconstruction in ITA or the assistance model lacks the 
aspect of international warfare, but the risks it poses to political independence and 
the attendant values are similar.92 The international actors involved in such 
paradigms of state reconstruction do, though, at least purport to have benevolent 
intentions, so there is perhaps not the need for the same degree of hesitancy about 
change and development as is found in the law of occupation. This is not, however. 
to suggest that there is no need for hesitancy, as one state's benevolent intentions can 
be another state's evil. 93 Accordingly, the law of occupation should be seen as 
supporting the need for a more suitable legal framework to limit the discretion of 
90 Fox, op. cit .. fn. 49, p. 264, note 3S 1 includes a list of national military manuals which reaffinn the 
~rinciple. 
I See Greenwood op. cit., fn. 7, p. 2S I. 
92 See Chapters S and 6 of this study. 
93 See Roth. op. cit., fn. 44, p. 430. 
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those involved in the reconstruction. This would be in the interest of limiting the 
negative impact on political independence, or, failing this, seeking to accommodate 
the values of self-determination and international peace by other means, until the 
government can demonstrate effectiveness independent of international actors. Might 
the emergence of the legal right to self-determination, as the best explanation for 
state sovereignty, have been a stimulus for modification of the law of occupation so 
that it is more suited to reconstruction and accommodation of these values? 
s. The Potential Impact of Self-Determination on the Law of Occupation 
The established law of occupation existed before the emergence of the legal right of 
self-determination. Nonetheless, in seeking to protect the rights of the sovereign it 
also serves to protect the rights of the people to self-determination in the sense of the 
right to political independence. Essentially, it precludes the exercise of the right to 
decide, pending the emergence of an effective domestic government that can serve as 
an agent for the rights of the state and its people in place of the belligerent occupier. 
Accordingly, despite a potentially wrongful basis for the involvement, the law of 
occupation can be seen as an attempt to reduce further risk to the values of self-
determination of peoples and international peace by strongly counselling against 
interference in the affairs of the state. It can be read as an extension of the principle 
of non-intervention, designed to rein in a situation that already affects self-
determination of peoples and international peace but has the potential to do much 
more damage if not regulated. 
The law of occupation does not appear well suited for situations of state 
reconstruction where there is an apparent need for some far reaching changes if an 
independently effective domestic government is to become a reality in something 
like a reasonable time span. Recalling how self-determination overlaps with state 
sovereignty as an explanation for non-intervention, and, indeed, provides the best 
explanation for state sovereignty. And, that the law of occupation is designed to 
protect state sovereignty. It would not be unreasonable to expect that right of self~ 
detennination might be seen by states as requiring modification of the law of 
occupation so that it better accords with self-detennination as a basic principle: 'the 
possibility of self-government decided through the freely expressed \\;11 of the 
people'. Accordingly. one might expect a more purposeful framework for occupation 
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administration, one designed to facilitate self-detennination rather than just restrain 
the activity of the occupier, to be emerging. 
However, the concept of the will of the people is abstract and open to misuse. 
Developments in the doctrine of self-detennination beyond the right to political 
independence, which might help to guard against this, such as links with a legal 
concept of democracy, remain, at best, inchoate. There is thus the possibility that the 
pursuit of a self-determination framework, while covering reconstruction activity of 
an occupier with legitimacy, might serve only to enable the occupier to entrench its 
position to the detriment of the rights of the target state and is people. Hence. while 
some impact appears likely, the actual impact of the emergence of the right to self-
determination on the law of occupation as a framework for state reconstruction need 
not be a positive one from the perspective of the core values of the UN system of 
self-determination of peoples and international peace. The fact that the law of 
occupation is already a challenge to an effective reality, does, though, encourage one 
to be hopeful that inchoate developments in relation to self-detennination and 
democracy will have been harnessed in an occupation situation. This is on the basis, 
as suggested in Chapter 3, that such developments have stalled in the nonnal run of 
things, in part at least, as a result of the threat they pose to the authority of effective 
but hardly democratic governments. 
As the law of occupation already has provisions dealing with reconstruction, this 
is an area where the Martens clause of the preamble of the 1907 Hague Convention 
IV, which counsels that general international law be looked to where the laws of 
anned conflict do not deal with a specific case occurring in warfare,94 does not seem 
a likely route for modification of the law of occupation. Moreover, the states parties 
to the multilateral treaties, which are the law of occupation, have not sought 
modification by agreement.95 There are, though, other avenues for the development 
of the law of occupation. Practice under the law of occupation can result in 
development of the law through interpretation of a provision,96 amendment of the 
treaty,97 or new customary international law . 98 
94 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States). 
Merits, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1986. p. 14 at pp. 113-1 14, para.78; Legality of the Threat or L'st' of 
Nuclear Weapons, op. cit., fit. 6. p. 257. para. 78 and p. 259, para. 84; A. Cassese, 'The Martens 
Clause: Haifa Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?', (2000) II ElIL 187. 
9' See 1969 VCL T. Articles 39-41. 
96 This is provided for in Article 31 (3) (c) of the VCL T. which allows for interpretation of treaties in 
light of 'any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
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Two aspects of the law of occupation which appear susceptible to a re-
interpretation in light of the right to self-determination, and which could be of 
relevance in tenns of a framework for state reconstruction, are the principle of 
conservation and the rules on the end of application while the occupiers remain. 
In relation to principle of conservation, the potential impact of the right to self-
detennination has not gone unnoticed by Pellet. Pellet has argued that whereas: 
In the classic law of war, the non-acquisition of sovereignty by the occupier constitutes the 
criterion of occupation ... thanks to the 'subsequent development of law through the Charter 
of the United Nations and by way of customary law' the respect of the sovereign rights of the 
occupied people has become the effective criterion not only of occupation itself, but of the 
rights of the occupier.99 
This means for Pellet that, whereas originally the law of occupation was intended to 
protect the rights of the displaced sovereign so the principle of conservation should 
detennine the validity of any changes made in the interest of military or 
humanitarian necessity, now, when it is the people who are sovereign, the limit 
should be the right of self-detennination. Hence changes linked to humanitarian 
interests can be pursued to the extent that they do not affect the right to self-
detennination or, in Pellet's words, '[t]o the extent that the 'humanitarian' measures 
taken by the occupation authorities do not threaten these rights [sovereign rights of 
the people whose territory is occupied], they are lawful.' 100 This, for Pellet, would 
allow such changes up to the point of 'change the physical character, demographic 
composition, institutional structure, or status of ... territories.' 
the parties regarding its interpretation', Article 31 (3) (c) also allows for interpretation of treaties in 
light of 'any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties'. 
97 This is found only in customary law. It was included in the 1966 ILC Draft Articles on the Law of 
Treaties as: '[a] treaty may be modified by subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
establishing the agreement of the parties to modify its provisions', (1996)YILC 236; that it was 
already custom is supported by reference to the Temple case of 1962 in which the ICJ, dealing with a 
treaty provision on a boundary line, found that the practice of the parties was irreconcilable with the 
ordinary meaning of the treaty so that the practice had amended the treaty, Case concerning the 
Temple Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 6 at pp. 33-4; ~e 
ILC has identified that the line between interpretation and amendment through subsequent practice 
may be blurred, but they remain legally distinct, (1996) YILC 236; see also G. Danilenko, Law-
Making in the International Community (1993) 165-166. 
98 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3 at p. 44; see also M. Akehurst. 
'Custom as a Source of international Law', (1974 - 5) 47 BYIL I; R. Cryer, 'Of Custom, Treaties. 
Scholars and the Gavel: the Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary 
Law Study', (2006) II JeSL 239. 
99 Pellet, op. cit., fn. 50. p. 186. 
100 Pellet, op. cit., m. 50, p. 20:! 
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While, for Pellet, there clearly is a limit to what could be changed, this is vastly 
more lenient than the principle of conservation. In its favour, Pellet's proposal 
retains a conceptual link with the protection of sovereign rights (cast as the people's 
sovereign rights), and is not as lenient as that suggested by Dinstein: that the limit 
for validity of changes introduced by an occupier should depend upon whether not 
the occupier has displayed equal concern for their own population. IOI Still, the lack 
of specificity in Pellet's proposal would hand a large degree of discretion to the 
occupiers, with little means of distinguishing activity which helps entrench the 
occupier's position to the detriment of self-determination rather than its realisation. 
This is not improved if one refers to the doctrine of self-determination in 
international law because it does not yet offer any specificity on state and civil 
infrastructure required for consistency with the will of the people. Accordingly, one 
doubts whether use of self-determination as a directive for change and development 
could presently be read as consistent with the object and purposes of the law of 
occupation. In this respect, the signs of an emerging consensus on the procedure for 
identification of a government and standards of substantive conduct for a 
government to be considered consistent with the will of the people for the purpose of 
self-determination - the legal concept of democracy - appear more relevant for 
modification of the rules on the end of application; if the application of the law of 
occupation can be ended while the occupier remains there is obvious opportunity for 
greater reconstruction. 
Benvenisti, writing in 1992, sought to offer a contemporary reading of the law of 
occupation based on different codifications of the law, state practice, and other 
developments in international law. One of 'the other developments' is the emergence 
of the legal right of self-determination, which confmns 'the idea that sovereignty lies 
in a people rather than a government' .102 Benvenisti includes a range of examples in 
his study, including a host of examples where the law of occupation was not 
accepted as applicable by the occupiers, and without substantial opinion that it was 
applicable, such as US interventions in Grenada in 1983. and Panama in 1989, and 
Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 1978.103 In relation to Grenada Benvenisti 
describes how 'infringements of the law of occupation, if such existed. were healed 
101 Y. Oinstein, 'The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights'. (1978) 8/YHR 
105 at 113. 
102 Benvenisti. op. cit .. fn. 4. p. 215. 
103 Benvenisti, op. cit .. fn. 4, p. 164-173. 
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by the institution of a democratic process through which the general public expressed 
its endorsement of the new political system' .104 The fact that the will of the people 
appeared to coincide with the action of the occupiers is the essential point for 
Benvenisti's acceptance of the validity of the activity under the law of occupation. 
Whether one thinks that the law of occupation should have applied or not. the fact 
that it was not generally treated as applicable undermines the relevance in terms of 
evidence of development of the law of occupation. Nonetheless, Benvenisiti' s study 
indicates that it is reasonable to imagine that self-determination might have had an 
impact on the rules related to the end of application of the law of occupation while 
the occupiers remain. Certainly some scholars, without furnishing opinio juris, have 
offered opinions which can be read as suggesting this has been the case. 105 And the 
fact that since Benvenisti' s study, the strength of the consensus on a legal concept of 
democracy linked to the right of self-determination has improved, is support for the 
likelihood of such an impact. 
A few examples of practice stand out in terms of the level of reconstruction, the 
pursuit of democracy, and level of international acceptance - Post World War II 
Germany, Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), and Iraq. Recalling Chapter 3, 
this commonality suggests that democracy has served to accommodate the values of 
self-determination and international peace, which are put at risk by the neglect of 
political independence occasioned by the disregard of the law of occupation for the 
purpose of reconstruction. It also hints at potential modification of the law of 
occupation in relation to the emergence of the right to self-determination. It is 
important, however, not to confuse trend with legal development. A survey of these 
examples is necessary to reveal the reality of the role of democracy. 
6. The Reconstruction of Post World War II Germany 
'By the middle of 1944 the ultimate result of the war in Europe was not in doubt and 
the Allies began to make arrangements for the treatment of Germany after its 
surrender.' 106 The idea was that there would be unconditional surrender, followed by 
104 Benvenisti, op. cit., fn. 4, p. 171. 
10' See, e.g., B. S. Brown. 'Intervention, Democracy, and the Residual Responsibilities of the 
Occupying Power in Iraq'. (2005) I ~ UC Davis Journal 0/ International Law and Policy 2~ at 43: F. 
L. Kirgis, 'SC Resolution 1483 on the Rebuilding of Iraq". May 2003 ASIL Insights. 
106 J. Crawford. The Creation o/Stales in International Law (2006) ~52. 
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continued allied occupation. 107 The unconditional surrender came on 8 Mav 1945 
. . 
signed by Admiral Donitz.108 By 5 June 1945, there was no longer any German 
government, either effective or recognised, which could be 'capable of accepting 
responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the country and 
compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers.,I09 Accordingly, the 
Allied Powers, without entering into a peace treaty that would signal the end of 
warfare, assumed 'supreme authority with respect to Germany' .110 The Allied 
Powers did not purport to annex the territory nor did they consider themselves bound 
by the law of occupation. Extensive reconstruction of the German state and civil 
infrastructure was undertaken. III Without a domestic government, the right to 
political independence of the German state was clearly not respected. Still, 
international recognition of the process was forthcoming. 112 The fact of international 
acceptance of foreign governance, along with extensive reconstruction, without any 
form of state consent, is reason to consider how the process was positioned in 
relation to the value of self-determination, as it is posited that this would be of 
crucial importance for international acceptance. A key issue in this respect is why the 
law of occupation was not thought to be applicable. After all, if it were applicable, it 
would have better preserved the right to political independence and, consequently, 
the value of self-determination. 
The debate on the explanation for the non-applicability of the law of occupation 
remains unresolved. Virally argued that the territory had become res nul/ius, this is a 
suggestion that the German state ceased to exist and was open to acquisition through 
a display of effective control and claim to title. l13 While at the time, before the 
emergence of a legal right to self-determination, a sovereign state becoming res 
nullius may have been a theoretical possibility, in Fox's words, 'the formality of 
surrender and the continuing functioning of at least some local governmental units 
107 See Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany, London, 12 September 1944: 227 UNTS 279, 
Art.l. 
108 Act of Surrender by Germany, Signed at Berlin, 8 May 1945. 
109 Berlin Declaration, 5 June 1945, 145 BFSP 796. 
110 Statement on Control Machinery in Germany, 5 June 1945, 145 BFSP 803. affirmed at Postdam: 
the structure of the authority as well as the guiding principles were set out in the Berlin Declaration 
(June 1945, control machinery) and the Postdam Agreement (between July and August 1995). 
III W. Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Germ any (1947) 65. 
112 See, e. g., Exchange of Notes with Spain concerning German Enemy Assets, Madrid, 28 Oct 1946: 
147 BFSP 1058: 'the Allied Control Council for Germany will assume. after its recognition by Spain 
as the Government of Germany, the rights and obligations incident to its status as a government.' 
113 See M. Virally. L 'Administration internationale De L "Allemagne (1948) 26. as cited by G. H. Fox. 
Humanitarian Occupation (2008) 257. 
158 
belied this claim' .114 Kelsen argued it was an instance of debellatio. I 15 While the 
exact meaning of debellatio is debated, generally it is seen to reflect circumstances in 
which 'one of the belligerent states has been defeated so totally that its adversary or 
adversaries are able to decide alone what the fate of the territory of that state and of 
the state authorities will be.,116 It does not follow that there would have to be 
annexation. 117 Accordingly, it does seem to capture well the circumstances of 
German defeat, but it tends to be Jennings' theory that is cast as most influential. I IS 
Jennings view was that: 'the whole raison d'etre of the law of belligerent occupation 
is absent in the circumstances of the Allied occupation of Germany, and to attempt to 
apply it would be a manifest anachronism,.119 This opinion was reasoned on the 
basis that the law of occupation was designed for a temporary occupation awaiting 
annexation or a peace treaty, and as these were absent the law was not relevant. The 
implication, then, is that had there been a possibility of one of these two outcomes 
the law of occupation would have applied. Jennings supports the course of action 
taken (assumption of governmental authority) by indicating that the allies would 
have been free to annex the territory had they chosen to do so, so that a lesser form 
of annexation, government only, was permissible. While this starts to sound like 
debellatio, the important point is that the emergence of the legal right to self-
determination would today, amongst other factors,120 prevent claims of debellatio, or 
Jennings' logic, because the right supports a persistent prohibition on annexation of 
territory following occupation. 
At the time, the legal right of self-determination had not yet emerged. The right to 
political independence at stake was solely that of the German state. However, the 
Allied Powers signed the UN Charter on 26 June 1945, and by this, the importance 
of the value of self-determination, in the sense of giving the possibility of self-
government to all peoples, for the UN system was identified. Hence there was some 
onus on the Allied Powers to at least appear to be acting consistently with the value 
of self-determination. Not annexing the territory can be read as a nod in the direction 
114 Fox, op. cit., tn. 113, p. 257 
liS See, e.g., H. Kelsen. 'The LegaJ Status of Germany According to the Declaration of Berlin', 
(1945) 39 AJIL 518. 
116 K-U. Meyn, 'Debellatio', (1992) EPIL 969 at 969. 
117 Cf. Fox. op. cit., fn. 113, p. 257. 
118 See, e.g., Fox, op. cit., tn. I t 3, p. 269. 
119 R. Jennings, "Government in Commission', (1946) 23 BrlL 116 at 136. 
120 See Fox, op. cit .• fn. 113. p. 259. 
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of the importance of the value of self-determination. However, continuing to occupy 
the territory without the regulation of the law of occupation, and the protection it 
provides for the right to political independence, is hardly consistent with the value of 
self-determination. This is especially so when one considers that the level of 
reconstruction pursued went far beyond what could be reconciled with the law of 
occupation, as Friedmann notes: 
even the most elastic interpretation could not bring the wholesale abolition of laws, the 
denazification procedure, the arrest of thousands of individuals, the introduction of sweeping 
social reforms, the expropriation of industries, and above all the sweeping changes in the 
territorial and constitutional structure of Germany within the rights of belligerent occupation. 
These are symbols of sovereign government, yet it is of the essence of belligerent occupation 
that it does not claim such powers. 121 
Given the fact of German aggression, and that reconstruction of the state and civil 
infrastructure was needed to prevent a reoccurrence, there was always likely to be a 
significant amount of leeway accorded by the rest of international society with 
regards the attention given by the Allied Powers to the value of self-detennination. 
Still, to govern without any concern for the value of self-detennination would not 
only contradict its inclusion in the UN Charter but would also risk igniting conflict, 
as a core tenet of the inclusion in the UN Charter is that respect for self-
detennination supports international peace. Hence one would expect the level of 
international acceptance to have been affected had there not been efforts to address 
the value of self-determination. With the discussion from Chapter 3 in mind, the 
form of government pursued is of vital importance, in tenns of how consistency with 
the value of self-determination is portrayed. 
In the Postdam Agreement, which set out the core of objectives of the Allied 
Powers administration, there is stress on the realisation of democratic Gennan self-
government. One of the guiding political principles identified as a purpose of the 
occupation is '[ t]o prepare for the eventual reconstruction of Gennan political life on 
a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by 
Germany: 122 Moreover, Nazi party members removed from public and semi-public 
office are to be replaced "by persons who, by their political and moral qualities. are 
deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in 
121 W. Friedmann. Ope cit., fn. Ill. p. 65. 
122 Agreements of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference. July 17-August 2. 1945. (a) Protocol of the 
Proceedings. I August 1945. Section II (8) (3) (IV). 
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Gennany.,123 'Gennan education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate 
Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of 
democratic ideas' .124 'The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the 
principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens 
without distinction of race, nationality or religion' .125 'Local self-government shall 
be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through 
elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of 
military occupation', 126 'All democratic political parties with rights of assembly and 
of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany,127: 
'Representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial 
and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful 
application of these principles in local self-government' .128 
The actual approach to democratic reconstruction has been described as involving 
'programmed installations of democracy,129 and 'a period of re-education in 
democratic responsibilities'. 130 Yet there was no attempt to define democracy in the 
Postdam agreement and at the time there was no suggestion of a legal aspect to 
democracy. Thus there was no scope for regulation or accountability in relation to 
the pursuit of democracy. But even as a political concept, democracy still carries the 
message of genuine rule by the people. Consequently, by pursuing this form of 
political reconstruction, the Allied Powers are projected as necessary for self-
determination; they are cast as the vehicle which creates the form of government 
most readily identified as the basis for identifying a government that represents the 
will of the people for the purpose of exercise of self-determination. Attention is 
taken away from the neglect of the value of self-determination that the Allied Powers 
assumption of the rights to decide represented. Consequently, one is less inclined to 
challenge the looseness in respect of when authority will be handed back to the 
123 Section II (a) (6); see also E. Plischke, 'Denazification Law and Procedure', (1947) 41 AllL 807. 
124 Section II (a) (7). 
125 Section II (a) (8). 
126 Section II (a) (9) (i). 
127 Section II (a) (9) (ii). 
128 Section II (a) (9) (iii). 
129 J. D. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free (1957) 4. 
130 E.Chadwick, Self-Determination. Terrorism and the International Humanitarian Law of Armt!d 
Conflict (1996) 184 
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German people - '[ f]or the time being, no central German Government shall be 
established' .131 
Administration of Germany was split into four zones of occupation. Each zone 
was administered by one of the four powers - US, ~ France, USSR. The Powers 
d · . I . h d G 132 acte Jomt y WIt regar s ermanyas a whole. There was, however, in May 1949, 
a breakdown in the relationship between the Western Powers and the USSR. While 
the Western Powers combined their zones of occupation to fonn the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the USSR responded with the creation of the Gennan 
Democratic Republic. 133 That the latter name was possible, despite an apparent lack 
of commitment to anything like the democratic ideal, is testament to how democracy 
as a hortatory device is subject to misuse. 134 It did not, though, manage to speed up 
the conferral of international recognition on the purported East Gennan State. Other 
factors, such as the level of USSR involvement, slowed down this process. 135 
Democracy, then, is not to be seen as some instant remedy for securing international 
recognition for activity in neglect of the right to political independence. 136 Rather, 
where the context in which neglect political independence has its own worthy goal, 
such as international peace in the occupation and reconstruction of post-World War 
II Germany, democracy is a vital element for galvanising international acceptance. 
This is because it upholds the value of self-determination, which is important for its 
own sake, but if neglected would likely affect international peace. 
Most pertinently, the Germany example is a reminder that, even today with an 
emerging legal concept of democracy, there may not be a need for occupiers to 
encourage legal development to secure international acceptance of reconstruction in 
breach of the law of occupation; despite the greater uncertainty about what will be 
realised, by way of democracy, which this introduces. 
7. The Reconstruction of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) 
131 Section II (a) (9) (iv). 
132 See J. L. Kunz, 'Ending the War with Gennany', (1952) 46 AJIL 114 at 115-117. 
133 See Crawford, op. cit .. tn. 106, pp. 454-458. 
134 On the (lack of)commitment to democracy, see Statement by the United States Secretary of State. 
Dean Acheson, 12 Oct 1949, in R. von Oppen (ed.), Documents on Germany Under Occupation 1945 
- 1954, (1955) p. 424. 
13' See Crawford, op. cit., tn. 106, pp. 456-457. 
136 One need only consider the situation with Turkey in Cyprus. there. despite free elections. the 
conduct is still attributed to Turkey which remains cast as the occupier, see Loi=idou v Turkey, .\Ierits. 
ECtHR (1996), Series VI. 2216 at 2235-2236. para. 56; and ()prus v Turkey, 10 May 200 I. at paras. 
69-77, available at <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int>. 
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The occupation of the Palestinian Territories by Israel is a prolonged one, during 
which change and development of the infrastructure is needed to stop stagnation. 137 
It is generally agreed, although disputed by Israel in relation to Geneva law, that both 
of the main instruments of occupation apply to the occupied territories (although 
Israel still claims to follow Geneva law).138 Still lacking the status of a sovereign 
state, the law of occupation serves to protect further impediment of the right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination. 139 Israel does not acknowledge a right to 
Palestinian self-determination, so would not be expected to invoke pursuit of it in 
legal reasoning. 140 Nonetheless, because of its relevance for international acceptance 
of activity not in accordance with established doctrine of the law of occupation, there 
is the possibility of Israeli interpretation of the law of occupation taking into account 
the right to self-determination, albeit without explicit acknowledgement. 
A key occurrence that has permitted change and development of the Palestinian 
infrastructure is the considerable degree of self-government that has been accorded 
since 1993. This arose as a consequence of a breakthrough in the peace process in 
1993, whereby Chairman Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO), recognized the right of Israel to live in peace and security, and Prime 
Minister Rabin of Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian 
People. 141 By putting aside the question of the fmal settlement of the dispute,142 the 
parties were able to agree on an interim settlement, which provided for a degree of 
self-government for a 5 year transitional period, leading to further negotiations on a 
permanent settlement. 143 The framework for the interim period was set out in the 
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DoP) 
137 See Roberts, Ope cit., fit. II. 
138 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
Advisory Opinion, IC) Report 2004, p. 136, at p. 171, paras. 89 - 101; Milano, Ope cit., fil. 51. p. 92; 
Ben-Naftali, Gross and Michaeli, Ope cit., fit. 24, p. 567 and references therein. 
139 GA Res. 2672 (1970) was the first of many resolutions to proclaim that the people of Palestine are 
'entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the UN. '; s.ee also 
Wall Opinion, Ope cit., fit. 138, p. 182, para. 118; A. Irnseis, 'On the Fourth Geneva Convention and 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory', (2003) 44 Harvard JIL at 97; Roberts, Ope cit., fn. 19, p. 304; 
s~cifically on the lack of statehood see Crawford. Ope cit., fil. 106, p. 435. 
I See C. Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (2000) 153. 
I ... Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition, Letters and Speeches, 10 September 1993. 
1 .. 2 This centres on the right of the Palestinians to statehood and the territory that this would be based 
on. 
1 .. 3 See A. Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (2000) 516-523. 
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negotiated in Oslo and signed in Washington on 13 September 1993,144 and 
elaborated on in subsequent interim agreements. 14S The DoP provided for immediate 
transfer of authority to an interim Palestinian Authority (P A), to be appointed by the 
PLO with Israeli approval, in the areas of education and culture, health, social 
welfare, direct taxation, and tourism 'with the view to promoting economic 
development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,;I46 further authority being gradually 
transferred to an elected Palestinian Council,147 such as has been provided for in 
subsequent agreements. 148 While the governance arrangements, as agreed upon and 
as have evolved, are complex,149 the present concern is with how the fact of self-
government, and the fact of consequent further reconstruction of the infrastructure of 
the OPT, relates to the law of occupation. 
Israeli action in breach of the law of occupation is usually identified as such, for 
example, the IC] identified that the Israeli settlements in the OPT are illegal pursuant 
to Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the transfer of 
population of an occupying power into the territory it occupies. 150 While there may 
be little effort at enforcement, flagging up breaches of the law goes someway to 
stopping situations from becoming, overtime, legalized. In this respect, the 
arrangements for self-government, and the level of change and development this has 
made possible, are hardly compatible with the principle of conservation. Yet, one 
struggles to find comment on how this process relates to the law of occupation. 151 
One might ponder whether this occurrence represents a more expansive 
interpretation of the principle of conservation in order to better ensure the self-
144 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Washington, 13 Sept. 1993 
(witnessed by US and Russian Federation). 
145 See, e.g., Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, 28 September 1995 (Oslo II) 
(witnessed by US, Russian Federation, Arab Republic of Egypt, Hahemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
Kingdom of Norway, and EU); for all the agreements visit 
<www.israelmfa.gov.iVmfa.go.asp?MFAHOOOcO>; Watson identifies the agreements as legally 
binding bilateral treaties, G. R. Watson, 'The "Wall" Decisions in Legal and Political Context', 
(2005) 99 AJIL 6 at 22-24, and at 23 noting that neither side has invoked any law to suggest that they 
no longer apply in light of practice in breach; see, though, Y. Shany. 'Faraway, So Close: The Legal 
Status of Gaza after Israel's Disenagement', (2006) 8 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 
369 at 16-17 (on author's copy). 
146 Article VI, DoP. 
147 Article lII, DoP. 
148 See, e.g., Oslo II. loc. cit., fn. 145, for the long list of areas see Annex III. 
149 See, e.g., Bell, op. cit., fn. 140, p. 157 
150 Wall Advison' Opinion, op. cit., fn. 138, paras. 119-20. 
151 The ICJ. for ~xample, hardly mentioned any aspect of the Oslo process in the Wall Opinion, on its 
apparent relevance for the Opinion see Watson. op. cit .. fn. 145, p. 24. 
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detennination of the Palestinian people.1S2 However, there is nothing to support this 
view in the relevant agreements. Indeed, the Interim Agreement directs the limits on 
Palestinian authority to be gauged by reference to the provisions of 'the DoP, this 
Agreement, or any other agreement that may be reached between the two sides'. with 
no mention of the law of occupation. 153 It can seem, then, that the law of occupation 
no longer applies. 154 However, this is far from a situation in which the occupier has 
left, in the sense of no longer exerting any influence, and has been replaced by an 
independent effective domestic government, a situation that one would readily 
accept as no longer occupation. In this respect, Malanczuk has emphasised that Israel 
retains jurisdiction over Israelis, controls security and external relations, and 
maintains residual power, so Israel is still an occupant 'with regard to the fields that 
it has not transferred to the Palestinans for self-government'. 155 The implication 
being that the law of occupation continues but does not affect those areas designated 
for self-government. While the law of occupation does not contemplate such a 
process, it does, indeed, appear that the consent of the PLO, followed by 
international acceptance of the consent as sufficient, has essentially removed the 
application of the law of occupation for those areas designated for self-government. 
How, then, does this consent position the reconstruction process in relation to the 
right of political independence? 
At the time of the signing the DoP, the PLO is a national liberation movement,156 
an umbrella organisation for a number of factions, 157 which had received widespread 
international recognition as the representative of the people's right to self-
determination. 158 Without effective control of the territory, one would hope 
152 See the discussion of Pellet's idea in this respect, above. 
153 Article XIII, Interim Agreement (Oslo II). 
IS4 See E. Benvenisti, 'The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles: A Framework for Future 
Settlement', (1993) 4 EJIL 542 at 545-546 arguing that by the Israeli giving up control in these areas 
the law of occupation ceases to apply. 
155 P. Malanczuk, 'Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements between Israel and the PLO from the 
Perspective of International Law', (1996) 7 EJIL 485 at 487; see, similarly, A. Imseis, 'ICJ Advisory 
Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Critical Reflections on the 
International Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion', (2005) 99 AJIL 102 at 
note 21; Wall Opinion, Ope cit .. fn. 138, para. 78; on the position following the recent Israeli moves 
for disengagement from Gaza. see the contrasting positions of I. Scobbie 'An Intimate 
Disengagement: Israel'S Withdrawal from Gaza. the Law of Occupation and of Self-Determination', 
(2007) 11 Yearbook o/Islamic and Middle Eastern Law (2004-2005) 3: and, Shany, op. cit .. fn. 145. 
156 F.L.M. Van de Craen. -Palestine Liberation Movement', (1990) 12 EPIL 278. 
157 See E. Wing, 'The Palestinian Basic Law: Embryonic Constitutionalism', (1999) 31 Case Western 
Reserve Journal 0/ International Law 383 at 392. 
m In 1974. the UN General Assembly recognised the PLO as 'the principal party to the question of 
Palestine', GA Res. 3210 (14 Oct 1974). 
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international recognition is based on an assessment of the allegiance of the people. In 
this respect, to support the PLO's status at the time, one can identify pledges of 
allegiance from significant unions, as well as other institutions such as newspapers, 
political parties and guerrilla groupS.1S9 One is thus much more convinced of the 
representative quality of the agent than in a situation where the occupier has clearly 
selected a group favourable to its own interests as a source of consent. However, 
without independent effective control, there is still an unequal bargaining position 
that could see the people's rights under the law of occupation too readily given away 
to the occupier. Further, when one adds to this the significant level of opposition to 
the Oslo Accord amongst Palestinians, that the PLO Executive Committee was split. 
making it a struggle for Arafat to muster the necessary majority amongst the 18 
members,160 and Arafat was accused by some of 'abandoning principles to grab 
power' ,161 there is good reason for being hesitant about accepting the consent of the 
PLO as remedying concern for the right of the Palestinian's to decide on change and 
development of the infrastructure; a right which, by curtailing its exercise, the 
continued application of the law of occupation would help to preserve. 162 
Such a criticism is not intended to challenge that, in the interests of the peace 
process, there was a need to be pragmatic as to who could consent,163 especially not 
in light of the complexity of the territorial situation. l64 But, given the risk to the 
Palestinian rights that removing the law of occupation represents, one struggles to 
imagine that international acceptance of the approach would have been so 
forthcoming were there not further assurances that self-government would be in 
accordance with the will of the people. This is found in the democratic element of 
the DoP. Article III of the DoP indicates that: 
In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves 
according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for 
159 See O. M. Dajani, 'Stalled between Seasons: the International Legal Status of Palestine 
during the Interim Period', (1997) 26 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 27 at 50-~ 1. 
citing J. R. Nassar. The Palestine Liberation Organization: from Armed Struggle to the Declarallon of 
Independence (1991) 30-36; see also Crawford, Ope cit .• fn. 106, p. 437. 
160 See Shlaim. Ope cit .. fn. 143, p. 521. 
161 Shlaim, Ope cit .. fn. 143, p. 521. 
162 See also C. Campbell, • A Problematic Peace: International Humanitarian Law and the 
IsraelilPalestinian Peace Process', in K. Schulze. M. Stokes, and C. Campbell (eds.). ,\'ationalism. 
Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the Middle East (1996) 39 at 53. 
IbJ See Malanczuk. Ope cit .. fn. 155, p. 498. 
164 See Dajani, Ope cit .. fn. 159. 
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the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian 
police will ensure public order. 
This projects the removal of the law of occupation as in pursuit of genuine rule by 
the people, rather than about empowering the PLO for its own sake. However. the 
indication, in Oslo II, that the process is bound by international human rights law, 165 
and the provision for a dispute settlement mechanism, in DoP, essentially dependent 
on co-operation from both sides, offers little in terms of a basis for regulation and 
accountability of the pursuit of democracy.l66 There is no suggestion of a legal 
concept of democracy, encompassing procedural identification and substantive 
conduct, to help ensure that which the term democracy promises, and which makes it 
a useful device for engendering international acceptance, through the projected 
accommodation of the value of self-determination. 
In practice, the path to democracy in Palestine is a slow one. Circumstances do not 
make it an easy task. 167 In particular, the need to communicate all legislation to Israel 
can frustrate efforts at change and development. 168 To the extent that progress has 
been slowed due to a lack of a genuine commitment to the democratic ideal, a legal 
concept of democracy as part of the right to self-determination could have provided 
an impetus for more effort. However, 'both sides had reasons not to negotiate into 
the peace agreements, a package which would harmonise Palestinian autonomy with 
internal self-determination', 169 thus an interest in a continued security presence for 
Israel,170 and a retaining of discretion for the Palestinian authorities,171 helps explain 
why a legal concept of democracy was not in their interests. Particularly, when the 
same hortatory effect can be achieved with democracy depicted merely as a political 
165 The DoP does not even mention the process as bound by international human rights law, the later 
interim agreement (Oslo II) does mention that the process is bound by international human rights law, 
Article XIV. 
166 Article XV, DoP offers some scope for dispute settlement but as Bell notes 'it is essentially a 
Pt0litical mechanism dependent on cooperation from both sides, Bell, Ope cit., fn. 140, p. 308. 
67 See NORDEM Report, Palestine: Presidential Elections 2005 (August 2005) p. 16 and p. 23. 
168 See Bell, Ope cit., fn. 140, p. 204. 
169 Bell, Ope cit., til. 140, p. 186. 
170 This has a serious impact on freedom of movement, and thus freedom of association and assembly 
as required by the emerging legal concept of democracy; see the discussion of the checkpoint system 
as an impingement on freedom of movement by Machsomwatch, . A Counterview: Checkpoints 2004 ' 
(2004), available at <http://www.machsomwatch.org! docslCounterview.pdf>; see also B'Tselem-
The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 'Forbidden Roads: The 
Discriminatory West Bank Road Regime' (2004), available at 
<http://www. btselem.org!download/2~O~ _ Forbidden _ ~oads _ Eng.pdf>. . . .. 
171 Wing reports the avoidance of the slgnmg of the BasiC Law .(th~ Palestm~an constltutl~n) because 
of a desire to avoid the checks and balances on government which It would mtroduce, Wmg. Ope cll., 
th. 157, p. 404. 
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concept. And, of course, Israel would not have agreed to explicit mention of the 
Palestinian right to self-determination:72 Consequently, while the pursuit of 
democracy helps to excuse the avoidance of the law of occupation, so far it does not 
appear a sufficient excuse for the people who are left disappointed at the 
undemocratic practices of the Palestinian Administration. 173 Indeed, the peoples 
yearning for democratic self-government has been suggested as an element that 
might erode the peace process. 174 This feeds into debate on the relevance of law for 
resolution of the dispute, which raises the broader question as to the extent that 
justice is expendable in the interest of peace? The answer remains far from clear, 175 
but there are certainly signs that avoiding legal regulation of the governance deal 
struck in the pursuit of peace might eventually have the opposite effect. 
The complexity of the situation, in relation to Israeli occupation of the Palestinian 
Territories, helps to explain why the pursuit of democracy as a loose political 
concept would be sufficient to satisfy wider international opinion that the value of 
self-determination has been addressed. In a more traditional situation of belligerent 
occupation, such as occurred in Iraq, one might hope, at least, that wider 
international opinion would not be satisfied with the promise of the pursuit of a loose 
political concept as sufficient to accommodate the value of self-determination in 
place of the law of occupation. 
8. The Reconstruction of Occupied Iraq 
It is widely accepted that during at least May 2003 to June 2004 the coalition forces 
occupied Iraq: 76 These dates represent the point from which the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) was established to administer Iraq until authority was 
transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government. 177 The occupation followed a short 
period of conflict between Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, and the coalition forces, 
172 See Bell, op. cit., fn. 140, p. 153. 
173 See G. E. Bisharat, 'Peace and the Political Imperative Reform in Palestine', (1999) 31 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 253 at 284. 
174 See Bisharat, op. cit., fn. 173, p. 254 
175 See J. Quigley, 'The Role of Law in a Palestinian-Israeli Accommodation', (1999) 31 Case 
Western Reserve Journal oflnJernaJional Law 351 at 375: Bell, op. cit .. th. 140, p.187. 
176 . th 34 See, e.g., Boon. op. cit.. ". . . . . . . ' . 
In On the CPA, see L. E. Halchm, "The Coahtlon ProvIsIonal Authonty (CPA). Origm. 
Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities", Congressional Research Sen'ice, The Library of 
Congress, 6 June 2005, available at: <www.fas.orglsgpJcrslmideastlRL32370.pdf>. 
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predominantly US and UK forces, in response to a perceived threat posed by Iraq' s 
purported possession of WMD. The legality of the coalition forces use of force to 
remove Hussein from power has received a significant amount of scholarly 
attention. 178 However fmnly the coalition might have protested the legality of their 
action, it is, in the words of Lowe: 
simply unacceptable that a step as serious and important as a massive military attack upon a 
State should be launched on the basis of a legal argument dependent upon dubious inferences 
drawn from silences in Resolution 1441 and the muffled echoes of earlier resolutions, 
unsupported by any contemporary authorisation to use force. 179 
The coalition, then, became the occupiers of Iraq following a use of force that 
struggled for wider international support,180 which meant that its administration 
would receive close international scrutiny. Nonetheless, the CPA still engaged in 
change and development of Iraqi state and civil infrastructure far beyond what could 
be reasonably reconciled with the principle of conservation. 
The CPA introduced a wide range of reforms. These were in relation to security 
and military institutions, human rights reform, criminal law and law enforcement 
reforms, economic reform, as well as changes to remove the influence of the Ba' ath 
party on Iraqi society and reduce corruption in governmental bodies: 81 The latter 
included the complete overhaul of the existing structure of government. This practice 
of change and development attracted significant scholarly comment,182 but not the 
level of international condemnation that one might have expected, particularly in 
light of the circumspect origins of the occupation. Such international endorsement 
hints at modification of the law of occupation to be more permissive of 
reconstruction, and is thus of interest for this study. 
178 See, e. g., N. D. White and E. P. J. Myjer, 'The Use of Force Against Iraq', (2003) 8 JCSL I. 
179 V. Lowe, 'The Iraq Crisis: What Next?'. (2003) 521CLQ 859 at 866. 
180 When the SC discussions broke down in March 2003, the three other pennanent members of the 
SC remained strongly opposed to the use of force, see UN Doc. SIPV/4721 (19 March 2003); the UK 
Foreign Affairs Committee (F AC) explained the division in the SC as 'likely to have been a 
consequence of genuinely different assessments of the nature and extent of that threat.' , Ninth 
Report, FAC, Session 2002-03, The Decision to Go to War in Iraq, HC 813-1 (7 July 2003) para. 82. 
181 For an account see Fox, op. cit., fn. 49, 208-223: see also, as an example of more in depth 
investigation of specific areas changed and developed. T. W. Kassinger and D. 1. Williams. 
'Commercial Law Refonn Issues in the Reconstruction of Iraq'. (2004-05) 33 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 217. 
182 See, e.g., K. Kaikobad. 'Problems of Belligerent Occupation: The Scope of Powers Exercised by 
the Coalition Provisional Authority', (2005) 54 lCLQ 253: C. McCarthy. 'The Paradox of the 
International Law of Military Occupation: Sovereignty and the Refonnation oflraq'. (2005) 10 JeSL 
43; R. Buchan •. International Community and the Occupation of Iraq'. (2007) I:! JeSL 37. 
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The occupation of Iraq did not involve a straightforward application of the law of 
occupation. The law of occupation was arguably modified for the situation by a 
chapter VII resolution. In this respect, SC Resolution 1483 refers to . certain 
transfonnative objectives for the occupation', which suggests authorization beyond 
the conservationist raison d'etre of the law of occupation. 183 The exact intention of 
the SC is, however, muddled by the continued stress on the importance of adherence 
to the law of occupation; for example, paragraph 5 of Resolution 1483 requires the 
occupiers to 'comply fully with their obligations under ... the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and Hague Regulations of 1907'.184 This resulted in legal ambiguity, for 
which the conditioning of changes by the occupiers in the areas of economic 
reconstruction, conditions for sustainable development, the protection of human 
rights, legal and judicial refonn, on consultation with the Special Representative of 
the UN Secretary General,185 is a rather weak substitute for the stringent protection 
that the law of occupation provides for the right to political independence. 
Although, '[m]ost [CPA] regulations contained a blanket preamble to the effect 
that instruments issued by the CPA were enacted 'under the laws and usages of 
war",186 it remains that the muddled SC chapter VII authorisation of activity beyond 
the law of occupation helped remove the need for the occupiers to try and explain 
their activity as consistent with the established doctrine of the law of occupation. 187 
This undennines the example in tenns of evidence of modification of the law of 
occupation. 188 It does not, though, provide a comprehensive explanation for 
international acceptance of practice beyond the established framework of the law of 
occupation, which neglects the right of the state of Iraq and its people to political 
independence. 
Scheffer has addressed the problem of how to find a more coherent legal basis for 
the transformative reconstruction intentions of the coalition forces in Iraq, than was 
found in the uncertain mix of law of occupation modified in a vague manner by SC 
Resolution 1483. Scheffer suggests that answers could be found in a fresh UN 
183 See A. Roberts, 'Transfonnative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and 
Human Rights' (2006) 100 AJIL 580; D. Scheffer, 'Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict: Beyond 
Occupation Law' (2003) 97 AJIL 842 at 845-6. 
184 See also Fox, Ope cit., fo. 49, pp. 259 - 62. 
18S SC Res. 1483 (2003) para. 8. 
186 Boon. Ope cit., fo. 34, p. 14. 
187 See. e.g .. comments to this effect in the UK House of Commons Research Paper 03/51. 2 June 
2003,25. 
188 Cf. Benvenisti. Ope cit., fn. 12. pp. 37-38. 
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chapter VII mandate establishing an international territorial administration; a clearer 
delegation of administrative responsibilities to the coalition forces so that they would 
not necessarily be acting as occupying powers; or in the creation of an Iraqi 
government that might invite the occupying powers return. 189 Roberts, similarly 
suggests that any legal validation of transformative policies in a situation of 
occupation could only come from a chapter VII resolution or an amendment of the 
GCIV. 190 While the SC could have done better in its drafting of Resolution 1483 for 
legal certainty, and this could have helped improve the accountability of the CPA 
which was able to take advantage of the legal ambiguity, in itself, as was noted in 
Chapter 2, a chapter VII resolution would not address the neglect of the right to 
political independence. 
The neglect of political independence puts at stake the values of self-
determination and international peace. Restoring effective government in Iraq was of 
clear importance for international peace, but to attempt to do so in neglect of the 
value of self-determination would be counterproductive because the people would be 
unlikely to adhere to an imposed regime and this would likely spark conflict. Some 
efforts to project accommodation of the value of self-determination are found in the 
introduction of an Iraqi element into the administration of the occupied state. 191 This 
was in the form of the Governing Iraqi Council (GIC), which was to be part of a 
tripartite type formation for governance, composed also of the UN Secretary General 
and CPA:92 The CPA essentially selected the 25 members of the OIC:93 and its 
significance in relation to addressing the value of self-determination was further 
diminished because it ended up with a limited advisory role. 194 The OIC might have 
189 Scheffer, op. cit., fit. 183, p. 859. 
190 Roberts, op. cit., fn. 183, p. 622. 
191 The UN Secretary General was well aware that involving Iraqis in the reconstruction was crucial 
for the success of the efforts, and when discussing political and legal reforms had emphasized this 
point, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 24 of Security Council Resolution 1483, 
UN. Doc. S/20031715 (2003), para. 23. 
192 See T. D. Grant, 'The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice', (2003) 97 AJIL 823. 
193 See Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 24 of Security Council Resolution 1483 
UN Doc. S/20031715; see the FCO website, 'Iraq country profile' describing how: 'The Governing 
Council was neither selected nor elected - it emerged from a consensus building process involving the 
CPA and the main bodies of Iraqis interested in influencing the future of their country.' Accessed on 
<08/0912005>; conversation with General Tim Cross a deputy to the CPA revealed that prominent 
Iraqis in exile were selected and then encouraged to agree with prominent Iraqis in Iraq on who 
should be on the GIC; see also C. J. Williams, 'Iraqi Council's Most Pressing Task: Legitimacy'. Los 
Angeles Times, 28 August 2003. .., . 
194 A lack of precision surrounded how the Governing Council would fit Into the governing structure, 
as Fox has sunnised '[i]n sum. the Governing Council appears to have played a purely advisory role.' 
Fox, op. cit., fn, 49. p. 206. 
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been better than nothing but no one could pretend that the GIC actually reconciled 
the practice with the right to political independence. 
More important for the projection of the accommodation of the value of self-
determination was the depiction, by the SC, of the occupiers as working towards the 
'creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely detennine there o\\n 
political future.' 195 To be achieved when 'an internationally recognized, 
representative government is established by the people of Iraq and assumes the 
responsibilities of the Authority.' 196 There has been some scholarly consideration of 
what the SC meant when it specified that the Iraqi government must be 
'representative' .197 It is, after all, as noted in Chapter 3, still an open-ended term that 
does not limit the government to a democratic one. Orakhelashvili has argued, on the 
basis of his view that the self-determination of peoples has assumed peremptory 
norm status, that the term 'representative' must be interpreted in accordance with 
this principle, which means (if one accepts that self-determination requires it) that a 
democratic form was required. 198 Orakhelashvili needs to resort to the right of self-
determination as a norm of jus cogens because of the general lack of mention of the 
right in the resolutions or the preceding debates. The argument struggles not least 
because if self-determination has the status of jus cogens then it is as a right to free 
from foreign domination not ideas that are at best emerging such as the link with 
democracy.199 Alternatively, White suggests that, in light of past SC practice in 
relation to election monitoring, the term representative should be understood as 
obliging a democratic form of government to be constituted.2oo However, in the 
debate on the signing of Resolution 1483, only Germany's comments implied that 
representative meant democratic: 
It is important now to give the Iraqi people the perspective of building a democratic and 
stable Government, at peace with itself and its regional neighbours - a respected member of 
the family of nations. 
195 SC. Res. 1483 (2003), para 4. 
196 SC. Res. 1483 (2003). 
197 On the wider debate about what should guide the interpretation ofSC resolutions, see M. C. Wood. 
'The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions', (1998) 2 Max P/~nck UNY~ 73, at 7~5 and 92. 
198 A. Orakhelashvili, 'The Post War Settlement in Iraq: The UN Secunty CounCil ResolutIon 1483 
(2003) and General International Law', (2003) 8 JCSL 307 at 312-13. 
199 See discussion in Chapter 1 and Conclusions of this study. 
200 N. D. White, 'The Will and Authority of the Security Council after Iraq', (2004) 17 ~/~ 645 at 
653 - 54: see also Kirgis, loc. cit., fn. 105, suggesting that the use of the term 'representative may ~ 
seen as further step in the development of the emerging international law principle of democratic 
governance. 
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And then it is the context of its relevance for international peace that Germany 
believes a democratic form is inevitable in Iraq.20l It thus seems most likely that the 
term 'representative' was adopted exactly because it preserved flexibility for all 
those involved when it came to the process of identifying an agent to work with on 
behalf of the Iraqi state and its people. This flexibility allowed the handing over of 
political authority to an interim government to be treated as sufficient to remove the 
restraints of the law of occupation, despite the fact that the government was still 
dependent on the coalition forces for its control of the territory and was, essentially, 
CP A selected rather than elected. 202 
Moreover, the invitation from the SC, to the CPA and GIC, to select a democratic 
form,203 without specification of the components, further emphasises that democracy 
was not legally required by the term 'representative', but also that it was treated as a 
political rather than a legal concept. The choice of democracy was, then, an act of 
self-determination rather than a requirement of self-determination, albeit a rather 
inadequate one given the credentials of the GIC and the CPA that chose democracy 
and gave meaning to it in the first stages of the constitution making process. 204 
Nonetheless, it was readily apparent that the term representative would in fact lead 
to the introduction of a democratic form of government, not least because of the 
dominant influence of US and UK, and the understanding of the term that they 
promoted in debates leading to GA Resolution 2625 (1970).205 Indeed, the CPA was 
not shy about stating, in a mid-term review, that 'the ultimate goal for Iraq is a 
durable peace for a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that is underpinned by new 
and protected freedoms and a growing market economy.,206 Thus, despite the 
reluctance to be explicit, because democracy was always understood as the 
201 SC 4761stmtg, 22 May 2003, p. 5. . . 
202 For criticism, see A. Carcano, 'End of the Occupation in 2004? The Status of the MultmatlOnal 
Force after the Transfer of Sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government', (2006) II JCSL 41 at 66. 
203 UN Doc. SC Res. 1511 (2003), para. 7. 
204 One might also argue that the term 'representative' was chosen so as not to in~nge the right t.o 
self-determination by taking the choice of governmental fonn away from the Iraqi people. In thiS 
respect. the input of the Iraqi people in the form of the GIC was hardly sufficient, see S. Wheatley, 
'The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy, and Regime Change in Iraq'. (2006) 17 EJIL 531 at 
541; cf. N. Feldman. 'Imposed Constitutionalism'. (2004/5) 37 Connecticut Law Review 857 at 857-
858. 
20' On GA. Res. 2625. see Chapter 3 of this study. 
206 CPA. An Historic Own'if!'lt' o/CPA Accomplishments at 4. available at <www.cpa-iraq.org>. 
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outcome,207 the occupation was still seen as about democracy, and hence about the 
realisation of genuine rule by the people. The failure to be explicit at the SC on this 
point, or to identify links with the law of occupation, or the right to self-
determination, of course, guarded against encouraging the development of more 
relevant legal bounds for the discretion of the occupiers, in terms of actually 
achieving a minimum standard of democracy. 
The point, though, is that it is not simply by pursuing democracy that the coalition 
was able to escape the restraints of the law of occupation. Nor is it to suggest that 
there was no criticism of the change and development as in violation of the right to 
self-determination.208 And it is certainly not to advocate intervention in sovereign 
states to impose democracy. 209 The point is that democracy, because of its ability to 
project accommodation of the value of self-determination, is an essential element of 
the explanation for international acceptance of the process as whole. In terms of 
international acceptance of a practice that, through disregarding the law of 
occupation in relation to reconstruction and the end of application, neglected the 
right to political independence, the apparent legality and confirmation of importance 
for international peace from chapter VII authorisation must also been seen as of 
extreme importance. 
In relation to the subsequent consensual basis of the occupation following the 
establishment of the Interim Government, without democracy, or at least the promise 
of democracy, one struggles to accept that international recognition for the interim 
government,210 or the otherwise ineffective governments that followed, would have 
been forthcoming. Without international recognition the interim government would 
not have been treated as competent to validly consent to end of the application of the 
law of occupation when the military forces remained, and so the prospect of some 
legal restraint from the law of occupation would have continued.211 In this instance. 
the underdeveloped rules on the expression of the will of the state and its people 
combine with the pursuit of democracy to explain international acceptance of the end 
of application without an independently effective domestic government. 
207 See, e.g .• A. Roberts, 'The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004'. (2005) 54 ICLQ 27 at 42. 
208 See McCarthy. lac. cit., fn. 182. 
209 See K. Reinhart and G. S. Merritt. Reconstruction and Constitution Building in Iraq. (2004) 37 
Vanderbilt Journal a/Transnational Law 765 at 767. 
210 On the extensive international recognition of the interim government. see Carcano. op. cit .. fn. 202. 
D.49. 
211 See also Carcano. op. cit .• fn. 202. pp. 53-54. 
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When the time came for the actual constitution of Iraq to be drafted, following the 
selection of a Constitutional Committee from the elected Transitional National 
Assembly in January 2005, application of the law of occupation had ended. The 
framework and, essentially, the blueprint for the new constitution, 212 the 
'Transitional Administrative Law' (TAL), was, however, drafted before the end of 
the formal application of the law of occupation, between January and March 2004.213 
The fact that a permanent constitution was not drafted during the occupation appears 
to have had more to do with concerns of acceptance by the Iraqi people rather than 
any perceived limitation because of the application of the law of occupation. This is 
because the US had in fact planned to appoint a national conference to draft a 
permanent constitution,214 but 'under pressure from Iraq's most senior religious 
authori!lls and the United Nations,216 it accepted that direct elections would in fact 
be held, and that a transitional law should be written in order to establish the 
framework within which the country's permanent constitution would be drafted.,217 
The OIC was given formal responsibility for drafting the TAL, but there was 
considerable CPA involvement.218 The content of the TAL is wide ranging, 
significant aspects relating to the infrastructure of Iraq were addressed.219 It points 
the direction of Iraq's political future towards democratic self-government, and 
received implicit international endorsement in the form of SC Resolution 1546.220 
It was always expected that the Iraqi government would draft a constitution 
committed to democracy, indeed, one reflecting the emerging consensus on 
democracy as a human right.221 However, the failure to link a legal concept of 
democracy to the legal right of self-determination during the process leading to the 
212 P. Dann and Z. AI-Ali, 'The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant -Constitution-Making Under 
External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor', (2006) lOMax Planck UNYB 423 - 463 at 440; 
see also International Crisis Group (lCG), 'Iraq: Don't Rush the Constitution', Middle East Report. 
Number 42, 8 June 2005, 7. 
213 Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (March, 2004) available at 
<http://www.cpa-iraq.orgigovernmentffAL.hnnl>. 
214 L. Diamond, Squandered Victory (2005) 41. 
21S Feldman, op. cit., fn. 204, 857. 
216 See The Political Transition in Iraq: Report of the Fact-finding Mission, United Nations Security 
Council, 23 February 2004, Doc. S/2004/140 available at <http://www.un.intlusals-2004-140-
iraq.pdf.> . 
217 Dann and AI-Ali. op. cit., fn. 212, p. 436. 
218 Dann and AI-Ali. op. cit .• fn. 212, p. 436. 
219 See, e.g .• Article 13 of the TAL. 
220 SC Res. 1546 (8 June 2004) 
221 See Dann and AI-Ali. op. cit., fn. 212, p. 440 - 442: full text of the constitution adopted October 
2005 available at < http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-
dynlcontentlartic1el2005/1 01 121 AR20051 0 120 1 450.html> . 
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establishment of the government, raises a pressing question: on what basis can the 
elected Iraqi government, still dependent on international actors for effective control , 
be challenged if it should abandon its democratic commitment by, for example, 
seriously impeding freedom of expression? 
In terms of challenging the authority of an elected government, scholarly reactions 
to the purported location of sovereignty since the formal end of the occupation are 
telling. The international acceptance of the interim government as the embodiment of 
Iraq's sovereignty was criticised because of the dominance of international actors in 
its selection.222 This was not repeated with regards the treatment of the subsequently 
elected government as the embodiment of Iraqi sovereignty.223 Yet in neither 
instance was there a government with independent effective control of the territory, 
the occupiers remained. If scholars treat the fact of elections as an adequate 
substitute for independent effective control of the territory, then it is unlikely that 
states, which were satisfied with the selected Interim Government, will feel 
confident, or be inclined to challenge an elected government's authority. This 
indicates that, in either situations, if the government's democratic commitment was 
abandoned, elected or not, international actors that provide the effectiveness would 
be left to call for compliance with the individual human rights. This is far from 
adequate, when the cornerstone of the excuse for neglect of political independence in 
the reconstruction processes is the realisation of democracy, genuine rule by the 
people. 
In Iraq, then, legal regulation of the democracy excuse for neglect of political 
independence was eschewed, but international acceptance of the process was still 
forthcoming. This supports that the positing of the pursuit of democracy can in itself, 
and dependent on the surrounding circumstances, provide enough satisfaction for 
international actors, in relation to the value of self-determination, for there not to be 
a 'need' to seek to develop new law. Whether the international actors and the people 
of Iraq will live to regret the lack of scope for international regulation and 
accountability of the government they put in power remains to be seen. The 
relationship between the reconstruction of Iraq and the right to political 
222 See, e.g., A. Carcano, op. cit., fn. 202, pp. 49-57: S. Wheatley, op. cit .• til. 204. p. 541 ~~ p. 550. 
223 See, e.g., Caracno, op. cit .• fn. 202, p.66; Wheatley. op. cit .. fn. 204. p.550 Orakhelashvlh. op. CII .• 
m. 198, pp. 312-13: White, op. cit .. fn. 200, pp. 653-654. 
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independence after the fonnal end of the occupation is addressed in Chapter 7 as an 
example of the assistance model of state reconstruction. 
9. Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed how the law of occupation deals with reconstruction in 
relation to the right to political independence, and the relevance of this approach for 
the other paradigms. It has been seen that, despite origins prior to the right to self-
determination and the prohibition on annexation of territory by the use force. there 
are good reasons, found in the desire to protect the sovereign rights of the target 
state, for further interest to be shown in the law of occupation as a framework for 
contemporary state reconstruction. The situations, in which it applies, despite 
originating from a neglect of political independence, relate to the subject of this 
study because of the need for no further neglect. The other paradigms rest on state 
consent and chapter VII but this has been argued not to make the premise of the law 
of occupation, that the authority in charge lacks attachment to the state and its 
people, irrelevant. With its design intended for warfare, the conservative emphasis 
makes the law of occupation unsuitable for contemporary reconstruction and thereby 
unlikely to be adopted by analogy in the other paradigms. Still, the fact that it 
permits some change even in the context of warfare is support for the idea that some 
change should be permissible, the difficulty, of course, is gauging the extent, once 
you move away from strict conservation. 
The legal right of self-determination could have encouraged development of the 
law of occupation so that it permits and regulates the creation of a democratic 
government that could pursue the changes. A review of practice has revealed 
democracy to be an essential part of the excuse for the neglect of political 
independence occasioned by a disregard for the law of occupation for the purpose of 
state reconstruction. This is because of its ability to project accommodation of the 
value of self-determination by advising that genuine rule by the people will be 
realised; recalling Chapter 3, in light of neglect of political independence, 
accommodation of both self-determination and international peace would be 
expected in an explanation for international acceptance. The value of self-
determination being something which the other elements in the explanation for 
international acceptance in the practice reviewed - legality from one. or both. of 
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consent and a chapter VII resolutio~ and discrete benefits for international peace -
struggle to address. It is, however, democracy as a political rather than a legal 
concept that has been pursued. This is not an adequate guarantee for the value of 
self-determination. Especially not when compared with the stringent legal regulation 
that the law of occupation provides in the interest of preserving the right to political 
independence. With these fmdings in mind, the next chapter turns attention to how 
reconstruction through ITA relates to political independence. 
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Chapter 5 
State Reconstruction by International Territorial Administration 
1. Introduction 
International territorial administration (ITA) denotes direct governance of a territory 
by international actors. 1 A flourishing political science and international legal 
literature has emerged in response to, in particular, the recent occurrence of ITA in 
Cambodia (1992 - 1993), Bosnia Herzegovina (1995 - ), Kosovo (1999 - ), and East 
Timor (1999 - 2002).2 Despite similarities with occupation,3 the law of occupation 
does not apply because of one, or both, of the legal justifications of state consent and 
SC chapter VII resolution.4 Wilde's comprehensive study of ITA as a policy 
institution has provided a broader understanding of the historical and political 
context within which the projects operate.5 How IT A and reconstruction through this 
medium relates to the right to political independence was, however, beyond the 
scope of Wilde's study. Indeed, one struggles to identify a comprehensive analysis of 
the practice from the perspective of the right to political independence.6 Most 
commentators appear at least implicitly satisfied with a valid legal justification in the 
form of one, or both, of state consent and a chapter VII resolution for dispelling any 
reason for doubt about (in)consistency with the right to political independence.7 Yet, 
as was noted in Chapter 2, when there is no independently effective domestic 
I Wilde defmes territorial administration as reference 'to a formally constituted, locally based 
management structure operating with respect to a particular territorial unit; it can be limited (e.g., a 
territorial program concerned with certain matters) or plenary (e.g., a territorial government) in 
scope.' R. Wilde, 'From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International Territorial 
Administration', 95 AJIL (2001) 583 at 585 
2 See, e.g., the literature listed in the introduction to this study. 
3 See T. H. lnnscher, 'The Legal Framework for the Activities of the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo: The Charter, Human Rights, and the Law of Occupation', (200 1) 
44 OYIL 353; S. R. Ratner, 'Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The 
Challenges of Convergence' (2005) 16 EJIL 695 . 
.. See Chapter 4 of this study. 
, R. Wilde. International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission 
Never Went Away (2008) 439. 
6 See, though, D. laum. The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of International 
Slatebuilding (2007), and G. H. Fox. Humanitarian Occupation (2008). 
7 See, e. g., A. J. J. de Hoogh, 'Attribution or Delegation of (Legislative Power by the Security 
Council? The Case of UNT AET'. (200 1) 7 The Yearboolc of International Peace Operations 1; 
M. Matheson. 'United Nations Governance ofPost-Contlict Societies', (2001) 95 AJIL 76 at 84. 
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government, both legal justifications have shortcomings in tenns of reconciling 
large-scale international involvement in state reconstruction with the right to political 
independence. In light of the significance of the preservation of the right to political 
independence for the UN system, this chapter addresses how the fact of IT A and 
reconstruction through this medium in the four prominent examples, noted above, 
relates to the right to political independence and the attendant core UN system values 
of self-detennination of peoples and international peace. 
There are significant differences in the context, nature of the ITA, and approach to 
reconstruction in the examples addressed. Not least, there is the fact that neither 
Kosovo nor East Timor were whole sovereign states at the time, and that in these two 
examples the ITA has been of a plenary nature (international actors have exercised 
complete governmental authority), unlike in the sovereign states of Cambodia and 
Bosnia where the IT A has been of a more partial or limited nature (international 
governmental authority has been concerned with certain matters and has operated in 
a complex dynamic with domestic government). There is, though, a common theme 
of reconstruction without an independently effective domestic government. It is this 
common theme that leads one to expect a degree of commonalty in the approach 
taken to political independence and the attendant values. 
The second section of this chapter surveys each of the examples in turn to identify 
the extent to which the ITA can be read as consistent with the right to political 
independence. This involves consideration of the context, legal justification, and 
nature of the ITA. The rest of the chapter deals with how the approaches to 
reconstruction across the examples position the practice in relation to political 
independence and the attendant UN system values of self-detennination and 
international peace. 
The main argument is that, while there are variations in the level of consistency 
with the right to political independence, none of the examples represent sufficient 
consistency with political independence to satisfy the values of self-detennination 
and international peace. In this respect, it is argued that democracy. as a prominent 
aim of reconstruction, is an essential element for accommodation of the value of self-
detennination and the engendering of international acceptance. It is further argued 
that the lack of a legal concept of democracy makes the portrayal of consistency with 
the value of self-detennination less convincing. This is because of the lack of scope 
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for regulation and accountability to ensure the genuine rule by the people that 
democracy promises. 
Other recent examples of ITA in the divided city of Mostar in Bosnia, and Eastern 
Slavonia (Danube Region of Croatia) are not addressed. lbis is because the contexts , 
a divided city within a state and facilitation of a peaceful transfer of territory from 
one state to another, make issues related to the right to political independence less 
prominent, and, consequently, less significant for the UN system than in the 
examples to be addressed.8 Another example that is often cited in relation to IT A is 
the transition to independence of Namibia. For Namibia, however, while ITA was 
proposed, the UN never actually went beyond an advisory role.9 The main reason 
older examples, such as the League of Nations administration of the Free City of 
Danzig (1920 - 1939) or the German Saar Basin (1920 - 1935), are not addressed is 
that at this time the only right to political independence was that of states. Thus an 
impact on the right to political independence would not be expected to be seen as so 
significant for the international society of states as it would be today, when the 
people's right to political independence, with its stronger ethical pedigree, is also at 
stake. 10 
A further point of clarification relates to the distinction between assistance and 
administration. In practice, because assistance can be so comprehensive, it is not 
always clear whether the assistors are actually the administrators. 11 The lack of local 
governance capabilities in Afghanistan, following the international intervention in 
2001, coupled with comprehensive international assistance is a clear example. In 
light of this, Chesterman, in his study on key policy issues confronting what he terms 
international transitional administrations, includes examples where the international 
actors are not formally, at least, the administrators under the banner of 'transitional 
administrative-like powers' .12 It is, however, an important distinction for this study 
to maintain. This is because the choice to pursue assistance rather than direct 
8 See S. Chestennan, You the People: The United Nations. Transitional Administration. and State 
Building (2004) 70 -72 (Eastern Slavonia), 77 -78 (Mostar). 
9 See J. S. Kreilkamp • UN Postconflict Reconstruction'. (2003) Journal of International Law and 
Politics 619 a 624. 
10 See N. Bennan, "'But the Alternative is Despair": European Nationalism and the Modernist 
Renewal ofInternational Law', (1993) 8 Harvard Law Review 1792 at 1874-1893. discussing such 
examples in relation to self-detennination of peoples as a political principle. 
\I See also Wilde. op. cit., til. 1. p. 585. 
12 Chestennan. op. cit .• fn. 8. p. 83. 
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administration appears in itself as a means of projecting greater consistency with the 
right to political independence; such examples are addressed in Chapter 6. 
2. The Consistency of ITA with Political Independence 
If the law of occupation is applicable in a given situation this indicates that the 
international presence is not consistent with the right to political independence and 
therefore must be regulated in its administration of the territory. In none of the four 
examples of ITA addressed by this study has the law of occupation applied, and one 
struggles to fmd a commentator addressing the consistency with the right to political 
independence. This is despite that governance without an independently effective 
domestic government, primarily because of a lack of objective attachment to the will 
of the target state and its people, is better presumed inconsistent than consistent with 
the right to political independence. To form a view on the extent of consistency with 
the right to political independence, along with its relevance for the particular 
situation, this section explores the context, legal basis, and nature of ITA, in each of 
the four noted examples of ITA from this perspective. 
A. Cambodia 
Cambodia gained independence from France, for the second time,13 at the end of 
1953:4 The political history of Cambodia since then has been described as 'a 
struggle among factions and visions of order ... contested by different sectors of 
Cambodian society and supported from time to time by foreign powers.' IS ITA was 
introduced in 1991 as part of the peacemaking process that sought to bring the main 
factions together and end the conflict that plagued Cambodia, to varying degrees, 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.16 The lack of earlier international efforts to bring 
the factions together is explained by the connection between the conflict and the 
Cold War. 
13 See D. Chandler, 'The Political Dynamics of the Peacemaking Process in Cambodia', in M. W. 
Doyle, I. Johnstone, and R. C. Orr. (eds.), Keeping the Peace - Multidimensional UN Operations in 
Cambodia and EI Salvador (1997) 25 at 25. 
14 Chandler, Ope cit .• fn. 13. p. 31. I' Chandler, Ope cit., fn. 13, p. 25. 
16 See J. A. Tully. A Short History a/Cambodia: From Empire to Sun'ival (2006). 
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In 1978, the Vietnamese communists invaded. By 1979 they had gained control of 
most of Cambodia, ruling through a government known as the People ~ s Republic of 
Kampuchea (PRK).17 While the Soviet bloc supported the incumbent PRK 
government, the US, China, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
supported the factions that had coalesced along the Thai border!8 These joined 
together, with international encouragement, and were internationally recognised as 
the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).19 
A series of internationally sponsored peace conferences, involving the factions 
and a variety of international actors, eventually led to the 1991 Paris Agreements, 
which set out the terms for peace,20 including ITA. Given the context of long-tenn 
conflict, with a significant international commitment on both sides already, it is easy 
to understand how a solution which did not accord with the right to political 
independence might be entertained by all those involved. As Cambodia is a whole 
sovereign state, however, the right of political independence is not easily evaded. 
Accordingly, efforts to minimise neglect and maintain consistency, if the 
international actors are still committed to the values of self-determination and 
international peace that underpin the legal protection afforded political independence 
in the normal run of things, would be expected. Some evidence of this is found in 
both the nature of the IT A and its legal justification. 
As was noted in Chapter 2, while both a SC chapter VII resolution and state 
consent can preclude the wrongfulness of international involvement in the internal 
affairs of a state, it is state consent that better reconciles the practice with the right to 
political independence. The extent to which this is possible, as was argued in 
Chapter 2, depends on the level of independent effective control that the source of 
consent possesses. It is only upon state consent that the ITA, and international 
involvement surrounding it, was legally justified in Cambodia.21 
17 Chandler, op. cit., fn. 13, p. 48 and p. 50; see also S. R. Ratner, 'The Cambodia Settlement 
Agreements', (1993) 87 AJIL 1 at 3 and 7; N. SuntharaJingam, 'The Cambodian Settlement 
Agreements', in M. W. Doyle, I. Johnstone, and R. C. Orr. (eds.), Keeping the Peace-
Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and EI Salvador (1997) 82 at 86. 
18 See J. Song, 'The Political Dynamics of the Peacemaking Process in Cambodia' in M. W. Doyle. l. 
Johnstone, and R. C. Orr. (eds.), Keeping the Peace - Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia 
and EI Salvador (1997) 53 at 54. 
19 See Suntharalingam, op. cit., fn. 17, p. 86. 
20 See Song, op. cit., fn. 18. 
21 The process was, though, endorsed in SC Res. 668 (1990). 
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Although there was a not a complete lack of effective control on the territory, the 
context meant that there was a need for ingenuity to identify a source of consent that 
satisfied the interested actors, domestic and international. At the time, the State of 
Cambodia (SOC) (formerly PRK), retained control of somewhere around 80% of the 
territory.22 That this control was sustained through significant Vietnamese support 
helps to explain why there was considerably more international recognition of the 
CODK?3 With neither side of the international groupings confident that they had 
both a politically legitimate and legally entitled to consent government, 24 the 
Supreme National Council (SNC), consisting of the two governments, was created as 
a source of consent.25 The SNC was not recognised as the government; both sides 
still maintained that they were the government. 26 Rather the SNC was treated and 
recognised as the embodiment of Cambodian sovereignty, and permitted to represent 
Cambodia externally during the transitional period.27 
While better than no consent, one factor which undermines the consent of the SNC 
as an authentic expression of the will of the state and its people is that the factions 
with significantly less control of the territory were given an equal say in the SNC. 
Also, those with control of the territory, the SOC, were heavily dependent on 
Vietnamese support. Further, as the international recognition of SNC competence 
appears to be inextricably linked to the factions acceptance of an agreement 
acceptable to the international parties at the Paris negotiations,28 a lack of SNC 
autonomy in the decision making process is implied. One is therefore hardly 
reassured that international involvement is reconciled with the right to political 
independence by means of consent. 
If the arrangements for governance during the transitional period were consistent 
with the right to political independence, through being an authentic expression of the 
will of the state and its people, this would remedy concerns about the legal basis for 
22 Suntharalingam, op. cit., fn. 17, p. 86; Chandler, op. cit., fn. 13, pp. 49-52; see also M. W. Doyle. 
UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNT A C IS Civil Mandate (1995) 17 who suggests 90 percent of 
territory; E. Uphoff Kato, 'Quick Impact, Slow Rehabilitation', in M. W. Doyle, I. Johnstone, and R. 
C. Orr, (eds.), Keeping the Peace - Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and EI Salvador 
(1997) 186 at 186 who suggests 75-80 percent control of the territory. 
23 See Suntharalingam, op. cit., fn. 17, p. 86; Chandler, op. cit., fn. 13. pp. 49-52; Ratner, op. cit .. fn. 
17, p. 9 note 45. 
24 See Ratner. op. cit., fn. 17, p. 9. 
2.S 1991 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Senlem~nt of the ~ambodia Co~flict [hereinafter 
1991 Comprehensive Settlement Agreement]. Part 1, Section I, Article I and Artlcle 6. 
26 Ratner. op. cit., fn. 17. p. 10. 
27 Ratner, op. cit., th. 17, p. 11. 
21 See Ratner op. cit .. th. 17. p. 40. 
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international involvement and the reconstruction pursued during the transitional 
period. The makeup of ITA in Cambodia as partial, governance was shared between 
the SNC and the UN, helps to portray greater consistency with the right to political 
independence.29 This is because it suggests at least some correlation between 
governance and the will of the state and its people. However, a complex and far from 
transparent formula for the distribution of authority between the domestic and 
international,30 and a tendency for considerable diplomatic pressure being exerted 
over the decision making of the SNC,31 do not serve to convince that such a 
correlation was a reality. Moreover, both the SNC and the UN relied upon a 
substantial international military presence for effective control of the territory. 32 This 
removed the traditional basis for identification of a government as an authentic 
embodiment of the will of the state its people in international law, and thus 
undermines the consistency with the right to political independence, which the 
domestic element in the government suggests. 
B. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bosnia consists of three main ethnic groups, the Bosniacs (Muslim), Bosnian-Croats, 
and Bosnian-Serbs.33 The process of disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFRY), 1991 - 1992, brought the tensions between these groups to 
the forefront. 34 A European Community (BC) mediator sought to liase between these 
main groups in Bosnia to seek agreement on the future of the republic.3s The Bosnia-
Serbs wanted to keep the SFRY together.36 But in an EC supervised referendum on 
independence, on 29 February and 1 March 1992, without the participation of the 
29 See SC Res. 745 (1992) para. 2; Report of the Secretary General on Cambodia UN Doc. SI23613, 
19 February 1992; UNTAC, 'Final Report of the Civil Administrative Component' Phom Penh, 
September 16, 1993, pp. 1-37. 
30 See 1991 Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, Annex 1, Section A, para. 2(a), (d) and (e) and 
~ara. 2(c) and (d); see also Ratner, op. cit., fn. 17, p. 12. 
I Doyle, op. cit., fn. 22, p. 27; see also L. Keller, 'UNT AC in Cambodia - from Occupation, Civil 
War and Genocide to Peace', (2005) Max Planck UNYB 127 at 161. 
32 See 1991 Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, Annex 1, Section C. 
33 M. Cox, The Making of the Bosnian State: International Law and the Authority of the International 
Community (2002) (unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Cambridge) 90; see also Zaum. op. cit .. th. 6, p. 89. 
34 See J. Gow, 'One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1993) 2 Jane's Intelligence Re\';ew 1 at 
I; R. Caplan, Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia (2005) 124-125. 
3~ See Economist. 7 March 1992, p52; D. TUrk, 'Remarks Concerning the Breakup of the Former 
Yugoslavia', (1993) 3 Transnat'lL. & Con/emp. Probs. 50. . 
36 Caplan, op. cit., th. 34, p. 126, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) held a referendum of Bosnlan-
Serbs on 9-10 November 1991 at which they decided to live in a single state. 
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Serb population, a majority voted for independence.37 This led the EC, despite the 
lack of Bosnian-Serb participation, to recognise BiH as an independent state (the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), from 7 April 1992.38 Belgrade refused to 
recognise the independence of Bosnia. However, admission to the UN soon 
followed, helping to confmn the status of BiH as sovereign state.39 This was despite 
the obvious difficulties of the government in exercising control of the whole 
territory, particularly after the Serbs, with support from Belgrade, prior to 
recognition, had abandoned their role in governance of the republic and began 
making moves towards the partition of BiH.40 
Over the subsequent three and a half years, from the point of international 
recognition of statehood, in the context of a war with internal and external aspects, 
Yugoslav and Croatian forces continued to operate on Bosnian territory. and areas 
aspiring to breakaway - the Republic of Srpska and the Bosnian Republic of Herzeg-
Bosna - engaged in what Cox describes as 'systematic ethnic cleansing of territory 
under its control' .41 The international actors who were instrumental in the realisation 
of the legal status of statehood received heavy criticism for not doing more to ensure 
that Bosnia could function as a peaceful state.42 A desire to put an end to the blood 
bath, which the international actors might be seen as in part responsible for, suggests 
a likely willingness to entertain a solution not entirely consistent with the right to 
political independence. Still, as a sovereign state, the right to political independence 
is prominent, and efforts to minimise neglect and maintain consistency with the right 
to political independence, as with Cambodia, would be expected. Again, some 
evidence of this is found in both the nature of the ITA and its legal justification. 
It was not until 1995 that the international actors decided to change approach and 
become particularly pro-active in attempting to improve conditions in the Bosnian 
37 TUrk, op. cit., fn. 35, p. 55. 
38 Caplan, op. cit., fn. 34, p. 120. 
39 The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted as a Member of the UN by GA Res. 461237, 
(22 May 1992); the ICJ considered admission to the UN to be definitive evidence of stateh~ see 
Application o/the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o/the Crime o/Genocide. 
Preliminary Objections, Judgment. ICJ Reports 1996, p. 595 at p. 611: . ., 
40 Caplan, op. cit., fn. 34, p. 124; TUrk. op. cit., fn. 35, p. 54, 'In Bosma-Herzegovma the situation was 
much more difficult [than in Croatia or Slovenia] and every reader of newspapers knew that the 
"overnment in Sarajevo did not have effective control over the territory of the country.' 
I Cox, op. cit., fn. 33, p. 88. . 
42 See M. Weller. 'The International Response to the Dissolution to the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia', (1992) 86 AJIL 60 1; Caplan, op. cit., fn. 34, p. 133. 
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state.
43 
The conflict was ended with the Dayton Agreement of November 1995. 
which set out the terms for peace, including an element of ITA. 44 
As with the Paris Agreements, there is no legal basis in a chapter VII resolution, 
the legal basis is found in the consent of the warring factions.45 A number of factors 
affect the level of reconciliation with the right to political independence that the 
consensual basis for the international involvement suggests. The fact that, of the 
three ethnic groups, only the Bosniacs, as the dominant group in the internationally 
recognised government of Bosnia, signed the actual agreement is not as significant 
as it might seem.46 This is because representatives of all three groups were involved 
in the negotiations and signed the annexes,47 which set out the key arrangements for 
the transitional period, including the international involvement.48 More pressing is 
the fact that what control of the territory each group had varied in light of the war 
context,49 and was severely affected by the persistent military support from Croatian 
and Serbian forces. 50 Moreover, the negotiation procedure at Dayton was hardly free 
of impediment on the autonomy of the representatives of the groups. The Bosnian-
Serb aspect was dominated by the FRY, with which the delegation was paired. 5 I This 
saw the Bosnia-Serb grouping refuse to initial several of the Dayton instruments, 
(initials which were gained several days later from an American visit to Pale). 52 And, 
the Croatian President, Tudjman, is said to have overruled certain objections of 
43 See Cox, op. cit., fn. 33, p. 89. 
44 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GF AP), initialled at 
Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, (1996) 35 ILM75; for an 
account of proceedings see C. Bildt, Peace Journey (1998), ChiefEU negotiator in Bosnia from 1995. 
45 SC Res. 1031 (1995) para. 26 merely endorsed the Dayton Agreement. 
46 Interestingly, in the absence of effective control of the territory, the ICJ has used the international 
acceptance of Izetbegovic as the representative of Bosnia for the purpose of signing the Dayton 
agreements, as evidence of status as the government in an international legal sense, Genocide case, 
of.' cit., fn. 39, pp. 621-2. 
4 These, for the most part, take the form of agreements between the Government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the two entities which are to constitute it: Republika Srpska and the BH Federation. 
48 See, for an overview of the changes introduced, K. Oellers Frahm, 'Restructuring Bosnia-
Herzegovina: A Model with Pitfalls', (2005) 9 Max Planck UNYB 179 at 189-194. 
49 Fox notes that on the eve of Dayton the Bosnian Serbs 'controlled approximately seventy percent of 
Bosnian territory, acquired through a series of ethnic cleansing campaigns' Fox, op. cit., fn. 6, p. 77; 
Oellers-Frahm notes how 'Croat and Bosnian forces had regained considerable parcels of territory lost 
to the Serbs and in early October 1995 they controlled again about 51 per cent of Bosnian territory'. 
Oellers Frahm, op. cit., fn. 48, p. 187. 
50 See B. Magas and I. Zanic, The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Henegovina 1991-J 995 (200 1) 131-
236. 
51 Certain concessions made by FRY on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs were kept secret from the 
Bosnian Serb representative, in particular the ceding of some territory. Bildt. op. cit .. fn. 44, p. 151; 
see also Cox, op. cit., fn. 33, p. 90. 
52 P. Szasz. 'The Dayton Accord: The Balkan Peace Agreement'. (1997) 30 Cornel/International 
Law Journal 759 at 763, at Pale more pressure was exerted and promises made to gain the consent. 
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Bosnian-Croats.s3 Moreover, the fact that the various groups were kept separate. \\ith 
US negotiators moving between them with texts that the US had prepared. is a cause 
for doubt about the extent that the parties truly agreed on the meaning of key terms. S4 
Furthermore, it was a UN authorised NATO air campaign, and the conditions 
required for its suspension, that paved the way for the peace settlement. 55 This, while 
not affecting the validity of consent in the framework of the VCLT,56 casts further 
doubts on the level of autonomy in the negotiating position of the Bosnian-Serbs. In 
light of these factors, the consent struggles to reassure in terms of consistency with 
the right to political independence. 
Again, as with Cambodia, the nature of the governance arrangement is a potential 
means for addressing neglect of political independence. Dayton foresaw governance 
by a set of elected domestic institutions of government. 57 In relation to which. it 
appeared that the central element of international governance, the Office of the High 
Representative (OHR), had largely an oversight role.58 However, when the reality of 
the political and security situation did not follow what was expected, the OHR, in 
1997, re-interpreted its prerogative and assumed a much greater governance role.59 
With the re-interpretation of its powers, endorsed by the Peace Implementation 
Council (PIC),60 it assumed a much greater set of administrative powers, placing it as 
an authority above the domestic government when the government was unable to 
reach agreement, as well as a host of other powers.61 While a loose oversight role 
for international actors in the decision making process appears far less offensive to 
political independence than the latter situation, neither arrangement, in terms of 
traditional legal doctrine, ensures consistency with political independence. This is 
because both the domestic and international aspects of the administration have been 
53 Cox, op. cit., fit. 33, pp. 90-91. 
54 See Oellers-Frahm, op. cit., fu. 48. 
55 Operation Deliberate Force, 30 August 1995, see E. Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations (2006) 
252; Oellers-Frahm, op. cit., fu. 48, p. 187: N. D. White, Keeping the Peace (1997) 99. 
56 See VCLT, Articles 52 and 75; see Milano, op. cit .. fu. 55, p. 252. 
57 See GFAP, Annex 3 (preamble). 
58 Zaum, op. cit., fu. 6, p. 83. 
59 Zaum, op. cit., fit. 6, p. 83. 
60 The PIC is the 55 states and international organisations that attended the December 1 ~5 . 
conference on Bosnia. which. through a steering board, designates the High Representative and gives 
~licy guidance. 
I Zaum, op. cit., fit. 6. p. 83. 
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heavily dependent on a substantial NATO military presence for effective control of 
the territory. 62 
c. Kosovo 
Kosovo, unlike Bosnia, was a provmce, not a republic, in the constitutional 
framework for the SFR Y. The distinction between republic and province in the 
SFR Y constitution related to the ethnic origin of the popUlation. As the majority in 
Kosovo was Albanian, a nationality with a homeland outside of the SFR Y. Kosovo 
was not entitled to apply to be recognised as a state by the EC, which only 
considered recognition of republics.63 This was despite Kosovo having enjoyed 
almost all the prerogatives ofa republic.64 Subsequently, in the words of Caplan, "[a] 
combination of repressive measures by Belgrade and a campaign of non-violent 
resistance by the Kosovo Albanian leadership had kept a lid on unrest [reduction in 
the degree of autonomy was a major source of unrest] for nearly eight years since the 
breakup of Yugoslavia. ,65 International attention returned to Kosovo when, over the 
course of 1997 and 1998, the violent activity by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
increased,66 and was met by a violent response from the Yugoslav security forces. 
The SC found the ensuing internal conflict to represent a threat to international 
peace and security.67 An arms embargo was imposed under chapter VII.68 SC 
Resolution 1199 called for a ceasefire. A deal for the cease fire was made, along with 
agreements allowing for an OSCE observer mission to oversee compliance with the 
ceasefire, and a NATO air verification mission.69 However, the cease fire did not 
hold, and, after initial violations by the KLA, Yugoslav forces in the village of 
Racak massacred 45 civilians.7o It was on 24 March 1999, that NATO, without an 
explicit SC chapter VII mandate, began bombing FRY. The NATO campaign lasted 
62 See Milano, op. cit., fn. 55, p. 207. 
63 See EC Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union (December 1991). 
64 See Caplan, op. cit., fn. 34, p.138. 
65 Caplan, op. cit., fn. 34, p. 138; see also N. Malcolm, Kosovo: a Short History (1998) 
66 See Caplan, op. cit., fn. 34. pp. 141-145. 
67 SC Res. 1160 (1998) para. 2 condemned the 'use of excessive force by Serbian police forces 
:lainst civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as acts of terrorism by the KLA.· 
SC Res. 1160 (1998) para. 8. 
69 Agreement on the OCSE Kosovo Verification Mission, 16 October 1998, S! 1998 '278; K VM 
Agreement Between NATO and the FRY, 15 October 1998. S/I998/991. 
70 See Independent International Commission on Kosovo. The Kosovo Report: Conflict. International 
Responses. Lessons Learned (2000). 
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until 9 June 1999. Its end coincided with the agreement of FRY - the Kumanovo 
Agreement - to withdraw its forces from Kosovo and the deployment of a NA TO-
led force. 71 A day later, by Resolution 1244, a UN led ITA was mandated for 
Kosovo. At the date of the introduction of ITA, Kosovo, unlike Cambodia or Bosnia, 
was not considered a sovereign state. Rather it was part of a sovereign state, the 
FRY. This context introduces some uncertainty with respect to the right to political 
independence. 
As part of the FRY, Kosovo' s right to political independence is presumed to rest 
with the government of the FRY. However, a number of factors challenge this 
presumption. In light of the safeguard clause in the GA Res. 2625 statement on the 
right to self-determination,72 one might argue that, through the merciless campaign 
against Kosovo, the FRY government proved themselves to not be representative 
and so not competent to speak for the rights of Kosovo and people.73 Moreover, the 
FRY was clearly struggling to exert control over Kosovo, and this is a challenge to 
the attachment of the FRY government to the will of the people on that part of its 
territory. Arguably determinative of the approach that should be taken in respect to 
the right to political independence is that the future status of Kosovo is at the heart of 
the conflict. Thus, while both sides have claim to the right to political independence, 
to prefer one side would be to prejudge the outcome. Accordingly, Kosovo and FRY 
should have been seen as sharing the right to political independence, with attempts 
made to accommodate the wishes of both sides in relation to how the territory is 
administered and changed and developed. 
Following the NATO bombing, at least the NATO states appeared inextricability 
involved in the search for a lasting end to the conflict. This desire to end the conflict, 
and uncertainty surrounding the right to political independence suggest that 
consistency with the right to political independence might not have been seen as 
relevant as in the cases of Cambodia and Bosnia. The arrangements for ITA and its 
legal justification support this view. 
71 Military-Technical Agreement between the International Security .Force ~OR) and ~e 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. Signed ID Kumanovo. 
~YROMacedonia) 9 June 1999, in (1999) 38lLM 1217. 
See Chapter 1 and 3 of this study. 
73 For this argument in relation to a right to secession, see C. Tomuscha~ 'Yugoslavia's Damage~ 
Sovereignty over the Province of Kosovo" , in G. Kreijen (ed.). Siale. Sovereignty. and Internal/onal 
Governance (2002) 323 at 342. 
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Notwithstanding certain complexities with regards the military presence,74 chapter 
VII Resolution 1244 is commonly seen as the total legal basis for the UN-led 
territorial administration as well as the NATO-led KFOR security presence.75 As set 
out in Chapter 2, a chapter VII resolution does not reconcile activity with the right to 
political independence. There are elements of consent in relation to both the Kosovo 
and the FRY claim to political independence. These suggest a greater consistency 
with political independence than a chapter VII resolution alone. However, there are 
significant factors that reduce the relevance for the maintenance of political 
independence. 
FRY consent is found in the acceptance of points 1-9 of the general principles on a 
political solution to the Kosovo crisis, which had been adopted by the G-8 Foreign 
Ministers on 6 May 1999 (the St Petersberg Principles),76 accepted on 3 June 1999 
by the FRY (Ahtisaari Principles). 77 As the FRY agreed that the establishment of a 
UN civil presence was to be permitted to act under chapter VII in the manner 
decided by the SC,78 any regime created by the UN could readily be interpreted as 
consistent with the consent. But the consent was not gained in the normal run of 
things. The G8 states gained the consent of the FRY during a sustained bombing 
campaign by NATO. It was made clear that if FRY wanted the military action to 
stop, demands should be accepted.79 Leaving aside considerations of invalidity, this 
aspect clearly affects the idea of autonomous consent in relation to the 3 June 1999 
Agreement and, consequently, its ability to reconcile the involvement with the 
FRY's claim to the right to political independence. 80 
There was no explicit Kosovo consent to the ITA, which Resolution 1244 created. 
Resolution 1244 and the Ahtisarri Principles do both indicate genesis in light of the 
agreement for international involvement that Kosovo representatives, but not the 
74 See E. Milano, Security Council Action in the Balkans: Reviewing the Legality of Kosovo' s 
Territorial Status', (2003) 14 EJIL 999 at 1009. 
" For a detailed exploration of the legal basis of, in particular, the security presence see Milano, op. 
cit., fn. 55, pp. 237-265. 
76 The Petersberg Principles agreed to by the G8 Foreign Ministers at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 
1999, S/1999/516, Annex I to SC Res. 1244; see also Tomuschat, op. cit .. th. 73, p. 327. . 
77 The • Ahtisaari paper'. named after the Finnish President Martti ~tisaari -:vho: t.ogether With .. 
Russian envoy Victor Chemomyrdin presented to the Yugoslav PreSident MlloSIVIC the G8 position. 
S/ 1999/649 Annex 2 to SC Res 1244. 
7·3 June Agreement, UN Doc. S/I999/649, para. 2 and para. 5. 
79 Milano, op. cit .• th. 55, p. 244. 
10 The recent declaration of independence by Kosovo is addressed below. 
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ones from the FRY, had agreed to in February 1999 in Rambouillet, France.81 This 
draft agreement, negotiated with NATO air strikes looming, set out a solution 
including the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops, establishment of a NATO led security 
force, and a period of autonomy followed by the possibility of a vote on 
independence for KosovO.82 The type of international involvement agreed to was, 
however, considerably different to that which Resolution 1244 instigated. It looked 
much more akin to the model adopted in Bosnia, 83 and has even been suggested by 
some to have been imagined as an assistance rather than an IT A effort. 84 
Accordingly, consent at Rambouillet hardly removes concern about consistency of 
the ITA, created by Resolution 1244, with the Kosovo claim to the right to political 
independence. 
The actual arrangements for IT A in Kosovo continue the theme of less concern for 
political independence than in the sovereign states of Cambodia and Bosnia. 
Resolution 1244 granted the UN Secretary General a great deal of discretion in his 
authority to create and conduct the ITA of KosovO,85 which hardly suggests a 
concern for preservation of political independence. The Secretary General 
constituted the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) as a 
plenary international territorial administration, exercising 'all executive and 
legislative powers, including the administration of the judiciary' .86 It was based on a 
four pillar structure, including roles for the UNHCR, OCSE, and EU, with the SRSG 
the single head of the mission, and with each pillar headed by a Deputy SRSG.87 
Despite the fact that parallel Kosovar structures of governance had emerged, there 
was no direct role for the Kosovars in governance.88 This changed over time, with 
81 This is through the repeated phrase of 'taking full account of the Rambouillet Accords' . 
82 See M. Weller, 'The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo', (1999) 75 International Affairs 211. 
83 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self Government In Kosovo, Rambouillet, France - February 23, 
1999, Article V: Authority to Interpret 'The CIM [Chief of the Implementation Mission] shall be the 
final authority in theater regarding interpretation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement, and the 
Parties agree to abide by his determinations as binding on all Parties and persons.'. 
84 See Zaum, op. cit., fit. 6, p. 132. 
8S SC Res. 1244 (1999) para. 10. 
86 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo, UN Doc. 
S/19991779, 12 July 1999, paras. 35-9; this followed the more general suggestions on the authority to 
be assumed in Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999), UN Doc. Sl1999/672. 12 June 1999. para. 10. 
87 Report of the Secretary General. 12 July 1999, op. cit., fit. 86. paras. 43-108. 
88 See R. Caplan, International Governance o/War-Torn Territories - Rule and Reconstruction 
(2005) 93; M. Brand (The Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations 
CASIN), The Development o/Kosovo Institutions and the Transition 0/ A uthorityfro m l.J.VAflK to 
Local Self-Government (2003) 11. 
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more and more authority being transferred to Kosovar institutions of governance. 89 
These latter developments do not, though, remove the original complete lack concern 
for a domestic element in the IT A, which could have served to improve consistency 
with the right to political independence. 
D. East Timor 
F or centuries the island of Timor has been politically divided into two parts, an East 
and a West Timor. In 1946, following the end of Dutch colonial rule, West Timor 
became part of the newly independent Indonesia.9o East Timor was subject to 
Portuguese colonial rule, and the Portuguese continued to resist the UN GA' s 
declaration of East Timor as a non-self governing territory.91 The, eventual, 
Portuguese acceptance of the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination, 
in 1974, 92 unearthed divergent views on the best outcome for the territory amongst 
the East Timorese. On one side of the debate, and favouring independence, was 
Fretilin;93 on the other, was a coalition of pro-Indonesian parties dominated by the 
UDT, pursuing integration with Indonesia. 94 This disagreement, along with 
Portuguese withdrawal and Indonesian interference, fuelled a civil war, from which 
Fretilin are said to have controlled most of the territory.9S On 28 November 1975, 
Fretilin declared independence.96 A few days later, the pro-Indonesian parties 
declared independence and integration with Indonesia. Neither declaration gained 
international recognition.97 Following an invitation from the UDT, Indonesia 
invaded.98 The UN called on Indonesia to withdraw, but to no avail.99 As Indonesia 
gained more territorial control, through a provisional government, they established 
89 See, Brand, op. cit., fn. 88; C. P. M. Waters, 'Nationalising Kosovo's Ombudsperson', (2007) 12 
JCSL 139. 
90 See A. Cassese, Self-Determination 0/ Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (1995) 224. 
91 GA Res. 1542 (1960) para. 1. 
92 See I. Martin, Self-Determination in East Timor - The United Nations, the Ballot, and International 
Intervention (2001) 15. 
93 Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor. 
94 The Timorese Democratic Union. 
95 Martin, op. cit., fn. 92, p. 16. 
96 See E. Benvenisti, International Law o/Occupation (1993) 154. 
97 Zawn, op. cit., fn. 6, p. 182. 
98 M. Benzing, 'Midwifing a New State: The United Nations in East Timor' (2005) 9 Mat Planck 
UNYB 295 at 30 I. 
99 See SC Res. 384 (22 Dec 1975); SC Res. 389 (22 Apr 1976); GA Res. 3485 (xxx) (12 Dec 1975). 
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the un-elected Regional Popular Assembly.tOO In May 1976, the Assembly passed a 
resolution, in its only meeting, in favour of incorporation in Indonesia, from which 
point Indonesia treated East Timor as a self-determined province. tOt 
Many states remained silent, or offered vague statements, with respect to the 
actions of Indonesia. 102 The GA did, from 1975 until 1982, pass annual resolutions 
calling for Indonesia to withdraw, stressing the inalienable right of the people of East 
Timor to self-determination and expressing concern at the suffering that was caused 
by the ongoing conflict in East Timor. t03 From 1982, the Secretary General was 
given the mandate to help fmd a diplomatic solution to the problem; a progress 
report was then submitted to the GA each year. t04 An apparent thawing in the 
Indonesian position on East Timor's status in May 1999 paved the way for the East 
Timorese to vote on the question: 
Do you accept the proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia? 
OR 
Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor's 
separation from Indonesia?los 
The East Timorese chose the latter option, confident that it meant independence. 106 A 
period of UN administration would, though, precede independence. Thus East Timor 
was not yet a whole sovereign state at the time of the introduction of ITA. East 
Timor's actual status at this time relates to the relevance of the right to political 
independence in terms of the approach to ITA and reconstruction. 
100 Martin, 0p. cit., th. 92, p. 16; see also Cassese, op. cit., th. 90, p. 224. 
101 Cassese, op. cit., th. 90, p. 226. 
102 See Cassese, op. cit., th. 90, pp. 226 - 230; only Australia fonnally recognised the incorporation of 
East Timor, on the basis of the effective control that Indonesia came to exercise over the territory see 
(1987) to A flL 273. 
103 See GA Res. 31153 (1 Dec 1976); GA Res. 32/34 (28 Nov 1977); GA Res. 33/39 (13 Dec 1978); 
GA Res. 34/40 (21 Nov 1979); GA Res. 35127 (11 Nov 1980); GA Res. 36/50 (24 Nov 1981); East 
Timor (portugal v. Australia), Judgement, ICJ Reports 1995, p. 90 at pp. 96-7, paras. 14-16. 
104 GA Res. 37/30 (23 Nov 1982). 
lOS Annex II: Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese 
through a Direct Ballot, para. b; it was termed a 'popular consultation' rather than a 'referendum' as 
Indonesia felt the later implied an act of self-determination which for them had already occurred, 
Martin, op. cit., th. 92, p. 28. 
106 See the details which support this view provided in Wilde, op. cit., fn. 5, pp. 182-183, in particular. 
publicity material for the vote stressed that the choice was between autonomy within Indonesia or 
independence, '[t]he popular consultation is your chance to decide about East Timor's future. Every 
eligible person. no matter whether they want autonomy or independence. has the right to vote. Your 
vote is your choice.', (UNMAET Notice, 'To vote you need to register'. available at 
<www.un.orglpeace/etimor99/etimor.htm> . 
194 
Chapter XI of the UN Charter provides the regune for non-self governing 
territories. It sought to rein in colonial administration by requiring reports on non-
self governing territories, based on the principle that the interests of the inhabitants 
are paramount and that there is an obligation to promote self government. 107 In the 
period preceding the vote, Portugal remained listed as the administering power of 
East Timor as a non-self governing territory, and insisted on this basis that it was the 
sole entity entitled 'to speak on behalf of East Timor and to ensure the right of the 
East Timorese to self-determination.' 108 In such a context, East Timor is seen as part 
of Portugal, and thus it is with Portugal that the East Timor right to political 
independence rests. Up until the vote, then, there would be reason to accept that 
consent from Portugal would suffice to reconcile international involvement with the 
right to political independence. This is despite the Indonesian efforts, through 
military coercion and unrepresentative declarations of independence, to suggest that 
East Timor was part of Indonesia. l09 Nonetheless, the fact that they held effective 
control of the territory meant that in the interests of international peace there was a 
need to gain agreement from Indonesia to the granting of East Timor a vote on self-
government. 
In practice, Portugal and Indonesia transferred authority to the UN,110 and it was 
listed as a non-self governing territory with the UN as the administering power. III 
The implication being that the right to political independence now rested with the 
UN .112 However, following the vote, East Timor was destined for statehood. l13 This 
distinguishes East Timor from a normal self-governing territory where the future 
status is not known; the self-determining people had self-determined. The fact that 
they were not yet a state, by want of a formal declaration if one draws analogy with 
other states emerging following the end of colonial rule, should not be a bar to the 
possession of a right to decide on the change and development of the territorial 
107 See, for an overview of the concept, J. Crawfor~ Creation o/States in International Law (2006) 
602-637. 
108 Cassese, op. cit., fn. 90, p. 225. 
109 See G. Nettheim, 'International Law and International Politics' in J. Dunn (ed.), International Law 
and the Question 0/ East Timor (1995) 181. 
110 See J. Chopra, 'The UN's Kingdom of East Timor'. (2000) 42 Survival 27 at 29. 
111 C. Stahn. 'The United Nations Transitional Administration in Kosovo and East Timor: A First 
Analysis', (2001) 5 Max Planck UNYB 105 at 115. 
112 Chopra thus refers to East Timor a.s UN sovereign territo?, ~hopra. op: cil .. fn. 110, pp. ~9-30; 
see, though, on the view that the UN In not expected to acquire tItle to temtory. Stahn, op. cll .• fn. 
III. p. 144; I. Brownlie, Principles o/Public International Law (2003) 167. 
113 See preamble para. 3 of SC Res. 1272 (1990). 
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infrastructure - a core facet of the right to self-determination. After all, it was not the 
people that decided that official independence should be delayed pending a period of 
ITA. The international actors should therefore have sought, in the approach to ITA. 
to maintain consistency with East Timorese political independence. 
The central role of the UN Secretary General in getting things to the point where 
independence from Indonesia became a possibility clearly helps to explain the 
commitment at the UN to realise a successful outcome, in terms of an independently 
effective East Timor through ITA. This commitment, coupled with the uncertainty 
surrounding the status of East Timor subsequent to the vote, and during IT A, 114 is 
reason to suspect less concern for the maintenance of political independence than in 
other situations where the location of a right to political independence is more firmly 
established. Another reason is found in the need for far greater international 
involvement than had been anticipated. This was a result of devastation inflicted on 
the existing infrastructure in East Timor by pro-integration militia and Indonesian 
military forces, liS following the vote to reject autonomy within Indonesia. 116 As this 
only became apparent after the vote, it left little time for the planning that could help 
maintain political independence. The arrangements for IT A and its legal basis 
support the view that maintenance of political independence was far from prioritised. 
It was the restoration of security by an Indonesian requested,117 chapter VII 
authorised Australian-led multinational force (INTERFET),118 which paved the way 
for ITA. By Resolution 1272, acting under chapter VII, the SC created UNTAET. 119 
A chapter VII basis does not reconcile activity with the right to political 
independence. In relation to Portuguese and Indonesian claims to the right to 
political independence, the broad consent in the May 5th Agreement to a UN role in 
114 Wilde prefers either that it was still part of Portugal or a 'fonn of sui generis legal personality as a 
non-state territorial entity that was to become a state within a finite period', R. Wilde, 'International 
Territorial Administration and Human Rights' in N. D. White and D. Klassen (eds.), The UN, Human 
Rights and Post-Conflict Situations (2005) 149 at 168. 
liS See J. Chopra, 'Building State Failure in East Timor', (2002) 33 Development and Change 979 at 
983 describing the three week campaign triggered by the vote 'Operation Clean Sweep'; members of 
UNMAET described the violence as 'nothing less than a systematic implementation of a 'scorched 
earth' policy in East Timor, under the direction of the Indonesian military', UN Doc. S/1999/976, 
Annex, para. 1.: see also Martin. op. cit., tn. 92, p. 115: Zaum, op. cit., tn. 6, p. 185. 
1161n the popular consultation, 98.6% of registered voters participated and 78.5% of those rejected 
autonomy, Progress Report of the Secretary General, Question of East Timor. Al54/654 (13 Dec 
1999), paras. 30-31; see also J. C. Beauvais. 'Benevolent Depotism: A Critique of UN State-Building 
in East Timor'. (2001) 33/4 NYU Journal for International Law and Politics 1101 at 1121. 
117 See Chestennan. op. cit .• fn. 8, p. 63. 
III SC Res. 1264 (1999): see also Martin. op. cit., fn. 92. p. 115. 
119 SC Res. 1272 (25 October 1999). 
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the event of rejection of autonomy in Indonesia is evidence of concern for the 
interests of these two stateS.120 This pertains despite that their consent was not 
directly referred to in the resolution or in subsequent regulations issued by 
UNTAET.121 
From the perspective of an East Timorese claim to political independence, the 
question put to the East Timorese was far from forthcoming about what would 
follow a rejection of autonomy within Indonesia. Certain publicity material did 
indicate the consequences of a rejection of autonomy within Indonesia as: "[t]he 
United Nations will oversee East Timor's transition towards Independence'. 122 
There is, though, little to suggest the nature of this transitional period or the change 
and development that would come with it. Moreover, in the process of establishing 
the ITA, the East Timorese were ignored. 123 This was despite that in the little 
planning that was undertaken by the UN prior to the actual consultation there had 
been some limited room for East Timor representation through consultation with the 
National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT).124 This lack of concern for East 
Timor claim to political independence is typified by the fact that East Timorese 
leaders had drawn up a proposal for a joint Timorese-UN administration and passed 
it to UNAMET,125 but it never came before the SC. 126 
The actual arrangements for ITA were similar to those in Kosovo, with the SRSG 
head of a pillared governance structure. 127 While, in contrast to Kosovo, there was 
greater specificity in the enabling resolution about the degree of authority that the 
120 Article 6, May 5th Agreement 1999, between Portugal, Indonesia, and the Secretary General 
indicated that should the option of rejecting special autonomy prevail '[t]he Secretary General shall .. 
. initiate the procedure enabling East Timor to begin a process of transition towards independence. '; 
this is arguably made more specific with the tripartite meeting of September 28 where the mandate of 
UNT AET was discussed between Portugal, Indonesia, and the Secretary General, see Report of the 
Secretary General on the Situation in East Timor, S/1999/1024, 4 October 1999, at 5 and 6; 
121 Consent from Indonesia and Portugal, as noted above, is not directly referred to in the Resolution. 
or in subsequent regulations issued by UNT AET, see lawn, op. cit., th. 6, p. 61. 
122 See Wilde, op. cit., th. 5, p. 183, citing poster entitled 'If you accept autonomy', UNAMET Posters 
for the self-determination consultation, <http://www.un.orglpeaceletimor99/etimor.htm>; see also 
preamble SC Res. 1272: 'and taking note of its [vote] outcome through which the East Timorese 
people expressed their clear wish to begin a process of transition under the authority of the United 
Nations towards independence'. 
123 See Chopra, op. cit., th. 115, p. 990. 
124 See S. Cliffe, 'The Joint Assessment Mission and Reconstruction of East Timor', in J. Fox and D. 
Babo-Soares (eds.), Out o/the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction o/East Timor (2000) 252 at 
252-253. 
125 The UN mission that arranged the vote. 
126 J. Steele, 'Nation Building in East Timor' (2002) World Policy Journal 76 at 79 citing Jose 
Ramos-Horta. East Timor's Foreign Minister. 
127 For the structure ofUNTAET, see laum, op. cit., fn. 6, p. 186. Figure 5. 1. 
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ITA would posses,128 and a much more centralised mission, including civilian and 
'1' d' gl 129 ml ltary presence un er a sm e command, there was the same lack of a domestic 
element in the governance arrangements. Zaum identifies that the requirement of 
consultation with the East Timorese as part of UNT AET's mandate, in Resolution 
1272 para. 8, 'underlines the UN's commitment to East Timorese self-
d .., 130 On eterminatton. e cannot pretend, however, that such a loose requirement 
represented anything more than a gesture, especially not when contrasted with the 
degree of commitment that an authoritative position in government for the East 
Timorese would have represented. The subsequent moves towards greater domestic 
involvement in the IT A do not affect the initial lack of concern for political 
independence which the governance arrangements displayed. 
E. Evaluation 
In all the examples there are aims that could lead international actors to attempt to 
move beyond the confines of respect for political independence. These are conditions 
in which one might expect there to be a need for new law to protect the values that 
are important for the UN system, and ensured in the normal run of things by the 
preservation of the right to political independence. The need for such law may, 
though, be avoided by attempts to maintain consistency with political independence 
or, indeed, attempts to accommodate the attendant values of self-determination and 
international peace. 
In Cambodia and Bosnia, the right to political independence was more prominent 
than in relation to situations that led to the introduction of ITA in Kosovo and East 
Timor. This was because there was little doubt that the former two were whole 
sovereign states, and the right to political independence is a key attribute of 
sovereignty. In the latter situations, political independence was still affected by the 
introduction of ITA. However, uncertainty about the location of the right to political 
independence, amongst other factors, means that evasion of its maintenance is more 
susceptible to international acceptance. For, at least. the reason that it does not 
threaten to introduce a precedent for action that is inconsistent with the right of 
128 SC Res. 1272 (25 October 1999) para. 1; Benzing, op. cit., fn. 98. p. 320. 
129 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in East Timor.' UN document S/19991l02~. ~ 
October 1999. para. 27: see also laum.op. cit .. fn. 6, p. 185. 
130 laum, op. cit., fn. 6, p. 184. 
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political independence of a whole sovereign state. This difference, in respect of the 
prominence of political independence, helps to explain the differences in relation to 
the nature of the ITA and its legal basis across the examples. The focus on consent 
and inclusion of significant domestic aspects in the arrangements for IT A in the two 
whole sovereign states (Cambodia and Bosnia) is an attempt to maintain political 
independence of the target state. This is in contrast to the approach in the non-whole 
sovereign states (Kosovo and East Timor) where the emphasis was on the chapter 
VII basis and no need was felt, initially, for a domestic element in the ITA. That 
political independence, nonetheless, retained significance in these two latter 
examples is supported by the efforts that were made to seek consent from domestic 
elements. The seeking of consent in all the examples also suggests a lack of 
relevance for the concept of suspended sovereignty, which describes a situation 
where sovereign rights are not present for a temporary period of time, 131 as a means 
of encapsulating these realities. 
In terms of realising consistency with political independence, all the examples fall 
short because of the lack of an independently effective domestic government to serve 
as a source of consent to the international involvement or to administer the territory 
during the transitional period. Similarly, one struggles to see the consensual aspects 
or the domestic elements in the IT A as a comprehensive explanation for the 
international acceptance of the practice addressed. 
If it was just administration of the territory, while still an infringement of the right 
to political independence, one might be more willing to accept the justification of the 
pursuit of international peace as sufficient. This is because the idea of international 
actors filling an authority vacuum can more readily be seen as being in the interests 
of international peace than when coupled with a reconstruction mandate. In the 
former, the impact on right to political independence is only for the period that the 
international actors remain. A reconstruction mandate, however, is more distant in 
terms of international peace; there is certainly no immediate benefit for peace. 
Further, it represents the actual exercise of the right to political independence. 
meaning it has a permanent impact on the right to political independence. 
Accordingly, the reconstruction aspect is not only less securely attached to the 
131 For discussion of the contemporary relevance of the concept of suspended sovereignty in 
international law, see A. Yannis, 'The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law and Its 
Implications in International Politics', (2002) 13 EJIL 1037. 
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pursuit of international peace but also represents a more substantial infringement of 
the value of self-determination. It is this latter aspect, which also affects the value of 
international peace, that is most problematic when contemplating comprehensive 
explanation for international acceptance. Such acceptance, it is premised, would not 
have been forthcoming for reconstruction by ITA had there not been more 
convincing efforts to address the value of self-determination than this section has 
revealed. 
3. Reconstruction by ITA 
In light of the findings of the last section, similarities with the position of ITA and 
belligerent occupiers, addressed in Chapter 4, are apparent. This is in the sense of the 
lack of attachment to the will of the state and the people that would allow the 
administrators to reconstruct in a manner consistent with the right to political 
independence. The law of occupation responds to the foreign nature of the occupier 
by severely curtailing what can be changed and developed. However, in all the 
examples of ITA, reconstruction of the state and civil infrastructure is undertaken. 
Given the fact of international acceptance, it is necessary to consider attempts to 
reduce further impact on the right to political independence. This would help to 
move towards consistency with the value of self-determination, but it would not 
address the impact that the ITA in itselfhas been argued to represent. Accordingly, it 
is also necessary to consider additional attempts to accommodate the values of self-
determination and international peace as explanation for international acceptance. 
A. Reconstruction and Political Independence 
Across all the examples, conflict, amongst other factors, introduced a need for 
reconstruction of the state and civil infrastructure. A survey of the examples reveals 
varying levels of reconstruction being undertaken. The essence of each approach 
correlates with the importance that would likely be accorded to the right to political 
independence, set out above. 
In relation to Cambodia the approach to reconstruction was the most deferent to 
political independence. The essence of the reconstruction aspects of the transitional 
period can be found in the Declaration on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of 
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Cambodia attached to the Paris Agreements. This set out a series of principles on 
how reconstruction should have occurred. It stresses that "[t]he main responsibility 
for deciding Cambodia's reconstruction needs and plans should rest with the 
Cambodian people and government formed after free and fair elections.' 131 
Accordingly, while UNTAC's mandate indicated a role in a range of areas, such as 
co-ordinating with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
the repatriation of over 370,000 refugees, 133it did not have a specific reconstruction 
mandate. Instead, UNT AC was given tasks of rehabilitation: short-term assistance 
rather than long-term structural change. To this end, UNTAC established a 
rehabilitation component,134 which sought to address the urgent needs of Cambodia 
- identified as humanitarian aid, resettlement and demobilisation, and restoration of 
physical infrastructure.135 Similarly, the domestic element of the government, the 
SNC, as a signatory of the Paris Agreements was also expected to delay 
reconstruction. It did, though, still legislate and sign internationally binding treaties, 
including the ICCPR and ICESR,136 and passed a new penal code, encouraged by 
UNT AC. 137 The main area where reconstruction choices were not delayed was in the 
form of the government. The Paris Agreements required constitutional democracy to 
be the form of government subsequent to the transitional period. 138 
For Bosnia, Dayton introduced some major changes in the state infrastructure, far 
beyond what was agreed upon in Paris for Cambodia. The contrast is typified by the 
fact that Annex 4 provided the 'Constitution' for the state, unlike in Cambodia where 
it was left to the body emerging following elections to draft the new constitution. 
Guarantees of representation in government were a central concern for the three 
main Bosnian groups at Dayton, and this helps explain to willingness to reorganise 
the state infrastructure in a significant manner prior to a newly elected body being in 
place. 
One sweepIng change was the introduction of a highly decentralized state 
structure, with powers, other than those retained by the central state machinery, split 
132 1991 Declaration on Reconstruction, para. 2. 
133 1991 Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, Annex 4. 
13 .. See Report of the Secretary General. 19 February 1992, paras. 150-157. 
m Report of the Secretary General, op. cit., fn. 134, para. 153: see also Doyle. op. cit .. fn. 22. p. 50. 
136 Doyle, op. cit., fn. 22. p. 84 
IH See Doyle, op. cit., fn. 22, p. 42: Keller. op. cit., fn. 31. p. 165: T. Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy 
and Lessons of UNTAC (1995) 64. 
138 1991 Comprehensive Settlement Agreement. Article 12: see also Doyle. op. cit .. fn. 22. p. 29. 
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between the two newly created entities of the Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(the Bosniac-Croat construct) and the Republika Srpska (RS).139 The composition 
and procedures for governance within these areas also received close attention. 140 As 
with Cambodia, Bosnia was to be a democratic state. 141 In tenns of areas of 
authority, the Constitution lists those areas where the state would prevail. 142 and the 
entities are left with the rest. 143 This means that subject to adherence to the broad 
guiding principles of the Constitution, 144 Dayton deferred to the domestic 
government on how change and development away from fundamental aspects of the 
state infrastructure was to precede. 
There was, of course, international involvement in significant Bosnian institutions. 
Two international representatives, for example, were appointed to a Commission on 
Public Corporations. 145 This Commission was 'to examine establishing Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Public Corporations to operate joint public facilities, such as for the 
operation of utility, energy, postal and communication facilities, for the benefit of 
both Entities.' 146 However, as with the international involvement in general, which 
was intended to end after a year,147 it was hardly intended to have a direct 
governance role. The most significant international body, in tenns of governance, 
was the OHR. The OHR's role as envisaged at Dayton was, essentially, to monitor 
the peace settlement and coordinate the civilian aspects of the international 
involvement. 148 The OHR was, though, identified as 'the final authority in theater 
regarding interpretation of this Agreement [GF AP] on the civilian implementation of 
139 Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 1, para. 3. 
140 See Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Ch. IV (b), Article 2, Article 4, Ch. 
IV (a). 
141 See Dayton GFAP, Annex 3 (preamble). 
142 Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 1, Para. 3: as (a) Foreign policy. 
(b) Foreign trade policy. (c) Customs policy. (d) Monetary policy as provided in Article VII. (e) 
Finances of the institutions and for the international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (f) 
Immigration, refugee, and asylum policy and regulation. (g) International and inter-Entity criminal 
law enforcement, including relations with Interpol. (h) Establishment and operation of common and 
international communications facilities. (i) Regulation of inter-Entity transportation, (j) Air traffic 
control. 
143 • [E]conomic, cultural, and educational policies, their own social security and health care systems, 
different judicial systems, and control over their own police forces', Zaum, op. cit., fn. 6, p. 90. 
144 The Constitution in its preamble indicates guiding principles such as respect for human dignity. 
liberty, and equality: dedication to peace, justice, tolerance, and reconciliation; promotion of general 
welfare and economic growth through the protection of private property and the promotion ofa 
market economy; and guidance from the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
14' On the Commission on Public Corporations see Annex 9, Article I, para. 2. 
146 Annex 9 ofGFA on establishment of Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations Article I para. 
I. 
147 See. on expected length of involvement. Bildt. op. cit., fn. 44, pp. 306-8. 
141 Anenex 10, Article 2. 
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the peace settlement.' 149 And, as is well known, things did not go according to plaa 
leading the OHR to assume a much greater governance role through a 
reinterpretation of its powers. Nonetheless, while fundamental change in state 
infrastructure was agreed to, the parties at Dayton closely link this to the solution to 
the conflict, and the less contentious majority of the reconstruction is to be left to a 
domestic government. Thus one can still read the approach to reconstruction as 
intended to limit, where feasible, the impact on political independence. 150 Of course, 
those international actors called upon to assist will, through financial and technical 
influence, likely have a significant impact on policy choices made. 151 This, less 
obvious, form of encroachment on the right to political independence is returned to 
in Chapter 6. 
Thinking about Kosovo, the level of discretion that the Secretary General was 
accorded by Resolution 1244 does not suggest a concern for minimising neglect of 
political independence. Essentially, from Resolution 1244, it was up to the Secretary 
General how the mission would progress to achieve its responsibilities: the building 
of democratic institutions of self-governance, and transferring authority to them. 152 
The connection of the ITA's role with the search for a political settlement on 
Kosovo's future status helps to explain the lack of a time limit. However, it does not 
account for why discretion in relation to reconstruction was not, at least, more 
regulated, given the ITA's lack of connection to the territory or its people. 
Change and development of Kosovo governance and civilian infrastructure has 
been provided for in the vast number of legally binding regulations that have been 
issued by UNMIK. IS3 The Regulations remain in force until 'repealed by UNMIK or 
superseded by such rules as are subsequently issued by the institutions established 
under a political settlement' .154 Through such regulations, Kosovo has undergone 
significant change and development, which is characterized by the theory that it can 
all be repealed after the eventual political settlement. A point exemplified by 
emphasising that the constitutional arrangements for self-government are of a 
149 Annex 10, Article 5. 
150 For example, existing laws, provided they are consistent with the constitution, should remain in 
effect until otherwise detennined by a competent government, Annex 2 of the Constitution para. ~. 
151 See S. Woodward, Z. Hertic, and A. Sapcamin, ·Bosnia and Herzegovina'. in S. Fonnan and S. 
Patrick (eds.), Good Intentions: Pledges 0/ Aid/or Postconflicl Recovery (2000) 315 at 339-42. 
U2 SC Res. 1244 (1999) para. 10. 
m The first confinned the power to do so by defining the nature of the authority that would be 
exercised, Regulation No. 1999/1. UNMIKIREG/1999/1. 25 July 1999. Sec l. 
1S4 Regulation No. 1999/1. UNMIKlREG/I999/l. 25 July 1999. Sec 4. 
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provisional nature. ISS The stress on the temporary nature can be read as concern 
about consistency with the right to political independence. However, it is a fiction to 
believe that a province/state can be reconstructed so that it functions in an effective 
manner and that this can all be dismantled when the international actors leave. The 
change and development of a temporary nature thus affects the rights to decide in the 
same way that an explicitly permanent change. 156 
The approach to reconstruction in East Timor, as with the aspects addressed in 
Section 2, was similar to that found in Kosovo. The fact that the future status of East 
Timor was certain might explain the slightly more detailed mandate that UNT AET 
received. By Resolution 1272 UNT AET was instructed, with a view to the 
development of local democratic instructions,ls7 to: 
(a)To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; (b) 
To establish an effective administration; (c) To assist in the development of civil and social 
services; (d) To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
rehabilitation and development assistance; (e) To support capacity-building for self-
government; (f) To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development. ISS 
Again, as with Kosovo, the extensive authority and discretion afforded in these areas 
suggests no particular concern for political independence. In this respect, the use of 
the terms 'assist' and 'support' in relation to areas that will require reconstruction is 
interesting. One might explain this language on the view that there will be other 
international actors, as well as East Timorese, involved in projects. However, one 
cannot help but be struck by the contrast that UNTAET will 'provide security' but 
'assist' and 'support' with matters of change and development. Will it not, for 
example, direct the development of the civil and social services, who is it going to 
assist in this respect? This attempt to project UNT AET as assistor clearly does not 
match the plenary authority given to it. 
In practice, UNT AET displayed an initially cautious approach to reconstruction. 
This stemmed from the broad nature of UNT AET' s discretion that meant it was 
IS~ UNMIKlREG1200 1/9 of 15 May 2001; on the nature of local involvement in its formulation. 
including a lack of Serbian consent, see Brand, op. cit., fn. 88, p. 32. 
IS6 For support of this, see discussion on the reconstruction that is permissible under the law of 
occupation in the interests of preservation of the right to political independence. Chapter 4 of this 
study. 
IS7 SC Res. 1272 (1999) para. 8. 
ISS SC Res. 1272 (1999) para. 2. 
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difficult to know how to go about implementing the mandate,159 a lack of capacity to 
implement reform, 160 and from a lack of co-operation by local leaders with 
th . 161 On· ed fun· au onty. ce It manag to ctlOn, there was the complete overhaul of the 
judicial system,162 and a struggle to reconstruct the Civil Service,163 which counter 
any signs of a particular concern for political independence. Still the idea that 
reconstruction was following what was a necessity was portrayed by indicating that 
refonns which were not pressing were being held back prior to an elected 
government being in place, such as in relation to citizenship.l64 In the context of a 
devastated state and civil infrastructure there is a need for massive reconstruction. 
Thus only pursuing what is necessary is little protection for the right of political 
independence. Instead, it reiterates the taking away of political independence for 
international peace, which neglects the value of self-detennination, which in turn 
threatens international peace. 
Across all the examples, then, one can identify attempts to further reduce the 
impact on political independence in the approach to political independence. This was 
mainly by delaying aspects of the reconstruction until there was an elected domestic 
government. While most obvious in Cambodia, even in Cambodia there was 
agreement on the nature of governmental refonn before an elected body was in 
place. Thus the approaches to political independence, while making gestures towards 
its importance, are far from consistent with its maintenance. 
International peace was clearly a prime factor in the approaches to reconstruction 
agreed upon in relation to Cambodia and Bosnia. It was the nature of the conflicts, 
which Dayton and the Paris agreements sought to end, which meant that aspects of 
the reconstruction of the state infrastructure needed to be agreed upon prior to the 
elected government emerging. In relation to Kosovo and East Timor, there is also an 
international peace explanation for the pursuit of reconstruction, peace is better 
served by a functioning governing infrastructure. But, as was noted above, to neglect 
IS9 See S. Vieira de Mello, 'How Not to Run a Country: Lessons from Kosovo and East Timor', 
UNITAR-IPS-JIlA Conference to Assess the Report on UN Peace Operations, Singapore, February 
2001, cited by the Conflict Security Development Group (CDSG, KCL), A Review of Peace 
~rations: A Case for Change - East Timor Study (2003) para. 291. note 303. 
1 Zaum, op. cit., fn. 6, pp. 187 
161 Chopra, op. cit., fn. 110, p. 31. 
162 See H. Stromeyer, 'Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United 
Nations Missions in Kosovo and in East Timor'. (200 I) 95 AJIL 46. 
163 See CDSG (East Timor). op. cit., fn. 159, para. 311-312. 
164 See V. Tanaja, 'East Timor: Debate over Constituent Assembly Election Process', (14 March 
2001) available at <http://www.greenleft.org.aul200I.',w0/26494>. 
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political independence also neglects the value of self-determinatio~ which is 
important in its own right, but also affects international peace. The accommodation 
of self-determination is thus an essential element of the explanation for international 
acceptance. In respect of the value of self-determination, it is the pursuit of 
democratic reconstructio~ across all the examples, now turned to, which stands out 
as the means for accommodation of the value of self-determination in light of the 
neglect for political independence. 
B. Reconstruction and the Value of Self-Determination 
Recalling Chapter 3, democratic reconstruction is the obvious means for addressing 
the values of self-determination and international peace in situations of 
reconstruction without an independently effective domestic government. A survey of 
the examples reveals the prominence of democracy in relation to the reconstruction 
activity that is inconsistent with the right to political independence. 
In relation to Cambodia, from the outset of the negotiations at Paris, elections 
were identified as the means for Cambodians to exercise their right to self-
determination. 165 It was agreed that reconstruction, and choices about it, were to be 
delayed until there was an elected body to make the choices. The importance of the 
elections is witnessed in the fact that only in this respect was UNT AC pennitted to 
legislate and not restrained by the complex governance formula that made it, 
formally at least, subordinate to the SNC.166 However, this was not the case with 
regards democratic government. Annex 5 of the Comprehensive Settlement 
Agreement stresses essential aspects on which the new constitution should be 
founded, including that: 
Cambodia will follow a liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism. It will provide for 
periodic and genuine elections. It will provide for the right to vote and to be elected by 
universal and equal suffrage. It will provide for voting by secret ballot, with a requirement 
that electoral procedures provide a full and fair opportunity to organise and participate in the 
167 
electoral process. 
16~ Organization of Work, Text Adopted by the Conference at its 4th Plenary Meeting. on 1 August 
1989 Paris Conference on Cambodia Document, CPC/89/4; see also Ratner. op. cit., th. 17. pp. 3-5. 
166 1991 Comprehensive Settlement Agreement ,Article 13, Annex I. Section D; see also Doyle, op. 
cit .• th. 22, pp. 51-58. . .., . 
167 1991 Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, Annex 5 Declaration on ConstltutlOnal Prmclples. 
para. 4. 
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The specification of democratic government was clearly seen as somehow different 
from other aspects of reconstructio~ almost as if it was part of the right to self-
determination. 
In Bosnia, the main focus of the reconstruction before elections was the changes to 
the state infrastructure. This practice did not sit well with political independence. 
However, this was reconstruction designed to provide democratic self-government, 
which stands for genuine rule by the people, thus fears about inconsistency with self-
determination are assuaged. Similarly, as the elected government remained 
dependent on international military presence for effectiveness, its commitment to 
democracy buttresses the claim of its reconstruction activity to consistency with self-
determination. The importance of democracy for justifying involvement inconsistent 
with the right to political independence is also seen with regards the OHR's 
assumption of authority from the elected government. 
The dominance of the three main groups in Bosnia in the multiparty elections for 
parliamentary and executive office at the state level in September 1996,168 and the 
consociational arrangements in place,169 resulted in stalemate on many of the issues 
vital to the reconstruction of Bosnia. 170 Thus the international military and civilian 
presences were extended, eventually indefinitely.171 Moreover, at the meeting of the 
PIC in Bonn in December 1997, a more expansive interpretation of the OHR's 
function in relation to interpretation of GF AP was endorsed. It was established that 
binding decisions on interim measures were within his powers when local parties 
were unable to agree. Moreover, obstructive local officials could be dismissed, 
legislation reviewed, amended, and imposed. The OHR essentially stepped in to lead 
rather than observe the reconstruction of Bosnia. By 2002, the OHR 'had eight 
departments (excluding its own administration and the press office), covering all 
major aspects of statebuilding' .172 
This transformation of the role of the OHR has received considerable attention in 
political and legal literature, in which it has been depicted as a modem day form of 
168 See F. Friedman, 'Dayton, Democratization and Governance: Electoral Dilemmas in Bosnian 
Peace and Security', (2000) 15 International Relations 22 at 24-26, on the nationalist domination at 
the local level, 26-28; see also International Crisis Group (ICG). Elections in Bosnia and Her:ego\'ina 
(1996). 
169 See below. 
170 See lawn. op. cit., fn. 6, p. 92. 
171 SC Res. 1088 (1996) para. 18; see also laum. op. cit., fn. 6. p. 83. 
172 laum. op. cit., fn. 6. p. 86 
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imperialis~173 and its legal accountability questioned. 174 Certainly~ the manner in 
which it gets its legal basis (through an extensive interpretation of clause in the 
Dayton Accord that was signed in a manner inconsistent with political 
independence), the powers that it has removed from the elected governmen~ and the 
change and development it has introduced, are reason for thiS. 175 Nonetheless, the 
OHR has managed to continue, the position has not been made untenable by 
responses of the population or wider international society. Crucial in this respect 
must be the projection, by the OHR, that his role is to introduce reforms so that 
Bosnia can operate as a democratic state. Bosnia has an elected governmen~ but one 
that could not manage to operate as a government and thus introduce the reforms 
thought necessary for a peaceful democratic future in Bosnia. 176 If it had assumed the 
powers with no intention of returning them, or returning them to any entity it 
pleased, then the OHR would not survive, its ability to shrug off charges of 
imperialism would be severely impeded. There is the broader goal of international 
peace, in terms of avoiding slipping back into conflict. Still, to pursue international 
peace without concern for self-determination would be counter-productive. The 
pursuit of democracy allows the OHR to continue to claim consistency with the 
value of self-determination even when authority is taken from the domestic 
government. i77 
In both Kosovo and East Timor, the ITA has been responsible from the outset for 
the reconstruction, but has not limited this to democratic government or aspects of 
the state infrastructure linked to democracy, as was noted in respect of Cambodia 
and Bosnia. Rather, democratic government has been posited as a central aim from 
the outset, with the rest of the reconstruction surrounding it helping to build a state in 
which a democratic government will be able to govern effectively. Thus the 
discretion accorded the ITA appears necessary for the eventual realisation of genuine 
rule by the people. The pursuit of democracy also appears to have been an essential 
tool for justifying the IT As' retention of authority in the light of competing domestic 
claims. 
173 See e.g., G. Knaus and F. Martin, 'Travails of the European Raj' (2003) 14 Journal of Democracy 
(2003) 60. 
174 See e.g., Wilde, op. cit., th. 114. 
m A. Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (2006) 451. 
176 See P. Ashdown, 'What I Learned in Bosnia', New York Times. 28 October 2002. 
177 On whether the OHR is actually conducive to the development of an autonomous democratic state. 
see D. Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton (2000). 
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When there was no elected central Kosovar governing body, the need for UNMIK 
authority to be retained in the interests of democracy would be a viable excuse that 
could project accommodation of the value of self-determination. However. once 
there was an elected central Kosovar governing body, in line with the Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-Government promulgated as a regulation in May 
2001,178 such logic is clearly dampened. Accordingly, making the quality of the 
democracy that was practiced a condition for talks on the future status of Kosovo, 179 
also offered a basis for UNMIK to explain continuing to withhold power from an 
elected Kosovar institution. 180 
In East Timor, as was also the case in Kosovo, there was an immediate need to 
engage with the domestic actors that carried the authority of the people if progress in 
governance and reconstruction was to be made. As UNT AET struggled to get set up 
and exercise effective authority, the CNRT had reorganized and was the effective 
governmental authority in many areas. 181 The SRSG thus sought out the CNRT as a 
major, but unofficial partner of UNTAET to help adopt policy that would be 
accepted by the East Timorese. In light of the control that the CNRT enjoyed it 
would have been in line with the logic of the effective control test to give them a 
formal governance role as a measure to improve consistency with political 
independence. The SRSG, however, is said to have justified not doing this in the 
interests of the democratic process. 182 Democracy is thus called upon to justify 
withholding authority from a body with a strong claim to be the embodiment of the 
rights of the people. 
In sum, one cannot avoid the prominence of democracy in relation to activity 
inconsistent with the right to political independence. Across all the examples 
democracy clearly has a role in relation to peace, it offers a means of 
178 Regulation 9/200 I, On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, of 15 May 
2001; See Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration in 
Kosovo, UN Doc. S/2001/565 (7 June 2001), para. 20 et seq. 
179 See, e.g., UNMIK, Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (31 March 2004), available at 
<http://www.unmikonline.orglpub/misclksip_eng.pdf.at 8>; some progress in May 2005 is described 
in Doc. S12005/335 of 23 May 2005, para. 8; persistent difficulties include sustainable refugee return, 
minority protection and freedom of movement see UN Doc. S12004/907 of 17 November 2004, and 
UN Doc. S/2005/88 of 14 February 2005, para. 13. 
180 Such an approach, progressively transferring authority back, has been conceptualised as earned 
sovereignty, see. e.g., P. R. Williams, 'The Road to Resolving the Conflict over Kosovo's Final 
Status', (2003) 31 Den, J. Int'l L. & Poly 387. 
181 CSDG (East Timor). op. cit., fn. 159, para. 293; see also Chopra op. cit., fn. 110. p. 32: Chopra 
(2002), op. cit .• fn. 1 t 5, p. 990; Caplan, op. cit .. fn. 88, p. 96. 
182 CSDG (East Timor). op. cit .• fn. fn. 159. para. 294. 
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accommodating divergent views, which form the source of conflict, in one 
government. But, crucially, it also addresses the value of self-determination. 
Building on top of the other factors which help address self-determination (consent. 
delay in reconstruction, domestic involvement in governance), democracy projects a 
reorientation in relation to the value of self-determination: political independence is 
obscured and the international involvement cast as necessary for the realisation of 
genuine rule by the people. If democracy is to be an essential part of the explanation 
for the international acceptance of a practice that neglects political independence. 
then, as argued in Chapter 3, there should be a basis for regulation and accountability 
of democracy to help ensure the genuine rule by the people, which it promises and 
makes it of such utility. Thus the next section turns to how democracy was in fact 
treated in the examples of ITA. 
4. Democracy in Reconstruction by IT A 
Some commentators have identified the trend for democracy to be a central 
reconstruction aim in the practice of ITA as relevant for the existence of democracy 
as a legal concept. 183 One must, however, be careful of confusing trend for legal 
development. A significant amount of international democracy promotion in the 
normal run of things does not have to entail a legal concept; 184 neither does the 
prominence of democracy in state reconstruction. The crucial distinction being that 
legal development hinges on opinio juris, a belief that law required a certain course 
of action. 185 In this respect, one struggles to find a commentator with evidence of 
such opinio juris for even a minimal concept of democracy as free and fair elections, 
not to mention the more expansive understanding that Chapter 3 termed genuine 
democracy. 
183 See, e.g., J. d'Aspremont, 'Post-Conflict Administrations as Democracy-Building Instruments', 
(2008) 9 Chicago Journal of International Law 1 at 13: M. Cogen and E. De Brabandere, 
'Democratic Governance and Post-Conflict Reconstruction', (2007) 20 UIL 669; M. Salamun, 
Democratic Governance in International Te"itorial Administration (2005) 59: Fox, op. cit., fn. 6, pp. 
142-173; L. Carlowitz, 'UNMIK Lawmaking between Effective Peace Support and Internal Self-
Determination', (2003) 41/3 Archiv des V6lkerrechts 336 at 360-364. 
18-4 Cf. Fox, op. cit., fn. 6, p. 154-156. 
185 North Sea Continental Shelf. ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3 at p. 44: see also M. Akehurst, 'Custom as a 
Source of international Law', (1974 - 5) 47 BYIL 1: R. Cryer, 'Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the 
Gavel: the Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study'. 
(2006) II JeSL 239. 
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At the present time, the best that can be hoped for, from the perspective of the 
value of self-determination, is that democracy will have been treated as a legal 
concept along the lines of that sketched out by the HRC in its General Comment on 
Article 25 ICCPR. And, to give this legal regulation some bite. in terms of 
accountability, it will have been treated as part of the right to self -detennination. and, 
consequently, as the basis of governmental authority in the absence of an 
independently effective domestic government. This would permit challenge to 
authority were it not adhered. However, recalling Chapter 3, it is clear that there is 
not necessarily a need for democracy to be treated as a legal concept for it to, at 
least, portray accommodation of the value of self-detennination. This is because 
even as a loose political concept democracy promises the realisation of genuine rule 
by the people; despite that the type of democracy pursued might in no way be 
consistent with the democratic ideal that gives some substance to the claim of 
genuine rule by the people. Accordingly, in the interests of the value of self-
determination, this section addresses how democracy was treated in the sense of a 
loose political or legal concept. It also addresses why the particular approach was 
chosen and how it might have been improved in terms of consistency with the value 
of self-determination. 
A. The Nature of Democracy in ITA 
By Annex 5 of the Comprehensive Political Settlement Agreement Cambodia was 
. db' d' 'l'be al d ' 186 legally cormrutte to e constitute , to use Its terms, as a I r emocracy . 
Thus it is required that the new constitution will provide for government based on 
pluralism, for periodic and genuine elections, the right to vote and to be elected by 
universal and equal suffrage, voting by secret ballot, with a requirement that 
electoral procedures provide a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in 
the electoral process. 187 The constitution is also required to have a declaration of 
fundamental rights including the right to life, personal liberty, security. freedom of 
movement, freedom of religion. assembly and association including political parties 
and trade unions, due process and equality before the law. protection from arbitrary 
deprivation of property or deprivation of private property without just compensation. 
186 Ratner, op. cit., fn. 17. pp. 27-28. 
187 1991 Comprehensive Settlement Agreement. Annex 5. para. 4. 
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and freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. 188 These rights 
are not directly, at least, linked to the concept of democracy. Democracy is therefore 
understood in procedural terms, the process for identification of the government. 
which does not address the actual substantive conduct of the government. Still. even 
if a wider defmition of democracy had been adopted in the Paris Agreement, the 
Agreement lacks provisions for supervision or enforcement of governance that 
would give the regulation meaning. In this respect, there is nothing in the agreement 
to suggest that the legal right of self-determination required democratic government 
be constituted. Rather, democracy was chosen in act of self-determination by the 
SNC at Paris. 
By Article 1 para. 2 of Annex 4 (Constitution for Bosnia), Bosnia is committed by 
Dayton to be 'a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with 
free and democratic elections.' There is no further effort to define democracy, or to 
link its choice to a legal requirement of self-determination. Indeed, in the preamble 
to the constitution the choice of democracy is stressed for its importance in relation 
to peace: '[c]onvinced that democratic governmental institutions and fair procedures 
best produce peaceful relations within a pluralist society'. 
Making the ECHR directly applicable with priority over all other law indicates the 
importance of a Bosnian government committed to international human rights law. 189 
This, because of the Convention's protection of key rights identified as an emerging 
human right to democracy, encourages belief that governance will be conducted in 
accordance with the emerging consensus on democracy as a human right. Still, the 
European Convention, as was noted in Chapter 3, is weak in terms of its provision on 
rights to participation in government. Moreover, it does not change the fact that 
democracy is treated as a loose political concept chosen in an act of self-
determination by the parties to Dayton, rather than a legal concept of democracy 
required by the right of self-determination in light of a lack of independent 
effectiveness on behalf of the government. This means that governmental authority is 
not affected by a failure to commit to the democratic ideal. Consequently, flexibility 
is retained with respect to how the government conducts and constitutes itself and for 
the international actors in terms of who they will accept as a representative of the 
will of the state and its people. For example, the government once elected might act 
188 1991 Comprehensive Settlement Agreement. Annex S, para. 2. 
189 Constitution, Article II. para. 2. 
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without regard for the participation of people in government, there might be avenues 
to challenge the conduct in the domestic court, but there is no basis for challenging 
the actual authority of the government even though it is only effective because of the 
international military presence. 
With Kosovo, Resolution 1244 charges the international civil presence (UNMIK) 
with '[0 ]rganizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, 
including the holding of elections' .190 There is no further effort to define democracy 
in the Resolution. By paragraph 11 (a), though, UNMIK is required to promote 'the 
establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-
government in Kosovo, taking full account of Annex 2 and of the Rambouillet 
accords' . Annex 2 is the acceptance by the FRY of the principles set forth in points 1 
to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 for a solution to the crisis (the 
Ahtisaari principles). The Ahtisaari principles simply note that the interim 
administration is 'to provide transitional administration while establishing and 
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions,:91 
Rambouillet provides, as part of its framework principles, that: '[a]ll authorities in 
Kosovo shall fully respect human rights, democracy, and the equality of citizens and 
national communities.' 192 And that: 
Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to democratic self-government through legislative, 
executive, judicial, and other institutions established in accordance with this Agreement. 
They shall have the opportunity to be represented in all institutions in Kosovo. The right to 
democratic self-government shall include the right to participate in free and fair elections. 193 
Rambouillet is more forthcoming than the other two documents in terms of a 
definition of democracy, but the looseness of the concept identified as democracy 
reduces the significance of a 'right to democratic self-government' and, of course, 
the terms of Rambouillet are substantially different to what was constituted under 
Resolution 1244, and while signed by Kosovo leaders were not signed by the FRY in 
February 1999. At no point in any of the documents is there a link to the right to self-
190 SC Res. 1244 (1999) para. II(c). 
191 S/1999/649, para. 5 
192 Framework, Article I, para. 3, Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo. 
Rambouillet. France. February 23 1999. 
19) Framework, Article 1. para. 4. Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, 
Rambouillet. France, February 23 1999. 
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detennination. Instead, the pW'SUit of democracy is stressed for its importance in 
relation to peace. 194 Thus there is a legal obligation to pursue democratic government 
by Resolution 1244, but it is far from clear what would be required to satisfy this or 
the consequences of not pursuing it. 
For East Timor, Resolution 1272 stressed 'the need for UNTAET to consult and 
cooperate closely with the East Timorese people in order to carry out its mandate 
effectively with a view to the development of local democratic institutions' .195 There 
was no further effort to define democracy or to link it to the right of self-
determination. In March 2001, UNTAET issued Regulation 2001/2, which provided 
the legal framework for the constitution-making process. 196 This set out an extensive 
procedure for the creation of an elected Constituent Assembly composed of 88 
members, 75 of whom were to be elected in a nationwide election, and the remaining 
13 were to be elected in regional constituencies. Section 2.1 requires the Constituent 
Assembly to 'prepare a Constitution for an independent and democratic East Timor'. 
While Section 1.1 provides that convening the Assembly should contribute to the 
goal of 'protect[ing] the inalienable human rights of the people of East Timor 
including freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of association and 
freedom from all forms of discrimination', as Dann and AI-Ali note, "this is less an 
explicit mandate and more a general description of the purpose of the Assembly. 
Any further specifications as to the structure of government or other aspects of the 
constitutional system were avoided.' 197 Thus with democracy clearly cast as a loose 
political concept the Constituent Assembly was left with, formally at least, a great 
deal of discretion in terms of the structure of the government that was to be pursued. 
Across all the examples, then, there is a legal obligation that a democratic 
government be constituted. This obligation, however, is specific to the circumstances 
either from an agreement or SC chapter VII resolution. Moreover, the utility of the 
legal obligation, in terms of helping to guarantee genuine democracy, is severely 
reduced by the lack of effort to define democracy. In this respect, the Paris 
Agreement is most forthcoming and even then it is heavily focused on the procedure 
for identification of the government. Moreover. no provisions are made for challenge 
194 SC Res. 1244 (1999) para. 10. 
19' SC Res. 1272 (1999) para. 8. 
196 UNTAETlREG/2001/2 of 16 March 2001. available at: 
<http://www.un.orglpeaceletimor/untaetRJr-200I.htm> . 
197 P. Dann and Z. AI-Ali. 'The Internationalized Pouvoir Corutituanr -Constitution-Making Under 
External Influence in Iraq. Sudan and East Timor'. (2006) 10 Max Planck U.vrB 423 a1433. 
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of the authority of any of the governments that is given effectiveness through an 
international military presence should it abandon the pursuit of the democratic ideal. 
There is therefore little to safeguard the pursuit of the democratic ideal which gives 
meaning to the promise of genuine rule by the people. Consideration of the reason 
why democracy was treated in the way it has been is an opportunity to show how the 
accommodation of the value of self-determination could have been improved. 
B. Understanding and Improving the Approach to Democracy in ITA 
In relation to all the examples, the fact that democracy, as discussed in Chapter 3. is 
so well attached to the idea of genuine rule of the people is a crucial factor that 
means there was not a need, in terms of international acceptance, for a legal concept 
of democracy as part of the right to self-determination. There are also various other 
factors that help to explain why such proposed law was not likely to be encouraged 
by those involved. Here it is contended that, if justified in relation to international 
peace, these could be accommodated in the law proposed in Chapter 3; a move 
which would address some of the negative consequences for the value of self-
determination that arise from treating democracy as a loose political concept. 
In Cambodia, a limited and unaccountable democratic obligation suited all 
involved in negotiations at Paris. The Western states saw elections as a means of 
avoiding giving the budgetary support that reconstruction would require to a former 
enemy government, as the SOC still administered the majority of the state prior to 
pariS. 198 The satisfaction with the plan to remove the substantial international 
military and administrative aspects almost directly following the elections and 
creation of new constitution fits with the view that an end to the conflict was the 
primary motivation of the international actors; 199 with democracy an incidental goal 
that could be left to sink or swim. This is further supported by the fact that it was the 
Cambodian factions that were pushing for inclusion of the of liberal democracy 
terminology as a means of gaining Western contacts.2OO Further, the factions saw a 
vote as a means for them to get all power, rather than share with the other factions in 
198 See Uphoff Kato, op. cit., fn. 22 p. 191. 
199 On the circumstances surrounding the end of the involvement see Findlay, op. cit., fn. 137. pp. 97-
98. 
200 It was Prince Sihanouk who came up with the tenn liberal democracy. Ratner. op. cit .. fn. 17, p. 27 
note 163. 
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the SNC?OI Accordingly, there was little reason for any of the parties to want to 
encourage a wider legal concept of democracy linked to the right to self-
determination which would, at least, introduce a greater onus for the international 
actors to monitor the constitution making process. Although, given the history of a 
'single party, highly centralized state that controlled all aspects of public life and left 
no space for a genuine civil society' hiding behind the fa~ade of a democratic 
constitution,2°2 this would be far form sufficient in terms of safeguarding the promise 
of genuine rule by the people, it would have had some utility. 
During the constitution making process, Prince Sihanouk attempted to stage a 
constitutional coup by setting up his own government. 203 Yet, in the eventual 
constitution, significant powers, such as declaring war, remain vested in the King 
despite non-election.204 If a legal concept of democracy had been identified as part of 
the right to self-determination, given the lack of independent effectiveness, there 
would have been a basis for challenging this as a lack of commitment to genuine rule 
by the people. As well as for contesting the smaller aspects in the constitution which 
suggest a willingness to let the democratic ideal slide, shown, for example, in the 
exclusion of naturalised Cambodians from election to Parliament.2os Instead, the 
international actors that remained the source of effectiveness on the territory during 
the constitution making process were impotent, in terms of safeguarding democracy 
and with it the value of self-determination. 
In relation to Bosnia, flexibility in the governance arrangements was vital for the 
deal struck at Dayton. Dayton followed a series of structural proposals that had failed 
to satisfy the complex tensions between the three main groups inside Bosnia and the 
international mediators.206 Szasz notes that the Bosniacs desired a centralised, 
democratic, and united Bosnian state that they would dominate because of greater 
numbers and faster growth; the Serbs wanted no part of a common state with the 
201 Doyle, op. cit .. fil. 22, p. 69. 
202 S.P. Marks, 'The New Cambodian Constitution: from Civil War to a Fragile Democracy'. (1994) 
26 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 45 at 54-55. 
203 See Findlay, op. cit., fil. 137. p. 91 
204 S. P. Marks, Ope cit., fil. 202, pp. 67 - 68. . 
205 For an extensive review of the rights included in the Constitution in comparison with the earlier 
constitution see S. P. Marks, op. cit .. fn. 202. 
206 See for an account of the different proposals, P. C. Szasz. 'The Quest for a Bosnian Constitution: 
Legal Aspects of Constitutional Proposals Relating to Bosnia' (1995) 19 Fordham International Law 
Journal 363. 
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other two groups; the Croats probably preferred a decentralised state system.207 The 
sponsoring international powers preferred keeping the state together but were 
flexible about whether it be centralised or decentralised in its emphasis.208 
Agreement was thus dependent on guarantees that each of the main groups would be 
sufficiently represented in government following elections. Consequently, 
predetermined consociational democracy was agreed upon.209 Four central features 
identify this model: the sharing of authority, proportionality in public life, minority 
veto, and segmental authority.210 The model introduced is typified by the Presidency, 
the highest institution of the state, which consists of one Bosniac, and one Croat 
directly elected from the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the RS?11 
Decisions are taken by consent, only in exceptional circumstances by majority.212 
And, if by majority, the minority has a right of veto ifvital interests of their entity at 
stake, which then must be confinned within 10 days by a two third majority vote of 
the ethnic group representatives. This predetennined consociational democracy. is 
not, in the words of Wheatley: 
compatible with the human ri~ts of political participation,213 in particular when taken with 
the non-discrimination norm. 14 A constitutional requirement that the holder of a given 
political office be a member of a certain national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic 
group is an act of direct discrimination, prohibited by international human rights 
instruments.2lS A state constitution may require that a plurality of identities be represented in 
the executive, but it cannot specify that the President or the Prime Minister should be a 
member of a particular group. ,216 Moreover, exclusion of smaller groups, like the Roma of 
Bosnia, 'is not compatible with the right of all citizens to political equality.217 
207 Szasz, op. cit., th .. 52, p. 762. 
208 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Statement on Bosnia, Document Ad-opted at 
the London Conference, Doc. No. LC/C5 (Final), reprinted in (1992) 31ILM 1537. 
209 See S. Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities, and International Law (2005) 161. 
210 A. Lijphart, Self-Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethic Minorities in Power-Sharing 
Systems in W. Kymlichka (ed.), The Rights o/Minority Cultures (1995) 275 at 278; on the wider 
debate about power sharing models and accommodation of ethnic minorities, see D. Horowitz. 
'Comparing Democratic Systems', (1990) 1 Journal o/Democracy 73; see also Wheatley, op. cit., th. 
209, pp. 161-177. 
211 Constitution, Article V. 
212 Consitiution, Article V 2. 
213 ICCPR, Article 25. 
214 ICCPR, Article 2( I) and 26. 
21~ Persons may not be excluded from the rights of political participation on 'unreasonable or 
discriminatory' criteria such as 'decent': Human Rights Committee. General Comment No. 25, 
'Article 25', para. 15. 
216 Wheatley, op. cit., th. 209, pp. 163-164, footnotes included. 
217 Wheatley, op. cit., fn. 209, p. 164: on consociational arrangements and human rights. generally. 
see H. J. Steiner, 'Ideals and Counter-ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities', 
(1991) 66 Notre Dame Law Rel,iew 1539 at 1547-1548. 
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In light of this finding, one can appreciate why it would not be in the interests of 
those seeking to bring the parties to agreement to bind them to a legal concept of 
democracy, especially not one linked to the right of self-determination.218 However, 
as was suggested in Chapter 3, it would make sense for there to be exceptions to the 
legal concept of democracy which would permit reasonable derogation in interests of 
international peace. In this way there could still be a consociational arrangement, but 
if the conduct of such a government did not demonstrate a commitment to the 
democratic ideal this could result in a challenge to the authority of the government. 
Further in relation to Bosnia, a legal notion of democracy as a part of the right to 
self-determination could have provided a legal basis for the assumption of authority 
by the OHR from the elected government. It could also serve as a basis for a 
requiring an explanation from the OHR as to why authority has not been returned 
and when it will be. 
Kosovo, given how sensitive the self-determination issue is, was never likely to be 
an occasion in which any conceptual potential for a legal notion of democracy to be 
linked to the right of self-determination would be utilised. Indeed, given that the ITA 
was to be conducted against a backdrop in which the future status of Kosovo had still 
not be resolved, a more detailed legal concept of democracy would not be in the 
international actors interests. This is because it could have served as a basis for the 
Kosovars to call for authority to be transferred on the basis of their meeting the 
specific criteria. Left as a vague concept the international actors have been able to 
subjectively determine when the Kosovars are sufficiently democratic for more 
authority to be transferred. The fact that there is a freely elected government that 
power is being withheld from can be more readily evaded.219 Moreover, greater 
specificity might have led to assessment of the standard of government of UNMIK 
itself, and, as Stahn has noted, the concentration of power in the hands of the UN is 
hardly commensurate with principles of democratic governance?20 However, if 
democracy is to be an essential part of the excuse for the neglect of political 
independence, there is a good reason for the Kosovar authorities to be able to require 
more authority be transferred on the basis of evidence of a commitment to a set of 
218 Similarly it might not be in the interests of those international actors who it is said actively worked 
to block certain candidates, see Friedman, op. cit., fn. 168. p. 26. 
219 See Caplan. op. cit .• fn. 88, p. 122 . . .. 
220 C. Stahn, 'Consitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the Umted Nations ConstItutional 
Framework for Self-Government', (200 1) 14 LJIL 531 at 561. 
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criteria which reflect the democratic ideal. Likewise, there is no reason why UNMIK 
should not be assessed by those standards that are appropriate, subject to reasonable 
exceptions in the interests of international peace. 
The utility of avoiding a legal concept of democracy for the international actors in 
Kosovo seems to be well encapsulated in how the recent declaration of independence 
actually came about.221 On the one hand, status talks were delayed because Kosovar 
institutions, as noted above, were not yet democratic enough.222 But then when the 
Kosovo Assembly declared independence without a referendum on 17 February 
2008,223 without the type of debate that one would associate with a democratic 
society, the same international actors were quick to recognise statehood,224 with a 
democratic process apparently unnecessary for those states that recognised.225 The 
Special Envoy of the Secretary General found anything but independence for 
Kosovo, in light of the failure of negotiations with Serbia, to be impossible,226 but 
there was still a debate to had, and for the people to express their opinion in a vote 
following it. Indeed, in light of the great stress that both the Special Envoy 
recommendations and the Kosovar declaration of independence place on Kosovo 
pursuing democracy, 227 the pursuit of democracy continues to be the element which 
addresses the value of self-determination while the government remains dependent 
on an international military presence for effectiveness, and subject to the authority of 
UNMIK.228 Thus it would seem necessary to seek consistency with the democratic 
221 At the time of writing (August 200S) 46 States had formally recognised Kosovo as an independent 
sovereign state, see <http://www.kosovothanksyou.com!>; while the level of recognition remains far 
from overwhelming, there is a debate to be had about its actual status as a matter of international law , 
see on the creation of states Chapter 1 of this study. 
222 See, e.g., UNMIK, Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (31 March 2004), available at 
<http://www . unmikonline.org/pub/misc/ksip _ eng.pdf>, at S. 
223 Kosovo Declaration of Independence, Assembly of Kosovo, 17.02.200S available at 
<http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?krye=documents&docid=45&lang=en>. 
224 See 'U.S. and EU Powers Recognise Kosovo as Some Fear Precedent', International Herald 
Tribune IS February 200S, available online at < 
http://www.iht.comlarticlesireutersl200S/02/1S/europe/OUKWD-UK-KOSOVO-SERBIA.php>. 
ill Although the Netherlands delayed, wanting assurances in relation to commitment to democracy, 
see 'The Netherlands Recognizes Kosovo', New Kosova Report (4 March 200S). available online at 
<http://www.newkosovareport.coml200S0304694/politicsl-The-Netherlands-recognises-
Kosovo.html> . 
226 Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's Future Status. UN Doc. 
S/20071 16S (2007), para. 6-14. 
227 See Comprehensive Proposal For the Kosovo Status Settlement. Article I. SI2007/16S/add.l 
(2007) available at < http://www.unosek.orgldocreflComprehensive.J)roposal-english.pdf>; Kosovan 
Assembly, Kosovo Declaration of Independence. Preamble. 
228 See. on the continued authority of the international civilian presence, Article 146 and Article 147 
of the Constitution for Kosovo, and Annex IV Article 2 of Special Envoys Settlement; on the 
continued military presence. see Article 153 of the Kosovo Constitution. 
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ideal when it comes to matters such as the declaration of independence. Without a 
legal concept of democracy linked to the right to self-determination, flexibility about 
when it suits to champion democracy is retained, but clearly the inherent lack of 
safeguard for democracy undermines the actual accommodation of the value of self-
determination. 
East Timor was the only example where the initiation of IT A had not been 
accompanied by an element of domestic, in the sense of East Timorese, consent to 
democratic reconstruction. In respect of all the other examples, it is possible to make 
a case that the choice of democracy represented an act of self-determination, in 
Kosovo through Rambouillet, for example. This can, then, perhaps explain why the 
terminology in relation to governmental reconstruction was particularly vague, with 
meaning made dependent on consultation with the East Timor people. Similarly, that 
a constitution-making process was not expressly part of the UNT AET mandate. 
Unlike with UNMIK, there was no particular interest for UNT AET in hanging 
onto authority once there was an elected body. This can help to explain why the 
commitment to democracy on behalf of UNT AET was very much simply to hold 
elections. There is said to have been little cause of controversy in the drafting of the 
constitution for East Timor, which was based on that of Mozambique, and the 
passage was something of a formality given the majority that Fretilin held.229 It 
introduced a 'a semi-presidential arrangement in which a premier and cabinet 
exercise day-to-day executive power while the president can veto legislation and also 
enjoys the power to dismiss and appoint governments' .230 Still, as the theory of 
autonomous decision in relation to elections is challenged because of the likelihood 
of voting for the party that has proved itself popular with the international actors, 
there is at least one reason why there should have been wider legal concept of 
democracy pursued. This is especially so when one considers the level of ill feeling 
that continued in relation to those parties that had resisted independence and which 
would likely represent a minority in any elected government, indeed, there were calls 
that parties that opposed independence should be excluded?3) 
229 A. L. Smith, 'East Timor: Elections in the Worlds Newest Nation', (2004) 15 Journal of 
Democracy 145 at 153. 
230 Smith, Ope cit., til. 229, p. 153. 
231 See J. Morrow and R. White, 'The United Nations in Transitional East Timor: International 
Standards and the Reality of Governance', (2002) ~2 A wtralian Yearbook of International Law I at 
15. 
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Moreover, as was with Cambodia, the inclusion of the rights that form the 
foundation of the emerging consensus on democracy as a human right in the 
constitution, while of symbolic importance, is little protection against a government 
that seeks authoritarian rule; a threat that, while apparently minimal in East Timor. 
still remains.232 Further, a concern expressed in the literature about the overly harsh 
and criminal law based defamation law, which operates as a curb on freedom of 
expression, is an example of the weakness of international human rights law on their 
own terms as a means of actually securing the democratic ideal.233 A legal concept of 
democracy as part of the right to self-determination, as a legal impetus, could have 
helped reassure of a determined effort on the part of the government to achieve the 
democratic ideal. Arguably, such an idea retains relevance even today as the 
government of East Timor persistently struggles to exercise control of the territory 
without an international military presence some 6 years since the declaration of 
independence and the end of ITA. 234 
There are, then, across all the examples reasons related to international peace for a 
legal concept of democracy as part of the right to self-determination not being 
encouraged. However, there is little reason why predetermined consociational 
arrangements, for example, could not be accommodated as reasonable exceptions to 
the proposed law. By treating democracy as a legal concept and as part of the right to 
self-determination there would have been a basis for regulation and accountability 
for those that come to governance in pursuit of democracy, either international actors 
or domestic government which remains dependent on international actors for 
effective control. Such law, even based on a high standard of persistent neglect 
before any challenge to authority could be made, would have helped guarantee and 
encourage realisation of the standards which have some claim to reflect the 
democratic ideal both in terms of procedure for identification of the government and 
conduct of governance: thus helping to better guarantee the value of self-
232 See discussion in Smith, op. cit., fn. 229. 
233 See Cogen and Brabandere. op. cit., fn. 183. pp. 690-691. 
234 Independence and status as a sovereign state w~ recognised most noticeably ~y the process. 
leading to admission to the UN as a Member State m September 2002 under the title Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste SC Res. 1414 (23 May 2002); GA Res. 57/3 (27 Sept 2002); the ITA ended 
in May 2002. following the declaration of independence (as Timor-Leste), ~d ~as .replac~ by a 
more paJ1ial administrative role, see Zaum. op. cit., fn. 6, p. 193; on the contmulng international 
involvement see. e.g., SC Res. 1704 (25 August. 2006). 
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determination and also confmning the commitment of the international actors to 
seeing democracy realised. 
The key reason why such law has not emerged, despite the range of years that the 
practice considered represents, is that it is not required for international acceptance, 
yet. Democracy as a loose political concept continues to have the hortatory power to 
convince that there is a commitment to genuine rule by the people, even though there 
is little to safeguard this promise. Scholars that are more convinced in the present 
strength of the emerging concept of democracy in international law clearly help to 
sustain international acceptance by reassuring that there is legal regulation of the 
democratic excuse. This, however, is not the case, and one must wonder how long it 
will be before the hortatory power of democracy starts to wane, particularly in light 
of examples such as Cambodia. 
In Cambodia, the human rights provisions in the constitution have appeared 
ineffectual, as the tendency for autocracy has crept back into governance.235 But the 
international actors that were essential for laying the foundations for the present 
situation have hardly responded.236 Of course, one might argue that present 
conditions are far better than what existed at the time of Paris, and effectiveness in 
Cambodia has not been dependent on an international military presence for a 
considerable length of time, but that is not the present point. The core point is that if 
democracy is to be an essential element of the excuse for neglecting the right to 
political independence, there has to be a meaningful commitment to achieving the 
democratic ideal. And this requires regulation and accountability, at least while the 
government remains dependent on an international military presence, because at this 
stage it is not possible to judge if the government has the allegiance of the people. If 
not, the ability of democracy to plug the gap with regards the value of self-
determination will reduce where a real commitment is not forthcoming. In this 
respect, legal regulation and accountability represents a means of helping to secure 
democracy's utility as a device for galvanising international acceptance of practice 
of reconstruction inconsistent with the right to political independence. 
5. Other Thoughts on Democracy in ITA 
23' R. B. St John, 'Cambodia's Failing Democracy'. Foreign Policy In FOCIIS, 23 January 2006, 
available at < http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxtl30791>. 
236 Ibid. 
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There are a couple of recent studies which have also touched upon how IT A relates 
to the right to political independence and the relevance of democracy in the 
explanation for international acceptance, which it is useful to address in order to 
clarify the fmdings of this study in these respects. 
Zaum, in his study on the policymaking of the international administrations in 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, argues that it is the pursuit of a collection of values 
which bind the international community, represented in the 'standard of civilisation', 
that explains why international actors are willing compromise the right of self-
government. The 'standard of civilisation' identified by Zaum encompasses 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law, effective government, and a free market 
economy.237 It is read as legitimising the authority of local political institutions and 
thus strengthening their capacity to fulfil sovereign responsibility. Zawn refers to the 
fact that the right to self-government or, as this study prefers, right to political 
independence, is compromised to create a government that fulfils its sovereign 
responsibility, as the sovereignty paradox. 
For Zawn, the standards before status policy in Kosovo can be read as 'a 
contestation about different norms: the norms associated with the standard of 
civilization [including democracy] on one hand, and the norm of self-determination 
on the other. ,238 This approach implies a transition from the inter-sovereign relations 
paradigm of the international legal system, which prioritises the preservation of 
political independence in the interests of self-determination and international peace 
amidst a pluralist international society, to a system where the strength of common 
values of an international community about the internal constitution of states 
overrides the right to political independence. Alternatively, one might take the view, 
as this study does, that the idea of international community still struggles to be seen 
as more than an additional route for international actors to seek wider international 
acceptance of their involvement, which struggles to fit within the confines of the 
inter-sovereign relations paradigm; on the basis that its rhetoric projects a greater 
strength of unity on the importance of international involvement than where the 
action is taken because of the interests of particular states. Indeed, were the 
international community so convinced in the importance of the • standard of 
237 lawn, op. cit., fn. 6. p. 277. 
238 lawn. op. cit., fn. 6. P 143. 
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civilisation' then surely it would have sought to encourage a legal concept of 
democracy as a means of safeguarding the realisation of the values that bind it. 
In another very recent study, focusing on Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor and Eastern 
Slavonia, Fox seeks to answer, why has the international community taken the 
extraordinary step of governing national territory? To which he answers that it has 
been in an effort to hold existing states together, the only way for this to occur in 
territories subject to violent conflict was for ITA. And, what is the legal justification 
for the missions? The consent of the target state, a UN SC chapter VII resolution, 
and the international law of occupation, are addressed by Fox by as the standard 
explanations. As these justifications are found wanting, Fox develops the thesis that 
the SC is not limited by state-centric rules like the law of treaties, law of occupation, 
or jus cogens when it acts for the collective interest, because then it is not state v. 
state thus the state based rules become an anachronism. With IT A, Fox argues that 
the SC has acted in the collective interest of keeping states together and ensuring that 
they are democratic which serves the democratic peace thesis.239 The implication is 
that the combination of a SC resolution in line with a collective vision takes away 
the importance of the right to political independence for the UN system. Certainly 
SC authorisation and endorsement is an important part of the matrix, which induces 
international acceptance of the practice, but it alone does not bring international 
acceptance for an activity that goes beyond what was reasonably contemplated with 
the creation of the UN charter in terms of activity to address a threat to international 
peace and security. 
Crucially, both Zaum and Fox overlook the relevance of the efforts to keep the 
practice within the existing structures of the inter-sovereign relations paradigm - the 
search for consent, the delay in reconstruction, the domestic elements in the 
governance structures, as well as the emphasis that sovereignty is not affected in key 
resolutions. These factors indicate a desire to have the practice seen as consistent 
with the right to political independence. That they fall short requires one to think 
about how the values that underpin the legal protection of political independence in 
the normal run of things have been addressed, as satisfaction of these is an obvious 
route for engendering international acceptance in a society of states that still 
239 See Fox, op. cit., tn. 6, pp. 1-13. 
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subscribes to these values. Democracy is, as was set out in Chapter 3 ~ the obvious 
answer. 
Moreover, there have been a large number of other examples where large-scale 
international involvement was necessary to restore effectiveness, thereby keeping the 
state together, but ITA was not pursued. The SC has identified the conditions as a 
threat to international peace and security but has not sought to assume administration 
of the territory; it has not explicitly compromised self-government to pursue the 
standards of civilisation or a collective vision of the state. A key reason for this must 
be precisely because ITA is so offensive to the right to political independence. Had 
political independence and the attendant values been insignificant, as both Fox and 
Zaum imply in different ways, surely IT A would have been followed in at least some 
of the examples that are turned to in Part 3 of this study as examples of the assistance 
model of state reconstruction. The choice of approach in these examples is to be 
argued as a key element in maintaining consistency with the right to political 
independence. 
6. Conclusion 
Across all four examples there has been significant reconstruction of state and civil 
infrastructure without an independently effective domestic government to administer 
the process. The restoration of independent effectiveness on the territory has been 
prioritised over the preservation of the right to political independence in the interest 
of international peace. This, though, puts at stake the value of self-determination the 
neglect of which, in a pluralist international society, risks sparking conflict and 
threatening international peace. Accordingly, there have been efforts to maintain 
consistency with the right to political independence. 
In the two whole sovereign state examples (Cambodia and Bosnia), the 
underdeveloped rules on the expression of the will of the state and its people have 
been taken advantage of to find a source of valid state consent. In the other two 
examples (Kosovo and East Timor), the uniqueness of the situations has meant that 
consent has been possible from absent sovereigns. The weakness of this as a legal 
basis. regardless of consistency with the right to political independence, is supported 
by the fact of a chapter VII basis which was not required with the whole sovereign 
state examples. In the two whole sovereign state examples, the delay In 
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reconstruction pending a domestic government, except for what was necessary for 
., 
resolution of the conflict, helps maintain greater respect for the right to political 
independence, than in the other two examples - where stressing the temporary nature 
or that the changes introduced were only those considered necessary in light of mass 
destruction is less convincing. Similarly, domestic involvement in government helps 
maintain consistency with political independence, but does not reconcile the 
situation when authority rests with the international actors and control remains 
dependent on an international military presence. Such efforts indicate a concern to 
remain with the confines of the inter-sovereign relations paradigm of the 
international legal system.240 But do not in fact reconcile the practice with the right 
to political independence, primarily because of the lack of an independently effective 
domestic government. Given that the primary motivation for the international 
involvement is international peace, how the other value put at stake by the neglect of 
political independence, the value of self-determination, is addressed can be cast as 
the determining factor for international acceptance. If efforts are not made to address 
the value of self-determination then there is the risk of conflict and the international 
involvement becomes counter-productive. The essential element in this respect is the 
pursuit of democratic self-government as a central reconstruction aim of all the 
examples. The hortatory power of democracy to promise genuine rule by the people 
takes the emphasis away from the infringement of the right to political independence 
and casts the international involvement as necessary for the realisation of self-
determination. 
If, however, democracy is to be an essential element in the excuse for the neglect 
of the right to political independence it has been argued that it must be about 
procedure and substantive conduct of government, which is what is suggested by the 
term, and that there must be a basis for regulation and accountability of its 
realisation. In all of the examples, democracy has, essentially, been treated as a 
loosely defined political concept. As a consequence, there is little basis for regulation 
or accountability of its realisation. Thus the claim it suggests in relation to the value 
of self-determination is far from guaranteed. Its ability to plug the gap with regards 
the value of self-determination will reduce where a real commitment is not 
forthcoming. Legal regulation and accountability represents a means of helping to 
240 In this respect, see, e.g .• SC Res. 668 (1990) preamble. noting the consistency of the Paris process 
with Cambodian sovereignty. 
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secure its utility as a means of addressing the value of self-determination and, 
consequently, for galvanising international acceptance in future efforts. The next part 
of this study will consider how reconstruction by an otherwise ineffective 
government, dependent on international involvement for the ability to introduce 
change and development, relates to the right to political independence. 
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Part Three 
STATE RECONSTRUCTIO:\ BY I:\TER~ATIO:\AL ASSISTA:\CE 
Chapter 6 
The Assistance Model of State Reconstruction and the Right to 
Political Independence 
1. Introduction 
The continued existence of states without effective government affects the efficacy 
of international law, l leads to human suffering,2 and has been identified as a source 
of security threats for international society.3 Thus it is logical for international actors 
to want to assist with the immediate restoration of effectiveness on the territory 
through a military presence, and with the reconstruction of the state and civil 
infrastructure to try and help ensure future independent effectiveness. Such efforts, 
however, encounter a significant paradox. The legal framework that ensures the 
continuation of an ineffective state operates to preserve the political independence of 
a state and its people in the interests of self-determination of peoples and 
international peace; two of the core values of the UN system.4 However, political 
independence is clearly brought into question by large-scale international 
involvement in state reconstruction. Moreover, traditional international legal doctrine 
identifies the agent for the rights and obligations of the state and its people as the 
government in effective control of the territory.s How, then, can large-scale 
international involvement in the reconstruction of an ineffective state occur without 
disregard for political independence? The previous part of this study has outlined 
how reconstruction by foreign governance is not easily reconciled with the right of 
the target state and its people to political independence. In respect of which, it was 
argued the pursuit of democracy has been an essential part of the explanation for 
international acceptance because of its ability to at least go some way towards 
1 G. Sorensen, 'An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood: Consequences for Conflict and 
Cooperation', (1997) 23 Review of International Studies 253 at 258. 
2 G. Kreijen, State Failure. Sovereignty and Effectiveness (2004) 87. 
) UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004), p. 25. 
4 Article I (2), UN Charter; see also N. D. White. The United Nations System: Toward International 
Justice (2002) 47-72. . 
'B. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999) 137-42: D. Wlppman. 'Treaty-
Based Intervention: Who Can Say No?', (1995) 62 University of Chicago Law Review 607 at 611 and 
references therein at note 26. 
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accommodating the value of self-determination. The most common model for state 
reconstruction without an independently effective domestic government is what this 
study terms the assistance model of state reconstruction. Unlike with occupation and 
ITA, solely a domestic government administers the reconstruction in the assistance 
model. Accordingly, one's initial impression might readily be of consistency with 
the right to political independence. 
Prominent examples, with contextual differences but a core of common features 
which is what this chapter identifies as the assistance model, are found in the recent 
past of Haiti (1994 - 1997; 2004 - ), Sierra Leone (1998 - 2005), Liberia (2003 - ), 
Afghanistan (2001 - ), and in Iraq following the formal end of the belligerent 
occupation (2004 - ). There are also signs it will be pursued in Somalia following 
the establishment and international recognition of a transitional government. 
The assistance model involves an otherwise ineffective domestic government to 
all intents and purposes gaining legal capacity through recognition by other states. 
This allows it to provide valid consent for an international military presence and 
capacity building assistance from an array of international actors. Treated as a 
continuum, the international involvement makes the government effective and puts it 
in a position to administer state reconstruction. This presents a further troubling 
paradox. International recognition creates the notional authority that permits an 
ineffective government to authorise the international involvement that makes the 
notional authority a reality. Can this be consistent with the preservation of the rights 
of the target state and its people to political independence? The apparent 
international acceptance and lack of attention given to this aspect of the 
reconstruction process in the scholarly literature might lead one to believe that it at 
least does not neglect political independence in a way which poses any threat to core 
values of the UN system. 
In an attempt to draw attention to the nature of the assistance model and its 
significance for the UN system, this chapter, by an exploration of the key features of 
the assistance model and the legal issues which revolve around it. conceptualises the 
model and addresses how it relates to the political independence of the target state 
and its people. The main argument to be pursued is that while the assistance model 
appears unremarkable. in fact it offers little protection for the political independence 
of the target state and its people and. as a consequence, puts at risk the core values of 
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the UN system of self-detennination of peoples and international peace. It is further 
contended that international acceptance rests on a number of factors, including the 
pursuit of democracy, that help towards consistency with the right to political 
independence and/or accommodation of the attendant UN system values. 
To identify the points of commonality in the approach taken by international 
actors to restore effectiveness and reconstruct the target states, the chapter begins 
with an overview of the situations present in each of the examples. Having identified 
that the examples share common features, the focus is on how, despite the 
international involvement being from a variety of international actors, the model 
does not manage to evade the problem posed by the paradox; how to have large 
scale-international involvement while maintaining the political independence of the 
target state and its people. Subsequently, in an attempt to identify whether 
international acceptance and the absence of scholarly attention is because of a lack of 
significance for the UN system, further sections explore how key legal issues - the 
international recognition of the assisted government, state consent, chapter VII 
aspects, and the pursuit of democracy - explain the position of the assistance model 
in relation to political independence and the attendant values of the UN system. 
2. Conceptualising the Assistance Model: The Ineffective Government 
As a model for the short-term and hopefully long-term restoration of effective 
control on a territory, the assistance model is far less striking than some of the 
alternatives. A key distinction from belligerent occupation or international territorial 
administration is that a domestic government administers the reconstruction 
process.6 In light of this, one might readily imagine that the assistance model does 
not encounter the paradox of state reconstruction or, more specifically. that political 
independence is not put at risk. Hence it is necessary to consider how it is that 
queries about consistency with political independence are in fact raised. 
The assistance model has been prominent in the recent past of Haiti, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia, Afghanistan, and in Iraq following the formal end of the belligerent 
occupation. There are contextual differences across this selection of examples. It is 
6 On belligerent occupation, see E. Benvenisti, The Inlernational Law of Occupation ( 1993); on the 
concept of international territorial administration. see R. Wilde, . From Danzig to East Timor and 
Beyond: The Role oflnternational Territorial Administration'. 95 AJIL (200 1) 583 at 584-586. 
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possible, though, to identify a set of common features in relation to the process for 
restoring effective control on the territory, which, when taken as a whole. prompt 
one to query how the model relates to the preservation of political independence. 
This and subsequent sections survey the examples to extract these common features 
for analysis in relation to the right to political independence. This section introduces 
the examples and identifies commonality in the level of control that the government 
without international assistance was able to exert, and the fact of large-scale 
international involvement. 
A. Haiti 
In 1994, Haiti had a government that was able to retain a degree of control over the 
state. Cedras' government had come to power by a military coup in 1991 and 
maintained control by a reign of terror. Thus there was widespread international 
support for the international intervention that led Cedras to step down and reinstalled 
the still internationally recognised government of Aristide.7 This was the start of the 
first assistance effort to restore governmental effectiveness in Haiti. 
The success of the first effort in Haiti was seriously hindered by a lack of 
cooperation from the Aristide government and a series of political crises.8 After 
some improvement, the security situation worsened and successive governments 
struggled for control of the state.9 In February 2004, with Haiti in an anarchic 
condition, President Aristide, after being elected for a second time, stepped down, 
noticeably encouraged by some of the same international actors that had returned 
him to power in 1994.10 
President Alexandre, following the departure of Aristide, requested the second 
assistance effort in Haiti. ll Alexandre was Aristide's successor but with the 
establishment of a transitional government the President's role became ceremonial. 
The Transitional Government was selected rather than elected. A three-member 
council, which consisted of a representative of Aristide's party, one from the main 
opposition party, and one international representative, selected seven eminent 
7 See Roth, op. cit., th. 5. p. 377. 
sO. M. Malone and S. von Einsiedel. 'Haiti', in M. Berdal and S. Economides (eds.), United Nations 
Interventionism 1991 - 2004 (2007) 168 at 178-179. 
9 See Report of the Secretary General on Haiti. UN Doc. S12004/300 (16 April 2004). 
10 Malone and von Einsiedel. op. cit., th. 8, p. 184. 
II UN Doc. SC. Res. 1529 (2004) para 2. 
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persons to identify a Prime Minister. The Council selected Gerard Latortue as Prime 
Minister from a short list of three candidates. Subsequently in 2004, Prime Minister 
Latortue selected his government, which agreed to work towards elections within 
two years. 12 Political authority was passed to an elected government in February 
2006. A significant international military presence remains in Haiti and international 
support continues for the purpose of reconstruction. 
B. Sierra Leone 
During 1998 - 2005, assistance to an existing but ineffective government was also 
the approach adopted in Sierra Leone. 13 As Kabbah has broadcast 'it is widely 
acknowledged that my Government inherited an almost completely collapsed 
state' .14 Kabbah was then overthrown by a rebel and military led coup and went into 
exile in Guinea. 15 Sierra Leone was in an anarchic condition at the time when the 
exiled President Kabbah was reinstalled by a Nigerian-led ECOMOG (ECOW AS 
Monitoring Group) force in February 1998. 16 The level of international involvement 
in the state increased overtime. 17 Stability has been sustained in Sierra Leone without 
an international military presence since 2005,18 while considerable international 
support continues for reconstruction projects. 19 
c. Liberia 
12 For an account of events see 2004 Interim Cooperation Framework for Haiti, available at 
<http://haiticci. undg.orgl>. 
13 See A. Adebajo and D. Keen, 'Sierra Leone', in M. Berdal and S. Economides (eds.), United 
Nations Interventionism J 99 J - 2004 (2007) 246. 
14 Broadcast to the Nation by H. E. President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Friday 26 May 2000 (on file with 
author). I' See Chapter 7. 
16 Kabbah had been removed from office by a military coup in 1997. The coup was said to have had 
the shape more a mutiny than a revolution Roth, op.cit., fn. 5, p. 407; see also Adebajo and Keen. op. 
cit., fn. 13, p. 255; J. Hanlon, 'Is the International Community Helping to Recreate the Preconditions 
for War in Sierra Leone? (2005) 94 The Round Table 459 at 460; Chapter 7 of this study. 
17 At its height the UN peacekeeping force numbered some 17. 000, and UNAMSIL was described as 
'indispensable' for the extension of state administration throughout the country, Second Report of the 
Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) on the United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc 812000/13, II January 2000, para. 44. 
18 See, e.g., Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra 
Leone S120071257. 7 May 2007, at 3. 
19 For an overview of the progress made and the challenges which remain see Report of the 
Peacebuilding Commission. Al61/90I-SI20071269, 14 May 2007. 
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Liberia, like Sierra Leone, suffered with conflict throughout the 1990' s. 20 An 
insurrection led by Charles Taylor in 1990 was halted by an ECOMOG military 
intervention, but ECOMOG only secured the capital Monrovia, with Taylor in 
control of the rest of Liberia.21 A series of agreements between Taylor and 
ECOWAS led to Taylor's internationally monitored election in 1997.22 Taylor. 
however, ran the country 'as a personal fiefdom' ,23 and was eventually removed 
from office by rebel forces. An initial ceasefrre agreement between the three main 
parties indicated scope for resolution of the conflict.24 Commitment to move away 
from civil and political turmoil in Liberia was evidenced with the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CP Agreement) by all the main political parties in 
August 2003. 2S This agreement provided a framework for the reconstruction of the 
state under the auspices of a transitional government. 26 The warring factions parties 
to the internationally backed peace agreement nominated the transitional 
government, which operated on the basis of a temporary constitution and pursuant of 
a reconstruction mandate, set out in the CP Agreement, until elections.27 An 
international military presence supported the transitional government and continues 
to support the government that was elected in 2005.28 There has also been and 
20 See J. Levitt, The Evolution of Deadly Conflict in Liberia (2005). 
21 See D. Wippman, 'Military Intervention, Regional Organization, and Host State Consent', 7 Dulce 
J. Compo & Int'l L. (1996) 209; on the international efforts to help with reconstruction during this 
time see 'Assistance for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Liberia', Report of the Secretary-
General, Al51/303, 23 August 1996. 
22 The monitors judged them free and fair, see, though, J. Stromseth, D. Wippman and R. Brooks, Can 
Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions (2006) 100. 
23 International Crisis Group (lCG), Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability, 24 April 24 
2002, at 13. 
24 Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Republic of 
Liberia and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia, Accra (Ghana), UN Doc. S/2003/657, 17 June 2003, para. 7 requested an international 
stabilisation force. 
2S Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy, the Movement of Democracy in Liberia and the Political Parties (CP Agreement), UN 
Doc. S12003/850, 18 August 2003. 
26 International Crisis Group (ICG), Liberia Security Challenges, November 3.2003, at 2. 
27 CP Agreement, op. cit., fn. 25, Article XXXV 1 (e) .. All suspended provisions of the Constitution. 
Statutes and other laws of Liberia, affected as a result of this Agreement, shall be deemed to be 
restored with the inauguration of the elected Government by January 2006. All legal obligations of the 
transitional government shall be inherited by the elected government. . 
21 See Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (9 
June 2006) S12006/376; SC Res. 1509 (2003); see also Stromseth. Wippman. and Brooks. op. cit .. fn. 
22. p. 101. 
234 
continues to be massive international involvement with the reconstruction of the 
state.29 
D. Afghanistan 
In Afghanistan in October 2001, responding to the attacks of 11 September 2001. a 
US-led coalition toppled the Taliban regime and in doing so created a governmental 
and security vacuum.30 A UN-backed conference in Bonn in November 2001 
brought together a selection of eminent Afghans to work out the arrangement for the 
future of Afghanistan.31 The participants selected, in December 2001, the Interim 
Authority with whom political power would initially rest. 32 The Bonn agreement set 
out a framework for the political development of Afghanistan and requested UN 
assistance with the maintenance of security.33 An Emergency Loya Jirga was 
convened after 6 months and this led to the creation of the Transitional Authority 
(T A) - with the head of state elected by some 1,500 delegates that had been selected 
or elected from throughout the regions - which held power until free and fair 
elections were held in October 2004.34 Governmental effectiveness throughout the 
territory remains dependent on an international military presence, and the 
reconstruction process continues to be fuelled by international assistance.3s 
29 For an overview of the key' priorities for Liberia, and strategies for achieving them, including the 
key international actors who have been or will be involved through financial, technical, or resource 
assistance, see United Nations and World Bank, Liberia Joint Needs Assessment Synthesis Report 
February 2004, available at <http://www.undg.orgiindex.cfm?P=149#s6>; for a summary of World 
Bank involvement between 2003-2005 in economic management, community empowerment, 
infrastructure, and institutional capacity-building, see World Bank, World Bank Program in Liberia 
(December 2005) available at <http://go.worldbank.orglOD88RUW6KO>. 
30 See, M. Sedra, 'Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: The Slide Towards Expediency', (2006) 13 
International Peacekeeping 94 at 94. 
31 See Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan's Bonn Agreement One Year Later: A Catalog of Missed 
Opportunities, 5 December 2002, available at 
<www.hrw.orglbackgrounder/asialafghanistanlbonnlyr-bck.htm> , participants included Afghan 
military commanders, ethnic group leaders, expatriate Afghans, and representatives of the exiled king. 
32 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement), UN Doc S12001l1154, 5 December 2001. in 
particular: Section III Interim Administration A. Composition. 3; see also C. McCool, The Role of 
Constitution Building Processes in Democratisation, International IDEA (2004) at 8. 
33 See S. Chesterman, You the People: The United Nations. Transitional Administration and State-
BUilding (2004) 89-90. 
34 See for an overview of this process CSDG (Kings College), A Review of Peace Operations. A Case 
for Change: Afghanistan (2003) at 26-30. 
35 See International Crisis Group (ICG), 'Security in Afghanistan'. available at 
<http://www.crisisgroup.orglhome/index.cfm?id=3071 &1= 1 &gclid=CJ _ oqLCqvZUCFQmlAod7x1q 
Qg>, last accessed 3 September 2008. 
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E. Iraq after Belligerent Occupation 
It was international intervention by a US-led coalition and the removal of the 
effective government of Saddam Hussein in 2003, which produced the political and 
security vacuum in Iraq. Initially, rather than find a domestic government to support. 
the coalition established its own, at fIrst military, and then civilian administration. 
which governed until June 2004. This approach meant that for this period the law of 
occupation applied as a source of legal restraint and obligation on the coalition 
administration, and this period was addressed in Chapter 4. The transfer of authority 
to an interim government in June 2004, selected on 'the basis of wide scale 
consultations with all segments of Iraqi society' ,36 was the point at which the law 
occupation ceased to apply. The interim government, however, and the elected 
government, which has followed, have both relied heavily on an international 
military presence for stability and security,37 and continue to receive support in the 
building of the security sector and across the spheres of governance.38 
F. Commonality 
Across all these examples there is the common feature that the government, which 
will be assisted to reconstruct the state, does not have independent effective control 
of the state. Whatever control the government has is dependent on international 
actors. There are modalities in terms of how the government has been identifIed, 
either an existing but ineffective government, or selected by eminent 
persons/warring factions, but the essential point remains that on the basis of 
traditional international legal doctrine they would not be identifIed as the agent of 
the state or the people. Before addressing whether the type of international 
involvement actually affects the right to political independence, and the type and 
relevance of legal justifIcations, to help clarify the signifIcance of these common 
features it is useful to comment on why some similar examples have been excluded. 
36 Transitional Administrative Law, Article 62 
37 See, e.g., United States Government Accountability Office, Stabil~g Iraq, An Assessment of the 
Security Situation, Monday 11th September 2006, GA0-06-I094T available at <www.gao.~ov>. 
)8 See International Crisis Group (lCG), Crisis Watch. I September 2008, no. 61, p. II, avatlable at 
<http://www.crisisgroup.org!home/index.cfm?id= 1200& 1= I >. 
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3. Other Examples Surveyed 
In the examples cited above, there has been a complete lack of independent effective 
governance on the territory. In the interests of clarity it is useful to explain why some 
other examples that might be thought to reflect the same paradigm, because of an 
apparent lack of effectiveness and significant international involvement. are not 
included. 
A. EI Salvador 
One example close to the subject matter of this study is the international involvement 
in EI-Salvador in response to the civil war around 1990. In this instance, the 
insurgents were not strong enough to topple the government, but were strong enough 
to win significant concessions from it. These concessions took the fonn of 
institutional reforms that were implemented with the help of the UN.39 The main 
distinguishing point that explains why this instance is not addressed in this study is 
that the government had managed to retain a significant degree of effective control 
without international involvement; it then extended that control through engagement 
with insurgents. Thus there was not complete dependency on international actors for 
effective control of the territory. 
B. Albania 
One might also think of the situation in Albania in 1997, where civil disorder grew at 
a rapid rate in response to the collapse of a number of pyramid financial schemes, as 
relevant for this study. However, with the deployment of a multinational protection 
force, order was rapidly restored and the international military presence soon left. 
There was thus no need for a long-term international military presence to provide the 
government with effective control of the territory. 40 
c. Solomon Islands 
39 See J. S. Kreilkamp 'UN Postcontlict Reconstruction'. (2003) NYU Journal of International Law 
and Politics 619 at 627. 
40 See P. Tripodi. 'Operation Alba: A Necessary and Successful Preventive Deployment'. (2002) 9 
International Peacekeeping 89. 
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The law and order situation in the Solomon Islands, an archipelago of over 1000 
islands to the north east of Australia, was in decline throughout the 1990'S.41 Factors 
in the decline include, widespread governmental corruption, ethnic conflict, and 
rapid population growth.42 A coup in 2000 worsened the situation.43 The Townsville 
Peace Agreement of October 2000 helped to contain some of the violence, but 'the 
situation in the Solomon Islands continued to spiral downwards.,44 By 2003, the 
state was considered by Australia to be on the verge of failure.4s Rather than wait 
until all control was lost, it was at this point that Prime Minister Kemakeza indicated 
his support for comprehensive Australian involvement. 46 The international 
involvement has been based on agreement with the government of the Solomon 
Islands.47 The Solomon Island's recognition of Taiwan as a state, in light of 
implications for the relationship with China, is said to have led the government to 
withdraw its request for UN assistance.48 The President of the SC did subsequently 
endorse the international involvement, but offered no legal base.49 . Today, the 
41 See E. Wainwright, 'Responding to State Failure - the Case of Australia and the Solomon Islands', 
(2003) 57 Australian Journal of International Affairs 485; D. McDougall, 'Intervention in the 
Solomon Islands' (2004) 93 The Roundtable 213; R. Ponzio, 'The Solomon Islands: the UN and 
Intervention by Coalitions of the Willing' (2005) 12 International Peacekeeping 173; G. Peake and 
K.S Brown, 'Policebuilding: The International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands', (2005) 12 
International Peacekeeping 520. 
42 McDougall, Ope cit., fn. 41, pp. 215 -216; 
43 McDougall, Ope cit., fn. 41, pp. 215, particularly with regards the economy, as the newly elected 
Prime Minister Sogavare drained the government's finances attempting to bring peace by 
compensation payments to both sides. 
44 McDougall, Ope cit., fn. 41, pp. 216; Ponzio, op. cit., fn. 41, pp. 174-175, notes how the Townsville 
Peace Agreement, which 'included measures to demilitarize the warring factions, promote 
reconciliation, facilitate greater political autonomy for the two provinces of Malaita and Guadalcanal, 
and help the many Solomon Islanders who were displaced, lost family members and saw their 
Eroperty damaged or stolen', was not implemented effectively. 
, See speech of Australian Prime Minister John Howard outlining the case for intervention to the 
Australian Parliament: 'A failed state would not only devastate the lives of the peoples of the 
Solomons but could also pose a significant security risk for the whole region.' Transcript, 12 Aug. 
2003, quoted by Ponzio, Ope cit., fn. 41, p. 178 (note 17) 
46 On 17 July 2003 the Solomon's parliament unanimously approved legislation giving authority for 
the intervention force to enter the country see McDougall, Ope cit .. fn. 41. p. 218. 
47 See, e.g., 'Agreement between Solomon Islands Australia, New Zealand~ Fiji. Papua New Guinea. 
Samoa and Tonga concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Anned Forces and Other 
Personnel Deployed to Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security'. 
Townsville, 24 July 2003, available at <http://www.ramsi.org/nodeJlO>. 
48 Ponzio, op. cit., fn. 41, p. 176. 
49 UN Security Council. 'Press Statement on Solomon Islands by Security Council President', Press 
Release SCn853, 26 August 2003. The Security Council President, Fayssal Mekdad (Syria). 
expressed the hope 'that this imponant regional initiative will quickly lead to the restoration of 
nonnalcy and national hannony in the Solomon Islands'. 
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security situation is said to appear much improv~ if still fragile,50 and support 
continues for the purpose of reconstruction. 51 
The Solomon Islands is perhaps the example that, because the government had 
extreme difficulty holding onto any control of the state at the point of consent to 
international involvement, which clearly facilitated reconstruction of the state, one 
might most readily expect to be included in the study.52 Still, however minimal the 
difference between some and absolutely no effectiveness might be in practice, the 
distinction remains an important one for this study. This is because without any 
control whatsoever the traditional basis of the rules in international law on 
expression of the will of the state and the people is completely absent - effective 
control of the territory. Accordingly, international actors should, in the interest of the 
right to political independence, be required to develop new law. With some controL 
however, the traditional basis can be clung onto, the likelihood of new law is thus 
less, and this is why this study is interested in those examples where the government 
is completely lacking in anything like effective control at the time when the large 
scale international involvement commences. 
4. Conceptualising the Assistance Model: The International Involvement 
This section identifies common features of the international involvement and also the 
legal justifications for the international involvement, as a basis for evaluating the 
relationship between the assistance model and political independence in the next 
section. 
'0 As civil unrest in Honiara in April 2006 is testament, see report at the website of the Solomon 
Islands' Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet <http://www.pmc.gov.sbl?q=nodeIl431> last 
accessed 04/09/08. 
'1 For an overview of the work of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) with 
respects the 'machinery ofgovemment', 'economic governance' and 'law and justice' see RAMSI 
Perfonnance Assessment Advisory Team. Annual Perfonnance Report 200512006 (July 2006) at 14-
19, available at <htp://www.ramsi.orglnodelllO>; see also Report of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Eminent Persons Group, A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (May 
2005) available at <http://www.pmc.gov.sbl>; S. DinneD, 'State-Building in a Post-Colonial Society: 
The Case of Solomon Islands' • (2008) 9 Chicago Journal of International Law 51. 
'2 Another example where the government hardly retained effective control over all the territory but 
still retained a modicum control, is found in relation to the circumstances of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in recent times, see the judgment of the ICJ Case Concerning Armed Activities o~ the 
Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), ICJ Reports 2005, p. I. at p. 45, para. 109. wherem the lack 
of control of the government in the area where Uganda forces were stationed. fonned a key tenet of 
the circumstances which led to case being brought to detennine legality of Uganda's activity. 
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A. Haiti 
In Haiti in 1994, there was a 20,000 strong multinational force followed by a series 
of UN peacekeeping missions; the remnants of the UN military presence left in 
November 1997.53 In Haiti from 2004, a multinational force followed by UN 
peacekeeping, which remains today, have operated. 54 
In 1994, the UN peacekeepers were further mandated under chapter VII to assist 
the restored government of Aristide with certain security-related matters, focused on 
the recruitment and training of the police force. 55 Some prominent examples of the 
wider international support in relation to Haiti in 1994, include US support for legal 
reform to a model based on the US legal system,56 as well as a significant amount of 
conditioned funding for economic reform. 57 
From 2004, Resolution 1529 authorized the Multinational Interim Force to 
establish stability and assist with the development of the security sector. 58 Resolution 
1542 mandated the UN peacekeeping mission under chapter VII with assisting the 
Transitional Government in a variety of ways with security, political process, and 
protection and promotion of human rights. 59 A mass of international actors worked 
with the Transitional Government to draft the 2004 Interim Cooperation Framework 
for Haiti. 60 This mapped out how Haiti would be changed and developed over the 
next two years throughout all sectors and was the basis for a donor conference to 
gain funding and assistance to see it through.61 Subsequently, the US, for example, is 
involved across a number of different spheres, including economic growth and job 
53 See Malone and von Einsiedel, op. cit., fn. 8, p. 177, and at p. 181 noting that almost all the US 
soldiers had left by January 2000. 
54 See J. Leininger, 'Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping - Conflict Resolution through State Building 
and Democracy Promotion in Haiti' , (2006) lOMax Planck UNYB 465 at 521. 
55 UN Doc. SC. Res. 940 (1994) para. 9. 
56 Which after being pursued for a short time was rejected, see L. Hagman (Rapporteur). Lessons 
Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti, International Peace Academy, Seminar Report 23 -24 January 2002 
Wew York) p. 5 (on file with author). 
7 Which gradually dwindled, amidst a lack of cooperation from the government. Hagman (IPA). op. 
cit., fn. 56, pp. 8-9. 
58 UN Doc. SC. Res. 1529 (2004) para. 2. 
59 UN Doc. SC. Res. 1542 (2004) paras. 7 and 8. 
60 Led by the Inter-American Development Bank. the European Commission. the World Bank. and 
the United Nations System, see Interim Cooperation Framework for Haiti, op. cit .. fn. 12. p. 7. 
61 A number of countries and institutions pledged a total of $1.085 billion. see World Bank. News 
Release 2005127ILAC available at <http://econ.worldbank.org!>. 
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creation, health and human services, infrastructure budget suppo~ and security and 
legal refonn. 62 
As well as a chapter VII justification for the security involvement, there has also 
been a consent justification for the involvement. In Haiti in 1994, Resolution 940 
takes note of letters from Aristide requesting assistance63 and repeatedly refers to the 
Governors Island Agreement as the framework for international involvement. The 
Governors Island Agreement was reached between Cedras (who was in effective 
control of Haiti) and Aristide to allow for the return of the latter.64 In Haiti in 2004, 
Resolution 1529 acknowledged the request for assistance from President Alexandre. 
The wider international involvement has been called for in broad terms in the 
various chapter VII resolutions that authorise the international military presence; 
such as Resolution 940, in 1994, which reiterated the need for 'the international 
community to assist and support the economic, social and institutional development 
of Haiti' .65 And Resolution 1542, in 2004, which: 
Emphasizes the need for Member States, United Nations organs, bodies 
and agencies and other international organizations, in particular OAS and 
CARICOM, other regional and subregional organizations, international financial 
institutions and non-governmental organizations to continue to contribute to the 
promotion of the social and economic development of Haiti, in particular for the 
long-term, in order to achieve and sustain stability and combat poverty66 
This wider involvement has not, though, been provided with a chapter VII basis. 
Instead, the legal basis for the involvement is founded on state consent. This, of 
course, involves working with the domestic government, and the government of 
Aristide and the Transitional Government of 2004 were both criticised for not being 
sufficiently compliant with the wishes of those assisting them.67 
62 US Bureau of Public Affairs, The United States and Haiti: Helping Haitians Build a Better Life, 
Press Release, August 52004, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/paleilrlsl34980.htm>. 
63 Taking note of the letter dated 29 July 1994 from the legitimately elected President of Haiti 
(S/1994/905, annex) and the letter dated 30 July 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Haiti to 
the United Nations (S/1994/910). 
64 UN Doc. SC. Res. 940 (1994) preamble, notes how the government ofCedras repeatedly failed to 
comply with its provisions. 
65 SC. Res. 940 (1994) preamble. 
66 SC. Res. 1542 (2004), para. 13. 
67 On Aristide. see Eleventh Report of the Multinational Force in Haiti, S/1995/149. 21 February 
1995; on the Transitional Government. see International Crisis Group (ICG) memorandum sent to the 
Members of the United Nations Security Council Mission in Haiti 'Update on Haiti'. 8 April 2005 (on 
file with author). 
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In Sierra Leone since 1998, and up until 2005, an international military presence, 
with varying levels of ECOMOG, UN and British units, was in place. At its height, 
the UN peacekeeping force numbered 20,000 and was described as 'indispensable' 
for the extension of state administration throughout the country.68 As Chestennan 
has noted, '[f]or the duration of the mission, UNAMSIL [United Nations Mission in 
Sierra Leone] claimed to operate in support of Sierra Leonean authorities rather than 
in their stead. As various functions were assumed by default, this proved to be 
operationally disingenuous. ,69 
The initial resolution establishing the UN military presence mandated the United 
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone to assist the government with disannament, 
demobilization and rehabilitation, implementation of the Lome-peace agreement and 
to generally have a presence.70 The chapter VII aspect of the mandate was limited to 
the use of force in self-defence and the protection of civilians in imminent danger. 71 
A subsequent resolution mandated a much stronger security presence in assistance to 
the Sierra Leone government under chapter VII. 72 
In Sierra Leone, there has been a significant amount of wider international 
involvement. 73 The World Bank, for example, was central amongst efforts by 
development partners to support the government's efforts to rehabilitate community 
schools, health clinics, markets, and roads.74 It was also crucial in creating a 
financial package that enabled private contractors to resume work on a hydroelectric 
dram crucial to meeting the electricity needs of Sierra Leone.75 The UK, in 
particular, has a long tenn commitment to Sierra Leone, and the UK DflD effort has 
been concentrated on refonning the civil service, the security sector, the judiciary, 
68 Second Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) on 
the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc S12000/13, 11 January 2000. para. 44. 
69 Chesterman, op. cit., th. 33, p. 87. 
70 SC. Res. 1270 (1999). 
71 SC. Res. 1270 (1999) para. 14. 
72 SC. Res. 1289 (2000) para 10. 
73 See, for a detailed account of the various actors involved and the nature of the involvement. The 
Government of Sierra Leone. Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO), Development 
Assistance to Sierra Leone 2004 - 2005 (2005) available at < http://www.daco-sl.orglreport.htm>. 
7"lnternational Development Association (IDA), Sierra Leone: Recovering from Years ofCont1ic~ 
February 2007. at 3, available at <www.worldbank.orglida>. 
" IDA, op. cit., th. 74. p. 6. 
and stimulating the private sector.76 The dependency on international actors was 
stressed by Brooks in 2003 who wrote: "[I]n Sierra Leone the fragile indigenous 
government relies heavily on UN administrators and peacekeeping troops to preserve 
the still tenuous peace and help with everything from education, health care, and 
food aid to legal and judicial reform." 77 
With regards legal justifications, a senes of peace agreements between the 
government and rebel forces stress that the government will request an international 
military presence.78 The wider international involvement has been called for in SC 
Chapter VII resolutions, such as SC Res. 1436 (2002) which: 
Emphasizes that the development of the administrative capacities of the Government of 
Sierra Leone, particularly an effective and sustainable police force, army, penal system and 
independent judiciary, is essential to long-term peace and development, and therefore urges 
the Government of Sierra Leone, with the assistance of donors and of UNAMSIL, in 
accordance with its mandate, to accelerate the consolidation of civil authority and public 
services throulZhout the country, and to strengthen the operational effectiveness of the 
. "19 
secunty sector. 
This wider involvement is, though, based on state consent. 
c. Liberia 
A multinational ECOW AS-led force was authorised under chapter VII in SC Res. 
1497 (2003) to establish and maintain security and facilitate the implementation of 
the initial ceasefire agreement between the warring factions.8o The requests for 
international assistance were repeated and expanded upon in the CP Agreement. 81 
SC Res. 1509 established UNMIL under chapter VII with a wide-ranging mandate of 
76 See FCO country profile available at <http://www.fco.gov.uk> last accessed 12.07.08; the UK has 
had a major involvement in the reconstruction process and has a memorandum of understanding 
(November 2002), which outlines conditional support of an annual 40 million until 2012, see 
discussion in Chapter 7. 
77 R. E. Brooks, 'The New Imperialism: Violence. Norms, and the Rule of Law', (2003) 101 
Michigan Law Review 2275 at 2279. 
78 Lome Agreement - Government of Sierra Leone and RUF (July 1999) part four; Ahuja Agreement 
_ Government of Sierra Leone and RUF (November, 200 I) para. 4. 
79 SC. Res. 1436 (2002) para. 7. 
80 SC Res. 1497, para. I, (I August 2003); Agreement on Ceasefire. Ope cit .. fn. 24, para. 7. 
I. CP Agreement, Ope cit., tn. 25, Part 9 Article XXIX para. 4. 
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assistance - including, implementation of the peace process, and security sector 
reform - to the transitional government. 82 
General international support to help Liberia restore itself as a functioning state 
was also encouraged in the various UN resolutions, for example, Resolution 1509 
'[claUs on the international community to consider how it might help future 
economic development in Liberia aimed at achieving long-tenn stability in Liberia 
and improving the welfare of its people'. 83 An international donor conference in 
February 2004 gained pledges of US$520 million and technical assistance to finance 
and enable the reconstruction of Liberia.84 Such wider international involvement has 
been on the basis of the consent of the government. 85 The World Bank, for example, 
along with involvement in core areas related to the economy and governance, has 
also provided funding and technical assistance for the development of the 
infrastructure for agriculture activity.86 Examples of the extensive US involvement 
include the funding, along with South Africa, for the retirement of over 4000 regular 
members of the anned forces recruited before the conflict,87 and the lead role in the 
training and restructuring of the Liberian Anned Forces. 88 
D. Afghanistan 
In Afghanistan, the Bonn Agreement requested UN and general international support 
with establishing security and reconstructing the state.89 SC Res. 1386 (2001) 
endorsed the Bonn process, and an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
was authorised under chapter VII to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the 
82 SC Res. 1509 (2003) para. 3, pursuant to the framework for establishment of a longer-term United 
Nations stabilization force to relieve the ECOMIL forces, as set out in SC Res. 1497 (2003). 
83 SC Res. 1509 (2003) para. 15. 
M International Reconstruction Conference on Liberia, 5 - 6 February 2004, Trusteeship Council 
Chamber, United Nations New York, Organized by the United States, World Bank and the UN 
Development Group with support from a core group of donors 
8~ See, e,g., the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) 9 September 
2005, which conditions aid on certain legal and administrative steps 'to improve financial and fiscal 
administration, transparency and accountability'; see also R. Sannerholm, 'Legal, Judicial and 
Administrative Refonns in Post-Conflict Societies: Beyond the Rule of Law Template', (2007) 12 
JCSL 65 at 86-93. 
86 See The World Bank's Engagement in Liberia <http://go.worldbank.orgl03L26ZL4QO> . 
• 7 See Ninth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. 
SI20051764, p. 7. 7 December 2005. 
18 See Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. 
S/2008/183. 19 March 2008. p. 7. 
19 Bonn Agreement. op. cit., fn. 32. Annexs 1 - III. 
maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.90 The resolution further 
called upon those contributing to the ISAF 'to help the Afghan Interim Authority in 
the establishment and training of new Afghan security and anned forces' .91 Wider 
international involvement has also been called for in relevant resolutions such as SC 
Res. 1419 (2002) which: 
Stresses once again the importance of continued international support to complete the 
process according to the Bonn Agreement, calls upon donor countries that pledged financial 
aid at the Tokyo conference to fulfil their commitments promptly and calls upon all Member 
States to support the Transitional Authority and to provide long-term assistance, as well as 
current budget support, for the current expenses of the Transitional Authority, and for the 
social and economic reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan as a whole.92 
The Afghan Government provides a consensual basis to the wider international 
involvement. 93 The funds and assistance pledged and provided to Afghanistan have 
far outstretched the other examples, aside from Iraq. 94 The US alone in the financial 
year 2004 provided some 2.2 billion US dollars, and amongst a variety of other 
projects trained thousands of Afghan soldiers and police.95 
E. Iraq after Belligerent Occupation 
In Iraq, the transfer of political authority to the interim government signified the 
formal end of the occupation by the coalition forces. 96 In respect of the subsequent 
90 SC Res. 1386 (2001) para. 1. 
91 SC Res. 1386 (2001) para. 10. 
92 SC Res. 1419 (2002) para 10. 
93 See, e.g., the website of the U.S.-Afghanistan Reconstruction Council (US-ARC) a non-profit, non-
partisan 501 (C)(3) organization, with an extensive range of reconstruction projects at the local level, 
which stresses that '[a]11 ofUS-ARC's projects have been approved with a written authorization from 
the local Shuras (Councils) and government ministries.' Available at <http://www.us-
rc.org/about.asp> 
94 See, e.g., The Afghanistan Compact, arising out of the London Conference on Afghanistan 31 
January - 1 February 2006, outlining the various commitments of the government and various 
international actors; and Official Review of the Joint Declaration of an Enduring Relationship 
between the UK and Afghanistan: An Enduring Relationship Action Plan, 14 February 2007 both, 
available at <www.fco.gov.uk> (under Afghanistan county profile). 
9' Progress in Afghanistan's Reconstruction, Fact Sheet Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, 
26 March 2004, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/palprslpsl2004/30803.htm>. 
96 See comments from U.S. administrator Paul Bremer at the ceremony to hand over sovereignty as 
reported by Washington Post Foreign Service, Monday. 28 June 2004; 2:55 PM 
<www.washingtonpost.com>. 'You are ready now for sovereignty and we think it's an important part 
of our obligation as temporary custodian to return the sovereignty to you ... I have confidence that the 
Iraqi government is ready to meet the challenges that lie ahead .. 
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basis for international involvement, SC Res. 1546 (2004) is a key resolution.97 The 
resolution sets out a detailed plan for procedures related to the reconstruction of Iraq. 
all under a chapter VII heading. It reaffmns the multinational force as a chapter VII 
authorised force, but also stresses that it is deployed at the request of the incoming 
interim government,98 and accordingly will terminate the mandate if requested.99 It 
provides the UN with a broad assistance mandate,IOO and acknowledges that the 
multinational force will also have a major role in security sector reform. 101 
Furthermore, it requests international assistance to be given to the interim 
government 
with the rebuilding of the economy, 1 02 and welcomes such efforts at the request of 
the government with rebuilding administrative capacity.103 Subsequent resolutions 
have followed a similar approach and the multinational force in Iraq today still 
benefits from chapter VII authorisation. 104 The vast array of international assistance 
that funds and facilitates the reconstruction of Iraq operates on the basis of the 
consent of the Iraqi government. IOS 
F. The Commonality in International Involvement and Legal Basis 
Efforts at reconstruction require stability and order. The first aim in the assistance 
model has been to establish and maintain security throughout the state through an 
international military presence. The other emphasis of the assistance model is 
helping the government to develop the capacity to govern effectively in a sustainable 
manner. This has been through assistance that collectively facilitates the change and 
97 Actually passed 20 days before the interim government took office, see C. J. Le Mon, 'Legality of a 
Request by the Interim Iraqi Government for the Continued Presence of United States Military 
Forces' (2004) ASIL Insights, <www.asil.orglinsightsl>. 
98 SC Res. 1546 (2004) para. 8. 
99 SC Res. 1546 (2004) para. 12. 
100 SC Res. 1546 (2004) para. 7. 
101 SC Res. 1546 (2004) para. 14. 
102 SC Res. 1546 (2004) para. 20. 
103 SC Res. 1546 (2004) para. 19. 
104 See, e.g., SC Res. 1723 (2006) para. I. 
10' See, e.g., International Compact with Iraq, 3 May 2007, available at 
<http://www.iraqcompact.orgl>; the Compact is a framework for mutual commitments, p. 3. and has 
been referred to in SC Res. 1723 (2006) preamble. as 'an initiative of the Government of Iraq to 
create a new partnership with the international community and to build a strong framework for Iraq' 5 
continued political. security and economic transformati~n and ~te~tion i~to the ~e~ional ~~ global 
economy. and welcoming the important role that the UOIted NatIOns 15 playmg by Jomtly chaanng the 
Compact with the Government of Iraq .. 
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development of the state and civil infrastructure. There has been assistance right 
across the political, economic, legal, and civil sector spheres of the state. It has been 
financial support in the fonn of grants for specific projects, and loans, as well as the 
provision of technical assistance, resource, and physical construction work. It has 
come from an array of different international actors. Moreover, as well as providing 
security through their own continued presence, the military forces are also mandated 
to assist the respective governments develop the capacity to ensure security on 
departure of the international forces. 
Across all the examples an international military presence has secured short-tenn 
effectiveness. The legal justification for this military presence is found in chapter VII 
resolutions as well as state consent. The wider international involvement, which has 
been essential for the change and development of state and civil infrastructure, has 
been called for in relevant chapter VII resolutions, but it rests on a consensual basis. 
The international involvement, viewed as a continuum, is intended to make an 
ineffective government effective. In light of effective control of territory being the 
traditional basis in international legal doctrine for the identification of the agent of 
the rights of the state and its people, there is good reason to be interested in how this 
practice relates to the right to political independence of the target state and its 
people. 
5. The Assistance Model and Political Independence 
The assistance model is a consequence of the realisation amongst policy makers that 
there is a need for a long-tenn commitment, rather than just a quick fix military 
solution, to conflict resolution. Thus the military presences have started to stay more 
long-tenn and wider international involvement has been called for to help 
reconstruct the state. Consequently, it is only relatively recently that the assistance 
model, to the extent witnessed in the examples addressed by this study, has become a 
common feature of the international arsenal for responding to ineffective states. 
The assistance model consists of a variety of international involvement from a 
range of international actors, in this respect. and as a domestic government 
administers the process, the assistance model of state reconstruction is less striking 
than belligerent occupation or international territorial administration in tenns of 
impact on the right to political independence. 106 This can help to explain its 
popularity at a time when a core tenet for international order remains respect for 
political independence. 
If one takes the wider international involvement on an individual basis, one might 
struggle to fmd reason for concern in relation to the right to political independence. 
F or example, the level of impact that assistance with the redesign and construction of 
a road system has on the right of the people to decide on change and development of 
the state and civil infrastructure is hardly a concern in itself:07 The fact that this 
wider involvement is from a range of international actors also helps obscure any 
thoughts that this involvement infringes the right to political independence. In other 
words, if one state were responsible for a vast array of the wider international 
involvement, suspicions that this was perhaps affecting the rights to decide of the 
target state and its people would be much more readily aroused. It is when one sees 
the international involvement as a continuum that the true impact on the right to 
political independence emerges. 
The military intervention in the examples cited has been intended to bring order to 
the target territory. Had the government retained even a modicum of independent 
effective control one would have been reassured about the government's credentials 
as the agent of the state and its people. Accordingly, how it governed during the 
international military presence could be accepted as in accordance with the will of 
the state and its people. This is how the situation in EI Salvador, highlighted above, 
for example, is understood by this study. However, without a modicum of 
independent effective control to begin with, the international military presence has a 
much greater influence on which political entity is able to exercise the governmental 
authority as the agent of the will of the state and its people. In other words, the more 
a government is able to exert control independently at the point when the 
international military presence arrives, the less impact the support provided to this 
government will have on any contests for governmental authority which might have 
106 In this respect, it is interesting to note that the prospect of international transitional administration 
in the sovereign state of Afghanistan was never seriously considered, see The Situation in 
Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security: Report ~f the Secret~­
General, 18 Mar. 2002, para. 98. UN Doc. AlS6/87S-SI20021278; see also Krellkamp. op. CII., m. 39. 
p.662. 
107 See, e.g .• UN Press Release, Liberian Government, World Bank and UN sign landmark agreement 
to rebuild key roads, 30 November 2006, UNMIL. PR 139. available at 
<http://unmil.org/article.asp?id= 1840>. 
248 
been fuelling conflict. Thus whether one VIews it as peacekeeping or peace 
-~ 108 d th elliorcement, an ere has been a mixture, the point is that without the 
international military presence, in the examples of the assistance model, the 
government which has provided the consensual basis lacked even a modicum of 
effective control of the territory and consequently must struggle in terms of 
credentials for being treated as the agent of the rights of the state and its people. 
If one views the wider international involvement with the military presence as a 
continuum, it is apparent that an ineffective government has been provided with the 
short-term effectiveness and the capacity to reconstruct the state. As the notional 
authority to consent to international involvement has come from international 
recognition, such practice clearly impacts upon the rights to decide, albeit in a less 
obvious manner than direct foreign governance. The circumstances that have played 
out in Haiti over the last two decades are a particular reason to be concerned about 
the neglect of political independence that appears to be involved in the assistance 
model of state reconstruction. 
In Haiti in 1994, Aristide enjoyed overwhelming international support for his 
continuation in government despite effective control of the state being lost. In Haiti 
in 2004, Aristide again lost effective control. This time, rather than assist with the 
restoration of effective control, some of the same international actors that had 
previously helped secure international support encouraged Aristide to step aside. 
Now international support favoured a government that was selected by a prime 
minister who had been selected by seven eminent persons that had been identified by 
two prominent Haitian politicians and a representative of international society. 
The obvious subjectivity of the international actors with regards the choice of 
government to place in effective control of the state is made all the more significant 
because the government is put in a position where it has the authority and the 
capacity to introduce significant reforms in state and civil infrastructure. Some 
examples from the most prominent common themes of extensive economic, security, 
and political restructuring include: in Haiti in 1994. Aristide disbanded the Haitian 
anned forces; 109 in Haiti from 2004, the anned forces were restored; 110 in both Sierra 
108 See Chapter 2 for discussion of the distinctions. and relevance in tenns of projected impact on the 
~t to political independence. 
I See Malone and von Einsiedel. op. cit .. tn. 8. p. 185. 
110 World Bank. Haiti: Recent Progress in Economic Governance Refonns. October 2006 available at 
<http://go.worldbank.orgIPF8ERYHLAO>. 
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Leone and Liberia there have been efforts to reorganize the diamond industry. a 
significant natural resource of these states; III in Sierra Leone, there have moves 
towards the devolution of political authority aimed at reactivating absent local 
government; 112 in Liberia, efforts continue with the refonn of the judicial system: 113 
in Iraq, efforts continue with the refinement of a constitutional text; 114 in 
Afghanistan the government continues to move towards a more market orientated-
legal system. IIS Thus the government is not only placed in control of the state by 
international actors, it exercises the rights to decide. Accordingly, there is a more 
pennanent impact on the design of the state and civil infrastructure than if the 
internationally supported government were simply charged with the practical tasks of 
administration, such as ensuring payment of civil service workers. 
It is readily apparent that the underdeveloped rules on the expression of the will of 
the state in international law have been essential in enabling international actors to 
find an agent for the rights of the state an its people. The core element in this process 
has been the ability of international recognition to establish the status of a 
government, in the sense of international law, where there is no effective 
government. As was noted in Chapter 2, while it makes practical sense that such a 
government should be able to offer valid consent to activity which does not affect 
sovereign rights, such as a postal treaty, it does not follow that the same should be 
true for activity which touches upon sovereign rights. The key concerns with the 
assistance model in relation to the right to political independence are about the 
credentials of the otherwise ineffective domestic government to be treated as the 
agent of the right of the state and its people to political independence. And, thinking 
about the discussion in Chapter 2 of attempts at surreptitious circumvention of the 
law of occupation by fictitious consent, there is reason to be concerned about the 
III See Partnership Africa Canada and the Network Movement for Justice and Development, 
'Diamond Industry: Annual Review', (January 2004) available at <www.pacweb.org>. 
112 See International Bank for Development and Reconstruction, 'Sierra Leone: The Role of the Rapid 
Results Approach in Decentralization and Strengthening Local Governance', Findings Reporl261 
April 2006 (on file with author); Statement by his Excellency Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. President 
of the Republic of Sierra Leone at the Special United Nations Conference on Sierra Leone held at the 
United Nations, New York, on 30 July 1998 (on file with author). 
113 See Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. 
S/2008/183, 19 March 2008, p. 10, para. 44. 
114 See The International Compact with Iraq A New Beginning, Annual Review May 2007-April 
2008, p. 16, para. 2.1.3, available at < http://www.iraqcompact.org>. 
11' See the website of the Afghan Ministry of Commerce and Industry for details of the moves 
towards establishing a legal and regulatory framework necessary for the functioning of an efficient 
free market economy <http://www.commerce.gov.aflMinister-Farhang-004.asp ... last accessed 
05/05/08. 
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ability of an otherwise ineffective government to resist the designs of the 
international actors, either explicit or implicit, as to how the state should be 
reconstructed. The apparent neglect of political independence puts at risk the values 
of self-detennination and international peace, and one, given the importance of these 
values for international order, is thus led to wonder about what underlies 
international acceptance of the model. 
6. The Portrayal of the Assistance Model as Unremarkable 
The legal justifications for the assistance model operate without a particular concern 
for the credentials of the government as an agent for the rights of the state and its 
people. Thus the law permits a government with little attachment to the state or its 
people to be put in effective control of the state. Furthermore, in relation to the 
preservation of political independence, one imagines that such a government would 
have difficulty resisting the designs of the international actors in relation to the 
reconstruction of the state and civil infrastructure. Still, the scholarly literature on 
state reconstruction through assistance is dominated by policy recommendations on 
how to improve the success of the international efforts. 116 Moreover, where the 
subject of legality is broached, commentators tend not to look beyond the 
identification of a valid legal basis for international involvement. 117 Does this mean 
that the assistance model is of little significance in relation to the core UN system 
values of international peace and self-determination of peoples, which are put at risk 
by a neglect of political independence? 
In order to establish whether the assistance model of state reconstruction is in fact 
a practice to be concerned about, it is necessary to address some of the legal issues 
that revolve around the assistance model and which can help project the risk to 
political independence and the attendant values as unremarkable for the UN system. 
A. International Recognition 
116 See e.g., Stromseth. Wippman and Brooks. op. cit .• th. 22. 
117 See, e.g., B. Oswald. 'Model Codes for Criminal Justice and Peace Operations: Some Legal 
Issues', 9 JCSL (2004) 253 at 253; Stromesth. Wippman and Brooks. op. cit., fn. 22. p. 51. 
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The lynchpin for the legality of assistance model is sufficient international 
recognition of the ineffective government. While international recognition remains 
evidence of status rather than the source, without international recognition there 
would be little else to base the status of the respective governments on. How, though, 
does international recognition help the assistance model? 
In the frrst place, the international legal significance that flows from international 
recognition, making a government the agent of the rights of the state and its people, 
could easily lead one to assume that recognition must be based on objective legal 
criteria; criteria that would guard against the international actors simply choosing 
whichever government they preferred, by requiring some meaningful attachment to 
the target state and its people. 
Secondly, even if one appreciates that there are no objective legal criteria to 
structure international recognition policy, an overwhelming international consensus 
that a particular ineffective government is worthy of recognition tends to suggest that 
the government is in fact worthy of its status as agent for the rights of the state and 
its people. 
The circumstances of the assistance model in Haiti indicate key reasons for being 
doubtful about the way international recognition portrays the assistance model as 
unremarkable in relation to political independence. With Aristide, in respect of Haiti 
in 1994, there was massive international support for the continued recognition of 
status. I IS With regards the 2004 Haiti Transitional Government, support was not so 
unanimous. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) refused to recognise the 
Transitional Governmentl19 but crucially, key SC resolutions backed it and thus 
secured its status. 120 The subjectivity and legally unbound nature of recognition 
policy is emphasised when one contrasts the difference in approach to Aristide' s 
elected government in 1994 and then in 2004. 121 This indicates that it is the opinion 
of international actors not the people of the state that counts, which hardly helps to 
118 See, e.g., the Organization of American States (OAS), '[t]o recognize the representatives of the 
Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the only legitimate representatives of the 
Government of Haiti', MREIRES. 1191 Corr. 1, OEAlSer.FN.l. 3 Oct. 1991, para. 3; endorsements 
from a wide variety of states at the Security Council meeting of 3 Oct 1991 UN Doc. SIPV. 3011. 
119 Malone and von Einsiedel, op. cit., fn. 8, p. 185. 
120 See, e.g., SC. Res. 1542 (2004) para. 7; on the significance of the endorsement of key international 
organizations for status see M. J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State 
Practice, 1815-1995 (1997) 42. 
IliOn the subjectivity of recognition policy see S. D. Murphy, 'Democratic Legitimacy and the 
Recognition of States and Governments' (1999) 48/CLQ 545 at 572-73. 
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reassure one of the worthiness of the government even where there is international 
consensus. 
The approach of CARCICOM, in contrast to other international actors in Haiti in 
2004, shows the scope for disagreement amongst international actors about which 
government is worthy. And that, for governmental status when effectiveness is 
missing, it is the international majority, or the opinion of the stronger states, that 
makes the degree of recognition sufficient. 122 It is thus not clear how many 
international actors must be in agreement before the recognition is sufficient to 
confer legal capacity on a government. Not only, then, is the matter of governmental 
status taken out of the hands of the people, but it is done so in a manner that defers to 
hegemonic tendencies in international society. This hardly makes one confident that 
there will be absolute agreement across international society on the worthiness of the 
assisted government, which would likely help reduce the threat to international 
peace, although, clearly not the value of self-determination. Indeed, the fact that 
Charles Gyude Bryant, former Chairman of the National Transitional Government of 
Liberia, stands charged with economic sabotage for misappropriating $1.3 million 
during his tenure is a further illustration of the inherent risk that the international 
involvement will put a self-interested government in control of the state in 
question. 123 
B. State Consent 
All the international involvement in the assistance model, regardless of whether it is 
mandated under chapter VII, has a consensual basis. 
The consensual basis removes any question of the law of occupation applying. 
The law of occupation applies when a state comes into uninvited effective control of 
the territory of a third state. 124 The law of occupation is a legal framework which 
guides the administration of the occupied territory. Its rationale is the preservation of 
122 In this respect see Peterson, op. cit., fh. 120, p. 42. 
123 See Sixteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, 
S/2008/183, 19 March 2008, p. 2, para. 6. 
124 The vast majority of the law of occupation is found in the 1907 Regulations Annexed to the Hague 
Convention No.IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. in particular Articles. 42-56, 
and the 1949 Geneva Convention No. IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, in particular Articles 27-34 and 47-78; the rules on application are found in Art. -'2 (Hague Law) 
and common Art. 2 (Geneva Law); see also Chapter 4 of thiS study. 
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the occupied states' sovereignty and the humanitarian well-being of the people, 125 
accordingly, there is a strict emphasis on conservation of the state and civil 
infrastructure. 126 That it does not apply in the assistance model can help project the 
international involvement as benevolent and of little threat to political independence 
because, one might reason, if there were a threat to political independence, surely the 
law of occupation would apply? 
Similarly, by precluding the wrongfulness of the international involvement one 
might readily assume that the assistance model must be consistent with the rights of 
the state and the people - if not, surely it would be wrongful? In this respect, 
international recognition and valid consent are closely related; the fact that they are 
separate - that recognition does not necessarily entail valid consent - means that 
the validity of consent reinforces how the international recognition helps the 
assistance model in relation to the worthiness of the credentials of the government to 
be assisted. 
The consensual basis is most significant because it portrays the government as 
being in charge of the change and development of the state and civil infrastructure. 
Thus, notwithstanding doubts about the attachment of the government to the state 
and the people, it suggests consistency with political independence. However, in a 
context where the legal status is the result of the recognition by international actors, 
rather than on the basis of objective legal criteria, and all effectiveness both present 
and in the near future appears dependent on international actors, it is far from 
guaranteed that the government could resist the desires of the international actors, 
explicit or implicit, as to how the state and civil infrastructure is developed. One 
might query, for example, how much leverage the Haiti Transitional Government 
had when developing the Interim Co-operation Framework in partnership with the 
international actors that would finance and enable the reconstruction it envisaged to 
be implemented. 
That there is at least some uneasiness from some of the international actors about 
the government's status as an agent of the rights of the state and its people might be 
suggested from the fact of the double legal justification for military intervention. 127 
125 See A. Roberts, 'Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967', 
(1990) 84 AJIL 44 at 46. . .... . 
126 See E. Benvenisti. 'The Security Council and the Law on OccupatIOn: Resolution 148J on Iraq 10 
Historical Perspective', (2003) 1 Israeli Defense Forces Law Review 19 at 20-1 and 23-7. 
\27 See, making a similar point. Wippman, op. cit., fn. 5, p. 672 note 225. 
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If the government is competent to consent to international involvement that puts it in 
control of the state then surely this should apply across the board, so why 
supplement consent with a chapter VII basis? 
7. The Importance of Chapter VII for the Assistance Model 
The UN SC's competence to create superior legal obligations and authorise activity 
that would otherwise be wrongful without contemporary consent, in the pursuit of 
international peace and security, is of huge significance for international law. 128 Not 
only does the SC have the ability to provide legal justification for activity that would 
otherwise be wrongful, but also, because of its position at the apex of the UN 
collective security system, it is able to confer certain activity with a degree of 
legitimacy that cannot be found from elsewhere. 129 This last point is sustained 
whether the activity is explicitly authorised in a chapter VII resolution or merely 
endorsed. 
In the assistance model, only the security aspects are chapter VII authorised. This 
addresses any lingering doubts about whether such intervention on the basis of 
consent alone would be legally justified. But it also might be taken as a signal that all 
assistance to the government that benefits from the military intervention is legitimate 
o a point made explicit in the relevant resolutions which call for wider assistance to 
the otherwise ineffective government to help it sustain effectiveness once the 
international military presence leaves. 130 Thus concerns about the effect of the 
assistance model on the political independence of the target state are assuaged 
because it is in pursuit of international peace and security and the most authoritative 
voice on the matter, the SC, has deemed it as such. However, there are reasons why 
it is not prudent for the SC to be blase about the preservation of political 
independence. 
One possible reason for relying solely on consent for the wider assistance is that 
this helps to present the actual process of reconstruction as an internal matter of the 
target state. If the SC authorise the wider assistance, this would take the choice of 
128 Article 2 (7), UN Charter, makes enforcement measures under chapter VII the exception to the 
prohibition on UN involvement with matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. see Chapter 
2 of this study. 
129 E. Milano. Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law (2006) 274. 
130 See, e.g., in relation to Haiti from 2004, SC. Res. 1542 (2004) para. 13. 
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whether to accept the assistance out of the hands of the domestic government, it 
would be internationally obligated to accept the assistance. Thus it would be harder 
to square with the idea that the only assistance that is received is that which the 
government desires, and, accordingly, with preservation of political independence. 
Should the SC be concerned with political independence if it is acting in the interests 
of international peace? 
The SC has a significant ability to legitimise and thereby make tolerable activity 
that might otherwise be questionable in relation to core values of the UN system. 
However, if this ability is misused to confer legitimacy where it is not deserved. then 
the strength of its power in this respect will weaken.131 The SC should therefore use 
its authority in a responsible manner. In this respect, for the sake of its own 
legitimacy, even if not legality, there are certain international legal principles of such 
fundamental importance that the SC even under chapter VII should seek to abide 
by. 132 
The apparent desire of the SC to render the assistance model consistent with 
political independence by limiting its chapter VII authorisation to the military 
aspects and overlapping this with state consent can be seen as evidence of the 
argument about adherence to fundamental legal principles. Yet, as noted, the 
consensual basis of the assistance hardly improves the situation in relation to the 
preservation of political independence. What this means is that both legal 
justifications benefit from the chapter VII 0 state consent composite. The SC 
benefits because the dominance of state consent as a legal justification for the 
assistance model as a whole presents the operation as more consistent with political 
independence. State consent benefits from endorsement in a chapter VII resolution 
because of the inherent reassurance that, regardless of the credentials of the 
government, it is in the interests of international peace that this government receives 
international support to enable it to remain in control of the target state. 
Does this projection render the neglect of political independence unremarkable in 
reality? One might be more inclined to accept the neglect of political independence 
as insignificant if it were just a right of the state to political independence at stake. 
This is because the rights of the state are obtained through a display of effectiveness. 
131 Milano.loc. cit., fn. 129. 
132 N. D. White, 'The Will and Authority of the Secwity Council after Iraq', 17 UIL (2004) 64S at 
672. 
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Thus the ethical argument for protecting them is solely in the interests of peace. and. 
as the actions of the SC are based on the pursuit of international peace and security. 
the SC aspect may more readily persuade one that any consequential neglect of 
political independence is not of significance. 
However, the assistance model also puts at stake the right of the people to political 
independence found in the legal right of self-determination, which exists regardless 
of effective control. The ethical strength of the people's right to political 
independence rests on the political value of self-determination, which stresses the 
importance of all peoples having the possibility of self-government. Its importance 
as a core value of the UN system is testified to by the fact of the continuation of the 
ineffective state as state for a prolonged period of time. 133 In light of this, one would 
be less inclined to tolerate neglect of political independence or expect international 
acceptance where its infringement was legitimated only by the pursuit of 
international peace. Not least, because neglect of the value of self-determination can 
pose a threat to international peace. One would thus expect widespread international 
acceptance to rest on attempts to address the value of self-determination beyond state 
consent where there is no independently effective domestic government. 
8. The Role of Democracy in the Assistance Model 
This study operates on the basis that the protection of political independence is 
important for the values of self-determination of peoples of international peace. 
Moreover, when the continuing status of the state is underpinned by protection of the 
people's right to political independence, to violate this right in the pursuit of state 
reconstruction would be to contradict the reason for the state remaining a state. 
Putting an ineffective government in control of the state brings political 
independence into doubt because of a lack of concern in the recognition-consent 
mechanism for the credentials of the government; and the influence that the 
international actors can have over an ineffective government in respect of how the 
state is reconstructed. A chapter VII aspect can assuage concerns in relation to 
international peace, but does nothing to improve the assistance model in relation to 
DJ See Chapter I of this study. 
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the value of self-determination. In this latter respec~ the pursuit of democracy 
appears significant. 
As a political principle, President Wilson, a key proponent, saw self-determination 
as entailing democracy:34 In an ideologically pluralistic international society. self-
determination as a legal right has traditionally stood for the right of a political 
community to political independence. An effective government has been as far as 
consensus has reached on means for identifying the agent of the right. Recalling 
Chapter 3, since the early 1990s there has, though, been debate about the position of 
democracy in international law. Some have concentrated on the emerging consensus 
on democracy as human right, focusing in particular on the meaning of Article 25 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 13S Others, by linking it to 
the legal doctrine of self-determination and the associated idea of popular 
sovereignty,136 have identified implications in the emerging consensus on democracy 
as a human right for matters of general international law such as governmental 
status. 137 
Hence in a situation where there is no effective domestic government, but there is 
felt a need to identify a domestic government, the pursuit of democracy is the natural 
response for efforts that seek to accommodate the value of self-determination. 
Accordingly, in the examples of the assistance model cited, the governments assisted 
have either possessed democratic credentials or have promised to pursue democracy 
in the very near future. This helps project a reorientation in relation to the value of 
self-determination, the neglect of political independence is obscured and the 
international involvement cast as a necessary for the realisation of genuine rule by 
the people. 
In light of how democracy has been treated in the other paradigms for state 
reconstruction, and that the assistance model is ostensibly the most unremarkable in 
relation to political independence, one is not confident in anything other than 
democracy having been treated as a loose political concept. This would mean little 
scope for regulation or accountability of an essential part of the explanation for 
134 M. Pomerance, 'The United States and Self-Detennination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian 
Conception', (1976) 70 AJIL 1 at 20. 
\3~ See, e.g., S. Wheatley. Democracy. Minorities and International Law C~OO5) 135-150. 
136 See Chapter I of this study. 
137 See e.g., T. Franck. 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance' (1992) 86 AJIL 46; G. H. 
Fox, 'The Right to Political Participation in International Law' (1992) 17 Yale Journal of 
International Law 539. 
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international acceptance in light of the core values of the UN system, which the 
assistance model, through neglect of political independence, puts at stake. 
Nonetheless, it remains important to clarify how democracy has in fact been treated. 
This is because, with the prominence of discussion of democracy in international 
law, there is a danger that one might be led to assume a legal concept of democracy 
has been adopted, with false hope of legal regulation and accountability. Moreover, 
if it can be demonstrated that the domestic and international actors involved are 
aware of the central role that democracy plays in justifying the practice in tenns of 
the core values of the UN system, then there is more likelihood of a legal concept 
being adopted, if not to date, then in future efforts; in light of the advantages of a 
legal concept, that this study has revealed. The present circumstances in Somalia 
help to illustrate why such an investigation is particularly pertinent at the time of 
writing. 
9. Somalia, the Assistance Model in Waiting 
In 1991, President Barre, leader of Somalia for 21 years, was finally ousted from 
office and Somalia descended into clan based civil war.138 Peace talks were held in 
Djibouti in early summer 1991 but General Aideed, leader of a major faction, 
rejected the proposed accord. 139 The plight of the Somalian people received 
substantial international attention. SC Resolution 733 (1992) imposed an arms 
embargo under Chapter VII and identified a threat to international peace and security 
on the basis of the 'heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage 
resulting from the conflict ... and ... its consequences on the stability and peace in 
the region' .140 UNOSOM I deployed in April 1992 as a peacekeeping mission with 
the consent of the two main factions, one of which represented the side that had been 
the government. 141 As Gray notes, 'it was the consent of the government. even 
though it was no longer in effective control of the whole territory, that was relied on 
in the SC resolutions establishing and deploying the United Nations Operation in 
138 See Kreijen. op. cit., th. 2, pp. 67-68. Barre died in exile in Nigeria in 1995. 
139 UNYB (1992) 198 -9. 
140 SC Res. 733 (1992) preamble. 
1411992 Mogadishu Ceasfire Agreement; by SC Res. 746 (M~ 17,1992) the C~uncil noted .~a.t the 
cease fire agreement included ·agreements for the implementatlon of measures aimed at stablhsmg the 
ceasefire through a UN monitoring missions'; see also SC Res. 751 (1992). 
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Somalia (UNOSOM I) peacekeeping force.' 142 A lack of local co-operation meant 
UNOSOM I was unable to complete its mandate. 143 On 3 December 1992 the 
COWlcil 'Acting Wlder Chapter VII ... authorises the Secretary General and Member 
States cooperating to implement the offer [from the United States to lead an 
operation] to use all necessary means to establish as possible a secure environment 
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.,I44 US-led UNITAF (Operation 
Restore Hope) was then deployed in December 1992, with an enforcement mandate 
but a humanitarian fOCUS. 145 A UN-led enforcement mission, UNOSOM II, was 
created to takeover from UNIT AF in March 1993,146 which it eventually did in May 
1993. With a realisation that a short-term military presence would not cure the 
anarchy that plagued Somalia the Secretary General was authorised to offer 
'assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and 
economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation.' 147 In such 
conditions, however, who do you help reconstruct the state? 
In March 1993, the Secretary General facilitated the conference of range of 
Somali parties in Addis Abba to, essentially, create a government and acquire a 
consensual basis for the international involvement. The Transitional National 
COWlcil (TNC) was created and was identified as the 'repository of Somali 
sovereignty'. The process, with no independent effective control on behalf the TNe, 
hardly sits well with the right to political independence. However, there was the 
chapter VII backing for the international involvement which stresses the importance 
for international peace and there was accommodation of the value of self-
determination in that the goal was a 'constitutional phase in which the institution of 
democratic governance, rule of law, decentralisation of power, protection of human 
rights and individual liberties, and the safeguarding of the Somali Republic are all in 
place.,148 Osinbajo has noted how it is difficult to classify Somalia in terms of 
142 C. Gray, 'Host- State consent and United Nations Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia', (1996) 7 Dulce J. 
Compo & Int'l L. 241 at 244. 
143 UNYB (1992) 208. 
14<4 SC Res. 794 ( 1992). 
145 See Chesterman, Ope cit., fn. 33. p. 143. 
146 SC Res. 814 (March 26 1993). 
147 SC Res. 814 (March 26 1993). 
141 Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the flrst session of the Conference on National 
Reconciliation in Somalia. 27 March 1993, Section IV. available at 
<http://www.usip.org!1ibrary/palsomalialsomalia_03271993.html> . 
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precedents for international involvement in a foreign territory.149 From the 
perspective of this study, in 1993, Somalia looked like being the first effort at the 
assistance model of state reconstruction. An ineffective government was to be made 
effective and put in a position to reconstruct the state. However, as Fox notes, "those 
holding real power in Somalia were unwilling to cede authority to the mc. and the 
well-known collapse of the Somalia mission put an end to Council efforts to promote 
that body as the center of a democratic nation-building enterprise.' ISO 
Somalia, then, was left to the mercy of the warlords, and this, to a large extent, is 
how it has remained, with the exceptions of Somaliland and Puntland where there 
has been relative peace and stability. lSI In August 2002, an assembly of elders 
elected a Transitional National Government, it struggled to gain any control and was 
described as without 'power, capability or support from the people. IS2 At peace talks 
in Kenya in October 2002 Kreijen describes how it was treated as merely one of 
many Somali factions. IS3 More recently, however, the prospect of another attempt at 
an assistance model of state reconstruction in Somalia has started to look more 
likely. 
In 2004, a new transitional government was set up in exile in Nairobi. In exile the 
government had no control over the territory. And the only election was of the 
President by the parliament appointed by the participants in attendance at the 2004 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) political conference where it 
was set up. Still the government is treated by international actors and considers itself 
as the total agent of the rights and obligations of the state and its people in 
internationallaw. ls4 This point is borne out by the international recognition and the 
toleration of Ethiopia's, January 2007, military intervention in Somalia at the request 
of that government, against contestants who controlled far more of the population 
and territory. While it continues to promise to be pursuing democratic elections, 
international support for the Transitional Government looks like it will continue. ISS It 
149 Y. Osinbajo, Legality in a Collapsed State: the Somali Experience (1996) 45 ICLQ 910 at 911. 
150 G. Fox, 'Democratization', in D. M. Malone (ed.), The u.N. Security Council: From the Cold War 
to the 21st Century (2004) 69 at 75; see also Osinbajo, op. cit., tho 149. 
1'1 For an overview of Somalia after the UN left. see Kreijen, op. cit .• fn. 2, pp. 66-73. 
U2 G. El Koury, 'Somalia: Black Hawk Down No More. A Field Report' ,issued by the Public 
International Law and Policy Group (2002) 4. 
U3 Kr .. . &... 2 73 elJen. op. Cit., UI. • p. . .. . 
1$4 See 2004 Transitional Federal Charter of the Somaha Repubhc. Article 1.1. 
15' See, e.g .• answer of the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Co~~onwe~l~ Affairs. Hansard 
Written Answers, 16 Jan 2007. Col. 986w: 'We fully support Somalia s TransItIOnal Federal 
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is, though, not yet receiving the massive international military presence that it would 
need to be put in effective control of the state and to allow for meaningful 
nstruct· IS6 Gi h' . I I . reco Ion. ven t e mternattona to eratlon of the Ethiopian intervention 
there is a real prospect that such a military presence might not be chapter VII 
authorised. Even with chapter VII, an operation designed to put this transitional 
government in power and in a position where it can reconstruct the state would be 
the most strikingly inconsistent, in the sense of the right to political independence, 
example of the assistance model of state reconstruction to date. In such a context 
how the value of self-determination is addressed assumes monumental importance 
for international law, a promise to pursue a loose political concept, which can easily 
be reneged upon, would appear woefully insufficient. 
10. Conclusion 
While the consensual basis and the fact of domestic administration portray 
consistency with the right to political independence, it has been argued that the 
assistance model of state reconstruction neglects political independence of the target 
state and its people. This is because of concerns about the credentials of an 
ineffective government to be put in control of the change and development of the 
state and civil infrastructure, as well as its ability to resists the designs on the 
international actors that keep it in authority. 
It is the under-developed rule of the expression of the will of the state, that 
become subservient to subjective international recognition in the absence of an 
effective government, which make the preclusion of wrongfulness possible. 
However, without further effort to address the values of self-determination and 
international peace that are put at stake by the neglect of the right to political 
government and Institutions in their efforts to find a lasting and inclusive political settlement, and to 
become an effective governing authority. The Transitional Federal Charter sets out a roadmap for a 
constitutional process and eventual transition to a democratically elected government. This is the 
framework within which the Transitional government should pursue a political process in Mogadishu. 
We are working with the Transitional government and Institutions. and our international partners. to 
help stabilise Somalia through the early depl0YJ!lent of a ~gional se~urity fon:e. resto.re governance 
through an inclusive political process, and rebUild Somaha through mcreased mternatlonal 
assistance. ' 
l~ See J. Gettleman. 'Somalia Town Falls to Insurgent Raid'. International Herald Tribune, I April 
2008 available at <http://www.iht.com/articlesl2008/03/3 1 lafrica/31 somalia.php>. 
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independence it has been argued that international acceptance of the model would be 
far less likely. 
While chapter VII endorsement provides important reassurance that the process is 
in the interests of international peace it does not, however, address the value of self-
determination. Projection of the accommodation of the value of self-determination is 
found in the persistent desire to realise democracy, which suggests that the process is 
one that will provide genuine rule by the people. Looking at the present 
circumstances in Somalia, there is a clear need for clarification of a how democracy 
has actually been treated in these examples. This is because, in circumstances where 
the government has so clearly been selected without any meaningful input from the 
people, as is the case with the Transitional Government of Somalia, a promise to 
pursue a loose political concept of democracy is hardly a sufficient excuse for the 
infringement of political independence that putting this government in control of the 
state would represent. There is a need for regulation and accountability of the 
government that exercises the rights to decide on the basis of the pursuit of 
democracy. This could be through a legal view of democracy linked to the right to 
self-determination. Accordingly, the next chapter surveys how democracy was 
treated in the process of reconstruction of Sierra Leone, to indicate more fully the 
essential importance of the pursuit of democracy for justification and international 
acceptance, in light of the UN system values at stake, of the assistance model. And, 
to search for evidence of democracy being treated as more than a loose political 
concept, in light of the discussions on the position of democracy in international law. 
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Chapter 7 
Democracy in the Reconstruction of Sierra Leone 
1. Introduction 
All the examples of the assistance model have involved governments with 
democratic credentials or governments that at least promise to pursue democracy. 
Space and time do not permit an in-depth inquiry into the role of democracy in all 
the examples of the assistance model. Accordingly, to better clarify the importance 
of democracy for those involved as a justification for the international involvement, 
and, related to this, the likelihood of democracy being treated as a legal concept 
linked to the right to self-determination in future efforts, this chapter concentrates on 
just one example, Sierra Leone. The chapter asks, is there evidence to suggest that 
the domestic and international actors involved are aware that the pursuit of 
democracy, because of its ability to accommodate the value of self-determination, is 
an essential element in the excuse for the neglect of political independence? If so, 
there is a basis for hoping that a legal concept of democracy will have been adopted. 
In view of this, it further asks, is democracy treated as a loose political concept or a 
legal concept linked to the right of self-determination? And, as a means of 
highlighting the utility of a legal concept of democracy, how does the way in which 
democracy has been treated relate to the actual accommodation of the value of self-
determination? 
Sierra Leone is chosen as the focus for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it is the 
example of the assistance model that appears, in relative terms, to have been the 
most successful, both in terms of the realisation of independent effective control of 
the territory and a functioning democratic form of government. It is the example 
which best provides the complete cycle of lack of effectiveness, international 
intervention, reconstruction, and eventual independent effectiveness. This means the 
Sierra Leone example provides all the stages of the assistance model. and thus 
potentially offers the fullest picture of the utility of democracy as a device for 
engendering international acceptance of a practice that does not sit easily with the 
right to political independence. Secondly. a significant amount of scholarly comment 
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was generated about whether the military intervention to return the government of 
exiled President Kabbah heralded a right to restore democratic government through 
the use of force. 1 Regardless of the outcome of this debate,2 the obvious importance 
placed on Kabbah' s democratic credentials as a justification for returning him to 
power, suggests that if there was to be an example in which a legal approach to 
democracy linked to the right to self-determination was adopted, it would be this 
one. The fact that Sierra Leone occurred some years after the return of President 
Aristide to Haiti in 1994, the other example often addressed in terms of a right to use 
force to restore democracy, 3 means that developments in relation to a legal concept 
of democracy and the link with the right to self-determination were more established. 
And, consequently, there is more chance of a legal concept of democracy being 
linked to self-determination in Sierra Leone, than Haiti 1994. Indeed, following the 
General Comment of the HRC on Article 25 ICCPR in 1996, Sierra Leone is the first 
example, of all examples of state reconstruction without an independently effective 
domestic government addressed by this study, where there was a readily identifiable 
emerging consensus on a legal concept of what Chapter 3 identified as genuine 
democracy. 
The chapter argues that both the domestic government and international actors 
were aware of the importance of democracy as a means of accommodating of the 
value of self-determination. It is contended, however, that there is no evidence to 
suggest that democracy is treated as a legal concept linked to the right of self-
determination. The flexibility that is necessary in the peacemaking context is argued 
to help explain why democracy as a political concept is preferred. However, it is 
argued that the value of self-determination would be better accommodated if a legal 
concept of democracy linked to the right to self-determination were adopted. This is 
primarily because the scope for regulation and accountability would provide an 
incentive for the government to continue to commit to the democratic ideal beyond 
elections, as well as a reason for the people to trust that they so committed. 
Furthermore, it is contended the flexibility that is necessary for the peacemaking 
I See, e.g., K. Nowrot & E. W. Schabacker. 'The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International 
Legal Implications of the ECOW AS intervention in Sierra Leone' (.1998) 14 A,!,: u. Int'l L: ~ev. ~21. 
2 See discussion in S. Chestennan. You the People: The United NatiOns. Trans1l1onaJ Adnllnlstrallon 
and State-Building (2004) 88-109 and 157-159. 
3 See M. W. Reisman. 'Haiti and the Validity oflnternational Action'. (1995) 89 AllL 82. 
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process could be addressed, in the proposed law, through reasonable exceptions in 
the interests of international peace. 
The chapter begins by outlining some of the recent political history of Sierra 
Leone, this is to indicate the context in which Kabbah was returned, to identify the 
period to be surveyed, and to show why it would be reasonable to expect a legal 
approach to democracy linked to the right to self-detennination. Subsequent sections 
examine statements from the government and actual practice of governance in 
relation to democracy, so as to form a view on how the government saw democracy 
in relation to the value of self-determination, how it was treated in terms of political 
or legal concept, and how the approach might have been improved in terms of 
accommodation of the value of self-determination. Moving on, the next section 
examines the various peace agreements. This is to discover the relevance of 
democracy, how democracy was treated, and how a legal approach to democracy 
linked to the right to self-determination would relate to the process. To help glean a 
better view on how democracy is likely to be treated in future examples, the 
penultimate section surveys the international approach to democracy in Sierra Leone. 
This is both in terms of democracy's relevance and how it was treated while the 
government was otherwise, without international military assistance, ineffective. A 
final section draws together key themes and relates the findings to the study as a 
whole. 
2. The History of Effective Control and Democracy in Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone was, up until 1961, a British colony, which had served as a home for 
freed slaves since the late Eighteenth Century. 4 Political organisation in the territory 
had already made modest moves towards democracy before the granting of 
independence. This was through the progressive enlargement of the legislative 
council that was created in 1863. By 1957, most men could vote, along with women 
taxpayers or property owners, and there was more than one political party contesting 
the elections. S The 1951 constitution was introduced as the framework for 
4 See ECOW AS.info, Country Profile for Sierra Leone: History available at 
<http://ecowas.info/s)ehist.htm>, last accessed 02/09/08. ., . 
5 See, for an overview of political developments up to the grantmg ofmdependence. InstItute for 
Security Studies. Profile of Sierra Leone: History and Politics available at 
<http://www.iss.co.zalati.profileslSieraLeoneIPolitics.html> last accessed 02JOQ'08; Commonwealth. 
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decolonisation. Local ministerial responsibility began in 1953, and constitutional 
talks in London, in 1960, led Sierra Leone to opt for a parliamentary system within 
the British Commonwealth. 
In 1961, a new constitution was introduced and with it came independence on the 27 
April 1961. The constitution provided for a unicameral parliament and Queen 
Elizabeth II as sovereign. The first general election with universal adult franchise 
was in May 1962.6 
The elections of March 1967 saw the All Peoples Congress (APC) gain the 
controlling majority from the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), with Siaka Stevens 
as Prime Minister. A series of short-lived coups followed, with Stevens and the APC 
restored to authority in 1968.7 A further attempted coup led Stevens to introduce a 
republican constitution, with himself made President in April 1971. Nationwide 
instability formed the backdrop to the adoption of a law that made Sierra Leone a 
one-party state in May 1978, the dominance of the APC in parliament obviously 
facilitated this.8 In 1985, Stevens was succeeded by his preference Major-General 
Joseph Momoh. Momoh won 99% of the vote as the only candidate.9 
Momoh's reign struggled with allegations of corruption and bad management. An 
initial response was the passing of a Code of Conduct for Political Leaders and 
Public Servants,10 this was followed by the setting up of a constitutional review 
commission. I I The Commission recommended a return to a multiparty democratic 
system, which Momoh eventually accepted in August 1991. 12 This did not stop 
Momoh being removed from power by an army coup led by Captain Valentine 
Strasser in April 1992, which suspended the constitution and set up the National 
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).13 In 1993, amidst public demand and a 
worsening security situation, a plan to hand over power to a civilian government in 
1996 was announced, along with constitutional changes. These involved a reduction 
in the term of office of the president down to two four-year terms, an age 
Sierra Leone Country Profile: History available at 
<http://www.thecommonwealth.orglYearbookIntemaV145182lhistory> last accessed 02/09/08. 
6 US State Dept., Sierra Leone: History, available at <http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgnl5475.htm> 
last accessed 04.09.08. 
'Institute for Security Studies, op. cit., th. 5; US State Dept., op. cit .. th. 4. 
8 Institute for Security Studies, Ope cit., th. 5. 
9 Institute for Security Studies, op. cit., th. 5. 
10 Institute for Security Studies, op. cit .. th. 5. 
11 Commonwealth, op. cit., th. 5. 
12 See Institute for Security Studies, op. cit., th. 5; Commonwealth. op. cit .. th. 5. 
13 Institute for Security Studies, op. cit .. fn. 5. 
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requirement of 40, and two houses in parliament: a house of representatives to be 
elected for a term of five years and a senate made up of 25 regional representatives 
and five presidential nominees.14 
Prior to the Valentine Strasser-led coup, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 
an opposition movement led by Foday Sankoh and fmancially backed by rebel 
leader, and future president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, had begun an armed 
insurgency. IS Following the coup, the insurgency continued in opposition to Strasser, 
and more territory fell out of governmental control. At one point in 1995 only the 
capital Freetown was under governmental control. 16 The situation was imprOVed 
somewhat by the hiring of the private security firm Executive Outcomes, this, with 
some 300 mercenaries, along with an uprising of civilian defence forces (Kamajors) 
managed to push the RUF away from the capital, back to enclaves along the 
border. 17 Presidential and Parliamentary elections were conducted in February 1996, 
albeit subsequent to a coup in January 1996, led by Julius Maada Bio who ensured 
that the elections occurred on schedule. 18 
'Voters defied violence and sabotage by the RUF and army elements' to 
participate in the elections and return a coalition government. 19 The SLPP was the 
most popular party, it gained 36.1 % of the seats in the legislature, and 35.8% of the 
presidential votes went to Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah its candidate. At a run off on 
15 March 1996, as no presidential candidate had made the required 55% share, 
Kabbah gained 59% of the votes to beat his closest rival Dr. John Karefa-Smart. 
Kabbah was sworn in as President on 29 March 1996, and reinstated the 1991 
constitution in July 1996.20 
Efforts at reconciliation with the RUF, facilitated by ECOWAS and a UN envoy. 
resulted in the Abidjan Agreement of November 1996, which allowed the RUF to 
register as a political party and permitted it access to the media 21 There was, though, 
14 Institute for Secwity Studies, op. cit., fn. 5. 
15 A. Adebajo and D. Keen, 'Sierra Leone', in M. Berda! and S. Economides (eds.), United Nations 
Interventionism 1991 - 2004 (2007) 246 at 247; see also W. Reno, Corruption and State Politics in 
Sierra Leone (1996) 166. 
16 Commonwealth, op. cit., fn. 5; US State Dept., op. cit., fn. 6. 
17 See Adebajo and Keen. op. cit., fn. 15. pp. 248 - 249; US State Dept.. op. cit., fn. 6 .. 
18 See Commonwealth Secretariat, Sierra Leone Presidential and Parliamentary ElectIOns 1-1 May 
2002: The Report o/the Commonwealth Observer Group (2006) 5-6. 
19 Commonwealth Secretariat, op. cit .• fn. 18, p. 6. 
20 See Institute for Secwity Studies. op. cit .• fn. 5; Commonwealth Secretariat (2006). op. cit .• fn. 18. 
p.6. 
~I 1996 Abidjan Agreement. UN Doc. SlI996/1034. 
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little international support for the implementation of the Abidjan Agreement. .. either 
in tenns of DDR or the provision of peacekeepers' .22 The UN at this stage was 
insisting on consent from all the parties to the conflict, not just the government, and 
this meant deference to the wishes of Sankoh the leader of the RUF, who would only 
permit a very limited number of UN observers.23 Thus the government could do little 
to resist the military coup in May 1997 by soldiers of the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who 'were 
joined with suspicious speed by the RUF rebels that they had ostensibly been 
fighting for the previous six years' .24 
Kabbah went into exile in Guinea. Koromah declared himself the new Chairman 
of the 20-member Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and Foday Sankoh 
of the RUF as the Vice-Chairman.25 Fighting continued with the Kamojor and 
ECOW AS (primarily Nigerian) forces (the later was holding strategic positions with 
the consent of Kabbah) resisting the AFRC and RUF.26 Reports suggest that 
Sandline International, a private military force, providing tactical and operational 
assistance services, assisted the Kamajors after being hired by Kabbah.27 Such 
fighting prevented the coup from establishing order. 28 There was significant 
international condemnation and isolation of the rebel regime, and international 
recognition of Kabbah' s government continued. 29 
An ECOWAS brokered agreement with the coup leaders in Conarky, Guinea in 
October 1997 provided a 6-month framework for the return of Kabbah's government 
to authority in April 1998.30 With signs that this agreement was breaking down, a 
Nigerian-led ECOWAS Ceasfire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) used military force 
to bring to an end the military regime in February 1998.31 Kabbah returned to office 
in March 1998. And governance in accordance with the 1991 constitution resumed, 
22 Adebajo and Keen, op. cit., fn. 15, p. 254. 
23 D. Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention (1998), cited by Adebajo and Keen, op. cit., 
fn. 15, p. 251. 
24 Adebajo and Keen, op. cit., fn. 15, p. 249. 
2.S Institute for Security Studies, Opt cit., fn. 5. 
26 B. R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999) 405. 
27 Report on the Question of the use of Mercenaries as a mean.s o~Violatin~ Human Rights ~d 
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determmatlon, submitted by the Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. Al53/338 (1998) pp. 6-7. 
28 Roth. op. cit .. fn. 26, p. 408. 
29 See Roth, Opt cit., fn. 26, pp. 405 - 407. 
30 1997 Conarky Agreemen~ UN Doc. S/I997/824. . . ..• . 
31 On debate about legality. see D. Wippman. 'Pro-Democratlc Intervention by InvitatIOn, In G. H. 
Fox and B. R. Roth (eds.), Democralic Governance and Inlernalional Law (2000) 293 at 303-5. 
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albeit with a state of emergency declared, which allowed detention without trial of 
suspected members and associates of the rebel regime and prohibited the possession 
of weapons and hoarding of food and fue1.32 The civil conflict was, however. far 
from over. Kabbah's authority was maintained through reliance on some 13,000, 
mainly Nigerian, ill-equipped ECOMOG peacekeepers.33 The UN presence was at 
this stage limited to the UN observer mission established in July 1998, with some 40 
observers. 34 
News that Sanokh had been sentenced to death seems to have been the spark 
which led the RUF and AFRC rebels to move on Freetown again towards the end of 
1998. Thousands were killed. ECOMOG, after some weeks of horrendous atrocities, 
forced the rebels out of Freetown.35 Sanokh was released in April 1999, a ceasefire 
was declared in May, and in July 1999 the Lome Peace Agreement was signed 
between the Kabbah Government and the RUF. At Lome, the Government, faced 
with the draw-down of the Nigerian peacekeeping presence,36 made major 
concessions including amnesties and power-sharing arrangements to try and secure 
peace.37 With Nigeria seeking to withdraw its troops from Sierra Leone, the UN was 
forced to act to shore up the security vacuum.38 The United Nations Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was created by SC Resolution 1270, and troops began to 
be deployed from November 1999. The response was, however, too slow and an 
ineffectual replacement for the Nigerian forces. 39 The rebels took advantage of this, 
advancing on Freetown in May 2000, killing and kidnapping UNAMSIL forces.4o 
The tide started to turn when the British Government, in response to the kidnapping 
of British soldiers, sent in 300 paratroopers to assist with defending Freetown and 
driving back the RUF.41 Eventually there were some 1,200 British troops in Sierra 
32 Commonwealth, op. cit., fn. 5. 
33 Adebajo and Keen, op. cit., fn. 15, p. 255. 
34 SC Res. 1181 (1998). 
35 Institute for Security Studies, op. cit., fn. 5; fighting continued in the north, Commonwealth 
Secretariat, op. cit., fn. 18, p. 7. 
36 See Adebajo and Keen, op. cit., fn. 15, p. 257 and pp. 259-260. 
37 1999 Lome Agreement. 
38 On the issues surrounding the withdrawal of Nigeria, see Adebajo and Keen,.op. cit., ~. 15, p. 2~; 
see also A. Abass, 'The Implementation of ECOW AS New Protocol and Secunty CounCil Resolution 
1270 in Sierra Leone: New Developments in Regional Intervention', (2002) 10 University o/.Hiami 
International and Comparative Law Review 177. 
39 On UNMASIL, see J. Hirsch, 'Sierra Leone', in D. Malone (ed.), The UN Security Council: From 
Cold War to the 2r' CenJury (2004) 521. 
40 Commonwealth Secretariat, op. cit., fn. IS, pp. 7-8. 
41 Commonwealth Secretariat, op. cit., fn. IS, p. S; for further discussion of the British military 
involvement at this stage from an international legal perspective, see K. Samuels. 'Jus Ad Bellum and 
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Leone, under British, not UN, command.42 Recognising the need for a stronger 
commitment to maintain security in Sierra Leone, the number of troops under UN 
command peaked at some 17,000.43 The ceasefrre agreed at Abuja in 2001 held, and 
Kabbah declared the war over in 2002. The gradual draw-down of the international 
military presence saw the last UN troops leave in 2005.44 
It is the period when President Kabbah was dependent on international actors for 
any sort of effective control over the territory of Sierra Leone that is of interest. 
Essentially, this is the period from 1998, when ECOW AS provided the security. up 
to 2004 - 2005, when the UN military presence was leaving and Sierra Leone 
became responsible for its own security. It is during this period that the normal 
international law assumption about a government being the embodiment of the will 
of the state and its people, because it manages to control the people, is not 
sustained.45 
3. The Treatment of Democracy by the Government of Sierra 
Leone when Effective Control was Dependent on International Actors 
Democracy is clearly central to the international justification for involvement. 
However, while Sierra Leone has a long history of attempts at democracy, 
democracy had hardly been established at the time of Kabbah's removal. An 
awareness of the importance of the pursuit of democracy for accommodation of the 
value of self-determination and, consequently, international acceptance of the whole 
process, might have been expected to lead to the encouragement, by Kabbah' s 
government, of a legal concept of democracy. This would have sent a strong 
message about Kabbah's commitment to the democratic ideal. Additionally, a 
Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of the International Community's Approach to Violence in the Conflict 
in Sierra Leone', (2003) 8 JCSL 315. 
42 Adebajo and Keen, op. cit., fit. 15, p. 263. 
43 Adebajo and Keen, op. cit., fit. IS, p. 263. 
44 First Report of the Secretary General on the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone. SI2006/269. 26 
April 2006. 
45 In this respect, it is interesting to note a defence argument that the Government of Sierra Leone 
lacked sufficient independent effective control to enter into agreement with UN Secretary Gene~l to 
create the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2002. Raised by counsel for Nonnan, when contestmg the 
constitutionality and jurisdiction of the Special Court in relation to the accused. the argument was 
brushed aside by the Court in light of a lack of evidence to substantiate the claim. Kallon. Norman. 
Kamara. SCSL-04-15-PT-059-1. 13 March 2004. Appeal Chamber. Decision on Constitutionality and 
Jurisdiction. at para. 72. 
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government in the position of Kabbah' s might also encourage legal regulation in 
order to set a precedent for future examples, where it may be that a not so worthy 
government seeks to take advantage of the hortatory power of democracy without a 
genuine commitment to the democratic ideal. Moreover, a legal concept of 
democracy could help to protect the democratic ideal should elections bring to power 
a government intent on autocracy. Accordingly, it is useful to establish how Kabbah 
in fact saw the relevance of democracy and how democracy was treated in tenns of a 
legal or political concept. A view on this can be gleaned from a review of official 
comments made by the government of Kabbah leading up to and during the process 
of state reconstruction. 
The exiled President Kabbah appealed at the GA for international military 
assistance and long-term wider assistance on the basis that: 
Only the speedy restoration of the democratically elected Government of Sierra Leone can 
provide a lasting solution to the crisis and enable the country to return to nonnalcy and to 
resume its place as a responsible member of the community of nations. This is no self-
serving statement. To insist on the restoration of my Government is no more than to insist 
that the Government which the people of Sierra Leone freely and openly elected in the most 
closel~ invigilated election in the post-independence history of the country be restored to 
them. 
Likewise at ECOW AS Kabbah stressed how: 
for the citizen voters in the queues, these elections were more than an opportunity to replace 
a military regime with a democratically elected and accountable government. They saw them 
as an historic watershed, the one opportunity to make a new beginning; and judging by the 
impressive voter turnout, they intended to seize that opportunity with both hands. 
Further, in light of this, Kabbah added that there was a need for '[ t ]he putting in 
place of a solid security system which will guarantee the security of all those who 
live within the borders of Sierra Leone. ,47 Essentially, the call to international actors 
was to give effectiveness to the government so that democracy can be realised. 
Democracy, then, rather than Kabbah' s own importance, is clearly acknowledged as 
the central basis for the return of his government. 
In terms of securing internal acceptance. from the outset, Kabbah relied on the fact 
of his democratic credentials to explain to the people why his government was 
46 GA Debates. 19th plenary meeting Wednesday, 1 October 1997. 10 a.m. New Yo~ A'52fPV.19. p. 
8. 
47 Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Address at the ECOWAS Summit in Abuja, Nigeria. 27 August 1997. (on 
file with author). 
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worthy to be returned to power through an international military presence. In a 
Statement issued by the Office of the President on the 13 January 1998, prior to his 
return to office in March 1998, it was stressed that: 
The people of Sierra Leone have demonstrated unequivocally that the junta has no mandate 
to represent or speak for them in any international meeting, nor to participate in any such 
meeting where the welfare of the people of Sierra Leone is being addressed, except with the 
consent or acquiescence of the democratically elected Government of President Tejan 
Kabbah.48 
Reference to the people demonstrating their preference, can be read as an implicit 
nod in the direction of the failure of the junta to establish effective control of the 
territory. Kabbah also did not have effective control, thus it is convenient for him to 
leave out explicit mention of this, and instead concentrate on the fact of democracy 
as the source of sovereign authority: 'President Kabbah's Government has the 
sovereign authority to set up radio facilities on any location within the territory of 
Sierra Leone to broadcast objective news and information to the people. ,49 While it 
is not explicitly mentioned that democracy is for the value of self-determination, this 
was strongly implied by statements such as that of Mr Jonah, representing Sierra 
Leone at a SC debate, '[ w]e very much hope that the Security Council will not allow 
them to not only frustrate the will of the people of Sierra Leone, but to defy the 
world community.' 50 
The weakness of a mere claim of commitment to democracy in the eyes of the 
people of Sierra Leone, in a context where the government previously had little 
opportunity to govern, in a historical context where democracy has often been a 
f~ade for dictatorship, paradoxically requires Kabbah to bolster his claim with 
reference to the international support that he has received based on the perception 
that he is who the people want: 
the international community has reiterated that 'the Government of President Ahmad Tejan 
Kabbah is the sole and legitimate government of Sierra Leone'. In particular, the UN 
.. 8 Government of Sierra Leone Public Affairs Unit, Statement Issued by the Office of the President 
His Excellency Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on implementation of the Conakry Peace Plan. 13 
January 1998 (on file with author) . 
.. 9 Government of Sierra Leone Public Affairs Unit, Ope cit., tn. 48. 
50 3822nd Meeting Wednesday. 8 October 1997, II a.m. New York. srpV.3822 Agenda: Situ~tion in 
Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone sat to participate) (vote on adoption ofSC Res. 1132, draft resolution 
initiated under the presidency of the UK 
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Secwity Counci~ has also acknowledged the legitimacy of the Government of President 
Kabbah.'1 
In a context where the commitment to democracy is so clearly central to the 
justification for international involvement, one might reasonably expect a 
willingness to embrace legal regulation and accountability of democracy. That 
Kabbah had an understanding of sovereignty that could have led to a legal concept of 
democracy being linked to the right to self determination, thus serving as a basis for 
regulation and accountability, was made clear when he offered the view that 
authority comes from the people: '[a]s leaders, we all speak with pride, in defence of 
the sovereignty of our respective states. We must never forget, however, that in the 
final analysis sovereignty belongs to the people. ,52 In other words: popular 
sovereignty. A survey of statements during the period of reconstruction when 
effectiveness was dependent on international actors can help to reveal how 
democracy was in fact treated. 
With his return to office pending, on 10 February 1998 Kabbah addressed the 
nation, setting out what the approach to government would be like on his return to 
office. His opening remarks provided an opportunity to identify any international 
legal limits on government as a result of the lack of effective control in the interests 
of the right to self-determination. Instead, after identifying that his government 
would soon be in 'full and effective control of the affairs of the country, to exercise 
its legitimate and constitutional functions', Kabbah goes only so far as to stress that 
the government 'will be doing so [exercising its constitutional functions] with much 
greater vigour, taking into account the situation which has prevailed in the country 
since May 25th 1997'.53 This concedes some need for special measures in light of 
the situation, but certainly envisages no particular international legal requirement 
that would limit and oblige the government in this situation. 
Instead, the situation is used as justification for streamlining the government. 
concentrating power in the hands of a few: 
'I Government of Sierra Leone Public Affairs Unit. op. cit., til. 48. 
'2 Address by the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to 
the Millennium Summit of the United Nations, New York. Thursday 7 September 2000 (longer 
version that was placed on record) (on file with author). . . 
'3 Address to the Nation by H.E. President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on the Restoration of Democracy In 
Sierra Leone. 13 February 1998 (on file with author). 
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We must face the reality that the new situation requires changes. Among other things, there 
would have to be a restructuring, reorganization and down-sizing of the cabinet and other 
structur~s of govern.ment. More emphasis will be placed on professionalism and probity. 
Ours WIll be, essentIally a government of technocrats. Within two weeks of my return. all 
cabinet ministers, and deputy ministers would be expected to submit their resignation. This 
should allow me the freedom, under the Constitution, to make the required changes in the 
structure of governance. ,54 
The emphasis on technocrats is an attempt to try and portray complete impartiality 
on behalf of the government, to stop it being challenged by other political parties, as 
the subsequent clause explains: 
Within a short time, I shall present to Parliament my proposals - concrete and realistic 
proposals - which I intend to use in charting the course of rebuilding our nation. Of course. 
Parliament has, not just the constitutional function in this regard, but also an important 
obligation to the people, to place, as far as possible, the good of the nation above party 
politics. I believe that we have the abili~ to use our multi-party constitution and political 
pluralism as instruments of national unity. 5 
Kabbah is here calling for trust to be placed in his government to make the right 
policy decisions and thus for others to resist objecting to changes. Implicitly the 
message is that peace, through the re-establishment of an effective system of 
government, involving state reconstruction, requires some dampening of normal 
participation in government. This is supported by the logic that trying to rehabilitate 
and reconstruct a state, when the clock on international involvement is ticking, 
requires quick decisions to be made. 
There is, though, a contradiction in commitment to democracy being the reason 
for supporting this government, and then the government encouraging normal 
democratic procedure to be dampened in the process of reconstruction. This is 
especially pertinent given that broad-based nature of the government was one of the 
justifications raised by Kabbah at the GA as to why he should be returned to 
power. S6 The implication is that it is only for the period of reconstruction, and then 
normal democratic functioning can resume. S7 Thus the pursuit of an independently 
effective democratic state is projected as the reason for a short-term impediment on 
,.. Ibid. 
" Ibid. II 
56 GA Debates, 19th plenary meeting Wednesday. 1 October 1997. 10 a.m. New York. October I 
AlS2IPV.19; p. 8 and p. 11. 
S? And in fact the reduction in the size of the government is suggested by Kabbah not to have affected 
its broad based nature. Address to the Nation by His Excellenc), the President of Sierra Leone. Alhaji 
Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. at the Silka Stevens Stadium. Freetown. Tuesday 10 March 1998 (on file 
with author). 
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democracy, as well as the international involvement that provides the effectiveness 
and the ability to reconstruct. 
The utility of democracy as a fix for decisions that impact upon the right of the 
people to decide on change and development is also witnessed when, speaking at the 
Special Conference of the UN on Sierra Leone, Kabbah justified the disbanding of 
the military on the basis that it would be replaced with one "based on competence. 
professional integrity, loyalty to our democratic institutions, and patriotism. ·58 
Hence, if one were concerned about the credentials of Kabbah to make such a 
decision, there is reassurance that it is in relation to the pursuit of democracy. and 
with it genuine rule by the people. 
At the opening of Parliament in June 2000, Kabbah' s speech reserved a section for 
the subject of democracy and good governance. 59 This speech identified democracy 
as the cornerstone of the whole process of reconstruction and rehabilitation: "my 
Government is keenly aware that the very basis for our survival as a nation today is 
our people's firm commitment to democratic principles. ' It aligned the 
understanding of democracy with emerging international consensus on what 
constitutes democracy by talking about 'grass-roots participatory democracy'. as 
well as identifying 'popular participation in the governance of the state', and 
'insistence on the right to freedom of expression' as cardinal elements of the 
democratic process. At the same time, though, the speech stressed that the situation 
in the state meant that not all these cardinal elements could be realised to the fullest 
extent at the time, when there was not yet a fully post-conflict situation. In this 
respect, one can understand why it would be convenient to project democracy as an 
aspiration with language like 'would wish to carry the citizenship with it' , rather than 
talk of specific obligations which, given the circumstances, might be seen as a 
hindrance to progress in the restoration of effective control. 
That it is democracy as a political aspiration rather than a legal concept that is in 
mind was latter implicitly stressed by Kabbah, "the principles of democracy and 
58 Reported from the Special United Nations Conference on Sie-:a ~n~. United Nati~,~: New. York. 
30 July 1998, by Sierra Leone Web. '30 July. 1998. News Archive. avaJlable at <hnp.www.slerTB-
leone.orglarchives.html>. .  
59 H' E II cy the President'S Address on the Occasion of the State Openmg of the Fourth SessIOn 
IS xce en "000 fil . h th ) 
of the First Parliament of the Second Republic of Sierra Leone. 16 June. - (on 1 e Wit au or. 
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good governance are ideals that we all cherish.'6O Nonetheless~ such vocal 
commitment to a future democracy is obviously important to sustain the support of a 
people whose state is in the process of being reconstructed by a government whose 
tentative hold on the state is based on an international military presence. 
Interestingly, when addressing ECOW AS, once established in office in December 
2000, there is not the same stress that security is needed to protect democracy as 
there was when seeking to be returned to office. Rather the security is needed to 
protect sovereignty. At this point, Kabbah is actually appealing for support to protect 
the right to political independence: '[a]s President I will be remise m my 
constitutional duty if I do not make provisions for the security of the nation. 
including the acquisition of essential military capability for its legitimate defence'. 61 
This could be read as a greater confidence in his government as the embodiment of 
the right of the state and its people to decide by this stage. It could also be read as an 
example of how, when seeking to encourage an activity that does not sit well with 
political independence, such as the return to power of an ineffective government, 
democracy is an essential tool for winning international support, as it eases concerns 
in relation to the value of self-determination. But, when the activity called for is 
more readily seen as protecting the right to political independence, for example, 
security to keep others out of the state, there is not the same need to stress 
democracy, because this aim is already about protection of the value of self-
determination. 
In such a context, as found in Sierra Leone, adopting a legal concept of democracy 
and making it part of the right to self-determination might serve to hinder some of 
the apparent flexibility required in the conduct of government, such as quicker 
decisions, through less consultation, during the process of reconstruction. Still it 
would help guard against a potential abuse of power and so help protect the right to 
decide. It would also have provided a stronger basis for Kabbah to resist the 
challenges of those opposed to his policy choices, rather than simple recourse to the 
fact of elections and calling for trust that he is doing the right thing: "let us all 
acknowledge that in a democracy. elected leaders are entrusted with the 
60 Statement by the President of Sierra Leone H.E. Albaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah . 
to the Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Italian Parliament Rome, 12 June 2002 (on file With 
author). ." . 
61 Address by the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone HIS Excellency AlbaJI Ahmad TeJan 
Kabbah to the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of Sta~e and Government of 
the Economic Community of West African States. 15 December 2000 (on file With author). 
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responsibility of making decisions on behalf of the people, with the best interests of 
the people in mind' .62 The suggested law could help reassure that it was not just trust 
alone that the reconstruction was proceeding on. Moreover, reasonable exceptions in 
the interests of international peace could have helped distinguish between what was 
necessary for peace and what was an abandonment of democracy. 
4. Democracy and the Conduct of Governance 
Consideration of how the actual conduct of governance relates to the emerging 
consensus on democracy as a human right provides an opportunity to indicate how 
the proposal of Chapter 3, to link this to the right to the right to self-detennination. 
responds to a context in which there is a likely need for derogation. The point is to 
show that better protection of the value of self-detennination, which a legal concept 
of democracy would offer, need not be a cause of frustration for the reconstruction 
efforts. Moreover, such consideration allows for the identification of conduct in 
relation to which, if interested international actors had understood democracy as a 
legal concept linked to the right to self-determination, one would expect at least 
some international comment. The responses of the international actors are addressed 
in the penultimate section of this chapter. 
The rights that constitute the legal concept of democracy, as was noted in Chapter 
3, even though the HRC helps develop a more specific understanding, are still broad 
and designed for implementation by a government. 63 Thus, in the proposal from 
Chapter 3, it would not be a simple neglect of a component that would raise interest 
in the credentials of the government. Rather, it would be a persistent neglect of one 
or more of the components that could trigger a challenge to governmental authority. 
An example of this would be transforming the constitution so that it no longer 
accommodated this basic model of democracy. Accordingly, in considering 
governmental conduct in Sierra Leone during the period when the government 
lacked independent effective control, an important starting point is to establish 
whether the Sierra Leonean constitution required modification to accommodate the 
emerging consensus on democracy as a human right. For if it did and was not 
modified, this could signal a lack of commitment to the democratic ideal. 
61 See, e.g., Broadcast to the Nation by H. E. President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Friday 26 May 2000. 
63 Sierra Leone ratified the ICCPR in 1996. 
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The Constitution, as noted above, was introduced in 1991 by a government 
seeking to win support from a people that were dissatisfied with the one party state 
system and the mismanagement and corruption. Chapter II of the Constitution on 
Fundamental Principles of State Policy indicates the policies that parliament should 
pursue when making laws, one of these is that the: 
5. (I) The Republic. of Sierra Leone shall be a State based on the principles of Freedom, 
Democracy and Justice. 
The meaning of democracy in relation to a form of government is left to be spelled 
out in subsequent parts: 
5. (2) (c) the participation of the people in the governance of the State shall be ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. 
Chapter IV on the Representation of the People provides for a multiparty democracy 
with elections at regular intervals. Chapter V provides for the regular election of the 
President with no more than two terms of office. Chapter III details how fundamental 
human rights are to be secured; this includes non-discrimination, freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and assembly. In general, the constitution could 
accommodate interpretations in line with the emerging consensus on democracy as a 
legal concept. It is therefore consistent with the idea of emerging law under 
discussion here for the existing constitution to be retained. One is thus interested in 
whether the government conducted itself in a manner consistent with the emerging 
consensus, and what impact a legal approach to democracy linked to the right to self-
determination would have had in relation to this conduct. 
The US State Department makes available yearly reports on human rights in states 
around the world. Recourse to these reports provides a general idea of how core 
components of the legal concept of democracy were treated during the international 
involvement and reconstruction period. Central features of the emerging consensus 
are freedom of expression, association and assembly. Over the years in question. 
1997 - 2005, there was little negative report on the government's treatment of 
freedom of association and assembly. A typical opening comment in the State 
Department reports is that of 2002: '[t]he Constitution provides for freedom of 
assembly, and the Government generally respected this right in practice: As well as: 
"[t]he Constitution provides for freedom of association~ and the Government 
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generally respected this right in practice.,64 There were always isolated incidents, 
such as the banning of RUF rallies in 1999,65 or the banning of a GRAO 
demonstration in Freetown, for which permission initially had been granted.66 But 
these are justified on the grounds of a state of emergency and in the interests of 
security, respectively. More concerning is when the motivation appears political, 
such as when the Government denied the GRAO permission to hold a march to 
protest the Government's decision to extend its term in office. But it did permit a 
rally instead,67 which helps to confrrm a general commitment to freedom of 
association and assembly, circumscribing it only in the interests of security. 
In relation to freedom of speech, the reports suggest a much more variable level of 
commitment. A typical introduction is: '[t]he Constitution provides for freedom of 
speech and of the press; however, the Government at times limited these rights in 
practice. ,68 This reflects that in general there appears to have been a commitment to 
the proliferation of outlets for free speech, without interference: 'the written press 
and radio generally reported on security matters, corruption, and political affairs 
without interference' .69 But this is marred by reports of isolated incidents such as: 
the IMC ordered the editor of the African Champion newspaper to stop publication and cease 
editorial functions for 2 months in response to two articles printed on February 6 and 11 that 
accused President Kabbah's son of using a Consul's diplomatic status to escape import 
duties. ,70 
Such incidents would of course send an implicit warning to all reporters to self-
censure. Still, in light of the general commitment to freedom of expression, this 
would not be the type of incident that one would envisage as leading to a challenge 
of the government's authority as evidence of persistent neglect. Nonetheless, 
international actors that keep the government in control should be aware of such 
incidents and be willing to raise the matter with the government should a pattern start 
to emerge. 
64 2002 US State Dept. Report. Section 2 b, all reports available at 
<http://www.state.gov/gldrVrlslhrrptl> 
M 1999 US State Dept. Report. Section 2 b. 
66 2001 US State Dept. Report. Section 2 b 
67 2001 US State Dept. Report. Section 1 b 
61 2002 US State Dept. Report. Section 1 a. 
69 2002 US State Dept. Report. Section 1 a. 
70 2002 US State Dept. Report. Section 2 a. 
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Another key element in the emerging consensus is the importance of the absence 
of discrimination. The 2002 Report notes how: '[ e ]thnic loyalty remained an 
important factor in the Government, the armed forces, and business. Complaints of 
ethnic discrimination in government appointments, contracts, military commissions, 
and promotions were common.' 71 It might be hard to substantiate such a claim, but if 
non-discrimination in relation to participation in government were made a part of the 
right to self-determination, through its inclusion in a legal approach to democracy, 
then, with the threat of challenges to authority on this basis, one would expect a 
much greater willingness to eradicate such practice. Likewise, one would expect a 
more pro-active response in respect of the restraints in the Citizenship Act that 
restricts the acquisition of citizenship at birth to persons of 'patrilineal Negro-
African descent.' This Act means that a large number of persons of Lebanese 
ancestry, who were born and resided in the country, 72 could not vote throughout the 
period of a lack of independent effectiveness. Moreover, while the discrimination of 
women in Sierra Leone appears a deep-seated societal problem, one would expect a 
more pro-active stance to address it than one that appears to turn a blind eye, which 
is what the 2004 Report on the place of women in Sierra Leone society appears to 
suggest. Essentially, the legal approach to democracy linked to the right of self-
determination would have helped encourage effective implementation of the 
constitutional provisions which prohibits discrimination against women and provides 
for protection against discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity.73 
The respect for the right to political participation is the cornerstone of the legal 
concept of democracy. In practice, it appears to have been a hard one to fulfil. Its 
realisation was affected by the search for peace up to 2002. Local elections, 
scheduled for 1999, were repeatedly postponed in light of ongoing fighting. 74 It was 
in May 2004 that the first local elections in 32 years were held. International and 
domestic monitors judged them to be generally free and fair at the time, but then 
irregularities on all sides emerged. 'A UNAMSIL electoral consultant concluded. 
however. that fraud did not alter the outcome of the elections because it was equally 
spread across party lines.' 7S The important point. in light of the contex~ would 
71 2004 US State Dept. Report. Section 5. 
72 2003 US State Dept. Report, Section 3 
73 2003 US State Dept. Report, Section 3 
74 2000 US State Dept. Report, Section 3. 
" 2005 US State Dept. Report, Section 3 
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appear to be that the elections were held. Had the postponement continue<L it could 
start to be seen as evidence of a lack of a general commitment to democracy. The 
difficult point for international actors, in the normal run of things, is feeling 
confident to voice an opinion on such matters so as not to be seen as interfering in 
the internal affairs of the state. However, when the government has its effectiveness 
as a result of international actors, it clearly is interfering in the internal affairs of the 
state, and the idea of this study is that there is a need to question it. Seeing 
democracy as part of the right self-determination would have provided the 
framework for questioning. And this would demonstrate to the people that the 
realisation of democracy was not entirely dependent on the whims of the 
government. 
In 2001, the Government extended its term to eventually around a year beyond the 
scheduled date for elections, citing the 'state of war' . This was much to the objection 
of opposition parties, who called for a coalition government to be formed in the 
meantime.76 When the elections did occur, there was criticism for not introducing a 
broad based government, and accusations of vote rigging, and corruption.71 A fear 
publicised by the International Crisis Group (lCG) was that, with the SLPP gaining a 
significant majority, Sierra Leone might slip back into the mindset of a one party 
state.78 In this respect, a legal approach to democracy as part of the right to self-
determination would have been a reassurance that there was a genuine commitment, 
and if not, that action would be taken to ensure the pursuit of democracy. As an 
aside, in the recent 2007 elections, the SLPP did not receive anything like the same 
level of support; with the international military presence gone, one can speculate 
about whether the people were now more willing to vote autonomously rather than 
so as to please the international actors, so that they will continue to provide support, 
by voting for the government that has proved itself favourable to international actors. 
In sum, the government of Sierra Leone was faced with a very difficult task in 
respect of achieving a functioning democracy that matched up to the emerging 
consensus on international legal standards in conditions of ongoing conflict up until 
2002. This helps to explain some of the failure to live up to the standards. After 
2002, however. in light of the lack of independent control as evidence that it reflects 
76 200 1 and 2002 US State Dept. Repo~ Section 3. 
77 See International Crisis Group (lCG), ·Sierra Leone After Elections: Politics as Usual?', Africa 
Report N°49, 1 S July 2002. 
71 Ibid 
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the embodiment of the rights of the state and its people, the government should do 
all it can to live up to the intemationallegal standards. For the main, from a tentative 
review of reports, there is evidence to support this, but at the same time there are 
instances which introduce doubt. In this context, were a legal approach to democracy 
part of the right to self-determination, one would expect the government to be more 
wary of allowing neglect; even if it would only be persistent neglect that would 
pennit a direct challenge on the competence of the government by those providing 
effective control. Persistent neglect would take into account mitigating factors such 
as the search for peace as reasonable exceptions, and the potential for false 
accusations from opposition groups. It would, though, permit and encourage 
international actors to monitor closely the conduct of the government that was 
returned to power on the basis of a commitment to democracy, and to indicate 
shortcomings in relation to the right of self-determination, which if they persisted 
would result in more direct challenge. 
At the UN, President Kabbah expressed a dislike for conditionality. 79 But when a 
government loses power, the people that it claims to represent have an interest in 
regulation and accountability of the basis for the government's return: genuine rule 
by the people. As international law, the conditions which the legal approach to 
democracy linked to the right of self-determination represent would carry far more 
legitimacy than the conditions which are thought up by the individual states or 
institutions providing assistance. Indeed, a government that was consistent with the 
suggested law would have a basis for resisting the imposition of wider conditions on 
the grounds that this consistency would enhance the claim to represent the will of the 
state and its people. 
5. Democracy and the Peace Agreements 
As has been noted, it was not until 2002 that the conflict in Sierra Leone was 
declared over by President Kabbah. Up until 2002, there were a series of attempts by 
Kabbah's government to come to agreement with the rebels on arrangements. 
including on governance. which would end the conflict. This section surveys how 
democracy was treated in the peace agreements and considers how this would relate 
79 Millennium Summit of the United Nations, op. cit .. fn. 52. 
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to the proposal of a legal approach to democracy as part of the right to self-
determination. This is important because peace agreements are a regular feature of 
the contexts surrounding contemporary instances of state reconstruction. 
Accordingly, if the proposal would frustrate such efforts, protection of self-
determination would be at the expense of peace, and one would thus be more reticent 
in advocating such an approach. Also, by seeing how the peace agreements relate to 
democracy, one gleans a view on how those international actors that support the 
peace agreement view democracy in the context. 
When Kabbah was initially calling for his government to return to power, it was to 
be in accordance with the terms of the Abidjan Agreement. The Abidjan Agreement 
had been entered into in 1996, before the exile of Kabbah. The preamble stresses that 
the parties are: '[ c ]ommitted to promoting popular participation in governance and 
full respect for human rights and humanitarian laws; [d]edicated to the advancement 
of democratic development and to the maintenance of a socio-political order free of 
inequality, nepotism and corruption.' so There is nothing in it to suggest that as part 
of self-determination a legal approach to democracy was required. However, the 
approach to governance is in line with the emerging consensus on democracy, 
stressing the need for civil and political rights of the people, including the rights 
'freedom of conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the 
governance of one's country,Sl be guaranteed and promoted. Moreover, there are not 
provisions for restructuring the apparatus of government that would hamper an 
interpretation in line with the emerging consensus on democracy as a human right. 
Indeed, it commits to electoral reform to ensure a level playing field amongst the 
parties to the agreement. 
While the core concession from the government, with the Abidjan Agreement, 
was in the form of amnesties, this was not enough to satisfy the rebels, and Kabbah 
was forced into exile. With the UN not prepared to deploy a peacekeeping mission 
without the consent of all of the parties, there was a need for further negotiations to 
permit the return of Kabbah. 
Closer to the time of Kabbah' s return, in October 1997. it was the Conarky Accord 
negotiated between the RUF and a committee of states representing ECOWAS 
10 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary 
United Front of Sierra Leone, signed at Abidjan on 30 November 1996. 
II Article 19, Abidjan Agreement. 
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(Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Ghana and Guinea) that was to provide a 
framework, albeit with little detail, for the return of Kabbah. Kabbah was at the 
Commonwealth summit in Edinburgh when the Conakry Accord was agreed. He 
claimed he was satisfied with the peace plan, 82 but then is reported to have indicated 
that he had not been consulted on the agreement with the AFRC, who he claimed had 
negotiated in bad faith.83 In the Conarky Accord, there is no mention of democracy, 
rather it is the return of 'constitutional governance' that is provided for in the 
Accord. It reinstates the amnesties, which were revoked by Kabbah in December 
1996; Kabbah is also said to have revoked the subsequent Conarky amnesties in 
November 1997.84 In relation to the governance arrangements the provisions are so 
vague as to make further negotiation a necessity. The vagueness would make it 
possible to read the provisions in line with emerging consensus on democracy. 
However, the implication from terminology such as 'broadening of power base'. 
'efforts should be made to ensure that an all-inclusive government is evolved', and 
then referring back to this as '[a]ll the above power sharing formulas', which are 
linked, in Point 5 of the Accord, to enabling President Kabbah to exercise effective 
control when returned to office,85 strongly suggests that there would be at least some 
infringement on democratic governance required to accommodate the interests of the 
junta. There is no evidence, on behalf of those negotiating, of a legal concept of 
democracy as a part of the right to self-determination, despite of circumstances 
where an international military presence to ensure effective control would appear 
inevitable. 
As was noted, frustration with the junta led to ECOMOG military intervention and 
the restoration of Kabbah. When, even with the support of thousands of ECOMOG 
forces, the government's effectiveness could still not hold, another agreement was 
entered into with the RUF, this was the July 1999 Lome Agreement. This agreement. 
in its preamble, emphasised the 'the conviction that sovereignty belongs to the 
people, and that Government derives all its powers, authority and legitimacy from 
82 President Kabbah, statement, S/ 1997/886, 5 November 1997. 
83 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Information Network 
for West Africa (lRIN). Background Briefing on the Conakry Peace Accord. 28.1.98 (on file with 
author) . . 
... UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated RegIOnal Information Network 
for West Africa (lRIN). op. cit .• fn. 83 . 
.., Conarky Accord. Point 5. 
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the people'. 86 It reiterated the commitment to democracy and human rights as found 
in the Abidjan Agreement. Along with amnesties, which were again reinstated 
(although the UN Secretary General did not endorse this element),87 a central point 
for the RUF was a lack of trust in Kabbah's government. This meant that a 
government arrangement without room for the RUF would not be accepted. 
Accordingly, Lome provided for power sharing arrangement until the next elections, 
which were scheduled for 2001. Prominent features included provision for the 
appointment of Corporal Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF/SL, as Vice Presiden~ 
answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone; and appointment of members of 
the RUF ISL to a broad-based cabinet. 88 Such an arrangement never came into being 
(the kidnapping of the UN staff and British intervention, essentially, saw the end of 
Lome). Still, it was hardly consistent with the emerging consensus on democracy as 
a human right. Its justification is found in the pursuit of peace, and willingness to 
enter into such an agreement must be measured against the fact of Nigerian 
withdrawal and the vulnerable position this would leave Kabbah's government in. in 
terms of keeping control of what limited aspects of the territory it had at this time. 
There is no suggestion that a legal concept of democracy was required as part of 
the right to self-determination by the parties or the international witnesses to the 
Lome agreement. 89 Without it, the international actors that provide effectiveness are 
left to call for compliance with the agreement and with human rights standards, there 
is no room for a direct challenge to the authority of the transitional government if it 
governs with a neglect for core aspects of the democratic right or if it does not 
proceed to free and fair elections; the point that reconciles Lome with the strive for 
the democratic ideal. Democracy as part of the right to self-determination, could, as 
an exception in the interest of peace, have allowed some reasonable impediment on 
86 Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of 
Sierra Leone, July 1999; this followed the ceasefire Agreement of May 1999. . 
87 See S. Williams, 'Amnesties in International Law: The Experience of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone', (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 271. 
88 Lome, Part 2, Article V. 
89 His Excellency Gnassingbe Eyadema President of the Togolese Republic Chainnan of ECOWAS; 
His Excellency Blaise Compaore President of Burkina Faso; His Excellency Dahkpan~ Dr. ~harles 
Ghankey TaylorPresident of the Republic of Liberia; His Excellency ?Iuseg~ <?b~Jo PreSident 
and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic ofNlgena: HIS Excellency 
Youssoufou Bamba Secretary of State at the Foreign Mission in charge of International ~oopcration 
of Cote d'lvoire; His Excellency Victor Gbeho Minister of Foreign Atfau: of the Republac of Ghana: 
Mr. Roger Laloupo Representative of the ECOWAS Special Representative; Ms. Ad~oa Coleman 
Representative Organization of African Unity: Ambassador Francis G. O~elo ExecutIve Secretary of 
the United Nations Secretary General; Dr. Moses K.Z. Anafu Representative of the Commonwealth of 
Nations. 
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democracy. It would, though, have provided a basis for international actors, that are 
called upon to provide effective control, to challenge the subsequent compromise 
government if it offered signs of persistent neglect of aspects of a legal concept of 
democracy. This would have been particularly relevant given how the jun~ when 
Kabbah was in exile, had hardly shown signs of a commitment to democracy, and 
had persistently missed the deadlines for reintroduction of the elected government. 90 
The Abuja Ceasefrre Agreement, 10 November 2000, provided the basis for the 
peace that held. A brief document, it concentrated on key points necessary for peace 
to be sustained, such as 'UNAMSIL shall have full liberty to deploy its troops and 
other personnel throughout Sierra Leone including the diamond producing areas in 
the discharge of its responsibilities' ,91 rather than restructuring of state infrastructure. 
It did, though, reaffirm a commitment to the Lome Peace Accord, albeit without 
mention of accommodation of the RUF in government. The agreement of the review 
meeting 2 May 2001, stresses the importance of facilitation of transformation of 
RUF into a political party as agreed to at Lome, and the ability of the RUF to stand 
at the next election appears to have been agreed upon.92 Kabbah' s government was 
thus left in control of the reconstruction, with effective control based on the massive 
international military presence. 
Analysis of the peace agreements confirms that democracy was not seen as a legal 
concept linked to the right to self-determination by neither the parties nor the 
international witnesses. Departing from the emerging consensus has appeared 
essential in the interests of peace. One might see this as an argument against 
adopting the proposal of Chapter 3, because it might inhibit the chance of agreement. 
However, the Lome deal was a transitional one, which would end with free and fair 
elections, during this time there should still be a requirement for conduct in line with 
the emerging consensus, and there is also the need for the elections to actually occur. 
In terms of the suggested law, reasonable exceptions in the interests of international 
peace could accommodate departures from the emerging consensus, provided they 
90 See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Integrated Regional Infonnation 
Network for West Africa (lRIN), op. cit., fh. 83. 
91 Abuja Cease fire Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF, 10 November 2000 
(on file with author). 
~2 UNAMSIL Press Release. 'Sierra Leone Ceasefire Review Meeting Concludes in ~buja' 3.May 
2001' the Committee of Six of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council. the United NatiOns. the 
Gov~mment of Sierra Leone, and the Revolutionary United Front. 
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are temporary and intended as step towards the creation of conditions in which an 
unimpeded strive for the democratic ideal can resume. 
6. International Actors and Democracy in Sierra Leone 
The preceding sections have indicated how the government of Sierra Leone sought to 
justify its return to authority, its basis to speak for the rights of the state and its 
people, including the right to political independence, on democratic credentials. It 
has been shown how democracy was not treated by Kababh as a legal concept as part 
of the right to self-determination. This has been seen in statements that present 
democracy as a political concept; a failure to identify self-determination when 
discussing democracy; and, conduct which varies from the emerging consensus 
without an explanation. The likelihood of a legal concept in future examples of the 
assistance model is, though, best identified through the international approach. as it 
is these actors who will be central in future efforts. For that reason, this section is 
interested in how much importance the international actors, those that have been 
involved in keeping the government in power and facilitating reconstruction, have 
placed on democracy as justification for the international involvement. The more it is 
stressed, the more it becomes reasonable to expect that potential for legal regulation 
and accountability both should and will have been adopted. Accordingly, this section 
also considers whether democracy has been treated as a legal concept linked to self-
determination as a basis for regulation and accountability. 
To fonn an opinion on the importance and treatment of democracy by 
international actors, the section reviews some of the statements, declarations issued, 
and agreements that were entered into with the government of Sierra Leone. across 
the period of 1997 - 2005. The practice identified above indicates that if it were 
treated as a legal concept, there would be comment from international actors on 
instances like the Lome Agreement, which appeared to at least delay aspects of the 
pursuit of genuine democracy in the interests of peace. 
Debate at the UN, in the GA and SC, as well as key resolutions from these fora. 
are useful sources from which one can glean an idea of how a variety of international 
actors saw the right to political independence. and the role of democracy in relation 
to it, in the reconstruction process. That one would expect to find relevant material is 
readily apparent in light of the pivotal role of the UN in the reconstruction process 
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and the consequent impact on the right to political independence: the peak presence 
of some 17,000 UNAMSIL military personnel kept the government in control, and 
the calls for wider international involvement to assist the government with the actual 
process of reconstruction helped make such international involvement a reality. 
In May 1997, the President of the SC made a statement on behalf of the Council. 
In it, the Council expresses that it 'deplores this attempt to overthrow the 
democratically elected government and calls for an immediate restoration of 
constitutional order. ,93 It further 'underlines the imperative necessity of 
implementing the Abidjan Agreement, which continues to serve as a viable 
framework for peace, stability and reconciliation in Sierra Leone.' This is an early 
example of what would be the consistent international support that President 
Kabbah's government received, despite not having anything like effective control of 
the state. It presents democracy as important for its own sake, which is about the 
value of self-determination; as well as vital for peace, through reference to the 
Abidijan Agreement that has democracy as its cornerstone. It is, though, democracy 
as a political concept, with no suggestion of any criteria - it could mean elected 
government, or could be more expansive and relate to conduct. 
Significant UN action came with Resolution 1132 in October 1997. Under chapter 
VII the Council demanded that the military junta make way for the return of 
Kabbah's government, and introduced sanctions prohibiting the sale and supply of 
petroleum and petroleum products, and arms and related materiel of all types to 
Sierra Leone.94 At the meeting preceding the adoption of the resolution, states 
indicated the basis for the support of the return of President Kabbah.95 The common 
message from the delegates in the debate is that the removal of democracy is itself 
the core threat to the peace; there can be no peace without a return to democracy. 
Although the value of self-determination is not explicitly mentioned, there are clear 
indicators that democracy is seen to address the value of self-determination, such as 
Egypt's reference to 'the will of the people of Sierra Leone'. and Guinea Bissau' s 
association of democracy with .. exercise of power by the people'. And when South 
Korea noted 'in the interests of peace and democracy in their own country, they 
93 SC Debates, 3781st Meeting. Tuesday, 27 May 1997.5.25 p.m. New York. S PV.3781 Agenda: 
Situation in Sierra Leone. 
94 SC Res 1132 (1997). 8 October 1997, para. 1 and 6. 9' SC'De~tes 3822nd Meeting Wednesday. 8 October 1997. 11 a.m. New York. S'PV.3822 Agenda: 
Situation in Sierra Leone. 
[military junta] should agree immediately to the restoration of the legitimate 
Government' one must ask why democracy is important in its own right separate 
from peace, and the only answer can be its connection with the value of self-
determination. There is no suggestion of criteria for democracy. It is again 
democracy as a political concept that the comments refer to, with the same 
vagueness as was noted above. Only China did not put a stress on or even mention 
democracy. Instead, China emphasised its regret at the suffering of the Sierra 
Leonean people, and voted for the sanctions out of respect for the African countries' 
desire to have an early settlement. 
Once Kabbah was back in office (sustained through the military presence of 
ECOW AS), there was debate at the SC, prior to a UN Special Conference for Sierra 
Leone to gain pledges of international involvement to keep Kabbah in power and to 
facilitate the reconstruction of the state. Given that such international involvement, 
as pledged at the Special Conference, is at the heart of the assistance model and its 
problematic relationship with the right to political independence, and that Kabbah is 
already dependent on an international military presence, it would be reasonable to 
expect some comment on the standards of government required. The delegates were 
keen to stress the progress in relation to democracy. Austria, speaking for the 
European Union, 'welcomes that the government has moved swiftly in order to re-
establish an effective administration and the democratic process.' Likewise, the 
government is commended by the UK for doing its bit "to re-establish effective 
administration and to reinforce democratic institutions and the rule of law', and it is 
on this basis that the UK call for 'greater support from the international community 
if this combined strategy [Government of Sierra Leone, ECOMOG and UNOMSIL] 
for peace and rehabilitation is to succeed. ,96 The implication is that the government 
is committed to democracy and that greater international involvement will help 
realise this goal. Thus, as democracy is the key to peace and the value of self-
determination, the international involvement is projected as consistent with these 
values. But again there is no specific indication of whether this reference to 
democracy is only about the return of the elected government or about subsequent 
conduct. 
96 SC Debates. 3902nd Meeting Monday. 13 July 1998. 12.20 p.m. New. Yo~ S.'PV:3902. Agenda: 
Situation in Sierra Leone. Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the Situation to SIerra Leone 
(S/ 1998/486 and Add. I ). 
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Moreover, there is no suggestion that making a government effective is contrary to 
any values of the UN system, or that because of a lack of independent effectiveness 
there are any particular limits or obligations. Austria, on behalf of the EU, . strongly 
encourage [ s] the Government of Sierra Leone to keep to its resolve to adhere to 
international human rights standards'. Had the potential for a legal concept of 
democracy linked to the right of self-determination been adopted, the EU could have 
reminded the government that its status was dependent on keeping its resolve to 
adhere to the legal concept of democracy; this would have been a strong 
encouragement. Instead, the government is treated as a normal (effective) 
government would be, with human rights obligations but a discretion as to how they 
are implemented, and little that can be done in legal terms if they are not. 
By the time of the Lome Peace Agreement, which curtailed democracy by 
introducing non-elected elements into government, the government remained 
dependent on ECOW AS for effective control. Indeed, it has been suggested that it 
was the desire of Nigeria to remove its troops from Sierra Leone that encouraged 
Kabbah to agree to the power sharing arrangements that put democracy on hold. In 
the debate at the SC, which followed Lome, putting democracy on hold in the 
interest of peace did not affect international support. In fact, the meeting included 
calls such as that of the UK for 'a full United Nations peacekeeping operation to 
assist in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and to help create a climate of 
confidence.' 97 
Dabor, the representative for Sierra Leone, is aware that some international actors 
might not be expected to be happy with Lome, because of the governance 
arrangements it introduces and the amnesties it grants: 'we calion the international 
community to support the people of Sierra Leone in their search for peace and not to 
do anything that would undermine the Peace Agreement which about six weeks was 
delicately negotiated by the parties in Lome .. 98 A crucial factor in the continued 
support, along with the interest of peace that are served through the apparent ending 
of conflict, must be the commitments in Lome, despite the obvious contrary practice 
in the governance arrangement, to reswne the full strive for the democratic ideal 
when conditions permit. Without this, continued international support would have 
97 SC Debates. 403Sth Meeting Friday. 20 August 1999. 11.15 a.m. New York. S/PV _-'03,5 .. Agenda: 
Situation in Sierra Leone [after Lom~). Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Untted 
Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (S i 1999/836). 
91 Ibid. 
been a major contradiction to the core reason for returning President Kabbah in the 
first place. That the commitment to democracy remained crucial for continued 
international involvement is seen in the comment of Argentina which stress that 
'[ t ]he implementation of the Agreement will require a clear commitment to the 
values of democracy, liberty and the rule of law', and that of Namibia: 'Sierra 
Leonean leaders need to continue to make a conscious effort to inculcate democratic 
values and belief in the worth and dignity of the human person and to diligently 
dispel temptations to take recourse to politics of revenge'. 
With democracy treated as a political concept, there is the freedom to be creative 
with government arrangements in the interest of peace. It also, however, risks the 
value of self-determination, because there is no effective legal restraint on the 
government if it chooses to govern with neglect for the emerging consensus on 
democracy as a human right. In this situation, a legal approach would pennit 
reasonable curtailment in the interest of peace, but it would also provide a basis for 
challenging the government if it should persistently neglect the emerging consensus. 
This latter point is particularly pertinent when one considers the source of authority 
of the Vice President of Sierra Leone under the Lome Agreement, which does not 
come from any vote or past evidence of democratic governance, but from 
participation in a conflict designed to bring down a freely elected government. 
A legal approach, in the sense suggested in Chapter 3, would also help stop 
democracy being seen as just about elections. While acknowledging that there is 
debate about the utility of elections in post-conflict situations,99 if democracy is the 
basis for the return of the government and this is what is needed to address concern 
for the value of self-determination, simply requiring elections seems insufficient. 
When a government is in power through external military presence, democratic 
governance, not just elections, is what accommodates the value of self-
determination. Yet the SC debates tend to have scattered amongst the vague mention 
of democracy (which could be just elections or also conduct) comments that suggest 
elections are the end of the matter: '[0 ]nly recently, thanks to the sustained and 
collective efforts of the member States of ECOW AS, life has begun to return to 
normalcy in that country as we implement the final phase of the peace process -
99 See O. H. Fox, 'War Time Entitlement to Democracy' (2003) 9 Global GowrnulJCt' 2179. 
namely, the conduct of elections.,loo Further, '[a]t this very moment there is 
jubilation in Sierra Leone for the smooth conduct of presidential and parliamentary 
elections, signalling a full transition from conflict to peace and democracy. ·101 
With such an approach, what is to stop the elected government from governing 
without care for the emerging consensus on democracy as a human right? This 
would put the international actors that provide the effectiveness in a difficult 
position, not wanting to withdraw support prematurely and cause a relapse into 
anarchy, but at the same time, hopefully, feeling uneasy about supporting such a 
government. In such a situation, calling on compliance with human rights is not 
sufficient. There is a need for an ability to challenge the status of the government if 
there is persistent neglect. In Sierra Leone, as was noted, the conduct of governance 
was largely in line with the emerging consensus on democracy as a legal concept, 
there were, though, instances of inconsistency, such as certain impingements on the 
freedom of speech, or the persistent delay in local elections, and the delay of national 
elections. In respect of these instances, an international legal basis for a reminder of 
the importance of striving for consistency could have helped dampen fears that such 
instances indicated a slide back to one party rule. 102 That it would be appropriate to 
spell out these obligations even once there had been fresh elections, is indicated by 
the fact that, following elections, the emphasis from the Security Council for wider 
support to continue was related to a call for' all political parties [in Sierra Leone] and 
their supporters to work together to strengthen democracy and thereby assure 
continuing peace' 103 - reiterating that support is based on the fact of democratic 
governance. A reasonable expectation, in this respect, is that there is at least strive 
towards the realisation of the emerging consensus on democracy as a human right. 
But as human rights there is the stigma of not questioning the authority of an 
incumbent government, especially not one that you are supporting, for risk of 
undermining one's own position. 
100 Comment from Nigeri~ SC Debates, 3797th Meeting Friday. II July 1997. 11.30 a.m. New York.. 
SIPV.3797. Agenda: Situation in Sierra Leone. . 
101 Comment from Gambi~ 4538th meeting Wednesday, 22 May 2002. ~ p.m. New.York. S Py.4538 
(Resumption I), Agenda: The Situation in Africa, Ad hoc Working Group on ConflIct Prevention and 
Resolution in Africa. 
102 See fears expressed by ICG, op. cit .• fn. 77. , '\ 
103 SC Debates. 4539th meeting Wednesday. 22 May 2002.9.30 p.m. New York.. S'P\ .·L 39. 
Indeed, at the Human Rights Commission, Mr Rowe speaking for Sierra Leone. in 
2003, diplomatically discourages indication or assessment of human rights in Sierra 
Leone: 
His Government did not need to be reminded of its human rights obligations. What it needed 
was the capacity to promote those rights. That required increased international cooperation. 
technical assistance and support, including for the National Recovery Strategy, the 
importance of which had been recognized by the Security Council in its resolution 1470 
(2003):04 
While this comment was made in the context of Sierra Leone being removed from 
Agenda Item 9, which focuses on the human rights situation as one of concern, it 
signifies the sensitive nature of human rights even in a situation where a government 
is dependent on international actors for effective control. The legal concept of 
democracy linked to the right to self-determination, when there is no independently 
effective domestic government, would provide a basis for observance, criticism, and 
if necessary in light of persistent neglect, challenge to authority. 
In terms of providing a military presence that would support the government, 
ECOWAS acted before the UN. In the communique issued at the end of the meeting 
of the Foreign Ministers of ECOW AS on the situation in Sierra Leone, which was 
held at Conakry, Guinea, on 26 June 1997, three objectives in relation to the 
situation in Sierra Leone were identified: the early reinstatement of the legitimate 
Government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the return of peace and security to 
Sierra Leone, and the resolution of the issues of refugees and displaced persons. lOS 
The term legitimate must be read as a reference to Kabbah's embodiment of the will 
of the people and thus, in the absence of effective control, his democratic credentials. 
As with the debates at the UN, the return of the government is thus justified in the 
interests of the value of self-determination and international peace. There is no 
suggestion of any particular limits or obligations on the government~ other than 
support for the Abidijan Peace Agreement, which sets out the terms of democratic 
rule. 
104 Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-Ninth Session. Summary Record of the 49th Meeting hel~ at 
the Palais des Nations. Genev~ on Tuesday, 15 April 2003. at 3 p.m. ElCN.4l2003 SR.49, 25 Apnl 
2003, para. 49. . .. . 
10' Communique issued at the end of the meeting of the ~orel~n ~In~sters of the Eco~oml,c 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the situatlon In Sierra Leone. which \\85 held at 
Conakry. Guinea. on 26 June 1997, SlI997/499. 
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Particularly telling in tenns of the lack of authority to challenge the otherwise 
ineffective government of Kabbah, were it not to act in a manner consistent with the 
emerging consensus on democracy, is the approach of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat. The Commonwealth Harare declaration set out a set of key principles on 
democracy in line with the emerging consensus. Had these been seen as part of the 
right to self-determination then there would have been a power, indeed arguably an 
obligation if it was continuing to help keep the government in power through 
technical assistance, to monitor compliance. Yet the report of the ministerial action 
group on the Harare declaration indicates that: 
The Group has continued to be seized of the situation in Sierra Leone, not because it believes 
the Government to be in serious or persistent violation of the Harare principles, but at the 
request of the Government of Sierra Leone as a means of keeping the country's urgent needs 
for humanitarian and other assistance before the international community. 106 
The biggest bilateral donor to Sierra Leone has been the UK.. I07 The UK has a 
memorandum of understanding with the Government of Sierra Leone agreed to in 
November 2002, titled a 'Poverty Reduction Framework Arrangement', which sets 
out the terms for 'a substantial direct development programme to Sierra Leone. los 
The substance and terms are based on, at para. 2.1, '[t]he legacy of mismanagement 
by successive governments in Sierra Leone and civil war has undermined much of 
the country's social fabric, and prevented the development of its human resource 
base, institutional capacity and social and economic infrastructure.' Further, at para. 
3.1 : 
It [UK gov.] believes that Sierra Leone should be treated as a special case for international 
assistance. It recognises that without substantial, continued and flexible support from the 
donor community it will not be possible for the Government of Sierra Leone to sustain the 
difficult transition from conflict to peace and stability, and to attain the long term growth 
needed to reduce the extreme poverty suffered by the people of Sierra Leone. 
106 Chainnan of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG) to 
~resent the Group's 1999 Report, Sierra Leone, para. 16, (on file with author). 
07 See, DFID 'country profiles' available at ., I • 
<http://www.dfid.gov.uklcountrieslafricalsierraleone.asp>: The UK IS Sierra Leone S largest bilateral 
development partner. DFID provided £104.5m in aid in the three years from 00/01 to 02:03 (£35m. 
£37.1m, £32.4m). DFID has undertaken to provide £120m in aid over three years (03104 to 05106). as 
well as a 'substantial direct development programme' over the next ten years. (from Sept 2005). . . 
108 Poverty Reduction Arrangement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great B.ntam 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone. 13 November 2002. It may 
be tenninated by either government on giving six months notice. p. 7. 
As well as massive amounts of funding, the UK commits to assist with the 
development of governmental capacity, with the training of the military. and \\ith 
support for the cause of Sierra Leone in international fora such as the World B~ 
and the EC. In return Sierra Leone must strive to meet a series of targets: I. 
Resolving Conflict; II. Improving Standards of Governance and Combating 
Corruption; III. Reforming the Security Sector; IV. Reducing Poverty (incorporates 
the Millennium Development Goals); V. Ensuring Macro-Economic Stability; VI. 
Developing Human Resources. The terms for 'Improving Standards of Governance 
and Combating Corruption' highlight that '[t]he Government of Sierra Leone will 
work towards making progress on broad-based inclusive political agenda, grass root 
democracy and popular participation in decision making.' 109 There is, though. no 
further definition of democracy or attempt to link it to the right to self-determination. 
Similarly, the US, another major donor to Sierra Leone, in a press release 
announcing $272 Million USD to Sierra Leone in 2003, poses the question of 
'[ w ] hat conditions are attached to this official and private assistance from the people 
of the United States to the people of Sierra Leone?', and answers' Americans expect 
that their contributions will assist Sierra Leone to build a peaceful and prosperous 
democracy.,110 In both instances, UK and US, the funding is intended to see the 
democratic ideal realised, and this addresses the fact that the government struggles 
for control of the state and accommodates the value of self-determination by the 
pursuit of genuine rule by the people. However, with such an approach, flexibility is 
retained for all involved when it comes to identifying whether the democratic ideal is 
in fact being pursued. 
A final point on international actors and democracy in Sierra Leone, relates to the 
internationally staffed Special Court for Sierra Leone. Established by agreement 
between President Kabbah and the UN Secretary General in 2000, to bring to justice 
those who bear the greatest responsibility for grave crimes committed since 
November 1996, the Court has at least one decision in which democracy has been 
accorded a significant role. In the cases of two pro-government Civil Defense Forces 
(CDF) leaders, Fofana and Kondewa. the Trial Chamber of the Court accepted the 
fact of a motive in support of democracy as reason for leniency in sentencing for war 
109 Poverty Reduction Arrangement, p. 4, op. cit., th. 108. 
110 Embassy of the United States of America, Freetown, Sierra Leone .. 1 ~ July 2003. Press Release. 
'The People of the United States of America Contribute Over S272 Militon USD to the People of 
Sierra Leone in 2003' (on file with author). 
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crimes. I II The Appeals Chamber, on the basis that international humanitarian law 
excludes considerations of political motivations as relevant for breaches of the law. 
rightly overturned this approach. 112 But the fact that the Trial Chamber allowed itself 
to be persuaded by the pursuit of democracy, in a situation where it should have no 
relevance is further testament to the ability of a connection with the pursuit of 
democracy to help present even the most dubious of activity as worthwhile, 
regardless of treatment as a legal or political concept. 
In sum, the international actors involved in the reconstruction of Sierra Leone 
clearly acknowledge how the pursuit of democracy is an essential element for 
justifying and engendering international acceptance of a process, which, because of 
the lack of an independently effective domestic government, does not sit well with 
the right to political independence. Nonetheless, democracy is treated as a loose 
political concept, easily satisfied. And, accordingly, the otherwise ineffective 
government is treated as if it were effective, in terms of being a complete 
embodiment of the will of the state and its people, and thus not subject to any more 
regulation and accountability of its conduct than any other established government. 
What this signifies for future efforts is turned to in the conclusion. 
7. Conclusion 
The context in which the assistance model arose in Sierra Leone gave one good 
reason to expect the potential for a legal approach to democracy linked to self-
determination, as a basis for regulation and accountability, to have been adopted. 
This would have been in the interests of better accommodation of the value of self-
determination, which democracy as a political concept does not guarantee. The 
government saw how vital democracy was for international acceptance of the 
process, it was well aware of a history in which democracy had been abused by those 
in authority as a fa~ade for authoritarianism, still it did not seek to encourage legal 
regulation and accountability of the pursuit of democracy. Likewise, the international 
actors emphasised how it was the commitment of Kabbah to democracy that justified 
his being put in control of the state. But there was no effort to suggest that the fact 
111 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa, SCSL-04-1-I-T. Trial Chamber. Judgment On The Sentencing 
Of Moinina Fofana And Allieu Kondewa.. 9 October 2007. para. 91 and para. 94. 
112 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa. SCSL-04-1-I-A. Appeal Judgement. 28 May 2008. paras. 530-
535. 
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that his effectiveness was dependent on international actors required regulation and 
accountability of the pursuit of democracy. 
In such a context, regulation of democracy should not be seen as an insult to the 
government, rather it is about setting an example/precedent for future efforts where 
the government that is supported on the basis of a promise of democracy might not 
be so committed to the democratic ideal. Where there is a conflict between the 
democratic ideal and peacemaking objectives, these can be accommodated on the 
basis of reasonable exceptions. Moreover, the point is not to seek to remove 
governments from office, although this would be an ultimate possibility if there were 
persistent neglect while the government remained dependent on international actors 
for effectiveness. Rather, the point is to provide a basis for ensuring that there is a 
commitment to the democratic ideal, which, as has been stressed throughout this 
study, is what excuses the neglect of political independence by addressing the value 
of self-determination. The importance of this point is illustrated by the fact that the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) felt it necessary to urge the international actors in 
Liberia to do more to reconstruct the state before an elected government was in 
place. The implication being that, on the basis of the consent of the warring factions. 
the international actors had free reign until an elected government, regardless of its 
effectiveness, would have the discretion to reconstruct as it pleased and might not be 
so compliant with the wishes of ICG; including wishes such as the importance of the 
strive for the democratic ideal. 113 
Moreover, in relation to Haiti from 1994, the international actors that kept Aristide 
in power had no basis to challenge his authority, regardless of their providing 
effective control. If it had been clearer from the start that Aristide' s authority, as a 
matter of international law, was dependent on striving for basic standards of 
democratic governance, this could have been relevant in 2004 when international 
involvement again appeared to be necessary. This is because it would have provided 
some grounds for explanation as to why a government, deserving of support in 1994, 
was required to step down in 2004. Of course, the lack of an international military 
presence keeping Aristide in power in 2004 would not have pennitted a direct 
challenge to his authority on the basis of the proposal of this study. Instead. such a 
challenge could have been based on the inability to exert effective control of the 
113 International Crisis Group (ICG). 'Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed St~t.es·. (8 
December 2004) Crisis Group Africa Report No.8;' p. i. available at <http: www.cnslsgroup.org>. 
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territory, coupled with a history of lack of commitment to the democratic ideal. The 
international actors in question, however, without the proposed law, could not rely 
upon this explanation without appearing inconsistent. This is because they had made 
the same ineffective government effective in 1994, without indicating any legal 
criteria for democratic governance. Some evidence of democratic credentials, in the 
form of an electoral mandate, had appeared sufficient, but Aristide also had this in 
2004. 
By not grasping the opportunity in relation to Sierra Leone, a chance was missed 
to set in process legal development that would have served to better ensure the value 
of self-determination in subsequent examples of state reconstruction without an 
independently effective domestic government. Thus, in relation to the Somalia 
circumstances, noted in Chapter 6, it seems unlikely that, if the transitional 
government were to be put in authority by a large-scale international military 
presence, the authority of the government could be legally challenged if it failed to 
pursue its promise of democracy in any meaningful sense; despite that this would be 
the central excuse for international involvement in neglect of the right to political 
independence. 
Thinking more generally, there is clearly reason to suspect that the positing of 
democracy, if not supported by a real commitment to realisation of genuine 
democracy, may not be able to galvanise international acceptance of processes which 
neglect political independence in the way that the assistance model and the other 
examples of state reconstruction have been argued, by this study, to do. Legal 
regulation and accountability of the democratic excuse is one means by which the 
commitment of all involved can be demonstrated. 
Conclusions 
Conclusions 
In the light of the significance of the preservation of the right to political 
independence for the UN system, and that traditional international legal doctrine 
requires an independent effective domestic government for embodiment of the rights 
and obligations of the state and its people in international law, this study asked: how 
does the practice in each of the three paradigms relate to the right to political 
independence of the target state and its people? To the extent that the legal 
justifications do not sufficiently address the right to political independence. what 
explains international acceptance of the approach? And, does this involve 
international legal development? 
Answers to these questions have been gleaned through analysis of prominent 
examples of the three paradigms for large-scale international involvement in state 
reconstruction: occupation, international territorial administration, and the assistance 
model. Despite the range of contexts and approaches, analysis of practice under the 
three paradigms in one study was based on the common theme of significant changes 
in the state and civil infrastructure, such as the redesign of the economic system. 
being made possible by international involvement, without anything approaching an 
independently effective domestic government to make the choices. This basic 
commonality is central to a number of strands of argument that run throughout the 
study and provide the foundation for the main thesis: when there is no independently 
effective domestic government, there is a need for greater international legal 
regulation and accountability of those that exercise the right to decide for the 
purpose of state reconstruction, to compensate for the lack of assurance that the 
process reflects the wishes of the state and its people, an aspect that threatens the 
core UN system values of self-determination and international peace. The strands of 
argument reflect key findings in response to the primary research questions. and can 
be identified by the headings of legality, projection. reality. and potential. These 
pages of conclusions will set out these findings and consider some of the 
implications. 
1. Findings 
)01 
A. Legality 
In tenns of legality, valid state consent is possible because of the power of 
international recognition as evidence of the status of a government in an international 
legal sense to override the requirement of traditional international legal doctrine that 
legal status is dependent on a display of independent effective control. International 
recognition, however, is subjective and thus offers no guarantees about the 
attachment of the government to the will of the state or its people, thus significantly 
reducing the extent to which state consent reconciles practice with political 
independence. A chapter VII resolution provides legality because member states of 
the UN have waived the right to complain about an infringement of their rights in 
international law in respect to activity within the powers of the Security Council 
under this heading. It does not, then, reconcile the practice with the right to political 
independence. While legality is an essential part of wider international acceptance. it 
does not appear, on its own, sufficiently considerate of the right to political 
independence to explain international acceptance. In this respect. the extent to which 
other facts reconcile the international involvement with the right to political 
independence is of vital importance. 
B. Projection 
The consensual basis and domestic elements in the government, in most of the 
examples, help provide some consistency with the right to political independence. 
but are far from convincing. Thus how the attendant values of self-determination of 
peoples and international peace have been addressed is of central importance for 
international acceptance. Endorsement of the practice in a chapter VII resolution 
helps engender the view that the practice is necessary for international peace, but it 
says nothing of the value of self-detennination. The value of self-determination is 
important in its own right but if neglected also risks sparking international contlict. 
With legality in place, it is argued that it is the pursuit of democracy that is the 
central element which engenders international acceptance of practice in neglect of 
the right of political independence. This is because the pursuit of democracy portrays 
the governance. when not by an independently effective domestic government. as 
intended to realise genuine rule by the people. The pursuit of democracy thus takes 
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the focus in relation to self-determination away from "keep out', as counselled by the 
right to political independence, to the means of exercising self -detennination. 
Moreover, the pursuit of democracy is also important for discrete aspects of the 
process related to international peace, such as the peacemaking process. 
c. Reality 
Democracy, in practice, is pursued as a loose political concept; this retains flexibility 
for all involved in governance. What it lacks is a basis for regulation and 
accountability of those that are entrusted with the right to decide on change and 
development of state and civil infrastructure on the basis of their commitment to 
democracy. This is argued to be an insufficient substitute for the right to political 
independence when core UN system values of self-determination of peoples and 
international peace are at stake, on the basis that there is little to prevent democracy 
being treated as a mere platitude by those who legitimate their authority through it. If 
we are to accept this approach as sufficient excuse for the neglect of political 
independence, as actually providing something like genuine rule by the people, then, 
as well as free and fair elections, there are basic standards of governmental conduct, 
as indicated in the emerging consensus on democracy as a human right, that must be 
realised. 
D. Potential 
It is argued, in the interests of the values at stake, that the practice could be improved 
if democracy was treated as a legal concept as part of the legal right to self-
determination. This might utilise the emerging consensus on democracy as human 
right. As part of the right to self-determination, democratic reconstruction would be 
seen as a required element for the exercise of the right to political independence in 
circumstances of a lack of independent effective governance. It would also introduce 
a set of rights and obligations with much more purchase than democracy as human 
right is able to provide. This is because it would be the basis of the government' S 
authority. whether already elected or pursuing elections. as such it would provide the 
basis for challenge to that authority if the required elements were not adhered to. 
This is unlike the situation with democracy treated as a stand alone human right. 
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which imposes obligations but comes with little impetus for enforcement in light of 
the nature of international human rights law. With reasonable exceptions in the 
interests of international peace and a high standard of persistent neglect for the 
authority to be challenged, this proposal would provide a legally bounded flexibility 
in contrast to the complete flexibility which exists when democracy is treated only as 
a political concept. It would, perhaps most importantly, encourage the questioning of 
the conduct of governments that cannot be described as independently effective 
domestic governments, because it would make explicit that the authority is because 
of the pursuit democracy, understood as more than just a promise of elections. 
2. Implications 
This study has indicated the failings of the current approach to state reconstruction 
without an independently effective domestic government in relation to the right to 
political independence. It has also suggested how it could be improved in relation to 
the attendant values of self-detennination and international peace through the 
development of new law. Such findings should make international actors realise that 
the framework for new law is available, and that it is needed, especially if the 
projection that the practice remains consistent with the legal structures and political 
values which underpin the inter-sovereign relations paradigm of the international 
system is to continue to engender international acceptance. Furthennore, particular 
elements of the findings also have wider implications for international law. 
A. The Persistent Possibility of State Consent 
If international actors want to find a way into a state without an independently 
effective domestic government, in a manner which will not be deemed wrongful 
under international law and at least maintain a degree of consistency with the right to 
political independence, the examples investigated indicate that state consent is the 
answer. Where there is no effective government. international recognition will 
readily evidence that a government has the international legal status and 
consequently the competence to consent to large-scale international involvement in 
the process of state reconstruction. Accordingly. state reconstruction has only taken 
place with some fonn of consensual basis. however inadequate this may be as a 
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representation of the will of the state and its people in relation to the right to political 
independence. The present situation in Somalia, where an un-elected government 
awaits a massive international military presence to put it in a position to reconstruct 
the state along democratic lines, is perhaps the most striking instance of how 
international recognition can essentially accord status to a government with little 
tangible basis for its claim to represent the state or its people. 
As was noted in Chapter 1, the doctrine of jus cogens means that, at least, "a treaty 
is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. ,1 This is to protect the values and interests that are fundamentally 
important to all of international society, or in the words of the Vienna Convention 
'the international community of states as a whole', 2 and it does so by preventing a 
state from entering into a contract to achieve what it could not do unilaterally. The 
legal principle of a right of all peoples to self-determination has been identified by an 
increasing number of scholars as a norm of jus cogens. 3 Once one starts thinking of 
the right to self-determination as applicable beyond the colonial context, however. 
such an idea becomes much more unlikely in light of the potential significance of the 
status of jus cogens and the uncertainty which surrounds the substance of the right of 
self-determination. Still there are those that strongly state that the right to self-
determination has a status of jus cogens beyond the colonial context and that it 
includes a right to democracy.4 While one might worry that this appears to be the 
type of inflationary argumentation of which Weil has warned,s the practice that has 
been addressed in this survey strongly supports a view that the principle of a right to 
self-determination does not have peremptory status beyond the colonial context. This 
is on the basis that it is a not a matter of fundamental importance for 'the 
international community of states as a whole', because, if it were, surely there would 
be greater interest in who can exercise the rights to decide found in the legal doctrine 
of self-determination. It is simply not consistent for a legal norm to be signaled out 
as one for which there can be no derogation, because of its vital importance for 'the 
I VCLT. Article 53. . 
2 VeLT, Article 53, see also Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija. No. IT-95-17/1-TIO, TnaJ Chamber. 
Judgmen~ 10 December 1998, paras. 155-157; J. Frowein. 'Jus Cogens·. (1984) 7 £~/L .329. 
3 See, e.g., M. Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa (1986) 91; A. Cassese, Self-DeterminatIOn of 
Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal (1995) 171-172. . 
4 See, e.g., A. Orakhelashvili, 'The Impact of~erempto~' N~nns on the Interpretation and 
Application of United Nations Secwity Council ResolutIons. (2005) 16 £..II L 59 at ~81 . 
'P. Weil, 'Towards Relative Normativity in International Law'. (1983) 77 AJIL ~ 1_,. 
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international community of states as a whole', and then for it to be overcome through 
some international recognition, and then consent, of a government that lacks any 
.. 
meaningful attachment to the will of the state and its people. 
The ease with which state consent can be obtained is also troublesome for those 
who advocate a jus post bellum to regulate, in particular, the reconstruction of a state 
after conflict. 6 This is because state consent serves to bring international involvement 
within the internal affairs of the target state. Thus international involvement is 
shielded from the eyes of international law, so to speak, by the same sovereignty, the 
same right to political independence, the preservation of which has been a key 
concern of this study. One need only contrast the attention given to the 
reconstruction of Iraq when still formally occupied with the complete lack of 
comment on how the reconstruction proceeded under a selected Iraqi government, 
which consented to the large-scale international involvement, to understand the 
power of consent in this respect. By identifying the inadequacy of the consensual 
basis in relation to the right to political independence, this study provides a basis for 
piercing the veil of sovereignty that the consensual basis sustains, and for arguing for 
regulation and accountability of all involved. 
The responsibility to protect doctrine, as advocated by leISS, envIsages 
intervention and rebuilding without a consensual basis as a response to immense 
human suffering. It was recently observed by Wills that the nature of the 
responsibility after intervention, including the responsibility to rebuild, is not 
addressed adequately in the Report. Wills has therefore indicated the need for 
clarification of: 'what are the legal responsibilities of the forces that have been sent 
to provide protection and what are the legal responsibilities of the state or 
organisation that sent them?" In practice, on the basis of this study, one finds it hard 
to imagine that the interveners would not, as soon as thoughts tum to reconstruction, 
select a government to consent to the international involvement and administer the 
reconstruction process. Thus projecting the process as an internal matter, and, 
consequently, helping to avoid calls for the development of international law. One 
6 See, e.g., C. Stahn, 'Jus ad bellum', Jus in bello' ... Jus post bellum'? -Rethinking the C~nception of 
the Law of Anned Force', (2006) 17 EJIL 943: B. Orend~ 'Jus Post Bellum: Th~ Perspective ora Just-
War Theorist', (2007) 20 UIL 571; K. Boon, 'Legislative Refonn in post-conf1lc~ Zones: Jus Post 
Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant's Law-Making Powers', (~OO5) 50 McGill U :!85: ... 
7 S. Wills, . Military Interventions on Behalf of Vulnerable Populations: ~e ~egal Respon~slblhtles of 
States and International Organisations Engaged in Peace Support Operations. (2004) 9 JCSL 387 at 
388. 
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also imagines, on the basis of this study, that such a government would decide to 
pursue democratic reconstruction, thus at least suggesting accommodation of the 
value of self-determination put at risk by a process inconsistent with the right to 
political independence. 
B. The Pursuit of Democracy as a Freely Chosen Political Concept 
The examples addressed by this study span some 20 years. So for 20 years, when an 
independently effective domestic government has been absent, democracy has been 
the substitute, the device for legitimising the entity that has made the choices about 
how the reconstruction should proceed. Over such a period of time, amidst the 
debate in international law about the emergence of a legal concept of democracy. it 
would be reasonable to expect that there would be some signs of adoption of a legal 
concept of democracy. Yet the developments that have been identified, by way of the 
emerging consensus on democracy as a human right linked to the right to self-
determination,S have been found by this study, which has searched for opino juris, 
not to have lead the international actors involved in state reconstruction to believe 
that they were legally bound. Instead, in all the examples, the democracy pursued has 
been chosen in act of self-determination and treated as a political concept. The 
potential for a legal concept of genuine democracy linked to the right to self-
determination, to provide a basis for regulation and accountability of the democratic 
excuse for neglect of political independence has been shunned. This finding is not 
affected by the fact that some scholars, of the opinion that democracy has already 
crystallised as an international legal concept in the normal run of things, have 
suggested that a legal concept of democracy did apply in the examples addressed by 
this study.9 
The complete lack of belief in legal obligation attaching to the use of the tenn 
democracy, on behalf of all those involved in state reconstruction, clearly does not 
support the development of a legal concept of democracy in the nonnal run of things. 
Not least because, in the normal run of things, there is the additional difficulty of the 
implications that a legal concept of democracy linked to the right to self-
8 See, e.g., T. Franck, 'The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance' (1992) 86 AJIL -'6. 
9 See, e.g., L. Carlowitz. 'UNMIK Lawmaking between Effective Peace Support and Int~rnal Self-
Detennination" (2003) 41/3 Archil' des Volkerrechts 336 at 360-364; G. H. Fox. Humanitarian 
Occupation (2008) ISS. 
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determination would carry for effective but undemocratic domestic governments. 
But, most significantly, this fmding also reveals how what may amount to little more 
than rhetoric has been able to sustain international acceptance of a practice that 
challenges the cornerstone of the international system, political independence. for a 
considerable period of time. This relates to the fact that if international actors do not 
perceive a 'need' for new law then it will not be created. 
If, however, in the future, in the absence of an effective government, the pursuit of 
democracy is not treated as a legal concept linked to the right to self-determination, 
there is the risk that the hortatory utility of democracy to suggest genuine rule of the 
people, and thereby convince that the international involvement is in the interests of 
the value of self-determination, will be lost. At the moment, when democracy is 
posited, there is still a reasonable expectation that it is something like the democratic 
ideal, with respect to both procedure for government identification and substantive 
standards of conduct, which the international actors are committed to helping realise. 
However, should the view start to form that democracy is simply a palliative for the 
neglect of political independence - through a pattern of lack of commitment to the 
democratic ideal - such power will naturally diminish. The adoption of the legal 
proposal of this study will not only help confirm the commitment but it will also 
provide a basis for challenging the authority of governments that the international 
actors keep in power in order to reconstruct the state. The idea is not to seek to 
remove the government, but to encourage the continued pursuit of the democratic 
ideal by having removal from authority as an option should there be persistent 
neglect of the legal standards. 
This call for a legal approach to democracy linked to the right to self-
determination is not meant as challenge to the argument that peace-making must be 
treated as a political process. This is the idea that 'international peacebuilding efforts 
should focus on those factors that allow stable political processes to emerge and 
flourish.,IO 'Hence, international peacebuilders should not focus primarily on 
prescribing or operating specific political structures but on facilitating or enforcing 
.11 
the conditions that constitute an appropriate context for these structures to emerge. 
But the call of this study does require. in the interests of the value of self-
10 E. M. Cousens. C. Kumar, and K. Wennester. Peacebuilding as Politics: CII/tivating Peace in 
Fragile Societies (2001) 183. 
II Ibid .• p. 184. 
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determination, that, while there is no independently effective domestic government 
and effectiveness is dependent on large-scale international involvement. the 
government which is supported, with reasonable exceptions to accommodate 
concessions in the peacemaking process, strives to realise the emerging consensus on 
democracy as a legal concept. 
c. The Disappearance of the Right to Political Independence in State 
Reconstruction 
Is large-scale international involvement in state reconstruction evidence that state 
sovereignty is losing meaning as an ordering principle of international society? The 
fact that, across all the examples, there is a consensual aspect indicates that fonnally, 
at least, state sovereignty is still seen as something that must be respected. Still. 
when one looks more closely, it is evident that, because of the lack of independent 
effective domestic government, there is little actual meaning left in the right to 
political independence in these examples. Why, then, retain the pretence? 
Chandler sees the desire of international actors 'to preserve the fonnal trappings of 
sovereignty' as a consequence of the contradictory desire to intervene but to avoid 
political responsibility.12 Undoubtedly, international actors might prefer not to incur 
responsibility for their actions. However, one can also see it as an inevitable result of 
how international law develops in an ad hoc fashion pursuant to the 'needs' of states 
rather than in pursuit of some blueprint for international order. As a decentralised 
international legal system there is a need for states, as the basic unit, to have 
effective governments if international law is to retain its efficacy. Without effective 
governments there is no chance of a state fulfilling its international obligations. 
Logically, then, international law should defer to effectiveness. Indeed, once upon a 
time it largely did. A turn to ethics has, however, taken international law ever further 
away from effective realities. The right of peoples to self-determination is a central 
feature of this turn, so much so that it is the explanation for why ineffective states 
remain sovereign states. 
12 D. Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics o/State-bui/~ing (2006) 40; ~e. simil~ly, O. 
Schachter. 'The Decline of the Nation State and its ImplicatIOns for International Law . (1997) 36 
Columbia Journal o/Transnational Law 7 at 19. 
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The importance placed in the right to self -detennination by international society 
and the need for states to be effective for the efficacy of international law collide in 
the context of state reconstruction. Its importance in its own right and as an ordering 
principle signifies that international actors are not able to simply abandon the right to 
self-determination and assume responsibility for the target territory and its people. 
Rather they must try and present the reconstruction process as consistent with the 
right to self-determination. The ease with which state consent can be obtained is one 
element which allows this; the other core element is the pursuit of democracy. So 
while the right to political independence is in fact hardly satisfied. there is the 
projection that both it and the attendant values are satisfied. If this compromise is 
going to continue to engender international acceptance, given the importance of the 
right to political independence for international order, then states, and scholars who 
advocate greater levels of international involvement in ineffective states,13 would be 
well advised to consider the suggestions of this study in relation to regulation and 
accountability of the democratic excuse. If not, then, those international actors 
involved will likely find that their conjuring trick of balancing state reconstruction 
with the target state and its people's right to political independence will one day fail 
to convince both the domestic and the wider international audience. 
13 See, e.g., S. D. Krasner and C. Pascual, 'Addressing State Failure', (July/August 2005) 84 Foreign 
Affairs 153. 
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